

Supporting Information:
The Obama Effect?
Race, First-time Voting, and Future Participation

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1 Effects of Voting in Other Presidential Elections

Here I present the general results of voting in other presidential elections (2000, 2004, 2012) on voting in all available downstream elections through 2016. I include a brief discussion of how the 2012 election offers not just a comparison to 2008, but also a “next best” test of the empowerment model of habitual voting, as it also featured the election of a Black president. As discussed in the paper, directly comparing the magnitude of the effects of elections from different points in time is difficult. The data are all measured in 2016 and 2017, so the levels of measurement error differ between treatment elections. The modeled comparison in the paper offers the best available comparison given these constraints, and I present the general results here for reference.

1.1 2012 Election

To put the effects of 2008 voting on future political behavior in context, and to test another formative voting experience where we might expect Blacks to experience stronger mobilizing effects than other groups, I estimate the effect of voting in the 2012 presidential election on downstream voting. This comparison offers a “most similar test” to the 2008 election. President Obama is still on the ballot, and Black turnout in 2012 was the highest ever seen in a United States presidential election, just outpacing 2008. Voting for the first time in 2012 may have felt less momentous than voting for the first time in 2008, but this election still represents a formative voting experience that should be more positive and more meaningful, and thus exert a stronger effect on downstream participation, for Blacks than for non-Blacks. The results for 2008 voting provide particularly strong evidence against my hypotheses because the 2008 election is the electoral context, if the model of group-based habitual voting put forth in this paper were true, where we would most expect to observe higher mobilizing effects for Blacks. If voting in 2012 also does not produce the hypothesized effects, then it

is further unlikely that the interaction of formative electoral context and racial identity is a primary determinant of voting habits.

Figure 1 shows the CACE estimates for 2012 voting on voting in 2014 and 2016. Here, we see no evidence of a mobilizing advantage for Black voters. The effects on 2014 voting are statistically indistinguishable across racial groups, while Hispanics again see the largest effects on 2016 voting.

Figure 1: Weighted Average of State-Level 2012 Effects






Figure 2: Weighted Distributions of State-Level 2012 Voting Effects



Distributional density of state-level CACEs, weighted by the inverse of the variance of the estimates.


1.2 2004 Election

Figure 3: Weighted Averages of 2004 State-level Effects



Points represent the meta analysis weighted average of state-level CACE estimates, weighted by the inverse of the variance of the estimates. Bars represent 95% confidence intervals.


Figure 4: Weighted Distributions of State-Level 2004 Voting Effects



Distributional density of state-level CACEs, weighted by the inverse of the variance of the estimates.


1.3 2000 Election

Figure 5: Weighted Averages of 2004 State-level Effects



Points represent the meta analysis weighted average of state-level CACE estimates, weighted by the inverse of the variance of the estimates. Bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

Figure 6: Weighted Distributions of State-Level 2000 Voting Effects




Distributional density of state-level CACEs, weighted by the inverse of the variance of the estimates.

2 Results in States that Record Race

Race in the voting file is generally imputed from voter's surname and census demographics of their residential location. As discussed in the paper, these imputations are highly accurate and frequently used in the studies of minority turnout. While I cannot observe the counterfactual of how results would look in states that impute race if it was instead recorded, we can at least look at the results where race is explicitly measured. Here, I demonstrate the consistency of the overall conclusions when I rely solely on the states that record race with registration (within my data, these states are Alabama, Florida, and South Carolina). Figure 7 plots the effect of 2008 voting on future voting in each of these states. On this subset, we still see that Blacks experience no mobilizing advantage as a result of voting in 2008, and the coefficients for Hispanics are similarly largest in 2012 and 2016 (albeit not

statistically distinct from the estimates for Blacks).

Figure 7: 2008 Effects in States that Record Race in Voterfiles



Points represent the state-level CACE estimates. Bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

3 Robustness to Different Bandwidths

Here I present the robustness of the results to different bandwidth specifications. I estimate the results for each state at bandwidths from 14 through 352 days in intervals of 14 days, and calculated the meta-analysis fixed effects weighted average at each bandwidth as in the main analysis. These results and the main results (365 day bandwidth) and the corresponding 95% confidence intervals are plotted in Figure 8. The results are generally consistent for each outcome across bandwidths, both in the relative ordering or the effects for Blacks, Whites and Hispanics and in the magnitude of the effects. Towards the smaller bandwidths, where power is low and variance is quite high, we see smaller effects that are not statistically distinguishable from zero. Generally, however, the results appear robust to bandwidths much smaller than the 365 day bandwidth used in the paper and in similar analyses.

Figure 8: Voting CACEs of 2008 Voting by bandwidth





Figure 9: Registration and PID CACEs of 2008 Voting by bandwidth



4 Alternative Specifications

Here I present the robustness of the results to higher and lower order polynomial specifications as well as specifications with and without the the lagged downstream vote variable. I present result from the meta-analysis fixed effects weighted average of the state-level CACEs for each alternative specification. The results are generally consistent with those in the main body of the paper.

The higher and lower order polynomials 2SLS specifications are formalized below.

Polynomial 0

- (1) $\widehat{\text{Vote}}_{1,i} = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 Z_i + \alpha_2 \text{Lagged Vote}_{2,i} + \epsilon_{1,i}$
- (2) $\text{Vote}_{2,i} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \widehat{\text{Vote}}_{1,i} + \beta_2 \text{Lagged Vote}_{2,i} + \epsilon_{2,i}$

Polynomial 2

- (1) $\widehat{\text{Vote}}_{1,i} = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 Z_i + \alpha_2 X_i + \alpha_3 Z_i X_i + \alpha_4 X_i^2 + \alpha_5 Z_i X_i^2 + \alpha_6 \text{Lagged Vote}_{2,i} + \epsilon_{1,i}$
- (2) $\text{Vote}_{2,i} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \widehat{\text{Vote}}_{1,i} + \beta_2 X_i + \beta_3 \widehat{\text{Vote}}_{1,i} X_i + \beta_4 X_i^2 + \beta_5 \widehat{\text{Vote}}_{1,i} X_i^2 + \beta_6 \text{Lagged Vote}_{2,i} + \epsilon_{2,i}$

Polynomial 3

- (1) $\widehat{\text{Vote}}_{1,i} = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 Z_i + \alpha_2 X_i + \alpha_3 Z_i X_i + \alpha_4 X_i^2 + \alpha_5 Z_i X_i^2 + \alpha_6 X_i^3 + \alpha_7 Z_i X_i^3 + \alpha_8 \text{Lagged Vote}_{2,i} + \epsilon_{1,i}$
- (2) $\text{Vote}_{2,i} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \widehat{\text{Vote}}_{1,i} + \beta_2 X_i + \beta_3 \widehat{\text{Vote}}_{1,i} X_i + \beta_4 X_i^2 + \beta_5 \widehat{\text{Vote}}_{1,i} X_i^2 + \beta_6 X_i^3 + \beta_7 \widehat{\text{Vote}}_{1,i} X_i^3 + \beta_8 \text{Lagged Vote}_{2,i} + \epsilon_{2,i}$

where $\widehat{\text{Vote}}_{t,i}$ is the number of votes cast by birth-day cohort i in election t and Z_i is whether the birth-day cohort i is eligible to vote in election 1. X_i is the running variable, the number of days that birth-day cohort i is from the election eligibility cutoff. I also estimate specifications without the lagged outcome variable.

4.1 Higher and Lower Order Polynomial Specifications

4.1.1 Effect of 2008 Voting on Downstream Voting

Figure 10: Voting CACEs – Polynomial 0




Figure 11: Voting CACEs – Polynomial 2





Figure 12: Voting CACEs – Polynomial 3



4.2 Specifications without Lagged Downstream Vote Variable

4.2.1 Effect of 2008 Voting on Downstream Voting

Figure 13: Voting CACEs – No Lagged Downstream Vote




Figure 14: Voting CACEs – No Lagged Downstream Vote, Polynomial 0




Figure 15: Voting CACEs – No Lagged Downstream Vote, Polynomial 2





Figure 16: Voting CACEs – No Lagged Downstream Vote, Polynomial 3



5 Attitudinal Evidence in Support of the Empowerment Model of Habitual Voting

5.1 Main Specification Detailed Write-up

Here I present survey evidence in support of the hypothesis – tested in the main analysis – that voting for the first time in the 2008 election should have produced a greater increase in the likelihood of voting in future elections for Blacks than for voters of other racial groups. Specifically, I test whether there are measurable attitudinal differences between 2008 eligible and ineligible cohorts that map onto the mechanisms by which an empowering election would produce a greater attachment to politics, one that could translate into higher rates of voting in future elections. I examine survey data from the Cooperative Congressional Study for the years 2009 through 2018, comparing respondents who were eligible to vote in 2008 compared

to those who were not eligible to vote in 2008 as a function of their age. Similar to the analysis in the main paper, I estimate how these cross-eligibility cohort differences vary across racial groups, comparing the differences for Blacks to those for Whites and Hispanics.

Data for this analysis comes from the Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES). Administered annually, the CCES is a national stratified sample survey of voting-age Americans. The survey is administered by the firm YouGov in two waves (pre-election in September and post-election in November) in election years (midterms and presidential) or one-wave (September) in non-election years. The CCES collects questions on political preferences, partisanship, participation, political interest, political knowledge, issue preferences, opinions of political candidates, and key demographics. Many survey questions are consistent across survey years, allowing for eligibility-cohort comparison across multiple cross-sectional survey waves.

With these data, I test whether people who were just old enough to be eligible to vote in the 2008 election report, in later years, greater political interest, approval of President Obama, and more positive assessments of the economy than people who were just too young to be eligible to vote in 2008. Testing the cohort differences between these variables tests whether being eligible¹ to vote in 2008 was more positive and empowering formative voting experience for first-time Black voters that increased their interest in politics, strengthened their approval of President Obama, and led them to be more positive in their assessments of the economy under President Obama. I then test whether, within the survey sample, these expressed attitudinal differences led to changes in actual political knowledge and engagement: testing whether respondents eligible to vote in 2008 demonstrated higher political knowledge, voted at higher rates in future elections, and were more likely to report that they had engaged in political activities such as attending a local meeting, putting out a campaign

¹Since I cannot measure 2008 voting across survey years in the CCES survey sample, I cannot measure compliance with eligibility to vote. Thus, in the survey analysis, the interpretation of the results is limited to the difference between eligibility cohorts, rather than the effect of vote in 2008 directly.

sign, volunteering for a campaign, and donating to political causes.

I estimate these differences for Blacks, Whites, and Hispanics. If voting in 2008 was an empowering political experience, then I expect to observe higher levels of political interest, approval for President Obama and more positive assessments of the economy for people who could vote in 2008 compared to those who could not. To the extent that 2008 was a more empowering election for Blacks, I expect that being eligible to vote in 2008 corresponds with a greater increase in each of these variables for Blacks compared to other groups. If so, the greater difference for eligible Blacks would indicate that voting in 2008 may have produced a shift in political attitudes that we might expect could be translated into greater rates of political participation. The absence of such an advantage for Blacks would suggest that voting in the 2008 election did not produce persistently stronger changes in political attitudes.

To estimate eligibility cohort differences, I limit my analysis to the sample of respondents in each election year who were born in the year 1990 and 1991. Respondents born in 1990, for the most part², would have been age-eligible to vote in the 2008 election. Anyone born in 1991 would have been ineligible to vote in 2008. So, for example, in the 2009 CCES, I restrict my sample to respondents ages 19 and 18 in 2009, but who would have been 18 and 17 at the time of the 2008 election. In the 2018 CCES, I restrict my sample to people 28 and 27 years of age. Table 1 presents the sample sizes across survey years, eligibility cohorts, and racial groups. In the analysis, I pool respondents across survey years, but account for the influence of different surveys by using survey year fixed effects in my estimation.

Restricting the analysis to voters born in this narrow window allows for the most precise comparison of voters who differ only slightly in age, but differ in whether or not they were

²Respondents born in 1990 on November 5th or later would have been ineligible to vote in 2008. The CCES does not record precise date of birth, so I cannot differentiate between eligible and ineligible voters born with the same year. Thus, the analysis compares the 1990 to the 1991 cohort. The small number of voters in the eligible cohort who were in fact ineligible should bias the results slightly, but towards a null effect.

Table 1: Sample Size Summary

| Survey Year | Total | | Black | | White | | Hispanic | |
|----------------|--------|----------|--------|----------|--------|----------|----------|----------|
| | Sample | Eligible | Sample | Eligible | Sample | Eligible | Sample | Eligible |
| 2009 | 295 | 156 | 37 | 17 | 208 | 124 | 50 | 15 |
| 2010 | 497 | 278 | 141 | 70 | 209 | 143 | 147 | 65 |
| 2011 | 361 | 216 | 39 | 14 | 260 | 170 | 62 | 32 |
| 2012 | 1,104 | 603 | 202 | 112 | 630 | 343 | 272 | 148 |
| 2013 | 512 | 287 | 98 | 56 | 320 | 185 | 94 | 46 |
| 2014 | 1,477 | 847 | 286 | 158 | 924 | 549 | 267 | 140 |
| 2015 | 465 | 260 | 61 | 28 | 306 | 172 | 98 | 60 |
| 2016 | 2,065 | 1,169 | 320 | 186 | 1,357 | 751 | 388 | 232 |
| 2017 | 661 | 372 | 99 | 51 | 344 | 207 | 218 | 114 |
| 2018 | 2,257 | 1,241 | 238 | 135 | 1,670 | 920 | 349 | 186 |

Table 2: Eligibility-Cohort Balance by Race

| Variable | Black | | | White | | | Hispanic | | |
|---------------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|----------|---------|---------|
| | Diff. | SE | P-Value | Diff. | SE | P-Value | Diff. | SE | P-Value |
| Ideology | 0.06 | 0.08 | 0.44 | -0.01 | 0.04 | 0.82 | 0.07 | 0.07 | 0.31 |
| Union | 0.04 | 0.03 | 0.21 | 0.00 | 0.01 | 0.70 | 0.03 | 0.03 | 0.32 |
| Military | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.28 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.25 | -0.01 | 0.01 | 0.11 |
| Home-owner | -0.02 | 0.03 | 0.58 | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.24 | 0.02 | 0.03 | 0.47 |
| Education | -0.03 | 0.08 | 0.71 | 0.11 | 0.05 | 0.02 | 0.22 | 0.08 | 0.01 |
| Family Income | 3343.60 | 2562.60 | 0.19 | 1343.22 | 1570.65 | 0.39 | 2550.71 | 2343.15 | 0.28 |
| Married | 0.04 | 0.03 | 0.16 | 0.03 | 0.02 | 0.03 | 0.05 | 0.03 | 0.14 |
| Democrat | 0.02 | 0.04 | 0.57 | 0.04 | 0.02 | 0.03 | -0.10 | 0.04 | 0.01 |
| Republican | 0.03 | 0.02 | 0.18 | -0.01 | 0.02 | 0.54 | 0.04 | 0.03 | 0.18 |
| Male | 0.03 | 0.04 | 0.42 | 0.05 | 0.02 | 0.01 | 0.06 | 0.04 | 0.08 |

eligible to vote in 2008. Table 2 reports the difference in means and corresponding standard error and significance tests for a range of CCES variables across eligibility cohorts and racial groups. For Blacks, the covariates are generally balanced across eligible and ineligible cohorts: None of difference in means for the variables are statistically significant at conventional significance thresholds. Whites who were eligible to vote in 2008 have significantly ($\alpha < 0.05$) higher levels of education, are more likely to be married, are more likely to be male, and are more likely to be Democrats than Whites who were not eligible to vote in 2008. For Hispanics, I observe significant differences for education and Democratic partisanship. Since balance is imperfect, and these variables are likely to influence the outcome variables, I include each of these variables as controls in my main specifications.

To estimate the difference in political interest, approval for Obama, and assessments of the economy between 2008 eligible and ineligible respondents, I regress each outcome on 2008 eligibility, interacting respondent race with eligibility to directly compare how the influence of 2008 eligibility varies by race. In my main specification, I control for each of the variables in Table 2. I also include state and survey year fixed effects, so estimation is made within state and CCES survey year. I interact the race variable with each covariate and the fixed effects, the statistical equivalence of estimating separate models for Blacks, Whites, and Hispanics. In the main specification, I include CCES survey weights, so that the inference

better reflects a nationally representative sample³. Formally:

$$Y_i = \alpha + \beta \begin{bmatrix} \text{Eligible}_i \\ \text{Race}_i \\ \mathbf{X}_i \\ \text{State}_i \\ \text{Year}_i \end{bmatrix} + \theta \text{Race}_i \begin{bmatrix} \text{Eligible}_i \\ \mathbf{X}_i \\ \text{State}_i \\ \text{Year}_i \end{bmatrix} + \epsilon_i$$

where \mathbf{X}_i is the vector of covariate values corresponding to voter i , ϵ_i is the error term, and Y_i is the value of the outcome⁴ corresponding to voter i . Political interest is recorded in each year of the CCES sample from 2009 through 2018, and is an ordinal response to the question :“Some people seem to follow what’s going on in government and public affairs most of the time, whether there’s an election going on or not. Others aren’t that interested. Would you say you follow what’s going on in government and public affairs.” Responses are coded from 1 to 4, with 1 corresponding to “Hardly at all”, 2 corresponding to “Only Now and Then”, 3 to “Some of the time”, and 4 to “Most of the time”. Approval for President Obama is recorded in 2009 through 2016, and is coded on a 1 to 5 scale (Strongly disapprove, Disapprove/Somewhat disapprove, Neither approve nor disapprove, Approve/Somewhat approve, Strongly Approve). Assessment of Economy is coded 1 to 5 based on the response to the prompt “Over the past year, the nation’s economy has...” (Gotten much worse, Gotten worse/Somewhat worse, Stayed about the same, Gotten better/Somewhat better, Gotten

³In Tables 22 through 35, I demonstrate the robustness of the results to specifications without survey weights, without controls, estimation only on the subset of survey respondents who are Democrats, and estimation of standard errors clustered by state, year, or both. In most cases, the results from the main specification are consistent across alternative tests. Where they differ in magnitude or significance, the direction of the coefficient is generally consistent.

⁴

$$Y \in \begin{bmatrix} \text{Political Interest} \\ \text{Obama Approval} \\ \text{Assessment of Economy} \end{bmatrix}$$

much better). Each of these outcomes is coded such that higher values indicate greater levels of interest, or more positive views of President Obama and the economy.

I present the result of the main specifications for each outcome in Table 3. The results are presented such that the omitted racial category out of Black, White, and Hispanic is Black. Therefore, the coefficient on 2008 eligibility represents the difference in the outcome between Blacks eligible to vote in 2008 and those who were ineligible. The interaction coefficients represent the difference between the eligibility gap for Blacks compared to Whites or Hispanics. A negative sign on those coefficients means that the difference between 2008 eligible and ineligible Whites or Hispanic is less than that for Blacks. These specifications all contain the list of covariates described in Table 2, as well as state and year fixed effects. The coefficients are from a weighted linear regression, weighted by the CCES survey weights, to make the inference more applicable to the general population. I present the full tables for the main specification in Table 21.

Blacks who were eligible to vote in 2008 reported greater levels of political interest, approval for Obama, and more positive assessments of the economy than Blacks who were not eligible to vote in 2008. The 2008 eligibility coefficients for all outcomes are positive and statistically significant at conventional thresholds. While I hesitate to interpret these results causally⁵, they are at least consistent with the hypothesis that the 2008 election represented a meaningful political experience for first time Black voters. These differences for Blacks are significantly larger than the eligibility cohort differences for Whites for each outcomes. Compared to Hispanics, the differences for Blacks are greater than that for

⁵The analysis in this regression compares cohorts that differ along observable characteristics that likely influence the outcomes. While I can account for these observables, it is possible there are other characteristics that confound causal inferences. The regression discontinuity design that tests the core voting hypotheses of this paper hinges on assumptions that are more likely to hold, specifically that differences in the treated and untreated populations need only be continuous across the eligibility cutoff in order for causality to hold. With the available survey data, incorporation of a regression discontinuity design is not possible, as specific date of birth data is not recorded. Therefore, the most reasonable estimate, as done here, is a comparison of the mean levels across eligibility cohorts, accounting for observable confounders.

Table 3: 2008 Voting Eligibility and Attitudes

| | Political Interest | Obama Approval | Economic Assessment |
|--------------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|------------------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) |
| Eligible 2008 | 0.210** (0.084) | 0.145** (0.068) | 0.201** (0.097) |
| Eligible 2008 * Hispanic | -0.270** (0.113) | 0.047 (0.112) | -0.211 (0.143) |
| Eligible 2008 * White | -0.257*** (0.094) | -0.195** (0.078) | -0.227** (0.108) |
| Constant | 0.527 (0.670) | 2.005*** (0.463) | 2.723*** (0.748) |
| N | 7,066 | 4,738 | 4,807 |
| R ² | 0.156 | 0.547 | 0.245 |
| Adjusted R ² | 0.131 | 0.528 | 0.213 |
| Residual Std. Error | 1.035 (df = 6865) | 0.910 (df = 4546) | 1.089 (df = 4614) |

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

Hispanics with respect to political interest, and statistically indistinguishable at conventional thresholds for the Obama approval and economic assessment outcomes. Thus, the results support the hypothesis that voting (or at least being eligible to vote) in the 2008 election contributed to greater attitudinal change for eligible Blacks than for eligible Whites, and evidence that it may have increased political interest at greater rates for eligible Blacks than eligible Hispanics.

Taken together, these results support the expectation that the 2008 election was a more meaningful election for Blacks than other racial groups, especially in comparison to Whites. The increase in approval for President Obama and assessments of the economy indicate that 2008 eligibility corresponds with meaningfully stronger attachments to President Obama, and greater support for the economy he oversaw. The increase in political interest, especially in comparison to the more limited increase of eligible voters from other racial groups, suggests that, when it comes to future voting, it is reasonable to expect that voting for the first time

in 2008 would cause a greater increase in the likelihood of future voting for Blacks than for voters of other racial groups.

5.2 2008 Voting Eligibility and Future Voting in Survey Sample

Here, I present the results from models estimating the 2008 eligibility cohort differences in future voting for Blacks, Whites, and Hispanics in the CCES sample. I measure turnout in the survey sample for each year of the CCES using two methods. First, I rely on CCES vote validation, where respondents are matched to administrative registration lists. These voterfiles contain records of whether respondents voted in the most recent election for that year of the CCES. Second, I use self-reported turnout, where survey respondents who completed the post-election survey in an election year were asked if they had voted in that year's general election. The linking performed by the CCES is highly accurate, and is considered a far more reliable measure of voting behavior than self-reported turnout, which is prone to overestimation of turnout. In Tables 17 and 18 I present the results from the main specifications for validated vote and self-reported vote, respectively. Model 1 in each table is the pooled specification across survey years⁶, and models 2 through 5 show the separate results for each election from 2010 through 2016. Across models and the two measures of turnout, I see no significant differences at conventional significance thresholds ($\alpha < 0.05$) in future voting between 2008 eligibility cohorts. I similarly find no significant differences between Blacks, Whites and Hispanics, consistent with the the main finding of the paper, that Blacks who voted for the first time in 2008 were not mobilized to vote in future elections at greater rates than first time voters in other racial groups.

⁶These models only use respondents from survey years in which there was a general election.

Figure 17: 2008 Voting Eligibility and Future Validated Voting

| | Validated Voting | 2010 | 2012 | 2014 | 2016 |
|--------------------------|--------------------|-------------------|-------------------|----------------------|-------------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
| Eligible 2008 | −0.036 (0.039) | 0.032 (0.083) | 0.051 (0.093) | −0.079 (0.063) | −0.029 (0.073) |
| Eligible 2008 * Hispanic | 0.031 (0.053) | 0.027 (0.107) | −0.143 (0.118) | 0.024 (0.083) | −0.045 (0.105) |
| Eligible 2008 * White | 0.018 (0.045) | −0.058 (0.127) | −0.015 (0.112) | −0.002 (0.082) | 0.042 (0.082) |
| Constant | 0.529** (0.231) | 0.263 (0.645) | 0.047 (0.389) | −0.846*** (0.324) | 0.007 (0.556) |
| N | 5,675 | 339 | 784 | 1,096 | 1,634 |
| R ² | 0.165 | 0.466 | 0.356 | 0.278 | 0.215 |
| Adjusted R ² | 0.137 | 0.184 | 0.222 | 0.165 | 0.133 |
| Residual Std. Error | 0.499 (df = 5491) | 0.540 (df = 221) | 0.553 (df = 648) | 0.445 (df = 948) | 0.503 (df = 1478) |

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

Figure 18: 2008 Voting Eligibility and Future Self-reported Voting

| | Self-reported Voting | 2010 | 2012 | 2014 | 2016 |
|--------------------------|----------------------|-------------------|-------------------|----------------------|---------------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
| Eligible 2008 | −0.042 (0.045) | 0.014 (0.252) | 0.159 (0.105) | −0.175* (0.090) | −0.163* (0.088) |
| Eligible 2008 * Hispanic | −0.017 (0.060) | −0.084 (0.302) | −0.218 (0.134) | 0.009 (0.162) | 0.114 (0.107) |
| Eligible 2008 * White | 0.064 (0.049) | −0.023 (0.261) | −0.092 (0.110) | 0.176 (0.107) | 0.166* (0.092) |
| Constant | −0.636*** (0.217) | 1.072 (0.970) | 0.414 (0.418) | −1.664*** (0.585) | 1.366*** (0.347) |
| N | 5,018 | 454 | 459 | 713 | 940 |
| R ² | 0.330 | 0.412 | 0.416 | 0.338 | 0.223 |
| Adjusted R ² | 0.304 | 0.188 | 0.213 | 0.186 | 0.085 |
| Residual Std. Error | 0.418 (df = 4826) | 0.622 (df = 328) | 0.322 (df = 340) | 0.480 (df = 579) | 0.319 (df = 798) |

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

5.3 2008 Voting Eligibility and Political Knowledge and Political Engagement

Here, I estimate the main specification for a series of survey questions that test political knowledge, and test whether there are 2008 eligibility cohort differences in political activities such as attending a local government meeting, displaying a campaign sign, volunteering for a campaign, and donating to political causes.

The political knowledge questions include items testing whether the survey respondent knows the political party of:

1. The respondent's senior U.S. Senator.
2. The respondent's junior U.S. Senator.
3. The respondent's U.S. House Representative.
4. The majority party in the U.S. Senate.
5. The majority party in the U.S. House.

The political engagement outcomes include four survey questions asking whether the respondent had engaged in the following political activities in the previous year:

1. Attended a local political meeting.
2. Put out a political sign.
3. Volunteered or worked for a political campaign or candidate.
4. Donated to a political cause, candidate, or political party.

Figure 19: 2008 Voting Eligibility and Political Knowledge

| | Sr. Sen. | Jr. Sen. | House Rep. | Sen. Maj. | House Maj. |
|--------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
| Eligible 2008 | 0.021 (0.041) | -0.012 (0.038) | -0.009 (0.038) | 0.049 (0.041) | 0.078* (0.041) |
| Eligible 2008 * Hispanic | -0.050 (0.057) | -0.041 (0.053) | -0.037 (0.053) | -0.138** (0.054) | -0.133** (0.053) |
| Eligible 2008 * White | -0.014 (0.046) | 0.002 (0.043) | 0.012 (0.043) | -0.055 (0.045) | -0.053 (0.045) |
| Constant | -0.187 (0.288) | 0.401 (0.257) | 0.241 (0.367) | 0.776*** (0.288) | -0.156 (0.270) |
| N | 7,224 | 7,198 | 7,152 | 7,260 | 7,264 |
| R ² | 0.157 | 0.166 | 0.133 | 0.182 | 0.227 |
| Adjusted R ² | 0.133 | 0.143 | 0.109 | 0.158 | 0.205 |
| Residual Std. Error | 0.520 (df = 7025) | 0.518 (df = 6999) | 0.524 (df = 6953) | 0.503 (df = 7058) | 0.495 (df = 7062) |

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

Figure 20: 2008 Voting Eligibility and Political Engagement

| | Meeting | Sign | Campaign | Donation |
|---------------------------------|----------------------|--------------------|--------------------|----------------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| Eligible 2008 | 0.035 (0.034) | 0.055 (0.037) | 0.027 (0.026) | 0.079* (0.045) |
| Eligible 2008 * Hispanic | -0.002 (0.046) | -0.079 (0.058) | -0.005 (0.035) | -0.060 (0.065) |
| Eligible 2008 * White | -0.074* (0.038) | -0.069 (0.042) | -0.045 (0.030) | -0.127*** (0.049) |
| Constant | -0.319*** (0.104) | -0.268* (0.146) | -0.102* (0.060) | -0.040 (0.150) |
| N | 4,089 | 4,089 | 4,089 | 4,089 |
| R ² | 0.111 | 0.102 | 0.108 | 0.157 |
| Adjusted R ² | 0.070 | 0.061 | 0.067 | 0.119 |
| Residual Std. Error (df = 3911) | 0.344 | 0.398 | 0.279 | 0.394 |

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

5.4 Main Specification Full Table

Figure 21: 2008 Voting Eligibility and Attitudes – Full Table

| | Political Interest | Obama Approval | Economic Assessment |
|--------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|---------------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) |
| Eligible 2008 | 0.210** (0.084) | 0.145** (0.068) | 0.201** (0.097) |
| Ideology | 0.080** (0.040) | -0.051 (0.034) | 0.003 (0.054) |
| Union | 0.401*** (0.109) | 0.498*** (0.089) | 0.221 (0.164) |
| Military | -0.111 (0.232) | -0.019 (0.180) | 0.321 (0.284) |
| Home-owner | 0.006 (0.092) | -0.129* (0.074) | 0.014 (0.105) |
| Education | 0.010 (0.035) | -0.076** (0.031) | 0.065 (0.045) |
| Family Income | 0.000** (0.000) | 0.000 (0.000) | 0.000** (0.000) |
| Unmarried | 0.027 (0.091) | 0.197* (0.101) | 0.024 (0.145) |
| Democrat | 0.272* (0.145) | 0.506*** (0.123) | 0.345** (0.161) |
| Republican | 0.502*** (0.164) | -0.065 (0.203) | 0.111 (0.255) |
| Male | -0.070 (0.086) | -0.200*** (0.070) | 0.164 (0.104) |
| Hispanic | 1.229** (0.575) | 0.574 (0.439) | -0.014 (0.687) |
| White | 1.460*** (0.502) | 0.772* (0.441) | -0.691 (0.698) |
| Eligible 2008 * Hispanic | -0.270** (0.113) | 0.047 (0.112) | -0.211 (0.143) |
| Eligible 2008 * White | -0.257*** (0.094) | -0.195** (0.078) | -0.227** (0.108) |
| Ideology * Hispanic | -0.111* (0.061) | -0.056 (0.058) | -0.107 (0.070) |
| Ideology * White | -0.108** (0.046) | -0.170*** (0.041) | -0.147** (0.061) |
| Union * Hispanic | 0.014 (0.161) | -0.636*** (0.175) | -0.045 (0.214) |
| Union * White | -0.227* (0.121) | -0.419*** (0.115) | -0.151 (0.183) |
| Military * Hispanic | -0.185 (0.321) | -0.147 (0.427) | -0.206 (0.500) |
| Military * White | 0.368 (0.267) | 0.195 (0.228) | -0.023 (0.321) |
| Home-owner * Hispanic | 0.092 (0.123) | 0.207* (0.123) | -0.059 (0.146) |
| Home-owner * White | -0.044 (0.103) | 0.169** (0.085) | -0.057 (0.116) |
| Education * Hispanic | 0.075 (0.050) | 0.041 (0.049) | -0.040 (0.067) |
| Education * White | 0.099** (0.040) | 0.157*** (0.035) | 0.064 (0.050) |
| Family Income * Hispanic | 0.000 (0.000) | -0.000 (0.000) | -0.000 (0.000) |
| Family Income * White | -0.000* (0.000) | -0.000 (0.000) | -0.000 (0.000) |
| Unmarried * Hispanic | -0.015 (0.126) | -0.087 (0.139) | 0.083 (0.207) |
| Unmarried * White | -0.080 (0.101) | -0.229** (0.111) | -0.066 (0.155) |
| Democrat * Hispanic | -0.197 (0.184) | 0.107 (0.193) | 0.005 (0.198) |
| Democrat * White | -0.006 (0.160) | 0.204 (0.145) | 0.133 (0.179) |
| Republican * Hispanic | -0.132 (0.209) | -0.442* (0.260) | -0.206 (0.299) |
| Republican * White | -0.303* (0.178) | -0.438** (0.217) | -0.239 (0.267) |
| Male * Hispanic | 0.163 (0.113) | 0.015 (0.107) | -0.050 (0.136) |
| Male * White | 0.449*** (0.095) | 0.238*** (0.080) | 0.120 (0.114) |
| Constant | 0.527 (0.670) | 2.005*** (0.463) | 2.723*** (0.748) |
| N | 7,066 | 4,738 | 4,807 |
| R ² | 0.156 | 0.547 | 0.245 |
| Adjusted R ² | 0.131 | 0.528 | 0.213 |
| Residual Std. Error | 1.035 (df = 6865) | 0.910 (df = 4546) | 1.089 (df = 4614) |

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

5.5 Robustness Check Specifications

Here I present tables for each outcome, comparing the main specification to alternative specifications, including estimation without survey weights, only on the subset of the sample who are Democrats, models without controls, and a series of alternative standard error estimations including clustering standard errors by state, year, and both.

Figure 22: Alternative Specifications: 2008 Voting Eligibility and Political Interest

| | Main | No Weights | Democrats | No Controls | State Cluster SEs | Year Cluster SEs | State and Year Cluster SEs |
|--------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|-------------------|---------------------|----------------------|---------------------|-------------------------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) |
| Eligible 2008 | 0.210** (0.084) | 0.167*** (0.059) | 0.040 (0.067) | 0.167** (0.079) | 0.210*** (0.063) | 0.210* (0.111) | 0.210 (0.129) |
| Eligible 2008 * Hispanic | -0.270** (0.113) | -0.160** (0.079) | 0.064 (0.096) | -0.103 (0.110) | -0.270*** (0.085) | -0.270* (0.141) | -0.270 (0.180) |
| Eligible 2008 * White | -0.257*** (0.094) | -0.194*** (0.065) | -0.094 (0.078) | -0.145* (0.088) | -0.257*** (0.083) | -0.257** (0.127) | -0.257* (0.152) |
| Constant | 0.527 (0.670) | 0.662 (0.456) | 1.042* (0.544) | 1.885*** (0.179) | 0.527 (0.433) | 0.527 (0.694) | 0.527 (0.580) |
| N | 7,066 | 7,066 | 7,933 | 9,014 | 7,066 | 7,066 | 7,066 |
| R ² | 0.156 | 0.157 | 0.174 | 0.086 | 0.156 | 0.156 | 0.156 |
| Adjusted R ² | 0.131 | 0.132 | 0.155 | 0.068 | 0.131 | 0.131 | 0.131 |
| Residual Std. Error | 1.035 (df = 6865) | 0.898 (df = 6865) | 0.960 (df = 7751) | 1.144 (df = 8840) | 1.035 (df = 6865) | 1.035 (df = 6865) | 1.035 (df = 6865) |

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

Figure 23: Alternative Specifications: 2008 Voting Eligibility and Approval for President Obama

| | Main | No Weights | Democrats | No Controls | State Cluster SEs | Year Cluster SEs | State and Year Cluster SEs |
|--------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|----------------------|----------------------|-------------------------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) |
| Eligible 2008 | 0.145** (0.068) | 0.037 (0.055) | 0.021 (0.055) | 0.061 (0.069) | 0.145** (0.066) | 0.145*** (0.054) | 0.145* (0.078) |
| Eligible 2008 * Hispanic | 0.047 (0.112) | 0.015 (0.080) | 0.144 (0.093) | 0.014 (0.109) | 0.047 (0.123) | 0.047 (0.132) | 0.047 (0.174) |
| Eligible 2008 * White | -0.195** (0.078) | -0.086 (0.062) | -0.033 (0.068) | -0.078 (0.084) | -0.195** (0.087) | -0.195*** (0.034) | -0.195** (0.077) |
| Constant | 2.005*** (0.463) | 3.354*** (0.465) | 3.760*** (0.304) | 2.230*** (0.464) | 2.005*** (0.392) | 2.005*** (0.497) | 2.005*** (0.442) |
| N | 4,738 | 4,738 | 5,309 | 6,275 | 4,738 | 4,738 | 4,738 |
| R ² | 0.547 | 0.506 | 0.177 | 0.217 | 0.547 | 0.547 | 0.547 |
| Adjusted R ² | 0.528 | 0.485 | 0.149 | 0.196 | 0.528 | 0.528 | 0.528 |
| Residual Std. Error | 0.910 (df = 4546) | 0.786 (df = 4546) | 0.813 (df = 5134) | 1.187 (df = 6111) | 0.910 (df = 4546) | 0.910 (df = 4546) | 0.910 (df = 4546) |

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

Figure 24: Alternative Specifications: 2008 Voting Eligibility and Assessment of the Economy Obama

| | Main | No Weights | Democrats | No Controls | State Cluster SEs | Year Cluster SEs | State and Year Cluster SEs |
|--------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|----------------------|----------------------|-------------------------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) |
| Eligible 2008 | 0.201** (0.097) | 0.128* (0.072) | 0.036 (0.077) | 0.229** (0.089) | 0.201*** (0.073) | 0.201*** (0.051) | 0.201** (0.094) |
| Eligible 2008 * Hispanic | -0.211 (0.143) | -0.142 (0.099) | 0.037 (0.134) | -0.186 (0.128) | -0.211 (0.179) | -0.211* (0.121) | -0.211 (0.206) |
| Eligible 2008 * White | -0.227** (0.108) | -0.135* (0.079) | -0.037 (0.090) | -0.201** (0.100) | -0.227** (0.089) | -0.227*** (0.073) | -0.227* (0.116) |
| Constant | 2.723*** (0.748) | 2.393*** (0.453) | 3.417*** (0.515) | 3.146*** (0.590) | 2.723*** (0.613) | 2.723*** (0.245) | 2.723*** (0.420) |
| N | 4,807 | 4,807 | 5,332 | 6,418 | 4,807 | 4,807 | 4,807 |
| R ² | 0.245 | 0.233 | 0.149 | 0.090 | 0.245 | 0.245 | 0.245 |
| Adjusted R ² | 0.213 | 0.201 | 0.121 | 0.066 | 0.213 | 0.213 | 0.213 |
| Residual Std. Error | 1.089 (df = 4614) | 0.907 (df = 4614) | 1.014 (df = 5157) | 1.196 (df = 6254) | 1.089 (df = 4614) | 1.089 (df = 4614) | 1.089 (df = 4614) |

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

Figure 25: Alternative Specifications: 2008 Voting Eligibility and Validated Voting

| | Main | No Weights | Democrats | No Controls | State Cluster SEs | Year Cluster SEs | State and Year Cluster SEs |
|--------------------------|--------------------|---------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|---------------------|-------------------------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) |
| Eligible 2008 | -0.036 (0.039) | -0.010 (0.029) | -0.054* (0.032) | -0.019 (0.032) | -0.036 (0.047) | -0.036* (0.021) | -0.036 (0.040) |
| Eligible 2008 * Hispanic | 0.031 (0.053) | -0.020 (0.040) | 0.054 (0.049) | 0.012 (0.044) | 0.031 (0.061) | 0.031 (0.037) | 0.031 (0.059) |
| Eligible 2008 * White | 0.018 (0.045) | 0.014 (0.033) | 0.069* (0.040) | 0.026 (0.037) | 0.018 (0.050) | 0.018 (0.029) | 0.018 (0.046) |
| Constant | 0.529** (0.231) | -0.390** (0.188) | -0.762*** (0.294) | -0.198*** (0.045) | 0.529*** (0.158) | 0.529*** (0.186) | 0.529*** (0.166) |
| N | 5,675 | 5,675 | 6,424 | 7,400 | 5,675 | 5,675 | 5,675 |
| R ² | 0.165 | 0.150 | 0.162 | 0.119 | 0.165 | 0.165 | 0.165 |
| Adjusted R ² | 0.137 | 0.122 | 0.140 | 0.100 | 0.137 | 0.137 | 0.137 |
| Residual Std. Error | 0.499 (df = 5491) | 0.449 (df = 5491) | 0.487 (df = 6257) | 0.496 (df = 7243) | 0.499 (df = 5491) | 0.499 (df = 5491) | 0.499 (df = 5491) |

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

Figure 26: Alternative Specifications: 2008 Voting Eligibility and Self-Reported Voting

| | Main | No Weights | Democrats | No Controls | State Cluster SEs | Year Cluster SEs | State and Year Cluster SEs |
|--------------------------|----------------------|--------------------|-------------------|---------------------|----------------------|---------------------|-------------------------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) |
| Eligible 2008 | −0.042 (0.045) | −0.060* (0.033) | −0.018 (0.034) | −0.062 (0.043) | −0.042 (0.040) | −0.042 (0.039) | −0.042 (0.055) |
| Eligible 2008 * Hispanic | −0.017 (0.060) | 0.011 (0.044) | −0.021 (0.048) | 0.032 (0.060) | −0.017 (0.045) | −0.017 (0.033) | −0.017 (0.063) |
| Eligible 2008 * White | 0.064 (0.049) | 0.080** (0.036) | 0.040 (0.039) | 0.091** (0.046) | 0.064 (0.049) | 0.064* (0.035) | 0.064 (0.060) |
| Constant | −0.636*** (0.217) | 0.054 (0.243) | 0.239 (0.210) | 1.020*** (0.179) | −0.636*** (0.200) | −0.636** (0.256) | −0.636** (0.253) |
| N | 5,018 | 5,018 | 5,792 | 6,289 | 5,018 | 5,018 | 5,018 |
| R ² | 0.330 | 0.232 | 0.305 | 0.298 | 0.330 | 0.330 | 0.330 |
| Adjusted R ² | 0.304 | 0.202 | 0.283 | 0.280 | 0.304 | 0.304 | 0.304 |
| Residual Std. Error | 0.418 (df = 4826) | 0.391 (df = 4826) | 0.384 (df = 5616) | 0.446 (df = 6127) | 0.418 (df = 4826) | 0.418 (df = 4826) | 0.418 (df = 4826) |

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

Figure 27: Alternative Specifications: 2008 Voting Eligibility and Attending a Local Meeting

| | Main | No Weights | Democrats | No Controls | State Cluster SEs | Year Cluster SEs | State and Year Cluster SEs |
|--------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|---------------------|----------------------|----------------------|-------------------------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) |
| Eligible 2008 | 0.035 (0.034) | 0.041 (0.030) | 0.040 (0.029) | 0.026 (0.030) | 0.035 (0.032) | 0.035 (0.025) | 0.035 (0.037) |
| Eligible 2008 * Hispanic | −0.002 (0.046) | −0.0003 (0.037) | −0.040 (0.040) | −0.011 (0.040) | −0.002 (0.038) | −0.002 (0.026) | −0.002 (0.040) |
| Eligible 2008 * White | −0.074* (0.038) | −0.075** (0.032) | −0.097*** (0.036) | −0.050 (0.033) | −0.074** (0.035) | −0.074** (0.030) | −0.074* (0.042) |
| Constant | −0.319*** (0.104) | −0.403*** (0.153) | −0.227 (0.333) | 0.789*** (0.066) | −0.319*** (0.069) | −0.319*** (0.026) | −0.319*** (0.047) |
| N | 4,089 | 4,089 | 4,651 | 5,138 | 4,089 | 4,089 | 4,089 |
| R ² | 0.111 | 0.092 | 0.089 | 0.058 | 0.111 | 0.111 | 0.111 |
| Adjusted R ² | 0.070 | 0.051 | 0.056 | 0.030 | 0.070 | 0.070 | 0.070 |
| Residual Std. Error | 0.344 (df = 3911) | 0.302 (df = 3911) | 0.354 (df = 4487) | 0.332 (df = 4987) | 0.344 (df = 3911) | 0.344 (df = 3911) | 0.344 (df = 3911) |

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

Figure 28: Alternative Specifications: 2008 Voting Eligibility and Displaying a Political Sign

| | Main | No Weights | Democrats | No Controls | State Cluster SEs | Year Cluster SEs | State and Year Cluster SEs |
|--------------------------|--------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|----------------------|---------------------|-------------------------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) |
| Eligible 2008 | 0.055 (0.037) | 0.007 (0.028) | 0.040 (0.034) | 0.042 (0.033) | 0.055 (0.059) | 0.055* (0.032) | 0.055 (0.060) |
| Eligible 2008 * Hispanic | -0.079 (0.058) | -0.033 (0.038) | -0.072 (0.058) | -0.063 (0.047) | -0.079 (0.057) | -0.079 (0.049) | -0.079 (0.075) |
| Eligible 2008 * White | -0.069 (0.042) | -0.010 (0.031) | -0.062 (0.040) | -0.041 (0.037) | -0.069 (0.063) | -0.069* (0.039) | -0.069 (0.069) |
| Constant | -0.268* (0.146) | -0.165 (0.223) | -0.095 (0.196) | 0.443 (0.320) | -0.268** (0.136) | -0.268 (0.224) | -0.268 (0.224) |
| N | 4,089 | 4,089 | 4,651 | 5,138 | 4,089 | 4,089 | 4,089 |
| R ² | 0.102 | 0.081 | 0.081 | 0.059 | 0.102 | 0.102 | 0.102 |
| Adjusted R ² | 0.061 | 0.039 | 0.048 | 0.031 | 0.061 | 0.061 | 0.061 |
| Residual Std. Error | 0.398 (df = 3911) | 0.339 (df = 3911) | 0.405 (df = 4487) | 0.388 (df = 4987) | 0.398 (df = 3911) | 0.398 (df = 3911) | 0.398 (df = 3911) |

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

Figure 29: Alternative Specifications: 2008 Voting Eligibility and Volunteering for a Campaign

| | Main | No Weights | Democrats | No Controls | State Cluster SEs | Year Cluster SEs | State and Year Cluster SEs |
|--------------------------|--------------------|---------------------|-------------------|-------------------|----------------------|----------------------|-------------------------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) |
| Eligible 2008 | 0.027 (0.026) | 0.018 (0.021) | -0.015 (0.023) | 0.013 (0.025) | 0.027 (0.033) | 0.027 (0.033) | 0.027 (0.037) |
| Eligible 2008 * Hispanic | -0.005 (0.035) | 0.005 (0.027) | 0.046 (0.033) | 0.008 (0.030) | -0.005 (0.036) | -0.005 (0.022) | -0.005 (0.032) |
| Eligible 2008 * White | -0.045 (0.030) | -0.016 (0.023) | -0.013 (0.029) | -0.021 (0.028) | -0.045 (0.034) | -0.045 (0.029) | -0.045 (0.035) |
| Constant | -0.102* (0.060) | -0.254** (0.103) | -0.109 (0.075) | 0.005 (0.062) | -0.102* (0.058) | -0.102*** (0.013) | -0.102*** (0.036) |
| N | 4,089 | 4,089 | 4,651 | 5,138 | 4,089 | 4,089 | 4,089 |
| R ² | 0.108 | 0.097 | 0.079 | 0.051 | 0.108 | 0.108 | 0.108 |
| Adjusted R ² | 0.067 | 0.056 | 0.046 | 0.023 | 0.067 | 0.067 | 0.067 |
| Residual Std. Error | 0.279 (df = 3911) | 0.235 (df = 3911) | 0.286 (df = 4487) | 0.273 (df = 4987) | 0.279 (df = 3911) | 0.279 (df = 3911) | 0.279 (df = 3911) |

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

Figure 30: Alternative Specifications: 2008 Voting Eligibility and Donating to Political Causes

| | Main | No Weights | Democrats | No Controls | State Cluster SEs | Year Cluster SEs | State and Year Cluster SEs |
|--------------------------|----------------------|-------------------|----------------------|---------------------|----------------------|----------------------|-------------------------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) |
| Eligible 2008 | 0.079* (0.045) | 0.022 (0.029) | 0.073** (0.033) | 0.055 (0.038) | 0.079** (0.037) | 0.079*** (0.021) | 0.079*** (0.028) |
| Eligible 2008 * Hispanic | -0.060 (0.065) | 0.006 (0.039) | -0.052 (0.056) | -0.036 (0.054) | -0.060 (0.071) | -0.060 (0.054) | -0.060 (0.074) |
| Eligible 2008 * White | -0.127*** (0.049) | -0.034 (0.032) | -0.112*** (0.040) | -0.088** (0.042) | -0.127*** (0.040) | -0.127*** (0.045) | -0.127** (0.050) |
| Constant | -0.040 (0.150) | -0.241 (0.160) | 0.014 (0.286) | 0.805*** (0.088) | -0.040 (0.155) | -0.040 (0.074) | -0.040 (0.113) |
| N | 4,089 | 4,089 | 4,651 | 5,138 | 4,089 | 4,089 | 4,089 |
| R ² | 0.157 | 0.125 | 0.143 | 0.070 | 0.157 | 0.157 | 0.157 |
| Adjusted R ² | 0.119 | 0.085 | 0.112 | 0.042 | 0.119 | 0.119 | 0.119 |
| Residual Std. Error | 0.394 (df = 3911) | 0.341 (df = 3911) | 0.399 (df = 4487) | 0.388 (df = 4987) | 0.394 (df = 3911) | 0.394 (df = 3911) | 0.394 (df = 3911) |

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

Figure 31: Alternative Specifications: 2008 Voting Eligibility and Knowing Senior Senator's Partisanship

| | Main | No Weights | Democrats | No Controls | State Cluster SEs | Year Cluster SEs | State and Year Cluster SEs |
|--------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|---------------------|-------------------|----------------------|---------------------|-------------------------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) |
| Eligible 2008 | 0.021 (0.041) | 0.018 (0.030) | -0.001 (0.034) | 0.012 (0.034) | 0.021 (0.041) | 0.021 (0.041) | 0.021 (0.041) |
| Eligible 2008 * Hispanic | -0.050 (0.057) | 0.012 (0.039) | 0.013 (0.049) | 0.006 (0.048) | -0.050 (0.057) | -0.050 (0.057) | -0.050 (0.057) |
| Eligible 2008 * White | -0.014 (0.046) | -0.017 (0.033) | 0.005 (0.039) | 0.030 (0.038) | -0.014 (0.046) | -0.014 (0.046) | -0.014 (0.046) |
| Constant | -0.187 (0.288) | 0.217 (0.219) | 1.119*** (0.277) | -0.054 (0.088) | -0.187 (0.288) | -0.187 (0.288) | -0.187 (0.288) |
| N | 7,224 | 7,224 | 8,082 | 9,615 | 7,224 | 7,224 | 7,224 |
| R ² | 0.157 | 0.150 | 0.166 | 0.093 | 0.157 | 0.157 | 0.157 |
| Adjusted R ² | 0.133 | 0.126 | 0.147 | 0.077 | 0.133 | 0.133 | 0.133 |
| Residual Std. Error | 0.520 (df = 7025) | 0.467 (df = 7025) | 0.497 (df = 7902) | 0.537 (df = 9443) | 0.520 (df = 7025) | 0.520 (df = 7025) | 0.520 (df = 7025) |

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

Figure 32: Alternative Specifications: 2008 Voting Eligibility and Knowing Junior Senator's Partisanship

| | Main | No Weights | Democrats | No Controls | State Cluster SEs | Year Cluster SEs | State and Year Cluster SEs |
|--------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|----------------------|---------------------|-------------------------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) |
| Eligible 2008 | -0.012 (0.038) | -0.003 (0.029) | -0.028 (0.032) | 0.027 (0.033) | -0.012 (0.050) | -0.012 (0.036) | -0.012 (0.064) |
| Eligible 2008 * Hispanic | -0.041 (0.053) | -0.012 (0.039) | 0.045 (0.048) | -0.055 (0.047) | -0.041 (0.052) | -0.041 (0.069) | -0.041 (0.091) |
| Eligible 2008 * White | 0.002 (0.043) | -0.001 (0.032) | -0.004 (0.038) | -0.010 (0.037) | 0.002 (0.062) | 0.002 (0.040) | 0.002 (0.074) |
| Constant | 0.401 (0.257) | -0.171 (0.188) | 0.350 (0.295) | -0.004 (0.100) | 0.401** (0.195) | 0.401** (0.182) | 0.401** (0.182) |
| N | 7,198 | 7,198 | 8,063 | 9,589 | 7,198 | 7,198 | 7,198 |
| R ² | 0.166 | 0.150 | 0.158 | 0.098 | 0.166 | 0.166 | 0.166 |
| Adjusted R ² | 0.143 | 0.126 | 0.139 | 0.081 | 0.143 | 0.143 | 0.143 |
| Residual Std. Error | 0.518 (df = 6999) | 0.467 (df = 6999) | 0.498 (df = 7883) | 0.536 (df = 9417) | 0.518 (df = 6999) | 0.518 (df = 6999) | 0.518 (df = 6999) |

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

Figure 33: Alternative Specifications: 2008 Voting Eligibility and Knowing U.S. Representative's Partisanship

| | Main | No Weights | Democrats | No Controls | State Cluster SEs | Year Cluster SEs | State and Year Cluster SEs |
|--------------------------|-------------------|---------------------|---------------------|-------------------|----------------------|---------------------|-------------------------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) |
| Eligible 2008 | -0.009 (0.038) | -0.012 (0.029) | -0.044 (0.031) | -0.009 (0.033) | -0.009 (0.045) | -0.009 (0.032) | -0.009 (0.059) |
| Eligible 2008 * Hispanic | -0.037 (0.053) | -0.020 (0.039) | 0.090* (0.047) | -0.026 (0.046) | -0.037 (0.064) | -0.037 (0.070) | -0.037 (0.111) |
| Eligible 2008 * White | 0.012 (0.043) | 0.032 (0.033) | 0.031 (0.037) | 0.043 (0.037) | 0.012 (0.050) | 0.012 (0.032) | 0.012 (0.064) |
| Constant | 0.241 (0.367) | 1.065*** (0.178) | 1.366*** (0.285) | 0.031 (0.095) | 0.241 (0.222) | 0.241 (0.250) | 0.241* (0.145) |
| N | 7,152 | 7,152 | 7,997 | 9,523 | 7,152 | 7,152 | 7,152 |
| R ² | 0.133 | 0.113 | 0.135 | 0.071 | 0.133 | 0.133 | 0.133 |
| Adjusted R ² | 0.109 | 0.088 | 0.115 | 0.054 | 0.109 | 0.109 | 0.109 |
| Residual Std. Error | 0.524 (df = 6953) | 0.473 (df = 6953) | 0.506 (df = 7817) | 0.533 (df = 9351) | 0.524 (df = 6953) | 0.524 (df = 6953) | 0.524 (df = 6953) |

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

Figure 34: Alternative Specifications: 2008 Voting Eligibility and Knowing Senate Majority Party

| | Main | No Weights | Democrats | No Controls | State Cluster SEs | Year Cluster SEs | State and Year Cluster SEs |
|--------------------------|---------------------|-------------------|--------------------|-------------------|----------------------|---------------------|-------------------------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) |
| Eligible 2008 | 0.049 (0.041) | 0.013 (0.029) | 0.022 (0.033) | 0.021 (0.034) | 0.049 (0.042) | 0.049 (0.036) | 0.049 (0.053) |
| Eligible 2008 * Hispanic | -0.138** (0.054) | -0.009 (0.038) | -0.045 (0.047) | -0.043 (0.046) | -0.138*** (0.050) | -0.138** (0.065) | -0.138* (0.082) |
| Eligible 2008 * White | -0.055 (0.045) | 0.008 (0.032) | -0.013 (0.038) | -0.004 (0.038) | -0.055 (0.042) | -0.055 (0.035) | -0.055 (0.050) |
| Constant | 0.776*** (0.288) | 0.190 (0.229) | 0.658** (0.306) | 0.160 (0.101) | 0.776*** (0.230) | 0.776*** (0.215) | 0.776*** (0.179) |
| N | 7,260 | 7,260 | 8,144 | 9,659 | 7,260 | 7,260 | 7,260 |
| R ² | 0.182 | 0.192 | 0.203 | 0.121 | 0.182 | 0.182 | 0.182 |
| Adjusted R ² | 0.158 | 0.169 | 0.185 | 0.105 | 0.158 | 0.158 | 0.158 |
| Residual Std. Error | 0.503 (df = 7058) | 0.439 (df = 7058) | 0.482 (df = 7961) | 0.512 (df = 9484) | 0.503 (df = 7058) | 0.503 (df = 7058) | 0.503 (df = 7058) |

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

Figure 35: Alternative Specifications: 2008 Voting Eligibility and Knowing House Majority Party

| | Main | No Weights | Democrats | No Controls | State Cluster SEs | Year Cluster SEs | State and Year Cluster SEs |
|--------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|-------------------|----------------------|---------------------|-------------------------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) |
| Eligible 2008 | 0.078* (0.041) | 0.009 (0.029) | -0.007 (0.033) | 0.037 (0.034) | 0.078** (0.039) | 0.078* (0.043) | 0.078 (0.057) |
| Eligible 2008 * Hispanic | -0.133** (0.053) | -0.026 (0.039) | -0.001 (0.046) | -0.038 (0.048) | -0.133*** (0.036) | -0.133** (0.055) | -0.133** (0.063) |
| Eligible 2008 * White | -0.053 (0.045) | 0.019 (0.032) | 0.023 (0.039) | -0.006 (0.038) | -0.053 (0.042) | -0.053* (0.027) | -0.053 (0.046) |
| Constant | -0.156 (0.270) | 0.972*** (0.190) | 1.054*** (0.267) | 0.056 (0.097) | -0.156 (0.267) | -0.156 (0.299) | -0.156 (0.289) |
| N | 7,264 | 7,264 | 8,145 | 9,668 | 7,264 | 7,264 | 7,264 |
| R ² | 0.227 | 0.227 | 0.224 | 0.150 | 0.227 | 0.227 | 0.227 |
| Adjusted R ² | 0.205 | 0.205 | 0.206 | 0.135 | 0.205 | 0.205 | 0.205 |
| Residual Std. Error | 0.495 (df = 7062) | 0.436 (df = 7062) | 0.478 (df = 7962) | 0.511 (df = 9493) | 0.495 (df = 7062) | 0.495 (df = 7062) | 0.495 (df = 7062) |

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

6 Effect of 2008 Voting Subset to Democrats

Figure 36: Weighted Average of State-Level 2008 Voting Effects on Future Voting for Democrats





Figure 37: Weighted Distributions of State-Level 2008 Voting Effects on Future Voting for Democrats



Distributional density of state-level CACEs, weighted by the inverse of the variance of the estimates.

7 Effect of 2008 Voting by Gender

Figure 38: Weighted Average of State-Level 2008 Voting Effects on Future Voting by Gender





Figure 39: Weighted Distributions of State-Level 2008 Voting Effects on Future Voting by Gender



Distributional density of state-level CACEs, weighted by the inverse of the variance of the estimates.

Figure 40: Weighted Average of State-Level 2008 Voting Effects on Future Registration by Gender





Figure 41: Weighted Distributions of State-Level 2008 Voting Effects on Future Registration by Gender



Distributional density of state-level CACEs, weighted by the inverse of the variance of the estimates.

8 Effect of 2008 Voting in States that Record Partisan Identification

Figure 42: Weighted Average of State-Level 2008 Voting Effects on Future Registration





Figure 43: Weighted Distributions of State-Level 2008 Voting Effects on Future Voting



Distributional density of state-level CACEs, weighted by the inverse of the variance of the estimates.

Figure 44: Weighted Average of State-Level 2008 Voting Effects on Future Registration





Figure 45: Weighted Distributions of State-Level 2008 Voting Effects on Registration Voting



Distributional density of state-level CACEs, weighted by the inverse of the variance of the estimates.

9 Effect of 2008 Voting - White versus Non-whites Comparison

Figure 46: Weighted Average of State-Level 2008 Voting Effects on Future Voting





Figure 47: Weighted Distributions of State-Level 2008 Voting Effects on Future Voting



Distributional density of state-level CACEs, weighted by the inverse of the variance of the estimates.

Figure 48: Weighted Average of State-Level 2008 Voting Effects on Future Registration





Figure 49: Weighted Distributions of State-Level 2008 Voting Effects on Future Registration



Distributional density of state-level CACEs, weighted by the inverse of the variance of the estimates.