

Supplementary Information for Childhood Cross-ethnic  
Exposure Predicts Political Behavior Seven Decades  
Later: Evidence from Linked Administrative Data

# S1 Linking 1940 Census and Contemporary Voterfile Data


To link records from the voter file to the census, we train a linking algorithm on hand-coded examples of links. The algorithm uses the following features to build a linking score for each potential match from the voter file to the 1940 census:

- Jaro-Winkler string distance in first and last names. The Jaro-Winkler distance metric captures, on a scale from 0 to 1, how many edits have to be made to the characters in one string to convert it to another string. Edits include substitutions, deletions, and additions. Differences in strings earlier in the string are more heavily penalized, leading to larger string distances. Distance in first name and distance in last name are two key features in our linking procedure.
- Absolute value difference in age in 1940. The 1940 Census asked for respondents age as of April 1940. We use the dates of birth in the voter file to estimate how old people in our sample should have been in 1940. We calculate the number of years different between a record in the voter file and a record in the 1940 Census. Age or year of birth can be off for many reasons including simple data entry error, misreporting, and age heaping.
- Soundex agreement in first and last names. Soundex and other phonex coding schemes attempt to convert strings or words into codes such that names that sound the same (John and Jon for example) get the same coding. Though Soundex is quite brittle—typos or transcription errors in strings will often “break” Soundex—it has some predictive power for which records should match, particularly because enumerators wrote down peoples’ names as they heard them when recording the 1940 census. We include two indicator variables for Soundex agreement, one for first names agreeing and one for last names agreeing.
- Number of potential census matches (logged). In the first step of the linking procedure, we identify records that could possibly match a given person in the voter file, loosely restricting based on string distance in first and last name, age, sex, and state of birth. The number of possible hits for a given record is indicative of the commonness of his or her name and the more common a name the more likely we are to make a Type I, false positive error in making a match. By including the number of potential or possible links, the algorithm can adjust matches accordingly.
- Agreement on specific characters in first and last names can be a signal that two records are the same. We include four indicator variables for first letter of first name agreement, first letter of last name agreement, last letter of first name agreement, and last letter of last name agreement.

- Middle initial agreement. Distinguishing between two people with the same or similar first and last names is often done with middle names or initials. In both the voter file and the 1940 census, we see middle initials in some cases and use them when we do.
- Birthplace and Sex. Our census links block on birthplace, requiring two records to have the same reported birthplace (state for the US-born). We limit our sample to people in the voter file born in the US and who are men to facilitate linking over so many decades.

## S2 Further Description of the Sample

Figure S1: Distribution of Age in 1940 Census Linked Samples




Plot shows the breakdown of partisanship of the linked sample compared to that of the voters in the CA 2005, NC 2009, CA 2017, NC 2017, and NE 2017 voterfiles who were old enough to be potentially linked.

Table S1: Fixed Effects Levels Descriptive Statistics - 2005/2009 sample

Fixed Effect Level	Count	Comparison Count	Comparison N	Comparison Treated
State	49	49	609878	22462
County	3088	1511	523233	22440
Enumeration District	110227	7551	103973	19779
Reel	4577	2566	405758	22448
Reel Page 10	2218131	8219	55057	15975
Reel Page 5	294985	7730	36322	12674


Note: Table shows the count of unique values for each fixed effect level in the 2005/2009 linked sample of whites. Comparison Count is the number of unique levels with at least 1 white individual with a Black next door neighbor and 1 without. Comparison N is the sample size within such levels. Comparison treated is the sample size within such levels with a Black next door neighbor.

Figure S2: Distribution of Partisanship in Linked Sample




Plot shows the breakdown of contemporary tract-level percent White of the linked sample compared to that of the voters in the CA 2005, NC 2009, CA 2017, NC 2017, and NE 2017 voterfiles who were old enough to be potentially linked. Percent White is calculated from American Community Survey Census data matching the date of each respective voterfile.

Figure S3: Distribution of Contemporary Tract-Level % White in Linked Sample




Plot shows the breakdown of contemporary tract-level percent White of the linked sample compared to that of the voters in the CA 2005, NC 2009, CA 2017, NC 2017, and NE 2017 voterfiles who were old enough to be potentially linked. Percent White is calculated from the American Community Survey Census data matching the date of each respective voterfile.

Figure S4: Distribution of Contemporary Tract-Level % High School Educated in Linked Sample



Plot shows the breakdown of contemporary tract-level percent high school educated of the linked sample compared to that of the voters in the CA 2005, NC 2009, CA 2017, NC 2017, and NE 2017 voterfiles who were old enough to be potentially linked. Percent high school educated is calculated from the American Community Survey Census data matching the date of each respective voterfile.

Figure S5: Distribution of Contemporary Tract-Level Median Household Income in Linked Sample



Plot shows the breakdown of contemporary tract-level median household income of the linked sample compared to that of the voters in the CA 2005, NC 2009, CA 2017, NC 2017, and NE 2017 voterfiles who were old enough to be potentially linked. Median Household income is calculated from the American Community Survey Census data matching the date of each respective voterfile.



Table S2: Fixed Effects Levels Descriptive Statistics - 2017 Sample

Fixed Effect Level	Count	Comparison Count	Comparison N	Comparison Treated
State	49	44	235824	10919
County	3031	1042	180821	10869
Enumeration District	74184	3340	37983	9060
Reel	4568	1627	122068	10887
Reel Page 10	119762	3953	21042	7089
Reel Page 5	148385	3600	13407	5334

Note: Table shows the count of unique values for each fixed effect level in the 2017 linked sample of whites. Comparison Count is the number of unique levels with at least 1 white individual with a Black next door neighbor and 1 without. Comparison N is the sample size within such levels. Comparison treated is the sample size within such levels with a Black next door neighbor.

Figure S6: Covariate Balance across Individuals with and without Black Next Door Neighbors





Figure S7: Power Analysis by Fixed Effects - 2005/2009 Sample




### S3 Power Analysis

Here, we present the results of power analysis simulations run to determine at which level of geographic fixed effects we have enough power to estimate realistic substantive effects. For each sample (2005/2009 and 2017), we ran 100 simulations per effect size for effect sizes 0.01 through 0.10, by increments of 0.01. In each simulation, treatment (Black next door neighbor) was randomly assigned at a rate equal to the levels of treatment in the samples. The outcome (Democratic partisanship) was then generated randomly with probability equal to the overall rates of Democratic partisanship in the samples, plus the corresponding treatment effect for the simulations. Thus, which units receive treatment, and the outcome values, varies across simulations. Other characteristics of the data were held constant across simulations: Geographic location was the same as in the actual data, as were control covariates and sample sizes.

For each simulated data set, we ran the main specifications for each fixed effect level: state, county, census reel, enumeration district, 10 census page grouping, 5 census page grouping, and also census page pairs and single census pages. Figures S7 and S8 plot the proportion of the time across effect sizes that each fixed effect model recovered significant effects. Based on the low-levels of power for the two and single page fixed effects, we did not estimate those for the main analysis.

Figure S8: Power Analysis by Fixed Effects - 2017 Sample



## S4 Main Result Tables

Table S3: Democratic Partisanship by Black Next Door Neighbor - 2005/2009 Sample

	Democrat							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Age		0.001*** (0.0002)		0.001*** (0.0002)		0.001*** (0.0002)		0.001*** (0.0003)
High School		-0.004* (0.002)		-0.003 (0.002)		-0.003 (0.002)		-0.005* (0.003)
Income		-0.00001*** (0.00000)		-0.00000** (0.00000)		-0.00000*** (0.00000)		-0.00000** (0.00000)
Mover		0.002 (0.002)		0.001 (0.002)		-0.00005 (0.002)		0.001 (0.002)
HoH Age		-0.0001 (0.0001)		0.0002** (0.0001)		0.0001 (0.0001)		0.0001 (0.0001)
Homeowner		-0.0003 (0.002)		-0.007*** (0.002)		-0.004** (0.002)		-0.001 (0.002)
Family Size		0.002*** (0.001)		-0.0003 (0.0005)		0.0003 (0.0004)		-0.0001 (0.0005)
Employed		0.011*** (0.004)		-0.001 (0.004)		-0.003 (0.004)		0.001 (0.005)
Labor Force		(0.000)		(0.000)		(0.000)		(0.000)
Hours per Week		-0.0001*** (0.00005)		-0.0001 (0.00004)		-0.0001 (0.00004)		-0.00005 (0.0001)
Weeks per Year		0.0002*** (0.0001)		0.0001 (0.0001)		-0.00002 (0.0001)		0.00004 (0.0001)
Black neighbor (k=1)	0.046*** (0.006)	0.042*** (0.006)	0.028*** (0.005)	0.027*** (0.005)	0.018*** (0.005)	0.016*** (0.005)	0.015** (0.006)	0.015** (0.007)
Black neighbor (k=2)	0.018*** (0.004)	0.015*** (0.005)	0.006 (0.004)	0.005 (0.004)	-0.002 (0.004)	-0.002 (0.004)	-0.006 (0.005)	-0.008 (0.005)
Black neighbor (k=3)	0.018*** (0.004)	0.019*** (0.005)	0.008* (0.004)	0.011** (0.005)	0.002 (0.004)	0.005 (0.005)	0.004 (0.005)	0.009 (0.006)
Black neighbor (k=4)	0.014*** (0.005)	0.012** (0.005)	0.006 (0.005)	0.007 (0.005)	0.003 (0.005)	0.005 (0.005)	-0.001 (0.005)	0.001 (0.006)
Black neighbor (k=5)	0.018*** (0.005)	0.013** (0.005)	0.008* (0.004)	0.005 (0.005)	0.004 (0.004)	0.0002 (0.005)	0.001 (0.005)	-0.004 (0.006)
Black neighbor (k=6)	0.017*** (0.004)	0.015*** (0.005)	0.007 (0.004)	0.006 (0.005)	0.003 (0.004)	0.002 (0.005)	-0.002 (0.005)	-0.003 (0.006)
Black neighbor (k=7)	0.011*** (0.004)	0.011** (0.005)	0.003 (0.004)	0.004 (0.005)	0.001 (0.004)	0.002 (0.005)	0.002 (0.005)	0.004 (0.006)
Black neighbor (k=8)	0.020*** (0.004)	0.020*** (0.005)	0.008** (0.004)	0.010* (0.005)	0.001 (0.004)	0.002 (0.005)	-0.001 (0.004)	0.001 (0.006)
Black neighbor (k=9)	0.023*** (0.004)	0.021*** (0.005)	0.011*** (0.004)	0.010** (0.005)	0.007* (0.004)	0.007 (0.005)	0.004 (0.005)	0.004 (0.006)
Black neighbor (k=10)	0.026*** (0.004)	0.020*** (0.004)	0.008** (0.004)	0.004 (0.004)	0.001 (0.004)	-0.003 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.004)	-0.005 (0.005)
High school educated neighbor (k=1)		0.0003 (0.002)		0.001 (0.002)		0.001 (0.002)		0.001 (0.002)
High school educated neighbor (k=2)		-0.001 (0.002)		-0.001 (0.002)		-0.001 (0.002)		-0.002 (0.002)
High school educated neighbor (k=3)		0.0003 (0.002)		0.0004 (0.002)		0.0005 (0.002)		0.00005 (0.002)
High school educated neighbor (k=4)		-0.002 (0.002)		-0.002 (0.002)		-0.001 (0.002)		-0.002 (0.002)
High school educated neighbor (k=5)		-0.002 (0.002)		-0.002 (0.002)		-0.002 (0.002)		-0.001 (0.002)
High school educated neighbor (k=6)		0.001 (0.002)		0.001 (0.002)		0.001 (0.002)		0.00003 (0.002)
High school educated neighbor (k=7)		0.001 (0.002)		0.001 (0.002)		0.001 (0.002)		0.001 (0.002)
High school educated neighbor (k=8)		-0.00001 (0.002)		-0.0002 (0.002)		-0.00001 (0.002)		-0.001 (0.002)
High school educated neighbor (k=9)		-0.002 (0.002)		-0.002 (0.002)		-0.002 (0.002)		-0.002 (0.002)
High school educated neighbor (k=10)		-0.001 (0.002)		-0.001 (0.002)		-0.001 (0.002)		0.001 (0.002)
FE	None	None	State	State	County	County	District	District
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
N	609,878	512,558	609,878	512,558	609,878	512,558	609,800	512,493
R <sup>2</sup>	0.005	0.005	0.015	0.014	0.025	0.025	0.198	0.215
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.005	0.005	0.015	0.014	0.020	0.019	0.021	0.019

\* p < .1; \*\* p < .05; \*\*\* p < .01

Table S4: Democratic Partisanship by Black Next Door Neighbor - 2005/2009 Sample

	Democrat					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Age		0.001*** (0.0002)		0.001*** (0.0004)		0.001*** (0.001)
High School		-0.003 (0.002)		-0.003 (0.004)		-0.006 (0.005)
Income		-0.00000** (0.00000)		-0.00000 (0.00000)		-0.00000 (0.00000)
Mover		-0.0001 (0.002)		0.001 (0.003)		0.001 (0.003)
HoH Age		0.0001 (0.0001)		0.0001 (0.0002)		0.00005 (0.0002)
Homeowner		-0.003** (0.002)		0.001 (0.003)		-0.003 (0.004)
Family Size		0.0002 (0.0004)		-0.00004 (0.001)		-0.00004 (0.001)
Employed		-0.001 (0.003)		0.001 (0.006)		0.0003 (0.008)
Labor Force		(0.000)		(0.000)		(0.000)
Hours per Week		-0.0001 (0.00004)		-0.0001 (0.0001)		-0.00004 (0.0001)
Weeks per Year		-0.00002 (0.0001)		0.0001 (0.0001)		0.0001 (0.0001)
Black neighbor (k=1)	0.018*** (0.005)	0.017*** (0.005)	0.016** (0.008)	0.015* (0.009)	0.017* (0.009)	0.021* (0.011)
Black neighbor (k=2)	-0.001 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.004)	-0.009 (0.006)	-0.011 (0.007)	-0.006 (0.008)	-0.012 (0.010)
Black neighbor (k=3)	0.003 (0.004)	0.005 (0.005)	0.006 (0.006)	0.014** (0.007)	0.006 (0.008)	0.015 (0.010)
Black neighbor (k=4)	0.003 (0.004)	0.005 (0.005)	0.003 (0.007)	0.005 (0.009)	0.005 (0.009)	0.007 (0.011)
Black neighbor (k=5)	0.004 (0.004)	0.001 (0.005)	0.0003 (0.007)	-0.003 (0.009)	-0.001 (0.009)	-0.003 (0.011)
Black neighbor (k=6)	0.003 (0.004)	0.002 (0.005)	-0.002 (0.007)	-0.005 (0.008)	0.001 (0.008)	0.002 (0.010)
Black neighbor (k=7)	0.001 (0.004)	0.003 (0.005)	0.002 (0.007)	0.002 (0.008)	0.003 (0.009)	-0.0001 (0.011)
Black neighbor (k=8)	0.001 (0.004)	0.002 (0.005)	-0.001 (0.006)	0.004 (0.007)	-0.002 (0.007)	0.005 (0.009)
Black neighbor (k=9)	0.007* (0.004)	0.007 (0.005)	0.008 (0.007)	0.007 (0.008)	0.011 (0.009)	0.009 (0.010)
Black neighbor (k=10)	0.002 (0.004)	-0.002 (0.004)	-0.003 (0.006)	-0.006 (0.007)	0.002 (0.007)	-0.003 (0.009)
High school educated neighbor (k=1)		0.001 (0.002)		0.001 (0.004)		0.001 (0.004)
High school educated neighbor (k=2)		-0.001 (0.002)		-0.002 (0.003)		-0.004 (0.003)
High school educated neighbor (k=3)		0.0004 (0.002)		0.001 (0.003)		-0.001 (0.004)
High school educated neighbor (k=4)		-0.002 (0.002)		0.0003 (0.003)		0.004 (0.003)
High school educated neighbor (k=5)		-0.002 (0.002)		-0.001 (0.003)		-0.001 (0.004)
High school educated neighbor (k=6)		0.001 (0.002)		-0.0001 (0.003)		-0.003 (0.004)
High school educated neighbor (k=7)		0.001 (0.002)		0.001 (0.003)		-0.0005 (0.004)
High school educated neighbor (k=8)		0.0001 (0.002)		-0.0001 (0.003)		-0.003 (0.004)
High school educated neighbor (k=9)		-0.002 (0.002)		-0.001 (0.003)		-0.002 (0.004)
High school educated neighbor (k=10)		-0.001 (0.002)		0.001 (0.003)		0.003 (0.004)
FE Controls	Reel No	Reel Yes	Page-10 No	Page-10 Yes	Page-5 No	Page-5 Yes
N	609,878	512,558	609,878	512,558	609,878	512,558
R <sup>2</sup>	0.028	0.028	0.372	0.398	0.495	0.520
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.020	0.019	0.023	0.021	0.022	0.021

\* p &lt; .1; \*\* p &lt; .05; \*\*\* p &lt; .01

Table S5: Democratic Partisanship by Black Next Door Neighbor - 2017 Sample

	Democrat							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Age		0.004*** (0.0003)		0.004*** (0.0003)		0.004*** (0.0003)		0.005*** (0.001)
High School		-0.021** (0.008)		-0.019** (0.009)		-0.018** (0.009)		-0.012* (0.007)
Income		-0.00001*** (0.00000)		-0.00000** (0.00000)		-0.00001*** (0.00000)		-0.00000** (0.00000)
Mover		-0.011*** (0.003)		-0.007** (0.003)		-0.007** (0.003)		-0.010** (0.004)
HoH Age		-0.0001 (0.0002)		0.0003* (0.0002)		0.0001 (0.0002)		0.0001 (0.0002)
Homeowner		-0.022*** (0.006)		-0.032*** (0.005)		-0.028*** (0.005)		-0.018*** (0.005)
Family Size		0.011*** (0.002)		0.009*** (0.002)		0.009*** (0.002)		0.007*** (0.002)
Employed		-0.020** (0.008)		-0.027*** (0.007)		-0.029*** (0.007)		-0.026*** (0.009)
Labor Force		0.357*** (0.011)		(0.000)		(0.000)		(0.000)
Hours per Week		-0.0005*** (0.0001)		-0.0004*** (0.0001)		-0.0003*** (0.0001)		-0.0003*** (0.0001)
Weeks per Year		-0.0004*** (0.0001)		-0.001*** (0.0001)		-0.001*** (0.0001)		-0.0004** (0.0002)
Black neighbor (k=1)	0.060*** (0.006)	0.053*** (0.007)	0.043*** (0.006)	0.039*** (0.007)	0.034*** (0.006)	0.031*** (0.007)	0.027*** (0.008)	0.028*** (0.010)
Black neighbor (k=2)	0.021*** (0.006)	0.013* (0.007)	0.010 (0.006)	0.004 (0.007)	0.003 (0.007)	-0.002 (0.007)	-0.004 (0.008)	-0.003 (0.010)
Black neighbor (k=3)	0.020*** (0.007)	0.018** (0.008)	0.011 (0.007)	0.010 (0.008)	0.006 (0.007)	0.005 (0.008)	0.008 (0.010)	0.009 (0.010)
Black neighbor (k=4)	0.016** (0.006)	0.009 (0.007)	0.007 (0.006)	0.003 (0.007)	0.005 (0.006)	0.002 (0.007)	-0.006 (0.008)	-0.009 (0.010)
Black neighbor (k=5)	0.022*** (0.006)	0.023*** (0.007)	0.012** (0.006)	0.015** (0.007)	0.009 (0.006)	0.011* (0.007)	0.003 (0.007)	0.002 (0.009)
Black neighbor (k=6)	0.023*** (0.007)	0.013* (0.007)	0.014** (0.007)	0.006 (0.007)	0.009 (0.007)	0.004 (0.007)	0.007 (0.009)	-0.001 (0.010)
Black neighbor (k=7)	0.015** (0.006)	0.018*** (0.007)	0.008 (0.006)	0.012* (0.007)	0.008 (0.006)	0.012* (0.007)	-0.003 (0.009)	0.002 (0.010)
Black neighbor (k=8)	0.018*** (0.007)	0.016** (0.007)	0.007 (0.006)	0.007 (0.007)	0.003 (0.006)	0.002 (0.007)	0.002 (0.008)	0.005 (0.009)
Black neighbor (k=9)	0.020*** (0.006)	0.017** (0.007)	0.009 (0.006)	0.008 (0.007)	0.004 (0.006)	0.003 (0.007)	0.003 (0.009)	0.005 (0.011)
Black neighbor (k=10)	0.024*** (0.006)	0.021*** (0.007)	0.006 (0.006)	0.006 (0.006)	0.002 (0.006)	0.001 (0.006)	-0.003 (0.007)	0.0001 (0.008)
High school educated neighbor (k=1)		-0.006 (0.004)		-0.006 (0.004)		-0.005 (0.004)		-0.004 (0.004)
High school educated neighbor (k=2)		-0.002 (0.004)		-0.002 (0.004)		-0.002 (0.004)		0.002 (0.005)
High school educated neighbor (k=3)		-0.005 (0.003)		-0.006* (0.003)		-0.006* (0.003)		-0.005 (0.004)
High school educated neighbor (k=4)		-0.009*** (0.003)		-0.011*** (0.003)		-0.010*** (0.003)		-0.005 (0.005)
High school educated neighbor (k=5)		-0.006* (0.004)		-0.007** (0.003)		-0.007** (0.004)		-0.005 (0.004)
High school educated neighbor (k=6)		0.0004 (0.003)		-0.001 (0.003)		-0.001 (0.003)		0.004 (0.004)
High school educated neighbor (k=7)		-0.007** (0.003)		-0.008*** (0.003)		-0.009*** (0.003)		-0.007 (0.005)
High school educated neighbor (k=8)		0.002 (0.005)		0.001 (0.005)		0.001 (0.005)		0.001 (0.006)
High school educated neighbor (k=9)		-0.006** (0.003)		-0.006** (0.003)		-0.007** (0.003)		-0.004 (0.004)
High school educated neighbor (k=10)		-0.005* (0.003)		-0.006** (0.003)		-0.006** (0.003)		-0.003 (0.004)
FE	None	None	State	State	County	County	District	District
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
N	238,344	203,915	238,344	203,915	238,344	203,915	238,318	203,892
R <sup>2</sup>	0.008	0.015	0.022	0.027	0.046	0.052	0.341	0.361
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.007	0.014	0.022	0.027	0.034	0.038	0.043	0.044

\* p &lt; .1; \*\* p &lt; .05; \*\*\* p &lt; .01




Table S6: Democratic Partisanship by Black Next Door Neighbor - 2017 Sample

	Democrat					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Age		0.004*** (0.0003)		0.005*** (0.001)		0.006*** (0.001)
High School		-0.015** (0.007)		-0.012 (0.010)		-0.005 (0.013)
Income		-0.00000*** (0.00000)		-0.00000 (0.00000)		-0.00001 (0.00000)
Mover		-0.007*** (0.003)		-0.009 (0.006)		-0.015* (0.008)
HoH Age		0.0001 (0.0002)		0.0001 (0.0003)		0.0001 (0.0004)
Homeowner		-0.023*** (0.004)		-0.023*** (0.005)		-0.021*** (0.007)
Family Size		0.009*** (0.001)		0.006*** (0.002)		0.005*** (0.002)
Employed		-0.021*** (0.006)		-0.029** (0.014)		-0.027 (0.021)
Labor Force						
Hours per Week		(0.000)		(0.000)		(0.000)
Weeks per Year		-0.0003*** (0.0001)		-0.0004*** (0.0001)		-0.0003* (0.0002)
		-0.0005*** (0.0001)		-0.0003 (0.0003)		-0.0003 (0.0003)
Black neighbor (k=1)	0.033*** (0.006)	0.031*** (0.007)	0.025** (0.013)	0.023 (0.016)	0.028* (0.017)	0.030 (0.020)
Black neighbor (k=2)	0.002 (0.006)	-0.002 (0.007)	0.002 (0.011)	0.003 (0.014)	0.004 (0.016)	0.004 (0.020)
Black neighbor (k=3)	0.005 (0.007)	0.005 (0.008)	0.008 (0.013)	0.012 (0.014)	0.015 (0.015)	0.018 (0.018)
Black neighbor (k=4)	0.004 (0.006)	0.001 (0.007)	-0.009 (0.012)	-0.011 (0.014)	-0.016 (0.015)	-0.014 (0.020)
Black neighbor (k=5)	0.008 (0.006)	0.011* (0.007)	0.001 (0.010)	0.004 (0.013)	0.001 (0.014)	0.001 (0.018)
Black neighbor (k=6)	0.007 (0.007)	-0.002 (0.007)	0.017 (0.012)	0.008 (0.015)	0.018 (0.016)	0.009 (0.018)
Black neighbor (k=7)	0.006 (0.006)	0.011 (0.007)	-0.001 (0.012)	0.002 (0.015)	-0.003 (0.015)	0.007 (0.019)
Black neighbor (k=8)	0.0001 (0.006)	0.0004 (0.007)	0.0003 (0.010)	0.006 (0.011)	-0.001 (0.015)	-0.001 (0.017)
Black neighbor (k=9)	0.003 (0.006)	0.003 (0.007)	0.004 (0.011)	0.011 (0.014)	0.015 (0.016)	0.023 (0.018)
Black neighbor (k=10)	0.001 (0.006)	0.001 (0.006)	-0.002 (0.010)	-0.001 (0.012)	-0.009 (0.015)	-0.007 (0.018)
High school educated neighbor (k=1)		-0.005 (0.003)		-0.003 (0.006)		0.001 (0.012)
High school educated neighbor (k=2)		-0.0003 (0.004)		0.007 (0.008)		0.007 (0.010)
High school educated neighbor (k=3)		-0.005 (0.003)		-0.0003 (0.006)		-0.002 (0.010)
High school educated neighbor (k=4)		-0.009*** (0.003)		0.0002 (0.007)		0.002 (0.009)
High school educated neighbor (k=5)		-0.006** (0.003)		-0.007 (0.007)		-0.008 (0.008)
High school educated neighbor (k=6)		0.001 (0.003)		0.003 (0.006)		0.003 (0.009)
High school educated neighbor (k=7)		-0.008** (0.003)		-0.004 (0.006)		-0.002 (0.010)
High school educated neighbor (k=8)		0.001 (0.004)		-0.002 (0.009)		-0.003 (0.011)
High school educated neighbor (k=9)		-0.006** (0.003)		0.001 (0.008)		0.002 (0.008)
High school educated neighbor (k=10)		-0.005* (0.003)		-0.002 (0.006)		0.001 (0.008)
FE	Reel	Reel	Page-10	Page-10	Page-5	Page-5
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
N	238,344	203,915	238,344	203,915	238,344	203,915
R <sup>2</sup>	0.058	0.063	0.524	0.548	0.641	0.664
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.039	0.042	0.044	0.045	0.048	0.052

\* p &lt; .1; \*\* p &lt; .05; \*\*\* p &lt; .01

Figure S9: Black Next Door Neighbor Association on Playmate Sub-Samples




Points represent the coefficient of the Black next door neighbor on future Democratic partisanship. Coefficients are from separate specifications with different geographic fixed effects, and are displayed in order of largest to smallest geographic comparison. Coefficient estimates are from models fitted to subset of whites in the data who have lived next to a neighbor within 3, 5, or 7 years of their age, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the county level. Controls include individual age, family size, whether their family had resided in the same residence 5 years previous, as well as the high school education, income, age, employment status, labor force status, and hours worked on average per week and per week for the head of the household, and whether or not each neighbor has a head of the household with at least a high school education.

#### S4.1 Black Next Door Neighbor and Partisanship Association in Playmate Sub-samples

Meta-analytic evidence points to cross-ethnic friendship as being central to racial attitude formation (Davies et al., 2011; Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006). As such, for a child, exposure to children of the same age with whom friendships may be likely to form could be especially likely to effect long-term attitudes. Thus, we expect this pattern to be present in the subset of our sample who live next to neighbors with children of a similar age in 1940. We estimate our models on these sub-samples. In separate specifications, we defined an individual as having a likely playmate next door when the next door neighbors have at least one child within 3, 5, or 7 years of age from the individuals age in 1940. In other specifications, we further require that a playmate is male, since the individuals in our sample are all male. In 2005/2009 and the 2017 samples, we see effects within this subsample similar to the main effects presented in the paper. (Figure S13).


Figure S10: Black Next Door Neighbor and Future Republican Association



Points represent the coefficient of the effect of a Black next door neighbor in 1940 on Republican partisanship in 2005/2009 and 2017. Coefficients are from separate specifications with different geographic fixed effects, and are displayed in order of largest to smallest geographic comparison. Coefficient estimates are from models fitted to subset of whites. Standard errors are clustered at the county level. Controls include individual age, family size, whether their family had resided in the same residence 5 years previous, as well as the high school education, income, age, employment status, labor force status, and hours worked on average per week and per week for the head of the household, and whether or not each neighbor has a head of the household with at least a high school education.


## S5 Additional Specifications

Figure S11: Black Next Door Neighbor and Future Republican Association – Playmate Subset




Points represent the coefficient of the effect of a Black next door neighbor in 1940 on Republican partisanship in 2005/2009 and 2017. Coefficients are from separate specifications with different geographic fixed effects, and are displayed in order of largest to smallest geographic comparison. Coefficient estimates are from models fitted to subset of whites in the data with a next door neighbor with a child within 3, 5, or 7 years of age of the individual, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the county level. Controls include individual age, family size, whether their family had resided in the same residence 5 years previous, as well as the high school education, income, age, employment status, labor force status, and hours worked on average per week and per week for the head of the household, and whether or not each neighbor has a head of the household with at least a high school education.

Figure S12: Black Next Door Neighbor and Future Democratic Association – Male Playmate Subset



Points represent the coefficient of the effect of a Black next door neighbor in 1940 on Democratic partisanship in 2005/2009 and 2017. Coefficients are from separate specifications with different geographic fixed effects, and are displayed in order of largest to smallest geographic comparison. Coefficient estimates are from models fitted to subset of whites in the data with a next door neighbor with a male child within 3, 5, or 7 years of age of the individual, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the county level. Controls include individual age, family size, whether their family had resided in the same residence 5 years previous, as well as the high school education, income, age, employment status, labor force status, and hours worked on average per week and per week for the head of the household, and whether or not each neighbor has a head of the household with at least a high school education.

Figure S13: Black Next Door Neighbor and Future Republican Association – Male Playmate Subset



Points represent the coefficient of the effect of a Black next door neighbor in 1940 on Republican partisanship in 2005/2009 and 2017. Coefficients are from separate specifications with different geographic fixed effects, and are displayed in order of largest to smallest geographic comparison. Coefficient estimates are from models fitted to subset of whites in the data with a next door neighbor with a male child within 3, 5, or 7 years of age of the individual, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the county level. Controls include individual age, family size, whether their family had resided in the same residence 5 years previous, as well as the high school education, income, age, employment status, labor force status, and hours worked on average per week and per week for the head of the household, and whether or not each neighbor has a head of the household with at least a high school education.

## S6 Neighbor Position Sensitivity Analysis

To better test the singular importance of the immediate next door Black neighbor on future partisanship. We run a series of sensitivity checks. First, we estimate the simple correlations between each combination of neighbor orderings. Results are shown in Figure S14. Next, we estimate models with each positional indicator – representing whether an individual had a Black neighbor living  $K$  household positions up or down from them on the Census page – on its own, absent the indicators for the other 9 positions. Figure S15 plots the results across different fixed effect specifications. We see that the coefficient on the nearest neighbor is consistently the largest, and the only one that retains statistical significance once we get down to the enumeration district fixed effect specification. This mirrors the pattern we see when in our main specifications, including all positional indicators simultaneously. Generally, these results support our assertion that the immediate next door neighbor is uniquely important for influencing future partisanship through cross-racial exposure.

Next, we estimate models sequentially adding in positional neighbor indicators, to see how the effect of the immediate next door neighbor decays as we account for neighbors who live further away. Figure S16 plots the coefficient on the immediate nearest neighbor, showing that the effect decays as we account for more neighbors, although this decay is limited in more restrictive fixed effect specifications.

Figure S14: Correlation Matrix among Neighbor Orderings








Figure S15: Coefficient of Each Black Neighbor Position Without Controlling for Other Positions



Note: Points represent the coefficient of a Black neighbor at the given position (1 through 10, from left to right) on Democratic partisanship, without controlling for whether they have a Black neighbor at any of the other  $K$  positions. Coefficient estimates are from models fitted to subset of whites in the data. Standard errors are clustered at the county level. Controls include individual age, family size, whether their family had resided in the same residence 5 years previous, as well as the high school education, income, age, employment status, labor force status, and hours worked on average per week and per week for the head of the household, and whether or not each neighbor has a head of the household with at least a high school education.

Figure S16: Coefficient of Nearest Neighbor, Sequentially Adding in  $K \in [2, 10]$  Neighbor Indicators



Note: Points represent the coefficient of a Black next door neighbor on Democratic partisanship. The furthest point to the left is the effect of a next door neighbor without controlling for any of the other  $K$  positions, and as we move to the left we sequentially add in controls for  $K \in [2, 10]$ . Coefficient estimates are from models fitted to subset of whites in the data. Standard errors are clustered at the county level. Controls include individual age, family size, whether their family had resided in the same residence 5 years previous, as well as the high school education, income, age, employment status, labor force status, and hours worked on average per week and per week for the head of the household, and whether or not each neighbor has a head of the household with at least a high school education.


## S7 Contemporary Geographic Diversity Outcome Analysis

The analysis in this paper provides evidence that having a Black next door neighbor early in life durably influenced partisanship decades later. This suggests that childhood interactions shaped racial attitudes that influence partisanship. One additional outcome that may be influenced by racial attitudes is where one chooses to live later life. If they were exposed to Black neighbors at an early age, are they more likely to opt to live near Blacks in their adulthood? This outcome can also be viewed as a potential mechanism by which early childhood cross-race exposure influences partisanship, in that it is not just the early childhood exposure, but the lifelong exposure that changes attitudes.

To adjudicate between childhood exposure and lifelong exposure, we test whether having a Black neighbor as a child predicts greater racial diversity of where one lives in the 2000s. For each individual in our sample, we calculate the percent of the population of their Census block group, tract, city/town and county that is Black, and estimate the same series of fixed effects models as in our partisanship analysis.


The results indicate that early childhood exposure to Black neighbors does not increase the likelihood of living near Blacks later in life, all else held equal. As shown in Figure S17, except in the least punitive geographic comparisons (no fixed effects and state fixed effects), we do not see significant results across Census geographies, and the coefficients go to zero as we restrict the fixed effect geographic comparison. This pattern is present in residential diversity measured at the county, city, tract, and block group level – strong evidence of a null effect. This suggests that, while early life cross-racial contact had long-term effects on partisanship, it did not do so as a result of producing an enduring increase in residential racial diversity experienced over lifetime. Further, residential location, as an outcome unto itself, is not uniquely influenced by the composition of one’s closest neighbors during childhood, after accounting for general residential geography and associated characteristics.

Figure S17: Effect of Black Next Door Neighbor on Downstream Residential Racial Diversity



Points represent the coefficient of the Black next door neighbor on percent Black of subject's census block group, census tract, city/town, or county at the date of the respective voterfile (2005, 2009, 2017). Coefficients are from separate specifications with different geographic fixed effects, and are displayed in order of largest to smallest geographic comparison. Coefficient estimates are from models fitted to subset of whites in the data. Standard errors are clustered at the county level. Controls include individual age, family size, whether their family had resided in the same residence 5 years previous, as well as the high school education, income, age, employment status, labor force status, and hours worked on average per week and per week for the head of the household, and whether or not each neighbor has a head of the household with at least a high school education.

Figure S18: Age Distributions of Father and Mother between Linked Samples



**S8 Additional Descriptives on Parents of Matched Samples**

Figure S19: Education Distributions of Father and Mother between Linked Samples




Figure S20: Moving Status of Father and Mother between Linked Samples





Figure S21: Wage Income Distributions of Father and Mother between Linked Samples



## S9 Reconciling with Aggregate Effects of Cross-Racial Contact

We’ve argued that one advantage of our analysis is that we can measure racial context at the individual-level: each individual in our sample has a measure of racial context unique to their location in the 1940 Census derived from the racial composition of their closest neighbors in 1940. We believe that this measure of racial context better captures day-to-day exposure to people of a different race than conventional measures. Previous studies of the effect of racial context on long-run political attitudes and partisanship generally measure racial context by the racial composition of aggregate geographic units (i.e. counties) (Goldman and Hopkins, 2020). Proximity to different racial groups can have important effects on inter-group conflict, especially when groups are segregated (Enos, 2017), but it is a poor proxy for actual contact with other groups. By looking at closest neighbors, our measure more likely captures the kind of cross-race contact that might produce long-term changes in attitudes, driving the partisan effects shown above.

What do we find when we use more aggregate (county-level) measures of racial context? In Tables S7 and S8, we demonstrate how percent Black at the county and enumeration district level correlates with downstream partisanship for whites in our sample. We also demonstrate that the next door neighbor effects persist even accounting for aggregate measures of racial composition. Whites living in counties with higher proportions of Blacks in 1940 were more likely to be Democrats in 2005/2009 and 2017. A one percentage point increase in percent Black at the county level corresponds with a 0.2 percentage point increase in the likelihood of being a Democrat downstream, and the effect for the enumeration district level is just 0.04 percentage points. Put another way, county or enumeration district percent black would have to increase by 10 (county) to 30 (enumeration district) percentage points to see the same increase in downstream Democratic partisanship as having a Black next door neighbor.



Table S7: Future partisanship on aggregate measures of racial context

	Outcome: 2005/2009 Democratic Partisanship			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Black neighbor (k=1)		0.023*** (0.005)		0.017*** (0.004)
Black neighbor (k=2)		0.001 (0.004)		-0.003 (0.004)
Black neighbor (k=3)		0.005 (0.004)		0.002 (0.004)
Black neighbor (k=4)		0.003 (0.005)		0.002 (0.004)
Black neighbor (k=5)		0.006 (0.004)		0.004 (0.004)
Black neighbor (k=6)		0.004 (0.004)		0.002 (0.004)
Black neighbor (k=7)		0.001 (0.004)		0.0001 (0.004)
Black neighbor (k=8)		0.005 (0.004)		0.001 (0.004)
Black neighbor (k=9)		0.008** (0.004)		0.006 (0.004)
Black neighbor (k=10)		0.002 (0.004)		-0.0001 (0.004)
County % Black	0.002*** (0.0003)	0.002*** (0.0003)		
County % Urban	-0.0001 (0.0001)	-0.00003 (0.0001)		
County % Manufacturing	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)		
Enumeration District % Black			0.0004*** (0.0001)	0.0002* (0.0001)
Enumeration District % Urban			-0.00001 (0.00002)	-0.00000 (0.00002)
Enumeration District % Manufacturing			-0.0002 (0.0001)	-0.0002 (0.0001)
FE	State	State	County	County
N	601,736	601,736	609,620	609,620

\*p &lt; .1; \*\*p &lt; .05; \*\*\*p &lt; .01

Note: Presents correlations between future partisanship and % Black at the county and enumeration district levels. Coefficient estimates are from models fitted to subset of whites in the data. Standard errors are clustered at the county and enumeration district levels, respectively. Models include fixed effects at the next highest geography (state for county models, county for enumeration district models). % Black coefficients represent the corresponding change in probability of being a Democrat in 2005/2009 for a 1 percentage point increase in % Black at the county or enumeration district level.

Table S8: Future partisanship on aggregate measures of racial context

	Outcome: 2017 Democratic Partisanship			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Black neighbor (k=1)		0.038*** (0.006)		0.033*** (0.006)
Black neighbor (k=2)		0.005 (0.006)		0.002 (0.006)
Black neighbor (k=3)		0.009 (0.007)		0.005 (0.006)
Black neighbor (k=4)		0.004 (0.006)		0.004 (0.006)
Black neighbor (k=5)		0.010 (0.006)		0.008 (0.006)
Black neighbor (k=6)		0.012* (0.007)		0.008 (0.006)
Black neighbor (k=7)		0.007 (0.006)		0.007 (0.006)
Black neighbor (k=8)		0.004 (0.007)		0.001 (0.006)
Black neighbor (k=9)		0.006 (0.006)		0.002 (0.006)
Black neighbor (k=10)		0.003 (0.006)		-0.001 (0.006)
County % Black	0.002*** (0.0004)	0.001*** (0.0004)		
County % Urban	0.0001 (0.0002)	0.0001 (0.0002)		
County % Manufacturing	-0.002*** (0.001)	-0.002*** (0.001)		
Enumeration District % Black			0.001*** (0.0001)	0.001*** (0.0002)
Enumeration District % Urban			0.00000 (0.00003)	0.00002 (0.00003)
Enumeration District % Manufacturing			0.001** (0.0002)	0.001*** (0.0002)
FE	State	State	County	County
N	233,767	233,761	238,248	238,248

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

Note: Presents correlations between future partisanship and % Black at the county and enumeration district levels. Coefficient estimates are from models fitted to subset of whites in the data. Standard errors are clustered at the county and enumeration district levels, respectively. Models include fixed effects at the next highest geography (state for county models, county for enumeration district models). % Black coefficients represent the corresponding change in probability of being a Democrat in 2017 for a 1 percentage point increase in % Black at the county or enumeration district level.

## References

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