



CS 366

Intro to Computer Security

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Today's Class


- Buffer overflow attacks
- Defenses

Benign Program with Buffer Overflow

```
void func(char *arg1)
{
    char buffer[4];
    strcpy(buffer, arg1);
    ...
}

int main()
{
    char *mystr = "AuthMe!";
    func(mystr);
    ...
}
```

upon return,
set %ebp to
0x0021654d
⇒ seg fault
⇒ Crash!



Malicious Program with Buffer Overflow

```
void func(char *arg1)
{
    int authenticated = 0;
    char buffer[4];
    strcpy(buffer, arg1);
    if(authenticated) { ...
}

int main()
{
    char *mystr = "AuthMe!";
    func(mystr);
    ...
}
```


call stack:



What Worse Can Be Done

```
void func(char *arg1)
{
    char buffer[4];
    strcpy(buffer, arg1);
    ...
}
```

culprit



strcpy lets you write as much as you want until a "\0"

As an attacker, you want to write code (action!)

In reality, strings come ~~from...~~

- ❖ Users, e.g.,
 - text input
 - file input
 - packets
 - environment variables
 - ...
- ❖ Validating assumptions about user input is extremely important!

Code Injection


❖ Basic idea:

```
void func(char *arg1)
{
    char buffer[4];
    sprintf(buffer, arg1);
    ...
}
```

Code Injection

❖ Basic idea:

```
void func(char *arg1)
{
    char buffer[4];
    sprintf(buffer, arg1);
    ...
}
```



- (1) Load my own code into memory
- (2) Somehow get %eip to point to it

Code Injection

- ❖ How to load code into memory
- ❖ What code to load
- ❖ How to get the code to run

How to Load Code into ~~Memory~~

- ❖ By exploiting a buffer overflow vulnerability in the program and overrun the buffer

What Code to Load

- ❖ Must be machine code: compiled and ready to run
- ❖ Can't contain all-zero bytes
 - otherwise, sprintf/scanf/gets...will stop copying
- ❖ Can't use the loader: must be self-contained

What Code to Load

- ❖ Best choice: general-purpose shell
 - a command line prompt that gives attacker general access to the system
- ❖ The code to launch a shell: shellcode

Shellcode Example

```
#include <stdio.h>
int main( ) {
    char *name[2];
    name[0] = "/bin/sh";
    name[1] = NULL;
    execve(name[0], name, NULL);
}
```



Assembly

```
xorl %eax, %eax
pushl %eax
pushl $0x68732f2f
pushl $0x6e69622f
movl %esp, %ebx
pushl %eax
...
```




Machine code

```
"\x31\xc0"
"\x50"
"\x68" "//sh"
"\x68" "/bin"
"\x89\xe3"
"\x50"
...
```

How to Get The Code to Run

Attacker:

- ❖ Can't insert a "jump to this code" instruction
- ❖ Doesn't know precisely where the code is



Recall: Memory Layout

~~Summary~~

❖ Calling function

- Push arguments onto stack in reverse
- Push the return address (%eip): the address of instruction you want run after control returns to you
- Jump to the function's address

❖ Callee function

- Push the old frame pointer (%ebp) onto stack
- Set frame point (%ebp) to the top of the stack right now (%esp)
- Push local variables onto stack


❖ Returning function

- Reset the previous stack frame: %esp=%ebp,
%ebp=(%ebp)

- Jump back to return address: %eip=4(%esp)

← Attacker
modifies %eip
to point to his code


Manipulating The Saved %eip



- ① put 0xbff into %eip
- ② But how does attack know 0xbff?
 - Most likely he doesn't know and needs to guess

Increasing Attacker's Chance

- ❖ Classic way: **nop sled**
- ❖ Single-byte instruction that does nothing and just moves on




But a bunch of nops look ~~suspicious~~

- ❖ More nops enlarge the attack surface
- ❖ But this pattern is easily detectable
- ❖ Various evasion techniques, e.g.,
 - move the register to itself
 - add zero to the register
 - add one to the register and then subtract one
 - ... to make the instructions look normal

Code Injection Summary

- ❖ The injection technique we covered:



- ❖ This is the most commonly referred-to buffer overflow exploit, called stack smashing

One More Thing...

- ❖ If the attacker doesn't have access to the target code
 - he doesn't know how far buffer is from %ebp
 - thus he doesn't know where %eip is to overwrite
- ❖ He can try guessing
 - worse case: trying all 2^{32} memory locations
- ❖ But he doesn't need to
 - the stack usually starts at a fixed address (unless address randomization is used)
 - the stack will grow but usually not very far (unless code has heavy recursion)

Other Buffer Overflow Attacks

- ❖ What we just saw is stack buffer overflow (write)
- ❖ There are other attacks that exploit bugs in buffer
 - heap overflow, integer overflow, read overflow, format string vulnerability
- ❖ Which one(s) of CIA does buffer overflow violate?
 - Confidentiality
 - Integrity
 - Availability

Heap Overflow

```
typedef struct _vulnerable_struct {  
    char buff[MAX_LEN];  
    int (*cmp)(char*,char*);  
} vulnerable;
```

```
int foo(vulnerable* s, char* one, char* two)  
{  
    strcpy( s->buff, one );  
    strcat( s->buff, two );  
    return s->cmp( s->buff, "file://foobar" );  
}
```

← Copy one into buffer
← Concatenate two into buffer

Must have: $\text{strlen}(\text{one}) + \text{strlen}(\text{two}) < \text{MAX_LEN}$
Otherwise: overwrite $s \rightarrow \text{cmp}$

Integer Overflow

```
void vulnerable()
```

OpenSSH 3.3

```
{
```

```
char Huge*response;
```

```
int nresp = packet_get_int();
```

```
if (nresp > 0) {
```

```
    response = malloc(nresp*sizeof(char*));
```

wrap-around

```
    for (i = 0; i < nresp; i++)
```

4bytes

```
    response[i] = packet_get_string(NULL);
```

```
}
```

overflow

- ❖ If attacker sets `nresp` to a large number, say, ~1 billion
- ❖ Then `nresp*sizeof(char*)` wraps around to 0
- ❖ Any writes to allocated `response` will overflow it

Data Corruption

- ❖ The attacks we have seen so far corrupt *code*
 - return address
 - function pointer
 - ...
- ❖ They can also corrupt data
 - modify the **secret key** to use the value the attacker knows
 - modify **state variables** to bypass checks (e.g., the authenticated flag we saw)
 - modify **interpreted strings** used as part of commands (e.g., SQL injection)

Read Overflow

- ❖ So far we have focused on write overflow
- ❖ In read overflow, a bug can permit reading past the end of a buffer rather than writing past the end
 - can result in information leakage

Read Overflow

```
int main() {  
    char buf[100], *p;  
    int i, len;  
    while (1) {  
        p = fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), stdin);  
        if (p == NULL) return 0;  
        len = atoi(p);  
        p = fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), stdin);  
        if (p == NULL) return 0;  
        for (i=0; i<len; i++)  
            if (!isctrl(buf[i])) putchar(buf[i]);  
            else putchar('.');  
        printf("\n");  
    }  
}
```

} Read integer

} Read message

} Echo-back
the message

Sample Output

```
% ./echo-server
```

```
24
```

```
every good boy does fine
```

```
ECHO: |every good boy does fine|
```

```
10
```

```
hello there
```

```
ECHO: |hello ther|
```

```
25
```

```
hello
```

```
ECHO: |hello..here..y does fine.|
```

} ✓


} ✓

} read
overflow

Format String Attack

- ❖ Formatted I/O: C's printf family

```
void print_record(int age, char *name)
{
    printf("Name: %s\tAge: %d\n", name, age);
}
```



- ❖ Format specifiers

- position in string indicates stack arguments to print
- type of specifier indicates type of arguments


Difference between The Two?

```
void safe()
{
    char buf[80];
    if(fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), stdin)==NULL)
        return;
    printf("%s",buf);
}
```

```
void vulnerable()
{
    char buf[80];
    if(fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), stdin)==NULL)
        return;
    printf(buf);
}
```

Let's recall the printf implementation

```
int i = 10;  
printf("%d %p\n", i, &i);
```



- ❖ Printf takes variable number of arguments
- ❖ It doesn't care where its stack frame ends
- ❖ It assumes that it's called with as many arguments as format specifiers

This Can Be Exploited

```
void vulnerable()  
{  
    char buf[80];  
    if(fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), stdin)==NULL)  
        return;  
    printf(buf);  
}
```

"%d %x"

0x00000000

0xffffffff



caller's
stack frame

Example Vulnerabilities

- ❖ `printf("%s");`
 - prints stack entry as a string
- ❖ `printf("%d %d %d ...");`
 - prints a series of stack entries as integers
- ❖ `printf("%08x %08x %08x...");`
 - prints a series of stack entries as 8-digit hex
- ❖ `printf("100% decent!");`
 - prints stack entry 4 bytes above the saved %e
- ❖ `printf("100% new");`
 - writes 3 (100) to location pointed to by stack entry

Why Is Format String Attack A Type of Buffer Overflow?

❖ In the sense that

- the printf stack itself can be considered a buffer
- the number and size of arguments passed to the function determines the buffer size
- providing a malicious format string causes program to overflow this buffer → read or write overflow