Spamhaus

Externalities

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Group number

6

GitHub

https://github.com/Erackron/EoC/

1 Introduction

In this report, the previously-described Spamhaus dataset will be used to identify which externalities can be expected when mitigating the risk imposed by the Gamut botnet. Externalities are costs or benefits that affect an external party which does not participate directly in the transaction. For example, when a production company chooses to dump its waste in a nearby river, the health issues this causes for citizens living downstream can be seen as a (negative) externality. These externalities can cause a lack of incentives for actors to take action and mitigate harm they are causing. In the case of the production company, the company does not bear the costs of the health issues and therefore has no incentive to mitigate risk it imposes for citizens living downstream.

Moreover, the analysis of the security performance for different countries has shown a significant variance in the infection rate among the countries. The second part of this report will be aimed at defining factors that cause this variance and will provide a statistical analysis showing the variance that be can be explained by a subset of these factors.

2 Externalities

In this section, the externalities that occur when certain actors invest in the treatment of the risk caused by the Gamut botnet will be assessed. First, three focal actors are chosen. Then, a countermeasure is discussed for each of these actors. Moreover, the distribution of costs and benefits for each actor and the respective countermeasure is evaluated. Finally, the lack of incentives to take the countermeasures as well as the externalities that occur are presented.

2.1 Actors

The first actor we will focus on is the Vietnamese governmental **cybersecurity agency**, which was also the problem owner in our previous report. This agency is responsible for

assessing the country's cybersecurity and it reports its findings to and gives advice to the Vietnamese government. The government may, in turn, impose certain security standards on the country's companies and may create regulations and legislation.

The choice for Vietnam is based on the country's disproportionate amount of infections by the Gamut malware. This makes it an interesting point of focus when it comes to analyzing the underlying reasons behind the existence of this problem.

A Vietnamese **IT company** such as VNPT¹ provides a large variety of services, ranging from telecommunications to consultancy. The Gamut botnet poses a threat to VNPT by sending extremely large volumes of spam, which may clog the network and reduce the available bandwidth for legitimate users. If users are significantly affected they may blame VNPT and switch to another provider. Therefore, VNPT should be interested in countermeasures even though Gamut does not directly attack the company.

The machines of **citizens** are interesting targets for malware such as Gamut because these machines are often poorly protected—they use default passwords and vulnerabilities are not often patched. On the other hand, citizens are not directly affected by malware such as Gamut other than slightly reduced performance. Therefore, citizens are an interesting actor to analyse because they can potentially solve the problem but do not have a vested interest in doing so.

2.2 Countermeasures

As the **cybersecurity agency** in Vietnam has general incentives for amplifying the defences of the country's network, one countermeasure that the cybersecurity agency could take to mitigate the security issue is to set up a collaboration network for ISPs. In general, most companies have not been adept at collaborating to defend against cyber attacks, and cybercriminals have exploited the fact that the defenders have not been coordinated. By exchanging information through this new information channel set up by the cybersecurity agency, the companies can to a larger extent coordinate responses and share experiences. This will lead to a more efficient security performance.

IT companies could set up spam filters. These will prevent spam emails from entering the network, thus protecting the network from further infections. Spam filters generally have a very high precision and recall, and, as analysed in our previous report are a cost-effective method against spam.

In order to respond to the botnet threat, **citizens** could properly secure the machines they own. One specific countermeasure they could take against the botnet threat is installing antivirus software. In some cases, the antivirus software will be able to detect and remove the malware from a device. However, in other cases, the complexity of the malware and creativity of the attacker disables the antivirus software from solving the issue.² To illustrate this, many malicious programs present on infected machines are able to interfere with the

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¹ http://vnpt.vn/en

² http://clico.pl/services/practical-defense-in-depth-protection-against-botnets

antivirus software and disable it (Hachem, Mustapha, Granadillo & Debar, 2011). In these cases, prevention in the form of e.g. better passwords may be a better alternative.

2.3 Cost distribution

(0.5 point) Analyze the distribution of costs and benefits among the different actors that the deployment of the countermeasure would entail.

// TODO

2.4 Incentives

Cybersecurity Agency

Overall lost efficiency and productivity in the country due to domains being on blocklists. The reputation of its national servers.

IT Companies

When dealing with a lot of incoming spam without having a spam filter, the employees will take much longer to go through their email on a day to day basis, leading to decreased efficiency and productivity and the potential of emails being missed in the flood of spam.

The other side of the incentive to install a spam filter is that if your network is perceived to be sending a lot of spam, your network might end up on a blocklist, which means that other companies with spam filters will likely mark all your legitimate email as spam as well, leading to decreased revenue and a loss of clients.

Citizens

When your personal home network or machine is infected with a botnet, things you might notice are a slower experience overall, due to the botnet or any of the other malware payloads it also installs taking up processing power, network bandwidth and more. Furthermore, the aforementioned extra malware payloads could also steal payment credentials, personal information or prevent access to personal data unless a fee is paid.

2.5 Externalities

Cooperation network

Positive

Sets up a network for collaboration for all kinds of threats, not just Gamut.

Negative

Because of all kinds of regulations that new companies will have to comply with, the entry barriers for new companies will be significantly higher. Furthermore, companies not in the network will be targeted worse. All put together, this will lead to more spam and with it, more infections.

Spam filters

Positive

When setting up a spam filter for a company network on both incoming and outgoing email, one positive externality is that other companies will experience less spam if your company is infected with a botnet that sends spam. Subsequently, this also reduces the spread of botnet-related malware that is mainly distributed through spam emails.

Positive

If you protect against spam from Gamut, you will also protect against spam from other sources.

Negative

Spammers will target other, worse-protected companies.

Secure your machine

Positive

Others are less likely to be infected and the total volume of spam will slightly decrease.

Negative

By buying a specific antivirus type, you can become part of the reason that malware developers will try to circumvent the protection from that specific antivirus vendor.

3 Analysis

(7 points) Identify the type of actor whose security performance is visible in the metric(s) you selected (e.g. ISPs, software vendors, countries). Note that this is not necessarily the problem owner, rather it is the unit of analysis in your metric.

- 1. Choose a type of actor.
 - a. Countries.
- 2. Identify different factors explaining (causing) the variance in the metric.
 - a. National cybersecurity investment
 - b. Global Cybersecurity Index³

Correlation:

Pearson -0.0851 Kendall 0.0450 Spearman 0.0629

c. GDP per capita per country⁴

Correlation:

 Pearson
 0.1144

 Kendall
 0.1700

 Spearman
 0.2537

³ https://www.itu.int/dms_pub/itu-d/opb/str/D-STR-GCI.01-2017-PDF-E.pdf

⁴ https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?view=map

- d. Population characteristics, e.g. density etc.⁵
- e. Government initiatives
- f. The ratio of cybersecurity papers published in the country⁷

Correlation:

Pearson 0.0126 Kendall -0.1260 Spearman -0.1878

g. Technology index⁸

Correlation:

Pearson -0.1066
Kendall -0.0037
Spearman 0.0225

- h. The ratio of cybersecurity experts in the country
- The ratio of attackers caught in a country = police effectiveness
- j. Median citizen income⁹

Correlation:

Pearson -0.1006 Kendall 0.0854 Spearman 0.1455

k. *IDI*¹⁰

Correlation:

Pearson -0.0264 Kendall 0.1399 Spearman 0.2204

- I. The annual turnover of IT companies
- m. Ratio of cybersecurity firms in a country
- n. Number of computers per citizen¹¹

Correlation:

 Pearson
 0.2318

 Kendall
 0.1326

 Spearman
 0.2029

- 3. Collect data for one or several of these factors.
 - a. OK
- 4. Perform a statistical analysis to explore the impact of these factors on the metric.
 - a. // TODO

⁵ https://population.un.org/wpp/DataQuery/

https://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Statistics/Documents/publications/misr2017/MISR2017_Volume 1 ndf

⁶ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List of countries and dependencies by population density

⁷ https://www.scimagojr.com/countryrank.php

⁸ http://www.nationmaster.com/country-info/stats/Economy/Technology-index

⁹ https://news.gallup.com/poll/166211/worldwide-median-household-income-000.aspx

¹¹ http://www.nationmaster.com/country-info/stats/Media/Personal-computers/Per-capita

References

Hachem, N., Mustapha, Y. B., Granadillo, G. & Debar, H. (2011). Botnets: lifecycle and taxonomy. In *Network and Information Systems Security (SAR-SSI), 2011 Conference on* (pp. 1-8). IEEE.