


# Connected Factories/IoT lecture 5/6: Safety



Associate Degree Smart Industry / Technische Bedrijfskunde  
Faculty of Engineering and Automotive

johan.korten@han.nl

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# Schedule

	<b>Theme</b>	
Lecture 1	Introduction	
Lecture 2	Network connections	
Lecture 3	Network protocols	
Lecture 4	Interconnections	
Lecture 5	<b>Today: Safety</b>	
Lecture 6	Security	
Assessment		

# Functional Safety

Brief definition:


*Protection of people and assets from hazards caused by incorrect functioning of a system.*

Full definition:

Functional safety is a part of overall safety, responsible for correct operation of system or equipment in response to input changes including safety management taking into account the possibility of human error and/or system/equipment or hardware failure and environmental changes.

Protection: halting system and putting it in to a predictable safe state.

# Safety by design



INCLUDES  
FREE  
NEWNES ONLINE  
MEMBERSHIP



## MISSION-CRITICAL AND SAFETY-CRITICAL SYSTEMS HANDBOOK


Design and Development  
for Embedded Applications

- Comprehensive coverage of all key concerns for designers of critical systems
- Features valuable design templates
- Real-world case studies contained within these pages provide insight from experience

Kim Fowler EDITOR

# PROFIsafe

One minute video: <https://youtu.be/S3tbB9-8X4Y>



PROFIsafe Live Demonstration: <https://youtu.be/QjEeRvgO6jc>

# Safety

- physical level
- data level

# What can possibly go wrong?

Different network communication issues:

Repetition

Deletion

Insertion

Re-sequencing

Data corruption

Masquerade

Revolving memory failure (FIFO)

# What can possibly go wrong?

Different network communication issues:

**Repetition** – malfunction of a bus device causes old / obsolete safety messages to be repeated at the wrong time Example: guard door is reported closed when it is already open.

Deletion

Insertion

Re-sequencing

Data corruption

Masquerade

Revolving memory failure (FIFO)

# What can possibly go wrong?

Different network communication issues:

*Repetition*

**Deletion** – malfunction of a bus device deletes a safety message

For example: request for “safe operational stop”.

Insertion

Re-sequencing

Data corruption

Masquerade

Revolving memory failure (FIFO)

# What can possibly go wrong?

Different network communication issues:

*Repetition*

*Deletion*

**Insertion** – malfunction of a bus device inserts a safety message.

For example: deselection of the “safe operational stop”.

Re-sequencing

Data corruption

Masquerade

Revolving memory failure (FIFO)

# What can possibly go wrong?

Different network communication issues:

*Repetition*

*Deletion*

*Insertion*

**Re-sequencing** – malfunction of a bus device modifies the safety message sequence.

For example: prior to initiating the safe operational stop one wants to select the safely reduced velocity.

The machine will continue running while these messages are swapped, no stop is necessary.

Data corruption

Masquerade

Revolving memory failure (FIFO)

# What can possibly go wrong?

Different network communication issues:

*Repetition*

*Deletion*

*Insertion*

*Re-sequencing*

**Data corruption** – malfunction of a bus device or the transmission link perturbs safety messages.

*Masquerade*

*Revolving memory failure (FIFO)*

# What can possibly go wrong?

Different network communication issues:

*Repetition*

*Deletion*

*Insertion*

*Re-sequencing*

*Data corruption*

**Masquerade** – malfunction of a bus device causes safety messages and non-safety messages mixed up.

Revolving memory failure (FIFO)

# What can possibly go wrong?

Different network communication issues:

*Repetition*

*Deletion*

*Insertion*

*Re-sequencing*

*Data corruption*

*Masquerade*


***Revolving memory failure (FIFO)*** – malfunction of a bus device causes an overload situation by simulating incorrect safety messages to a service that belongs to the message is delayed or prevented.

# PROFIsafe countermeasures


Remedy:	(Virtual) Consecutive Number	Time Out with Receipt	Codename for Sender and Receiver	Cyclic Redundancy Check
Error type:				
Repetition	✓			
Deletion	✓	✓		
Insertion	✓	✓	✓	
Resequencing	✓			
Data Corruption				✓
Delay		✓		
Masquerade (standard message mimics failsafe)		✓	✓	✓
Revolving memory failures	✓			

# Integrated Safety

Conventional safety system:



Integrated safety system:



# Safety Integrity Levels

SIL	Low demand mode: average probability of failure on demand	High demand or continuous mode: probability of dangerous failure per hour
1	$\geq 10^{-2}$ to $< 10^{-1}$	$\geq 10^{-6}$ to $< 10^{-5}$
2	$\geq 10^{-3}$ to $< 10^{-2}$	$\geq 10^{-7}$ to $< 10^{-6}$
3	$\geq 10^{-4}$ to $< 10^{-3}$	$\geq 10^{-8}$ to $< 10^{-7}$
4	$\geq 10^{-5}$ to $< 10^{-4}$	$\geq 10^{-9}$ to $< 10^{-8}$

# Safety Integrity Levels

PROFIsafe can support up to:

- Safety Integrity Level 3 ( SIL 3) IEC 61508,
- or Category 4, EN 954-1.


To meet SIL 3 requirements, the probability of an undetected error must be < 1 error for every  $10^7$  hours of operation (once every 1140.8 years).

The allowable PROFIsafe communication portion of the error probability is < 1 undetected error for every  $10^9$  hours (one undetected error every 114,077 years).

# Standard IEC 61511


- defines the functional safety requirements established by IEC 61508 (*master standard*) in process industry sector terminology.
- focuses attention on one type of instrumented safety system used within the process sector, the Safety Instrumented System (SIS).
- consists of three parts:
  1. Framework, definitions, system, hardware and software requirements
  2. Guidelines in the application of IEC 61511-1
  3. Guidance for the determination of the required safety integrity levels

# IEC 61508 and related standards (not exhaustive)




[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IEC\\_61511](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IEC_61511)

PiLZ (also: SICK, Phoenix Contact, ABB, etc.)



# Raspberry Pi and safety...




# Revolution Pi

EN 61131-2 compliant

Operation conditions: -40 till +55 °C

Raspbian with Real Time Patch




<https://www.pilz.com/nl-NL/eshop/00103002137157/Revolution-Pi>

[https://www.pilz.com/download/open/Fly\\_Revolution\\_Pi\\_1004838-EN-01.pdf](https://www.pilz.com/download/open/Fly_Revolution_Pi_1004838-EN-01.pdf)

# Remember: the two army problem.

Two army / general problem



Allied forces can only win with a coordinated attack, but how do they know when to attack?

# TCP: Transmission Control Protocol


TCP program layer in the client computer:

- waits until all the packets have arrived,
- then acknowledges those it received
- asks for the re-transmission of any it did not (based on missing packet numbers)

How does it deal with the *two generals problem*?


- TCP can't guarantee state consistency between endpoints
- timeouts

# Quality of Service: QoS



Source: <https://dzone.com/articles/internet-things-mqtt-quality>

# QoS with MQTT in Node-RED



<http://www.steves-internet-guide.com/configuring-the-mqtt-publish-node/>

# Final tip


Do more with your Arduino Nano 33 IoT board:

<https://www.amazon.com/Arduino-Nano-IoT-Development-Workshop-ebook/dp/B07WK9Y7YV>

or

[https://books.google.nl/books/about/Arduino\\_Nano\\_33\\_IoT\\_Development\\_Workshop.html?id=cZCpDwAAQBAJ&redir\\_esc=y](https://books.google.nl/books/about/Arduino_Nano_33_IoT_Development_Workshop.html?id=cZCpDwAAQBAJ&redir_esc=y)

## Arduino Nano 33 IoT Development Workshop



Agus Kurniawan

## More Links...

<https://skkynet.com/mqtt-answer-iiot/>

“

**That's all...**

**Any questions?**

**Next week: Security**