

Contracted Labor Mobility and Self-selection on Job Match Quality*

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Abstract

Migrants often observe their wages in the source and destination locations before their migration choice. The literature on migrant selection has overlooked this possibility of only migrating after successful job search. With wage dispersion, migration choices are then not based on source and destination location wage distributions but on specific realizations from these distributions. Theoretically, I extend the Roy-Borjas migrant selection model by wage dispersion in source and destination locations and observability of source and destination wage realizations prior to migration choice. This model of selection of contracted migrants predicts negative selection on source and positive selection on destination job match quality. Empirically, using Finnish administrative data, I compare contracted migrants to workers who similarly contract a job outside their location of residence but choose to commute. Residuals from wage regressions are interpreted as a measure of job match quality, albeit confounded by unobservable skills and the main challenge is to distinguish selection on job match quality from selection on unobservable skills. Mobility costs amplify selection and comparing contracted migrants and commuters, two arguably comparable groups facing different costs of mobility, identifies selection on job match quality as predicted by the theory.

JEL classification: J61; R23; D83

Keywords: Geographical labor mobility, internal migration, migrant selection, job match quality

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1 Introduction

The economic literature on labor related migration has mainly interpreted migration as speculative: migrants relocate in the hopes of finding employment in their destinations and, thus, with unknown destination location payoffs. However, migration is often contracted: migrants relocate only after a job in destination has been secured and, thus, with known destination location payoffs. The processes that select speculative and contracted migrants are different. Hence, models of speculative migration applied in the context of contracted migration are misspecified leading to biases in the interpretations of results. This paper takes a step toward the direction of explicitly studying selection of contracted migrants.

The selection mechanisms in cases where opportunities can be searched and secured in other markets before entering them are complicated, and have received little attention in the literature of market self-selection following Roy (1951). The first selective behavior is to search: only those who expect search to increase their utility net search and mobility costs search for opportunities in other markets. The second hurdle is not up to the searcher: the market provides opportunities only to those it judges to fit its goals best. For instance, in the labor market, employers select their employees and the hiring of profit-maximizing employers is not random. Finally, if a searcher receives an offer, she judges whether, net relocation costs, the offer is worth accepting.

I reduce this complexity by studying selection among the source location workers that have passed the first two hurdles. Taking the selection generated by the first two hurdles as exogenous allows the use of tractable techniques in studying selection while respecting the nonrandom selection that the choice to search and employers' hiring choices create. This modeling approach is accompanied by an empirical setting that similarly abstracts from the first two hurdles by studying selection among mobile workers, that is, among workers who have all chosen to search for jobs interregionally and have received a job offer.

Theoretically, I capture the essential aspects of contracted migration by extending the Roy-Borjas (Borjas, 1987) model of migrant selection by allowing within skill wage dispersion and observability of both the current wage in the source and the potential wage in the destination prior to the migration choice. Choice of contracted mobility is thus not only based on the mean and variance of source and destination region wage distributions but on specific realizations from these distributions. Given the current wage, low wage offers may not be enough to compensate for relocation costs whereas high offers may be. Thus, the deviation of the offered wage from the expected wage, job match quality in the destination, becomes a factor of relocation choice and there is positive selection on destination location job match quality. On the other hand, given the offered wage, the lower the current wage is, the larger are the gains from relocation. Thus, job match quality in the source becomes a factor of relocation choice and there

is negative selection on source location job match quality.

Empirically, the relationship between contracted migration and an empirical measure of a wage's deviation from its expectation, a residual from a wage regression, is confounded by unobservable skills and abilities which have been documented to correlate with migration (Borjas, Kauppinen, & Poutvaara, 2018; Bartolucci, Villosio, & Wagner, 2018; Gould & Moav, 2016). This complicates the identification of job match quality in at least three ways. First, in the source, contracted migrants may not be negatively selected relative to stayers on pre-migration residuals if they are positively selected relative to stayers on their unobservable skills. The positive selection of the subpopulation that receives job offers may mask low job match quality when this group is compared to stayers. Second, in the destination, contracted migrants may be positively selected relative to destination region workers on post-migration residuals not only due their higher job match quality but also due to their more valuable unobservable skills. Third, contracted migrants may increase their residuals when relocating their labor supply not only due to good new job match in comparison to current job match but due to higher compensation for unobservable skills in their destination than in their source.

It is thus difficult to identify effects of job match quality by comparing migrants to stayers. An alternative comparison group for the contracted migrants are those who contract a job outside their location of residence, but who choose to (tele)commute.¹ These two groups of mobile workers defined by their different technology to supply labor outside their current regions of residence make a relevant comparison for three reasons: First, the commuters, as contracted migrants have received and accepted a job offer, and, thus have both self-selected to search interregionally and have been selected by employers. Second, when comparing commuters and migrants within source-destination pairs, commuters and migrants experience the same change in the compensation paid for unobservable skills due to the change of labor market. Third, those who choose to commute and those who choose to migrate are, however, different in the relocation costs they incur. Relocation costs, on the other hand, magnify selection effects. Comparison of commuters and migrants thus allows us study how the selection effects change in costs and helps us discern whether, selection on job match quality or selection on unobservable skills is magnified.

This paper thus contributes to the migrant selection literature in two ways. First, I connect the Roy-Borjas migrant selection model to job search models and capture contracted migration by within skill wage dispersions and the observability of source and destination wage realizations prior to migration. The ensuing patterns of negative selection on job match quality in the source and positive selection on job match quality in the destination can be seen as a reinterpretation of the Borjas' (1987) "refugee

¹In the following, I use the term commuting but commuting throughout the paper may contain telecommuting as well.

sorting” pattern. This interpretation is relevant for market economies: refugees are workers fleeing bad job matches. Second, I establish the relevance of the theoretical extension by providing the first explicit evidence on selection on job match quality both in the source and destination locations. Migrants have 2-3 percent lower pre-mobility residuals and 2-3 percent higher post-mobility residuals than commuters. Selection on job match quality explains these results better than selection on unobservable skills. The findings imply that interpreting results on selection on residuals without taking job match quality into account underestimates positive selection on unobservable skills in the source and overestimates positive selection on unobservable skill in the destination.

My exploration of these ideas proceeds as follows. The next section positions the work into the existing literature. Section 3 presents the model of selection of contracted migrants. Section 4 outlines the empirical approach. Section 5 introduces the data and the chosen empirical counterparts of theoretical concepts. Section 6 provides evidence of the selection of contracted migrants on job match quality relative to the commuters. Section 7 concludes. All proofs of propositions are in the Appendix.

2 Related Literature

Since Hicks (1932), Schultz (1961) and Sjaastad (1962) the economic literature on migration has focused on the role of economic incentives. Borjas (1987) outlined the heterogeneity in incentives stemming from the differences in individual productivities and modeled the consequences of this heterogeneity for migrant selection. Since then, a large empirical literature has studied to role of incentives not only in inducing migration but also in selecting migrants. Clearly, productivity is an elusive concept to measure. As a large fraction of variation in wages is not explainable by observable determinants of productivity, empirical studies of migrant selection have, in addition to studying migrant selection on observable determinants, studied selection on unobservable determinants of wages, or on their empirical analogy, on residuals (Moraga, 2011; Abramitzky, 2009; Kaestner & Malamud, 2014; Borjas et al., 2018).

Gould and Moav (2016) take the analysis of selection on residuals forward by decomposing unobservable skills into a location-invariant and location specific components. This is important as these two types of unobservable skills affect selection differently. But unobservable skills, whether time-invariant or location specific, are not all the factors of wages unobservable to the researcher. I follow Gould and Moav (2016) in decomposing the unobservable variation in wages but the decomposition is into a location-invariant component and a job match component. This acknowledges that not all variation in residuals is due to unobservable skills and generates novel selection results in the context of contracted migration where the job match is observed both in the source and destination locations.

The dominant method of an econometric study of migration is to compare emigrants

(Moraga, 2011; Kaestner & Malamud, 2014; Borjas et al., 2018) or immigrants to stayers. However, in controlling for the heterogeneity of migrants and stayers, the literature studying migrant selection has also compared incoming migrants from different locations (Borjas, 1987; Abramitzky, 2009), outgoing migrants to different locations (Hunt & Mueller, 2004; Dostie & Léger, 2009; Parey, Ruhose, Waldinger, & Netz, 2017) and also migrants moving between the same locations but working in different industries (Gould & Moav, 2016). On the other hand, the literature aiming to estimate the labor market returns to migration has distinguished wage changes due to job changes and wage changes due to location changes by comparing migrants to job movers (Bartel, 1979; Yankow, 2003; Ham, Li, & Reagan, 2011; Emmmler & Fitzenberger, 2020). The comparison of migrants and commuters in this paper adds to this selection of settings by controlling for the effect of job change but still comparing two groups that are both interregionally mobile.

The distinction between contracted and speculative migration was introduced by Silvers (1977). The evidence on the respective roles of these two technologies of inter-regional labor supply is, however, scarce. Saben (1964) reports that 62 percent of high-skilled intercounty migrants moved having accepted a job in the destination whereas 38 percent of other migrants had a job at hand when migrating in the US in 1962. Detang-Dessendre and Molho (1999), using a small survey of young first-time migrants from rural regions, report contracted migration to be more common than speculative migration in France in 1993. Since the collection of the data used in these studies the share of contracted migration has likely increased and will likely be increasing in the future. As job search more and more often occurs online job opportunities can more easily be searched and secured in distant labor markets. Also, policies regarding international immigration have been gearing toward favoring high-skilled migration and such policies often contain requirements of a job contract at arrival (Kerr, Kerr, Özden, & Parsons, 2017). It is thus likely that contracted migration, rather than speculative migration is the dominant form of labor related migration, at least in the developed countries.

While not made explicit, the literature on labor related migration has often very likely studied contracted migration for instance, by not allowing a long gap between job spells (Ham et al., 2011) or by defining migration as a change in job location (Emmmler & Fitzenberger, 2020). Moreover, even without restrictions that increase the prevalence of contracted migration in the data, contracted migration has likely been common in the data used by many studies given the likely role of contracted migration as the dominant form of labor related migration. Thus, to assist the interpretations of empirical results, the literature would benefit in making the distinction between contracted and speculative migration explicit.

3 Selection of Contracted Migrants

Consider three locations or labor markets indexed by $h = j, k, l$. Let worker i reside in location l , work in location j , and potentially search for a job in location k . If worker i searches for a job in k , she may receive a job offer for a job in k . I call the subset I of workers working in location j that search for location k jobs and receive a job offer the *population at risk of contracted mobility*. Only the workers in the population at risk of contracted mobility can relocate.² Let $i \in I$. The continuum of workers working in location $h = j, k$ is defined by a skill distribution $\nu_i \sim \mathcal{N}(\mu_h^\nu, 1)$. Skills are time-invariant and perfectly transferable across locations.³ Let F_{ih} denote the distribution of wages i can potentially earn in location h .

The per-period cost for a worker residing in l of supplying labor in location h is π_{lh} . The worker i maximizes a discounted stream of per period net income $e_{ilh} = e(w_{ih}, \pi_{lh})$, $h = j, k$, where w_{ij} is the current wage and job offers w_{ik} from location k are sampled from F_{ik} . The asset value of search for $i \in I$ is

$$rV_i(e_{ilj}) = e_{ilj} + \int \max\{0, V_i(e_{ilk}) - V_i(e_{ilj})\} dF_{ik}(w_{ik}), \quad (1)$$

where the second term on the right-hand side is the option value of optimal job acceptance and mobility behavior. Job offers are accepted if and only if $V_i(e_{ilk}) > V_i(e_{ilj})$ which, since V_i is strictly increasing, is equivalent to $e_{ilk} > e_{ilj}$. Letting $e(w_{ih}, \pi_{lh}) = w_{ih} - \pi_{lh}$, we have the job acceptance and migration condition

$$w_{ik} > w_{ij} + \pi_{ljk}, \quad (2)$$

where $\pi_{ljk} = \pi_{lk} - \pi_{lj}$ is the cost of relocating labor supply from j to k .⁴ For now, for simplicity, suppose all location j workers are residing in the same location l and denote $\pi_{ljk} = \pi_{jk}$.

Decompose worker i 's wage in location h as $w_{ih} = \bar{\mu}_h + \rho_h(\nu_i - \mu_h^\nu) + q_{ih}$ where $\bar{\mu}_h$ is the expected compensation for location h mean skill, $\int w dF_{ih}(w) = \bar{\mu}_h + \rho_h(\nu_i - \mu_h^\nu)$

²Allowing speculative migration, a parameter restriction ensuring speculative migration does not occur requires specifying how speculative migrants land jobs in the destination. For instance, if they search in continuous time with unemployment income b and discount rate r and accept the first job offer that arrives at rate φ , the condition is $\frac{\int w dF_{ik}(w) - w_{ij}}{r} < \frac{w_{ij} - b + \pi_{jk}}{\varphi}$ (See Lemma 1 in Section A.1). Adding risk aversion makes speculative migration less attractive.

³This is plausible within a country and this region-invariance of unobservable skills is also an assumption maintained, for instance, by Borjas, Bronars, and Trejo (1992) who study internal migration in the US. Note however, that while I assume that the absolute level of skill is location-invariant, I do not assume that the ranking of a worker in skill distribution is location-invariant. A migrant with above mean skill in source location may have below mean skill in the destination if the destination location mean skill μ_k^ν is higher than the source location mean skill μ_j^ν . This may well occur, for instance, in case of rural to urban migration.

⁴Interpreting w as the logarithm of wage, a formally equivalent model follows from a time-equivalent labor supply cost $e(w, \pi) = w(1 - \pi)$ as $\ln[w(1 - \pi)] \approx \ln w - \pi$.

is the expected compensation for skill ν_i and the deviation q_{ih} from i 's expected wage allows within skill wage dispersion. This wage dispersion may have many sources (see e.g. Mortensen (2003)) but here it is taken as exogenous. From the perspective of a worker, the source of such variation is likely of little importance and I interpret q_{ih} generally as job match quality: the quality of w_{ih} relative to i 's market expectation. Plugging this wage decomposition into (2), we have the mobility condition

$$w_{ij} < w_{ik} - \pi_{jk} \iff \mu_j - \mu_k + \pi_{jk} < (\rho_k - \rho_j)\nu_i + q_{ik} - q_{ij}, \quad (\text{MC})$$

where $\mu_h := \bar{\mu}_h - \rho_h \mu_h^\nu$ is the compensation paid for zero skill level in location h .

Even if worker i when deciding whether to accept the job offer w_{ik} does not care how her current and offered wage can be decomposed, the decompositions determine the likelihood of worker i receiving an acceptable job offer. Thus, to study the selection that the migration condition (MC) generates, specify heterogeneity in I on the different components of the wage and see what types of agents satisfy the migration condition. Let

$$\nu_i | i \in I \sim \mathcal{N}(\mu_\nu, \sigma_\nu^2). \quad (3)$$

As those who are in a position to choose whether to relocate or not may be nonrandomly selected, allow $\mu_\nu \neq \mu_\nu^\nu$, $\sigma_\nu^2 \neq 1$. The values of individual effects $\nu_{ik} := \rho_k \nu_i$ in the source and destination regions in I are then distributed as⁵

$$\begin{bmatrix} \nu_{ij} \\ \nu_{ik} \end{bmatrix} | i \in I \sim \mathcal{N} \left(\begin{bmatrix} \rho_j \\ \rho_k \end{bmatrix} \mu_\nu, \begin{bmatrix} \rho_j^2 & \rho_j \rho_k \\ \rho_j \rho_k & \rho_k^2 \end{bmatrix} \sigma_\nu^2 \right). \quad (4)$$

Specify within skill wage dispersions as,

$$\begin{bmatrix} q_{ij} \\ q_{ik} \end{bmatrix} | i \in I \sim \mathcal{N} \left(0, \begin{bmatrix} \sigma_j^2 & 0 \\ 0 & \sigma_k^2 \end{bmatrix} \right). \quad (5)$$

The population at risk of contracted mobility I may be selected on job match quality. Low job match quality increases the relative payoff from job search and if only job-seeker-employer meetings with high job match quality lead to job offers, then the population at risk of contracted mobility is negatively selected on source location job match quality and positively selected on destination region job match quality. As we will see, such selection is qualitatively equivalent to the selection that (MC) generates and, thus, abstracting from the selection on job match quality generated by job search and hiring choices simplifies without affecting the qualitative results.⁶

⁵ $Var[\nu_{ih}] = Var[\rho_h \nu_i] = \rho_h^2 Var[\nu_i] = (\rho_h \sigma_\nu)^2$, $Cov(\nu_{ik}, \nu_{ij}) = E[\nu_{ik} \nu_{ij}] - E[\nu_{ik}]E[\nu_{ij}] = \rho_k \rho_j (E[\nu_i^2] - E[\nu_i]^2) = \rho_k \rho_j Var[\nu_i] = \rho_k \rho_j \sigma_\nu^2$.

⁶The selection into the population at risk of contracted mobility may also generate correlation

Proposition 1. *With heterogeneity specified by (3), (4), and (5), (i) the expected pre-mobility wages of migrants are*

$$\begin{aligned} E[w_{ij}|\text{(MC)}] &= \bar{\mu}_j - \rho_j \mu_j^\nu + E[\rho_j \nu_i|\text{(MC)}] + E[q_{ij}|\text{(MC)}] \\ &= \bar{\mu}_j + \rho_j(\mu_\nu - \mu_j^\nu) + \frac{1}{\sigma_\Delta} (\sigma_\nu^2(\rho_k - \rho_j)\rho_j - \sigma_j^2) \lambda(z_{jk}), \end{aligned} \quad (6)$$

and (ii) the expected post-mobility wages of migrants are

$$\begin{aligned} E[w_{ik}|\text{(MC)}] &= \bar{\mu}_k - \rho_k \mu_k^\nu + E[\rho_k \nu_i|\text{(MC)}] + E[q_{ik}|\text{(MC)}] \\ &= \bar{\mu}_k + \rho_k(\mu_\nu - \mu_k^\nu) + \frac{1}{\sigma_\Delta} (\sigma_\nu^2(\rho_k - \rho_j)\rho_k + \sigma_k^2) \lambda(z_{jk}), \end{aligned} \quad (7)$$

where $\sigma_\Delta^2 := \sigma_k^2 + \sigma_j^2 + (\rho_k - \rho_j)^2 \sigma_\nu^2$, $\lambda(z) := \phi(z)/(1 - \Phi(z))$ is the inverse Mill's ratio, where ϕ , and Φ denote the density and distribution functions of the standard normal, respectively, and

$$z_{jk} := \frac{1}{\sigma_\Delta} (\mu_j - \mu_k + \pi_{jk} - (\rho_k - \rho_j)\mu_\nu). \quad (8)$$

Job match quality enters the expected pre-mobility wage (6) with a negative sign indicating negative selection on job match quality in the source. Given a wage offer, the lower the current job match quality is, the larger is the gain of acceptance and relocation and, thus, the more likely relocation costs are covered. Hence, those with low current job match quality are more likely to relocate than those with high current job match quality.

Job match quality enters the expected post-mobility wage (7) with a positive sign indicating positive selection on job match quality in the destination. Low wage offers may not be enough to compensate for the costs of relocation whereas high job offers may be. Hence, those realizing job offers with high job match quality are more likely to migrate. Figure 1 illustrates the effect of wage dispersion. Since the difference between destination and source wages have to compensate for the migration cost, a typical contracted migrant is negatively selected in her skill specific wage distribution in the source and positively selected in her skill specific wage distribution in the destination.

The expected pre- and post mobility wages nest the migrant mean wages computed by Borjas (1987) and the selection results with respect to skills are as reported therein.⁷

between job match quality and skills. For tractability, I ignore these potential correlations here. For formalisation and more discussion on the selection into the population at risk of contracted mobility, see companion paper available from the author.

⁷Setting $\mu_\nu = \mu_j^\nu = \mu_k^\nu = q_{ik} = q_{ij} = 0$, (6) can be written as

$$E[w_{ij}|\text{(MC)}] = \mu_j + \frac{sd(\nu_{ik})sd(\nu_{ij})}{sd(\nu_{ik} - \nu_{ij})} \left(\frac{sd(\nu_{ik})}{sd(\nu_{ij})} - \frac{Cov[\nu_{ik}, \nu_{ij}]}{sd(\nu_{ik})sd(\nu_{ij})} \right) \lambda(z), \quad (9)$$




Figure 1: Source and destination wages of speculative and contracted migrants.

Whether selection on job match quality or on skills dominate selection depends on the relative magnitudes of the spreads of within skill wage dispersions σ_h^2 and distributions of expected wages $\rho_h \sigma_\nu^2$: If the variation in the distributions of expected wages across locations is low, the locational variation in μ_h and ρ_h may not be enough to cover the relocation costs. With enough wage dispersion in both locations, however, a change in job match quality may be enough to incentivize relocation and selection on job match quality dominates. This is especially likely to be the case in internal migration. On the other hand, if there are large locational differences in wage distributions relative to within skill wage dispersion, then selection on skills dominates. Without within skill wage dispersion, there is selection only on skills.

We can interpret the model's relation to the Roy-Borjas migrant selection model in two ways. First, the extension can be seen as allowing within skill wage dispersion. Without within skill wage dispersion each worker is always compensated exactly the value of their skills and there is no selection on job match quality. Second, if we interpret the wages in Roy-Borjas model as means of the within skill wage dispersions, the extension is the observability of wage realizations in the source and destination before relocation choice. If the wages are not observed the choices are made on expected wages which with risk neutrality is again equivalent to the model without within skill dispersion.

The expected wages of Roy-Borjas model can, however, also be interpreted more in line of the human capital approach to migration of Sjaastad (1962) as the expectations of discounted income streams. Such an interpretation allows the wage expectation to contain the option value of further job-to-job mobility. In contrast, interpreting the

and (7) can be written as

$$E[w_{ik}|\text{MC}] = \mu_k + \frac{sd(\nu_{ik})sd(\nu_{ij})}{sd(\nu_{ik} - \nu_{ij})} \left(\frac{Cov[\nu_{ik}, \nu_{ij}]}{sd(\nu_{ik})sd(\nu_{ij})} - \frac{sd(\nu_{ik})}{sd(\nu_{ij})} \right) \lambda(z), \quad (10)$$

where $sd(\cdot) := \sqrt{Var[\cdot]}$ and

$$z = \frac{1}{sd(\nu_{ik} - \nu_{ij})} (\mu_j - \mu_k + \pi_{jk}). \quad (11)$$

giving us the conditional expectations as formulated by Borjas (1987).

offered destination wage w_{ih} as an intertemporal utility stream may seem to restrict the model of contracted mobility to no further job-to-job mobility. However, the mobility condition (MC) is derived from on-the-job search model (1) that clearly allows on-the-job mobility in the destination. While the Sjaastad's human capital approach and the Roy-Borjas model typically assume irreversibility of migration choices, containing the choice of staying, here staying does not preclude mobility in later time. Later job opportunities in the potential destination remain available even after declining a job offer and, thus, in comparing staying and mobility, the on-the-job mobility prospects in the destination cancel out.

Borjas (1987) categorizes the possible selection patterns his model generates into positive selection, negative selection and refugee sorting. While positive and negative selection have found use in further theoretical and empirical work, the pattern of refugee sorting, in its somewhat narrow interpretation of high-skill but low wage emigrants suppressed in communist countries immigrating to non-communist countries and earning above average wages in market economies has been left as a mere mathematical possibility. Selection on job match quality here with the zero correlation between source and destination location match qualities, corresponds to the case of Borjas' refugee sorting. Here, we reinterpret refugee sorting as workers leaving jobs that do not pay them what they would expect to earn in the markets into jobs that do, as if refugees fleeing low paying jobs to high paying jobs. This interpretation makes the refugee sorting pattern relevant also in studies focusing on market economies.

4 Empirical Strategy

I now reformulate the model of selection of contracted migrants as a model of disturbances where disturbances are the variation in wages that cannot be explained by observable variables and assumed to be the sum of the value of unobservable skills and job match quality. This is the empirically relevant model as the value of unobservable skills and job match quality are not separately observed. I then discuss how this confounding of unobservable skills and job match quality makes the comparison of migrants to stayers obsolete in identifying the selection on job match quality and describe an alternative strategy based on variation in mobility costs of otherwise arguably similar groups of mobile workers.

4.1 A Model of Disturbances

Section 3 defines job match quality as the wage's deviation from the expected wage. The corresponding empirical measure is the residual from wage regression. However, as unobservable determinants of productivity cannot be included as regressors the resulting residuals reflect both job match quality and the price of unobservable skills. I assume

disturbances, the theoretical counterparts of residuals to be a sum of job match quality and the value of unobservable skills. This corresponds to an error decomposition devised by Flinn (1986) and Garen (1989). Such a factor model has also been used in migration literature (Borjas et al., 1992; Gould & Moav, 2016; Bartolucci et al., 2018), where the component corresponding to q_{ih} has been interpreted as a location specific effect.

To model the selection on disturbances, partial out the observable factors of productivity such that $w_{ih} = \bar{\mu}_{ih} + u_{ih}$ where $\bar{\mu}_{ih}$ is the component of wage that can be predicted by i 's observable variables and controlled for in the empirical analysis including location fixed effect. The sum of the value of the (demeaned) unobservable skills and job match quality, $u_{ih} := \rho_h(\nu_i - \mu_h^\nu) + q_{ih}$, is the disturbance. With an abuse of notation, reinterpret ν_i as the unobservable skills of i , ρ_h as the price of unobservable skills in location h and $\mathcal{N}(\mu_\nu, \sigma_\nu^2)$ as the distribution of unobservable skills in the population at risk of contracted migration.

Proposition 2. *The theoretical conditional expectation of migrants' pre-mobility disturbances is*

$$E[u_{ij}|(\text{MC})] = \rho_j(\mu_\nu - \mu_j^\nu) + \frac{1}{\sigma_\Delta}(\sigma_\nu^2(\rho_k - \rho_j)\rho_j - \sigma_j^2)\lambda(z_{ijk}), \quad (12)$$

and post-mobility disturbances is

$$E[u_{ik}|(\text{MC})] = \rho_k(\mu_\nu - \mu_k^\nu) + \frac{1}{\sigma_\Delta}(\sigma_\nu^2(\rho_k - \rho_j)\rho_k + \sigma_k^2)\lambda(z_{ijk}), \quad (13)$$

and the change in disturbances is

$$\begin{aligned} E[u_{ik} - u_{ij}|(\text{MC})] &= (\rho_k - \rho_j)\mu_\nu - \rho_k\mu_k^\nu + \rho_j\mu_j^\nu \\ &\quad + (\sigma_\nu^2(\rho_k - \rho_j)^2 + \sigma_k^2 + \sigma_j^2)^{\frac{1}{2}}\lambda(z_{ijk}). \end{aligned} \quad (14)$$

where $\sigma_\Delta^2 := \sigma_k^2 + \sigma_j^2 + (\rho_k - \rho_j)^2\sigma_\nu^2$, $\lambda(z) := \phi(z)/(1 - \Phi(z))$ is the inverse Mill's ratio, where ϕ , and Φ denote the density and distribution functions of the standard normal, respectively, and

$$z_{ijk} := \frac{1}{\sigma_\Delta}(\mu_{ij} - \mu_{ik} + \pi_{jk} - (\rho_k - \rho_j)\mu_\nu). \quad (15)$$

Unobservable skills confound the relationship between job match quality and disturbances in two ways: First, as disturbance is the sum of job match quality and unobservable skills, those with higher unobservable skills have higher disturbances. Second, if the destination region compensates for the unobservable skills well relative to the source region, it generates acceptable job offers disproportionately for those whose skill composition has a high weight on unobservable skills selecting them into mobility toward

this region. Then there is positive selection on disturbances due to positive selection on unobservable skills.

4.2 Commuters and Migrants

The population at risk of contracted mobility is likely not a random sample of workers in location j . Prior to being in a position to choose between contracted mobility and staying, these workers have chosen to search for jobs interregionally and have received a job offer. Both of these hurdles are likely to select positively on unobservable skills. Looking at (12) it is, thus, clear how even if there is negative selection on disturbances in the source at the job acceptance and migration choice, the positive selection of the population at risk of mobility, $\mu_\nu > \mu_j^\nu$, may mask this. Thus, the positive selection of those who are in a position to choose whether to migrate or not confounds the effect of job match quality when comparing the mobile to the stayers. Hence, positive selection of migrants relative to stayers on residuals is not evidence against negative selection on job match quality. Looking at (13), on the other hand, positive selection on disturbances in the destination may be due to both job match quality and unobservable skills and, thus, observing positive selection on residuals in the destination is not evidence for positive selection on job match quality. Thus, comparison of migrants and stayers is not helpful in identifying selection on job match quality.

Hence, I study two groups of workers who both relocate their labor supply but employ different mobility technologies: those that migrate and those that start commuting. I call these two groups of mobile workers (*contracted*) *migrants* and *commuters*. To the union of these two groups I refer as the (*contracted*) *mobile*. A contracted migrant and a commuter make a relevant comparison since they have both chosen to search for jobs outside their region of residence and have both received a job offer. Hence, this comparison controls for the selection into the group of population at risk of contracted mobility. Formally, I assume that the distribution of unobservable skills in the population at risk of contracted mobility $\nu_i | i \in I$ does not depend on π_{ijk} . Furthermore, when restricting comparisons to source-destination pairs, the contracted migrants and commuters experience the same change in the compensation for unobservable skills ρ_h and the same change in the unobservable location mean skill level effects $\rho_h \mu_h^\nu$.

The contracted migrants and commuters, however, incur very different costs of mobility. The choice between migration and commuting is based on the relative costs of these two mobility modes. These costs depend on a variety of factors such as access to public transport or a car, housing status and family. The employed mobility mode is thus seen here as a statistic summarizing these different cost structures. Presumably, migrants, who relocate both their residence and work locations incur on average larger costs than the commuters who relocate only their work locations. Hence, I assume $\pi_{jk}^m > \pi_{jk}^c$ where the superscripts denote migrants and commuters, respectively.




Figure 2: Reservation and inverse reservation wages as a function of relocation cost.

Thus, the identification of the effect of job match quality is based on variation in relocation costs. Figure 2 illustrates how mobility costs magnify selection on job match quality. Looking at the upper half, the vertical axis tracks the support of i 's within skill wage dispersion in location k . The worker i 's reservation wage $w_{ij} + \pi_{ijk}$ is an element on this support and increasing in mobility cost. Given current wage, w_{ij} the larger is the mobility cost, the smaller subset of possible location k wages are acceptable and the larger is job match quality required for i to accept a job offer and migrate. Looking at the lower half, the vertical axis tracks the support of i 's within skill wage dispersion in location j . Their worker i 's inverse reservation wage $w_{ik} - \pi$ is an element on this support and decreasing in mobility cost. Given job offer, the larger is the mobility cost, the lower is current job match quality required for this offer to be acceptable. Summing up, the gap in source and destination location job match qualities required for relocation increases in relocation costs.

Let D_i be an indicator with $D_i = 1$ if $i \in I$, (MC) and $\pi_{jk} = \pi_{jk}^m$ and $D_i = 0$ if $i \in I$, (MC) and $\pi_{jk} = \pi_{jk}^c$, that is $D_i = 1$ denotes the contracted migrants and $D_i = 0$ denotes the commuters.

Proposition 3. (i) *The expected difference of the pre-mobility disturbances of the contracted migrants and commuters is*

$$E[u_{ij}|D_i = 1] - E[u_{ij}|D_i = 0] = \frac{1}{\sigma_\Delta} (\sigma_\nu^2(\rho_k - \rho_j)\rho_j - \sigma_j^2) [\lambda(z_{ijk}^m) - \lambda(z_{ijk}^c)]. \quad (16)$$

(ii) *The expected difference of the post-mobility disturbances of the contracted migrants and commuters is*

$$E[u_{ik}|D_i = 1] - E[u_{ik}|D_i = 0] = \frac{1}{\sigma_\Delta} (\sigma_\nu^2(\rho_k - \rho_j)\rho_k + \sigma_k^2) [\lambda(z_{ijk}^m) - \lambda(z_{ijk}^c)]. \quad (17)$$

(ii) *The expected difference of the changes in residuals of the contracted migrants and*

commuters is

$$\begin{aligned} & E[u_{ik} - u_{ij}|D_i = 1] - E[u_{ik} - u_{ij}|D_i = 0] \\ &= (\sigma_\nu^2(\rho_k - \rho_j)^2 + \sigma_k^2 + \sigma_j^2)^{\frac{1}{2}} [\lambda(z_{ijk}^m) - \lambda(z_{ijk}^c)]. \end{aligned} \quad (18)$$

Relocation costs create what Borjas (1987) calls the scale effect: mobility costs magnify selection effects. Here, higher relocation costs can be covered in two ways: by changes in the compensation for unobservable skills or as changes in job match quality. The comparison of contracted migrants and commuters thus reveals the sign of the multiplier of $\lambda(z_{ijk}^m) - \lambda(z_{ijk}^c) > 0$ and so reveals whether variation in mobility costs magnify selection on job-match quality or on unobservable skills.⁸ Section 6.2.3 develops this argument formally.

5 Data and Empirical Definitions

This section describes the data I use, defines the two mobility groups of comparison, contracted migrants and commuters, and the outcome variables of interest, wages, predicted wages and residuals.

5.1 Data

I use total population annual individual level data compiled from various administrative registers provided by Statistics Finland.⁹ For each observation, I assemble data from three periods: the year before the potential mobility event $t-1$, the year of the potential mobility event, t , and one year after the potential mobility event $t+1$ (Figure 4 uses data all the way to the period $t-5$). As the theory in Section 3 models the behavior of salaried workers who are well attached to labor market, I use a sample of such workers. The sample for a year t consists of those aged weakly between 30 and 60 in year t and who were salaried employees, alive and in Finland in the last week of years $t-1$, t and $t+1$, who had positive earnings and zero registered unemployment days in these years and to whom all variables used in the analysis are observed. All residents and workers in and all migrants and commuters to and from the Åland Islands and students and retirees defined by the longest principal activity during the year are excluded. The age restriction is to reduce mobility of students, the first-time movers and mobility that may occur with retirement in the sample. I also, for reasons explained in Section 5.3.1,

⁸ $\lambda(z_{ijk}^m) - \lambda(z_{ijk}^c) > 0$ follows from $\pi_{jk}^m > \pi_{jk}^c$ and $\lambda' > 0$.

⁹ The data are available in data sets called FOLK modules. To build the data used I combine information from FOLK Basic data, FOLK Employment and FOLK Cohabitation modules. See <https://taika.stat.fi/en/>.

require that employer and establishment do not change between years t and $t + 1$. I pool data such that $t \in \{2011, 2012, 2013, 2014\}$.

5.2 Empirical Mobility

The contracted mobile are defined as those who change the location of their employment. This definition of mobility captures both labor related migration and changes in commuting destinations. The stayers are those who are not mobile and do not change the location of their residence. The mobile are further categorized as contracted migrants and commuters according to their post-mobility residential locations. As I study contracted migration, I do not aim to separate speculative and contracted migration, but to restrict the sample such that the mobility events in the data are very likely contracted.

In more detail, first, I define *job movers* as those whose postal code area or municipality of work place changes between years $t - 1$ and t and, to capture employment-to-employment transitions, who have zero days in registered unemployment in year t .¹⁰

Next, for all job-movers, I compute the distance from the location of their residence in year $t - 1$ to the location of their work place in year t . The distance to the location of the new job is defined differently for those who eventually commute and those who eventually migrate: For the commuters, the data contains information of the commuting distance in year t as an Euclidean distance between job and residence locations with accuracy of 250m x 250m squares computed in Statistic Finland. As commuters, by definition, do not change their residence, the distance between their residence and their new job equals their commuting distance in year t .

For the contracted migrants, the distance to new job location does not equal the commuting distance in year t . For them, the distances to new job location are computed as the Euclidean distances between the centroids of the postal code area they resided in year $t - 1$ and the postal code area of new job in year t .¹¹ The different accuracies used in measuring the distance to new job location are unlikely to be an issue as the distances to new job location are typically longer for the migrants than to commuters. Hence, relatively, distances measured using postal code areas are probably not subject to larger measurement errors than distances computed using the 250m x 250m squares. On the other hand, Euclidean distances between postal code area centroids are subject to most severe measurement errors for small distances. Using information on commuting

¹⁰The data records only primary employment without information on secondary jobs.

¹¹I use information on the coordinates of the centroids of postal code areas of job and residence in ETRS-35TMFIN format (Universal Transverse Mercation) for which a reasonable approximation of the distance between a pair of coordinates is the Euclidean distance. The data on centroids of postal code areas are from Statistic Finland's Paavo postal code area statistics database, see https://www.stat.fi/tup/paavo/index_en.html

distances for these distances avoids this problem. All location information is from the last week of the year similarly to employment information.

Next, the job-movers are divided into mobile and nonmobile. The extent of dislocation that qualifies as mobility is defined by a distance threshold. Using a distance threshold in place of changes in administrative regions has the advantage of removing the issue of mobility propensities depending on the distance to border which would effectively lead to an omitted variable bias if the distance to border is not controlled for. The threshold distance for mobility is set to 50 kilometers in the main analysis. This number is somewhat arbitrary, chosen to ensure that there are both commuters and migrants in the sample. The main results are robust to variation in this threshold. *Stayers* are now defined as those who are not job-movers nor mobile. To remove some speculative and residential migration from the sample, all observations that are not classified as stayers or mobile are discarded.

The mobile are then categorized into contracted migrants and commuters based on their post-mobility residential locations relative the pre-mobility residential locations. If the residential location does not change, a mobile individual is defined as commuter. Otherwise, she is a migrant. I leave out those mobile who migrate such that the distance between the location of their residence and their job increases as these moves are likely motivated by factors unrelated to labor market and thus outside the scope of the theory of Section 3.

A concern with this categorization is that commuting often is temporary. Rigidities in the housing markets may force an individual to commute for a while even if she later migrates. Thus, defining commuting and migration by the residential locations on the year of mobility may classify willing migrants as commuters due to the lags in residential adjustment. Ideally, migrants would be distinguished from commuters by studying their residential locations in all years after the mobility event. However, requiring commuting, say, until after n years after the mobility event would drop mobile observations whose employment lasted fewer than n years from the analysis. The loss of observations would be nonrandom leading to sample selection problems. As a compromise, commuters are defined to be those that have still not changed their original residence location in year $t + 1$.¹²

The choice between commuting and migration is not truly binary: The migrants have a strictly positive post-mobility commuting distance as well. Figure 3, however, shows, that the fraction of approximate corner solutions is large enough to render the binary classification of migrants and commuters a reasonable approximation.

Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of the sample by subsample. The commuters are more often males and older than the contracted migrants. The contracted

¹²Note that the post-mobility earnings are computed using the earnings information in year $t + 1$ and by requiring that the employer does not change between years t and $t + 1$. See Section 5.3. Given this constraint, the definition of mobility mode does not drop observations from the analysis.




Figure 3: New commuting distance as a fraction of distance to new job location. *Notes: Distribution of commuting distances in year $t + 1$ relative to the distance between the location of residence in year $t - 1$ and location of work in year t among the mobile. See definitions of the mobile and the distances in Section 5.2. For data, see Section 5.1*

migrants are clearly less constrained by family: they less often have a working spouse and children and they more often live alone. The contracted migrants are also less constrained by housing: they more often rent and less often own their dwelling. Contracted migrants tend to have higher education than the commuters. Choices between commuting and migrating seem to autocorrelate as well: previous migration experience is higher among the contracted migrants whereas previous commuting experience is more prevalent among the commuters.

5.3 Empirical Job Match Quality

Disturbances are estimated as residuals from wage regressions. Residuals are computed from the following wage models estimated in the complete sample for each year $t - 1$, t and $t + 1$:

$$\hat{w}_{ih} = E_{ih}[w] + u_{ih} = x'_i \gamma + \bar{\mu}_h + u_{ih}. \quad (19)$$

where \hat{w}_{ih} is the estimated wage (see Section 5.3.1), x'_i contains observable determinants of wages (see Section 5.3.2), and $\bar{\mu}_h$ is the location effect. Let \hat{u}_{ih} be the computed residual of i in location h and $\hat{E}_{ih}[w]$ the predicted wage of i in location h .

5.3.1 Wages \hat{w}_{ih}

The data have information on annual earnings: wages are computed as the ratio of annual earnings to annual employment days. As earnings and employment days are

	Mobile		Stayers
	Commuters	Migrants	
Female	0.32	0.47	0.52
Age, year t	44.7	39.7	45.5
Born abroad	0.03	0.06	0.04
Education, year t			
Basic education	0.08	0.06	0.10
Secondary education	0.34	0.28	0.41
Tertiary education	0.55	0.62	0.48
Doctoral or equivalent	0.03	0.03	0.02
Work, year $t - 1$			
Tenure in current job, days	2,209.6	1,601.6	2,878.1
Employment days	360.83	359.05	363.22
Unemployment days	0	0	0
Log wage	4.75	4.60	4.59
Mobility experience, year $t - 1$			
Migration experience	0.18	0.38	0.10
Commuting experience	0.79	0.59	0.45
Family, year $t - 1$			
Spouse working	0.68	0.45	0.65
Living alone	0.05	0.08	0.06
Living with spouse	0.80	0.57	0.76
Children	0.60	0.42	0.58
Housing, year $t - 1$			
Right of occupancy dwelling	0.01	0.02	0.02
Rents the dwelling	0.10	0.36	0.15
Owns the dwelling	0.88	0.60	0.82
Distance to (new) job, km			
Mean	147.77	216.68	14.86
Median	104.38	159.60	6.86
Observations	30,896	12,172	3,131,309

Table 1: **Descriptive statistics by mobility group.** *Notes: Means for continuous variables unless otherwise mentioned and shares for categorical variables. For the data, see Section 5.1. See Section 5.2 for the definitions of commuters, contracted migrants and stayers. See Section 5.1 for the sample restrictions.*

observed only annually, earnings cannot be allocated to jobs in source and destination locations that the mobile hold in the year of mobility t . Thus, year t information cannot be used to construct the pre- or post-mobility wages. Pre-mobility wages are measured using year $t - 1$ information. To measure the contracted post-mobility wage I use year $t + 1$ information. This does not come without potential problems. Whereas the contracted wage is determined as mobility occurs, the wages in year $t + 1$ may partly be a consequence of a certain mobility mode choice. This may happen, for instance, if source and destination location labor markets differ in their on-the-job search possibilities putting migrants and commuters in different positions with respect to their on the job search options. I remove this problem by restricting the analysis to those mobile workers who do not change their employer or establishment before the end of year $t + 1$. Within firm career advancement and wage growth likely do not depend

on the residence location and is, thus, not suspect to this concern. Also, the whole sample, including the stayers, is restricted to those who do not change their employer between years t and $t + 1$ to avoid any conditioning of mobility classification on specific employment paths.

The interpretation of year $t + 1$ wage as a determinant of mobility follows from the underlying assumption that all studied migration is contracted, that is, that the wage in the destination is observed prior to migration choice. As described in Section 5.2 the mobile are defined so as to highly likely be contracted migrants. Especially, the requirement of zero days in registered unemployment in the year of mobility is likely to exclude speculative migrants in the sample of workers with solid labor market histories to whom claiming unemployment benefits in case of unemployment is well incentivized. Nevertheless, it is possible that the sample contains speculative migrants who gained employment in the destination quickly and without drawing unemployment benefits. For these workers, the destination wage is determined after migration. However, speculative migrants transition from unemployment to employment and are, thus, in a weaker position to realize high job match qualities than the commuters who transition from employment to employment. Hence, if there were speculative migrants in the sample, they would likely bias the estimated positive selection on job match quality in the destination toward zero.

5.3.2 Wage Predictors x_i

In computing the residuals, x'_i contains gender, whether born in Finland, age, age squared, indicators for level of education, field of education, occupation and industry.¹³

If commuting time and labor supply competed from the same finite endowment of time, then keeping the wage fixed, the daily income should decrease in commuting time. As the empirical measure of a wage defined above is strictly speaking daily income the concern is that wages are underestimated for those who commute. If commuting costs were then left in the error term when computing the residuals, the commuters would have lower post-mobility residuals than the contracted migrants simply because they have higher commuting costs. However, if wages compensate for commuting costs, then removing commuting costs from the residuals would rather remove variation in job match quality that we aim to explain.

That is, if the empirical measure of wage has a negative association with commuting costs, we have the first case and we should include commuting costs into the wage re-

¹³Field of education is classified by the uppermost level of International Standard Classification of Education 2016 (10 categories + 1 for unknowns). See https://www.stat.fi/en/luokitukset/koulutusala/koulutusala_3_20180101/. Occupations are classified by the uppermost level of Classification for Occupation (AML 2010) (10 categories +1 for unknowns). See https://www.stat.fi/en/luokitukset/ammatti/ammatti_1_20100101/. Industries are classified by the uppermost level of Standard Industrial Classification TOL 2008 (21 categories +1 for unknowns). See https://www.stat.fi/en/luokitukset/toimiala/toimiala_1_20080101/.




Figure 4: **Wage decompositions of commuters, contracted migrants and stayers.** *Notes: For the data, see Section 5.1. See definitions in Section 5.2. For the wage models, see Section 5.3. Mobility potentially occurs between time points $t - 1$ and t .*

gression but if the the association is positive, we have the second case and we should not include commuting costs into the wage regression. The most straightforward measure of commuting costs in the data is the commuting distance. The estimated coefficient for the commuting distance in the wage regression in the whole sample of the mobile and stayers is significantly positive (not reported). Thus, when computing the residuals no measures of commuting costs are included in the wage regressions.

6 Empirical Results

6.1 Selection on Residuals

Figure 4 Panel A presents the wage paths of contracted migrants, commuters and stayers. While we observe the wages of stayers growing along a stable path, for the mobile the growth of the wages exceeds this stable growth path during the period of potential mobility. Moreover, the contracted migrants increase their wages more than the commuters. The decomposition of wages into their predicted and residual components, depicted in Panels B and C, respectively, shows that the residuals drive the pattern observed in the Panel A. While the contracted migrants have lower residuals than the commuters prior to mobility in the source, they have higher residuals than the

commuters after mobility in the destination. This is consistent with negative selection on job match quality in the source and positive selection on job match quality in the destination. The first column in Table 2 shows that the unconditional differences in residuals pre- and post mobility are statistically different from zero with signs as in Figure 4.

Recall the indicator D_i on the set of the mobile, with $D_i = 1$ if i is a contracted migrant and $D_i = 0$ if i is a commuter. The conditional differences in residuals, for $h = j, k$ are modeled as

$$\hat{u}_{ih} = \mu_{jkl} + \alpha_3 \Delta d_i + \lambda_t + \alpha_1 \hat{E}_{ij}[w] + \alpha_2 \hat{E}_{ik}[w] + \tau D_i + \gamma v_i + \varepsilon_i \quad (20)$$

where $\tau := E[u_{ih}|D_i = 1] - E[u_{ih}|D_i = 0]$. The triadic residence-source-destination municipality (LAU 2 region) fixed effect μ_{jkl} restricts the comparison to commuters and migrants within residence-source-destination triplets.¹⁴ Selection on unobservable skills may create dependence of the pre-mobility residuals of the outgoing workers on the destination location and dependence of the post-mobility residuals of the incoming workers on the source location. Thus, to control for the effect of destination region in the model of pre-mobility residuals and the effect of source location in the model of post-mobility residuals, the triadic fixed effect that interacts the source and destination locations is more appropriate than monadic source and destination location fixed effects. The triadic fixed effect also controls for the differences in residence, source and destination region characteristics, e.g. prices and availability of housing, and for transport infrastructures connecting the residence and destination locations. The difference between the distance to new job and the distance old job Δd_i adds to the geographical control. The time fixed effect λ_t controls for common year effects. To control for potential losses in firm, industry or occupation specific human capital, the vector v_i contains all the main and interaction effects of indicators of employer, industry of occupation changes between periods $t - 1$ and t and γ is a conformable vector of coefficients.

The indicator D_i can be thought of as denoting such a mobility cost structure that determines i 's preference over migration and commuting. There are many factors that contribute to this cost structure such as family, housing, ties to source location, networks, access to public transport and access to private transport. Here, a sufficient statistic for these costs is taken to be the revealed preference over mobility mode. The indicator D_i captures this preference. Hence, controlling for any mobility costs or proxies of mobility costs controls for the causal pathways of the effect of interest.

Table 2 presents the results of estimation of (20) for pre- and post-mobility residuals. The contracted migrants are negatively selected relative to the commuters on pre-mobility residuals and positively selected relative to the commuters on post-mobility residuals. Thus, the pattern of residuals in Panel C is observed within residence-source-

¹⁴Residence location refers to year $t - 1$ location of residence.

Dependent variable:		\hat{u}_{ij}		
Migrant (ref: Commuter)	−0.0239 (0.0055)***	−0.0214 (0.0091)*	−0.0228 (0.0092)*	−0.0203 (0.0092)*
Dependent variable:		\hat{u}_{ik}		
Migrant (ref: Commuter)	0.0316 (0.0051)***	0.0249 (0.0082)**	0.0239 (0.0083)**	0.0244 (0.0083)**
Dependent variable:		$\hat{u}_{ik} - \hat{u}_{ij}$		
Migrant (ref: Commuter)	0.0554 (0.0030)***	0.0462 (0.0090)***	0.0468 (0.0091)***	0.0447 (0.0088)***
Spatial controls				
Δd_i	No	No	Yes	Yes
$_{jkl}$ -triad FE μ_{jkl}	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
$\hat{E}_{ik}[w]$, $\hat{E}_{ij}[w]$	No	No	No	Yes
Year FE , λ_t	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
v_i	No	No	Yes	Yes
Constant term	Yes	No	No	No
Observations	43,068	43,068	43,068	43,068
Migrants	12,172	12,172	12,172	12,172
Commuters	30,896	30,896	30,896	30,896
R^2 , \hat{u}_{ij}	0.0005	0.0010	0.0013	0.0215
R^2 , \hat{u}_{ik}	0.0008	0.0027	0.0029	0.0267
R^2 , $\hat{u}_{ik} - \hat{u}_{ij}$	0.0024	0.0020	0.0022	0.0695

Table 2: **Selection on residuals.** Notes: * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$. Data pooled from years 2011-2014. See Section 5.2 for the definitions of commuters, contracted migrants and stayers. See Section 5.1 for sample construction. For the computation of residuals, see Section 5.3. White heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered at residence-source-destination municipality level in parenthesis.

destination-location triplets comparing similar workers in terms of their observable determinants of wages and controlling for the net distance to the new job and potential industry, employer, and occupation changes.

6.2 Selection on Job Match Quality

Selection on residuals may reflect either selection on job match quality or selection on unobservable skills. I now argue that the results identify selection on job match quality. I first show how balance on unobservable skills among the observed commuters and migrants identifies the effect of job match quality and discuss its plausibility. I then discuss the conditions under which difference-in-difference estimation identifies the effect of job match quality and study the differences in residual changes. Lastly, complementing the empirical identification with theoretical identification, I pit selection on unobservables and job match quality against each other by deriving corresponding coefficient sign restrictions from the theory and showing that the data is consistent with selection on job match quality alone while the data is not consistent with selection on

unobservable skills alone.

6.2.1 Balanced Unobservable Skills

The comparison of pre- and post-mobility residuals of the commuters and migrants in Table 2 identifies the effect of job match quality if the commuters and migrants are equal in their mean unobservable skills. To see this, consider the conditional difference in the residuals of migrants and commuters:

$$\begin{aligned}\hat{u}_{ih} &= \text{controls} + \tau D_i + \varepsilon_i \\ &= \text{controls} + [E[q_{ih}|D_i = 1] - E[q_{ih}|D_i = 0]] D_i + \epsilon_i\end{aligned}\quad (21)$$

with $\epsilon_i := \rho_h [E[\nu_i|D_i = 1] - E[\nu_i|D_i = 0]] D_i + \varepsilon_i$. If $E[D_i \varepsilon_i] = 0$, that is if *controls* contain all factors with a simultaneous effect on \hat{u}_{ih} and D_i excluding unobservable skills, unbiased estimation of $E[q_{ih}|D_i = 1] - E[q_{ih}|D_i = 0]$ requires $E[D_i \epsilon_i] = 0$ which requires

$$\rho_h (E[\nu_i|D_i = 1] - E[\nu_i|D_i = 0]) = 0 \iff E[\nu_i|D_i = 1] = E[\nu_i|D_i = 0]. \quad (22)$$

There is, of course, no direct way of knowing whether (22) holds in the estimation of (20). The theory suggests that everything else held constant, migrants are selected more strongly on unobservable skills if they incur larger relocation costs than commuters speaking against (22).¹⁵ However, if the selection on unobservable skills played a relatively minor role in selection (22) might be plausible owing to the sample choice ensuring high homogeneity with respect to labor market outcomes and the similar hurdles of search and job finding that the mobile pass. If (22) holds then the results in Table 2 identify selection on job match quality.

6.2.2 Difference-in-difference

It is clear that if the contracted migrants have lower pre-mobility residuals and higher post-mobility residuals than the commuters, then the change in residuals among the migrants should be greater than among the commuters. Modeling the change in residuals is, however, interesting in its own right since if the unobservable skills balance in the two mobility groups or if the compensations for unobservable skills in the source and destination region equal, the individual unobservable effect has a common trend among the commuters and migrants and, hence, within source-destination pairs, a difference-in-difference estimator identifies the change in job match quality.

To see this, consider model (20) but let now the residual change $u_{ik} - u_{ij}$ be the dependent variable. The coefficient τ then identifies the difference in the residual dif-

¹⁵Note also that (22) is not implied by the independence of $\nu_i|i \in I$ on π_{jk} or by $E[\nu_i|i \in I, \pi_{jk} = \pi_{jk}^m] = E[\nu_i|i \in I, \pi_{jk} = \pi_{jk}^c]$, where there is no conditioning on (MC).

ferences

$$\begin{aligned}
& E[u_{ik} - u_{ij}|D_i = 1] - E[u_{ik} - u_{ij}|D_i = 0] \\
& = (\rho_k - \rho_j) (E[\nu_i|D_i = 1] - E[\nu_i|D_i = 0]) \\
& \quad + E[q_{ik} - q_{ij}|D_i = 1] - E[q_{ik} - q_{ij}|D_i = 0],
\end{aligned} \tag{23}$$

where the first term is the difference in trends due to changes in the compensation for unobservable skills. Note that even if, as visible in Figure 4, the residuals of the contracted migrants and commuters evolve very similarly prior to mobility, these common trends cannot be extrapolated to the year of mobility as in that year the compensation for the unobservable skills changes so that the group specific unobservable effects do not cancel out in the before-after comparison.¹⁶ This means that if the commuters and migrants are on average different in their unobservable skills, then the compensations for their unobservable skills evolve differently in the year of mobility violating common trend.¹⁷

However, as is clear from (23) common trend with respect to unobservable skills is satisfied when $\rho_k = \rho_j$. I thus study subsamples restricted by the values the difference $\rho_k - \rho_j$ can take. There is no direct measure of the location's compensation for unobservable skills. Previous research has proxied ρ_h with various inequality measures of location h wages such as 90-20 income share ratio (Borjas, 1987), ratio of 75th to 25 the percentile of the earnings distribution (Parey et al., 2017), Gini coefficient (Liebig & Sousa-Poza, 2004) standard deviation of log wage (Borjas et al., 1992) and standard deviation of residuals from wage regressions (Borjas et al., 1992; Gould & Moav, 2016).¹⁸ I proxy ρ_h with two measures of wage variation: the standard deviation of wages and standard deviation of residuals among location h workers. All these measures are computed in the analysis sample to capture wage variation in the labor markets that the workers in the sample face. As there is substantial year-to-year variation, for each municipality an average over the sample years is computed.

Figure 5 presents the estimated coefficients in these samples. The upper panel uses as a measure of ρ_h the standard deviation of wages of location h workers whereas the lower panel uses the standard deviation of residuals of workers in location h . The most interesting sample is the one where $\rho_k = \rho_j$ is restricted to be close to zero. In this

¹⁶Note that since the group unobservable effect $E[\nu_i|D_i = d]$ and the effect of changing location $\rho_k - \rho_j$ are multiplicative, common trend is violated for both levels and logarithmic transformation of wages. See e.g. Lechner (2011) page 186.

¹⁷Several authors have studied migrants' wage growth in order to cancel out the individual (or group) fixed effects (Bartel, 1979; Yankow, 2003; Ham et al., 2011). However, the individual fixed effect in a wage regression should be interpreted as a the price paid for the underlying individual fixed characteristics. If this price changes as might be if the location of labor supply changes, then the individual fixed effect is not invariant in time nor location and does not cancel out in a before-after comparison.

¹⁸Also various measures of returns to education have been used (Gould & Moav, 2016; Moraga, 2013).




Figure 5: **Difference-in-difference with sample splits.** *Notes: For the data, see Section 5.1. See definitions in Section 5.2. Mobility potentially occurs between time points $t-1$ and t . Models of column 4 in Table 2.*

sample, the trends due to values of unobservable skills among the contracted migrants and commuters are close to parallel. Migrants have larger changes in residuals than commuters also in the sample where the common trend assumption is likely to be satisfied to a reasonable degree. The difference in the residual changes across migrants and commuters is thus likely due to selection on job match quality rather than selection on unobservable skills.

6.2.3 Model Restrictions

Selection on job match quality and selection on unobservable skills differ in predictions for the differences in residuals across contracted migrants and commuters. We can, thus, pit the models against each other and see whether selection on job match quality or selection on unobservable skills is more consistent with the data. Intuitively, this theoretical identification is based on the observation that if the selection is driven by unobservable skills then whichever group has more valuable unobservable skills pre-mobility has more valuable unobservable skills post-mobility as well. Selection on job match quality on the other hand predicts the higher cost group to go having lower residuals pre-mobility to having higher residuals post-mobility.

Consider the expected differences in residuals across contracted migrants and commuters given in Proposition 3. Removing within skill wage dispersion from the model,

$\sigma_j^2 = \sigma_k^2 = 0$, so that there is no selection on job match quality yields, for $\rho_k - \rho_j > (<) 0$

$$E[u_{ij}|D_i = 1] - E[u_{ij}|D_i = 0] = \frac{1}{\sigma_\Delta} \sigma_\varepsilon^2 (\rho_k - \rho_j) \rho_j [\lambda(z_{ijk}^m) - \lambda(z_{ijk}^c)] > (<) 0,$$

$$E[u_{ik}|D_i = 1] - E[u_{ik}|D_i = 0] = \frac{1}{\sigma_\Delta} \sigma_\varepsilon^2 (\rho_k - \rho_j) \rho_k [\lambda(z_{ijk}^m) - \lambda(z_{ijk}^c)] > (<) 0.$$

Restricting $\sigma_\varepsilon^2 = 0$ so that there is no heterogeneity in unobservable skills and thus no selection on unobservable skills yields

$$E[u_{ij}|D_i = 1] - E[u_{ij}|D_i = 0] = -\frac{1}{\sigma_\Delta} \sigma_j^2 [\lambda(z_{ijk}^m) - \lambda(z_{ijk}^c)] < 0,$$

$$E[u_{ik}|D_i = 1] - E[u_{ik}|D_i = 0] = \frac{1}{\sigma_\Delta} \sigma_k^2 [\lambda(z_{ijk}^m) - \lambda(z_{ijk}^c)] > 0.$$

In Table 3, we observe $\hat{E}[u_{ij}|D_i = 1] - \hat{E}[u_{ij}|D_i = 0] < 0$ and $\hat{E}[u_{ik}|D_i = 1] - \hat{E}[u_{ik}|D_i = 0] > 0$ for both $\rho_k - \rho_j > 0$ and $\rho_k - \rho_j < 0$. For pre-mobility residuals the estimates are imprecise, but the coefficients correspond largely to the coefficients estimated in the whole sample. Thus, selection on job match quality explains the pattern in observed residuals whereas selection on unobservable skills does not.

Consider the differences in changes in residuals across contracted migrants and commuters. Removing within skill wage dispersion from the model, $\sigma_j^2 = \sigma_k^2 = 0$, so that there is no selection on job match quality yields

$$E[u_{ik} - u_{ij}|D_i = 1] - E[u_{ik} - u_{ij}|D_i = 0] = \sigma_\varepsilon (\rho_k - \rho_j) [\lambda(z_{ijk}^m) - \lambda(z_{ijk}^c)] > 0$$

if $\rho_k - \rho_j > 0$ and

$$E[u_{ik} - u_{ij}|D_i = 1] - E[u_{ik} - u_{ij}|D_i = 0] = \sigma_\varepsilon (\rho_k - \rho_j) [\lambda(z_{ijk}^m) - \lambda(z_{ijk}^c)] < 0$$

if $\rho_k - \rho_j < 0$. Restricting $\sigma_\varepsilon^2 = 0$ so that there is no heterogeneity in unobservable skills and thus no selection on unobservable skills yields

$$E[u_{ik} - u_{ij}|D_i = 1] - E[u_{ik} - u_{ij}|D_i = 0] = (\sigma_k^2 + \sigma_j^2)^{\frac{1}{2}} [\lambda(z_{ijk}^m) - \lambda(z_{ijk}^c)] > 0,$$

$$E[u_{ik} - u_{ij}|D_i = 1] - E[u_{ik} - u_{ij}|D_i = 0] = (\sigma_k^2 + \sigma_j^2)^{\frac{1}{2}} [\lambda(z_{ijk}^m) - \lambda(z_{ijk}^c)] > 0.$$

In Table 3, we observe $\hat{E}[u_{ik} - u_{ij}|D_i = 1] - \hat{E}[u_{ik} - u_{ij}|D_i = 0] > 0$ regardless of the sign of $\rho_k - \rho_j$. Hence, again, the overall pattern of signs of the residual differences between the contracted migrants and commuters are better explained in terms of selection on job match quality than in terms of selection on unobservable skills.

ρ measure:	$sd(\hat{u}_{ih})$	$sd(w_{ih})$	$sd(\hat{u}_{ih})$	$sd(w_{ih})$
Sample:	$\rho_k - \rho_j > 0$		$\rho_k - \rho_j < 0$	
Dependent variable:	\hat{u}_{ij}			
Migrant (ref: Commuter)	-0.0201 (0.0107)	-0.0196 (0.0110)	-0.0108 (0.0129)	-0.0166 (0.0124)
Dependent variable:	\hat{u}_{ik}			
Migrant (ref: Commuter)	0.0329 (0.0095)***	0.0445 (0.0105)***	0.0385 (0.0123)**	0.0185 (0.0122)
Dependent variable:	$\hat{u}_{ik} - \hat{u}_{ij}$			
Migrant (ref: Commuter)	0.0531 (0.0109)***	0.0641 (0.0110)***	0.0494 (0.0143)***	0.0351 (0.0130)**
Spatial controls				
Δd_i	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
jkl -triad FE μ_{jkl}	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
$\hat{E}_{ik}[w], \hat{E}_{ij}[w]$	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE , λ_t	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
v_i	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	22,797	23,069	21,455	19,999
Migrants	6,345	6,314	5,827	5,858
Commuters	16,452	16,755	14,444	14,141
R^2, \hat{u}_{ij}	0.0261	0.0267	0.0236	0.0222
R^2, \hat{u}_{ik}	0.0263	0.0226	0.0248	0.0250
$R^2, \hat{u}_{ik} - \hat{u}_{ij}$	0.0771	0.0689	0.0660	0.0652

Table 3: **Residual differences and difference-in-differences by sign of $\rho_k - \rho_l$.**
Notes: * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$. Data pooled from years 2011-2014. See Section 5.2 for the definitions of mobile, contracted migrants and commuters. For the computation of residuals, see Section 5.3. For the computation of residuals, see Section 5.3. White heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered at residence-source-destination municipality level in parenthesis.

6.3 Mobility Costs

The differences between the residuals of contracted migrants and commuters have been interpreted as reflecting differences in the mobility costs across these two groups. To support this reasoning, I now study if these differences are mediated by more direct measures of mobility costs.

If different mobility costs drive the results, then when migration costs are smaller relative to commuting costs, the differences in residuals between contracted migrants and commuters should be smaller. Hence, I study the interaction effects of mobility mode and different mobility cost proxies. Table 4 presents the results. In the first column, the mobility cost proxy is whether the worker lives alone prior to mobility. Living alone reduces the relative migration costs. Thus, the difference in changes in residuals across contracted migrants and commuters should be smaller. This seems to be the case. Working spouse, on the other hand, increases the relative migration cost. Correspondingly, we observe a positive coefficient. Living rental reduces the relative cost of migration and as expected, we observe a negative effect, albeit not significantly

Dependent variable:			$\hat{u}_{ik} - \hat{u}_{ij}$		
Cost proxy, $t - 1$:	Lives alone	Spouse working	Lives rental	Owens a car	Distance to new job
Migrant					
* Cost proxy	−0.0482	0.0470	−0.0148	0.0302	−0.0009
(ref: Commuter	(0.0209)*	(0.0195)*	(0.0224)	(0.0203)	(0.0077)
* Cost proxy)					
Spatial controls					
Δd_i	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
jkl -triad FE μ_{jkl}	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
$\hat{E}_{ik}[w]$, $\hat{E}_{il}[w]$	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE , λ_t	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
v_i	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	43,068	43,068	43,068	43,068	43,068
Migrants	12,172	12,172	12,172	12,172	12,172
Commuters	30,896	30,896	30,896	30,896	30,896
R ²	0.0680	0.0682	0.0669	0.0674	0.0668

Table 4: **Residual difference-in-differences interacted with cost proxies.** *Notes:* * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$. Data pooled from years 2011-2014. See Section 5.2 for the definitions of mobile, contracted migrants and commuters. For the computation of residuals, see Section 5.3. For the computation of residuals, see Section 5.3. White heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered at residence-source-destination municipality level in parenthesis.

different from zero. Owning a car reduces the cost of commuting and as expected, we observe a positive interaction effect, albeit not significantly different from zero. Longer distance to new job increases the cost of commuting relative to migration. As would be predicted, we observe a negative effect, albeit not significantly different from zero.

6.4 Robustness

6.4.1 The Threshold Distance of Mobility

The threshold distance of 50km in defining spatial mobility is somewhat arbitrary, motivated to ensure that the choice between commuting and migration is not trivial and that there are both contracted migrants and commuters in the sample. Figure 6 shows that the estimated difference in job match qualities among the contracted migrants and commuters is robust to this threshold.

6.4.2 Ashenfelter's Dip

Larger wage gains among the migrants could be explained by an autoregressive wage process where the migrants suffer a larger Ashenfelter's dip in their wages prior to mobility than commuters and then regress toward the mean during the period of mobility event. It is, however, clear from Figure 4 that the wage paths of commuters and migrants are very similar prior to the mobility event. While Ashenfelter's dip's logic is




Figure 6: **Robustness with respect to the threshold distance of mobility.** *Notes: For the data, see Section 5.1. See definitions in Section 5.2. For the computation of residuals, see Section 5.3. Models of column 4 in Table 2. 95-percent confidence intervals are based on white heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered at residence-source-destination municipality level.*

similar to the negative selection on job match quality in the source here, it does not explain the positive selection in the destination.

6.4.3 Housing Constraints

It could be argued that those with larger wage gains are more likely to be able to afford migration and thus migrants are observed to have larger wage gains. However, as seen in Figure 4 commuters always have higher wages than migrants and they should, thus, be better able to afford housing in the destination.

7 Conclusion

Ignoring the possibility of contracted migration and interpreting all migration as speculative may lead to biases in the interpretation of results about migrant selection. First, no self-selection is required for contracted migrants to be positively selected when there is competition for jobs. Contracted migrants are selected by employers and profit-maximizing employers for each wage select the most productive applicants. Hence, even if a random sample of workers searches for jobs interregionally, those who receive a job offer are not randomly selected. Second, as contracted migrants base their choice of migration on a realized wage offer, their observed wage distribution in the destination is not their expected wage distribution in the destination but their expected wage distribution truncated below at some threshold wage. The contracted immigrants may

thus be drawing wage offers from the very same wage distribution as the natives, and so be equally able, but as the contracted migrants only accept wages that compensate for their migration costs, they realize higher wages than the natives. There is positive selection on destination job match quality. Third, since at the time of migration choice the destination wage of a contracted migrant is fixed, it is independent of the current wage. Thus, given the destination wage, lower current wages more likely lead to migration and the observed wage distribution of contracted migrants in the source is not their expected wage distribution but their expected wage distribution truncated above. There is negative selection on source job match quality.

This paper takes a step toward including the possibility of contracted migration into the analyses of migrant selection. The Roy-Borjas model extended with observability of source and destination location wages derived from a job search model that naturally highlights the wage dispersions in the source and destination location provides a framework to study contracted migration with many results and methods already familiar from the literature. While there is selection on unobservable skills depending on source and destination location difference in returns to skills, this selection is confounded by negative selection on job match quality in the source and positive selection on job match quality in the destination.

Adding job match quality with zero autocorrelation in to the Roy-Borjas framework also provides a relevant interpretation for Borjas' (1987) "refugee sorting" selection pattern that combines negative selection in the source and positive selection in the destination. Rather than the narrow interpretation of migration from communist to non-communist regimes, a more useful interpretation arises when we view workers fleeing their bad job matches for better job matches.

I find evidence for the role job match quality plays by comparing two mobile groups with different mobility costs. While the classification of migrants into speculative and contracted migrants is limited by data, the approach taken here identifies a group of migrants that highly likely are contracted. This group of contracted migrants is then compared to the commuters who incur different mobility costs. This controls for the self-selection to interregional search and employer selection. Mobility costs create a scale effect on migrant selection as higher costs are compensated by stronger selection. Comparing two groups with different costs reveals what type of selection, selection on job match quality or selection on unobservable skills is magnified. Migrants have around 2-3 percent lower pre-mobility residuals and 2-3 percent higher post-mobility residuals than commuters. That is, those who migrate while relocating their labor supply observe their wages increase 5-6 percent more than those who make similar changes in the locations, industries and occupations of their labor supply but choose to commute. Selection on job match quality explains these results better than selection on unobservable skills.

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A Appendix

A.1 Proofs of Propositions and Lemmas

Lemma 1 (No speculative migration). *Let a speculative migrant from j to k search for a job in k in continuous time with unemployment income b and accept the first offered job arriving at rate φ . Let she discount future with discount rate r . Then worker i does not migrate speculatively iff $\frac{\mu_k + \nu_{ik} - w_{ij}}{r} < \frac{w_{ij} - b + \pi_{ijk}}{\varphi}$.*

Proof of Lemma 1. Let $rV_k = b - \pi_{ik} + \varphi[\frac{\mu_k + \nu_{ik}}{r} - V_k]$ be the asset value of migrating to k and $rV_j = w_{ij} = w_{ij} - \pi_{ij} + \varphi[\frac{w_{ij}}{r} - V_j]$ the asset value of staying the in the current job in j . The values can then be written as

$$(r + \varphi)V_k = b - \pi_{ik} + \frac{\varphi}{r}(\mu_k + \nu_{ik}) \quad (24)$$

$$(r + \varphi)V_j = w_{ij} - \pi_{ij} + \frac{\varphi}{r}w_{ij} \quad (25)$$

and thus $V_k < V_j \iff \frac{\mu_k + \nu_{ik} - w_{ij}}{r} < \frac{w_{ij} - b + \pi_{ijk}}{\varphi}$. \square

Lemma 2. *Let $x \sim \mathcal{N}(\mu_x, \sigma_x^2)$, $\tilde{\Delta}_i \sim \mathcal{N}(E[\tilde{\Delta}_i], \sigma_{\Delta}^2)$ and $\Delta_i = \tilde{\Delta}_i - E[\tilde{\Delta}_i]$. Then*

$$E[x | \frac{\Delta_i}{\sigma_{\Delta}} > z] = \mu_x + \frac{E[x\Delta_i]}{\sigma_{\Delta}}\lambda(z), \quad (26)$$

where $\lambda(z) := \phi(z)/(1 - \Phi(z))$ is the inverse Mill's ratio, where ϕ , and Φ denote the density and distribution functions of the standard normal, respectively.

Proof of Lemma 2. First note that

$$E\left[\frac{x}{\sigma_x} \middle| \frac{\Delta_i}{\sigma_{\Delta}}\right] = E\left[\frac{x}{\sigma_x}\right] + \frac{\text{Cov}[\frac{x}{\sigma_x}, \frac{\Delta_i}{\sigma_{\Delta}}]}{\text{Var}[\frac{\Delta_i}{\sigma_{\Delta}}]} \frac{\Delta_i}{\sigma_{\Delta}} = \frac{1}{\sigma_x}\mu_x + \frac{E[x\Delta_i]}{\sigma_x\sigma_{\Delta}^2}\Delta_i \quad (27)$$

Thus,

$$E[x | \frac{\Delta_i}{\sigma_{\Delta}} > z] = \sigma_x E[\frac{x}{\sigma_x} | \frac{\Delta_i}{\sigma_{\Delta}} > z] = \mu_x + \frac{E[x\Delta_i]}{\sigma_{\Delta}} E[\frac{\Delta_i}{\sigma_{\Delta}} | \frac{\Delta_i}{\sigma_{\Delta}} > z] \quad (28)$$

$$= \mu_x + \frac{E[x\Delta_i]}{\sigma_{\Delta}} \frac{\phi(z)}{1 - \Phi(z)}, \quad (29)$$

where the second equality follows from Lemma 3 and (27). Defining $\lambda(z) := \phi(z)/(1 - \Phi(z))$ gives the result. \square

Lemma 3. *Let $r, a \in \mathbb{R}$ and $z \sim f_z$, $x \sim f_x$. Then $E[z|x] = c + rx \implies E[z|x > a] = c + rE[x|x > a]$.*

Proof of Lemma 3. Suppose $E[z|x] = c + rx$. Then

$$\begin{aligned}
E[z|x > a] &= \int_z z f_z(z|x > a) dz = \int_z z \int_{x>a} f_z(z|X=x) f_x(x|x > a) dx dz \\
&= \int_{x>a} \int_z z f_z(z|X=x) dz f_x(x|x > a) dx = \int_{x>a} E[z|x] f_x(x|x > a) dx \\
&= \int_{x>a} (c + rx) f_x(x|x > a) dx = c + r \int_{x>a} x f_x(x|x > a) dx = c + r E[x|x > a]. \quad \square
\end{aligned}$$

Proof of Proposition 1. Let $\tilde{\Delta}_i = (\rho_k - \rho_j)\nu_i + q_{ik} - q_{ij}$ be the right-hand side of (MC), $\Delta_i = \tilde{\Delta}_i - (\rho_k - \rho_j)\mu_\nu$ and

$$z := \frac{1}{\sigma_\Delta} (\mu_j - \mu_k + \pi - (\rho_k - \rho_j)\mu_\nu) \quad (30)$$

such that (MC) can be written as $\frac{\Delta_i}{\sigma_\Delta} > z$. Then by Lemma 2

$$E[\rho_h \nu_i | (\text{MC})] = E[\rho_h \nu_i | \frac{\Delta_i}{\sigma_\Delta} > z] = \rho_h \mu_\nu + \frac{1}{\sigma_\Delta} \sigma_\nu^2 (\rho_k - \rho_j) \rho_h \lambda(z) \quad (31)$$

and

$$E[q_{ij} | (\text{MC})] = -\frac{1}{\sigma_\Delta} \sigma_j^2 \lambda(z), \quad E[q_{ik} | (\text{MC})] = \frac{1}{\sigma_\Delta} \sigma_k^2 \lambda(z) \quad (32)$$

The result follows from the decomposition $w_{ih} = \bar{\mu}_h + \rho_h(\nu_i - \mu_h^\nu) + q_{ih}$. \square

Proof of Proposition 2. As Proposition 1 but the condition for relocation is now

$$w_{ij} < w_{ik} - \pi \iff \mu_{ij} - \mu_{ik} + \pi_{jk} < (\rho_k - \rho_j)\nu_i + q_{ik} - q_{ij}. \quad (33)$$

and thus let

$$z_{ijk} := \frac{1}{\sigma_\Delta} (\mu_{ij} - \mu_{ik} + \pi_{jk} - (\rho_k - \rho_j)\mu_\nu). \quad (34)$$

The result follows from the decomposition $u_{ih} = \rho_h(\nu_i - \mu_h^\nu) + q_{ih}$. \square