

Islam and the United States: streams of convergence, strands of divergence

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ABSTRACT *This article identifies four historical phases of relations between Islam and the Western world, as led by the United States. The first phase was a convergence of values coinciding with a divergence of empathy. The second phase reversed the order – Islamic and Western values diverged, but intercommunal relations became closer. The third phase is after September 11 when intercommunal relations once again diverged while differences between Western and Islamic values were greater than ever. The futuristic fourth phase of Islam's relations with the U.S.-led Western world is when the power of the new American Empire is circumscribed, Western values become less libertarian, and Islam reconciles itself to modernity.*

From 'The clash of civilisations'¹ thesis to 11 September 2001, and from Iraq to the Palestinian–Israel conflict, the relationship between Islamic values and Western—particularly American—norms in the 20th century appears to casual observers as a story of conflicts. Yet a more careful analysis of the 20th century Islamic *ummah* and Americans suggests a more complex tale of convergences and divergences. Can the 21st century be an era where strands of convergence could overpower the strands of divergence?

We are now able to identify three different phases of relations between America and the Muslim *ummah* both normatively and politically.

Phase I

Relationships between Euro-American *values* and traditional Islamic *values* were *close* in the first half of the 20th century. In the areas of sexual behaviour, gender roles, alcohol consumption and the death penalty, Islamic values and Euro-American values converged.

Relationships between Euro-American *people* and Muslim *people* as an *ummah* were *distant* in the first half of that century. Divergences between the two peoples were marked by prejudice and racism.

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Phase II

In the second half of the 20th century relationships between Euro-American values and traditional Islamic values *diverged*—as the USA became more ethically and sexually libertarian. Sex, alcohol and drugs were ascending in America. The importance of religion deteriorated markedly in Europe and, to a lesser extent, in the USA. The status of women improved in the Western world.

Also in the second half of the 20th century relations between the Euro-American people and Muslim people converged—as America became more liberal and the world became more internationalist. The USA (especially after the passage of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1965²) and Europe began to see large numbers of immigrants from the Muslim world, while more and more Westerners began to visit the Muslim world (particularly the Arab areas) for economic, political and academic reasons.

This was in process from the end of World War II until the end of the 20th century.

Phase III

In this new 21st century the relationship between American values and traditional Islamic values has continued to diverge as the USA has become even more socially libertarian. America is now flirting with the idea of same-sex marriages—or at least same sex civil unions, truly un-Islamic.

Since September 11 the trend of tolerant convergence between American *people* and Muslim *people* has either been interrupted or is being reversed. Most Americans and Muslims (both in the USA and worldwide) are regrettably in the process of being pulled apart. Muslims in the West are routine targets of harassment in various ways, while Westerners in the Muslim world have to be concerned about hatred and consequent physical harm.

Phase IV

The fourth phase is a deeper democratisation of America and the rolling back of the excesses of American social libertarianism. In the Islamic world, there is a recognition of the impotence of current political arrangements to improve economies, and the necessity to reinterpret Islam to bring about the improvement of the human rights of the Islamic *ummah*. Values on sex, marriage and gender converge, while differences on democratisation and liberalism converge to realise people's differing beliefs and aspirations. People converge through migration, study and knowledge.

This fourth phase of relations between Euro-America and Islam is really an optimistic scenario about the future rather than a report of what is already happening. In that sense this fourth phase is for the time being perhaps more akin to Martin Luther King Jr's 'I Have a Dream' speech.

Let us look at these phases now in some detail.

The First Phase

In the period between the two world wars, the social and sexual mores of the USA were much closer to those of a Muslim society than they are today.³ At the same time, the USA at that time was less tolerant of other races and religions. In social and sexual practices, the USA was closer to Islamic values, but in racial and religious prejudice, the two worlds diverged. Let us take a closer look at some of these convergences and divergences.

Sexuality

In the period before World War II, US public mores and opinions opposed premarital sex.⁴ The 1920s did see an increase—to almost 50%—of women who had premarital sex, but there were limits.⁵ There were even laws against sex outside marriage in some states.⁶ In the Muslim world sex before and outside marriage was strongly condemned, with some societies even having ‘honour killings’ for daughters who strayed sexually.⁷

Homosexual acts, especially between males, were criminal acts in the USA in the first half of the 20th century. There are numerous examples of laws that made such activities illegal—some of them until very recently.⁸ These acts have been, and remain, illegal throughout most of the Muslim world. For both gay men and lesbians, remaining ‘in the closet’ was the prudent way to live in both Muslim and US societies.

Gender and family

In the interwar years the family in America was still as sacrosanct as it is in much of the Muslim world. Unmarried couples living together were rare. Babies born out of wedlock still suffered from social stigma. And the very idea of same-sex marriages or even ‘civil unions’ had not even been conceived.

Families in America in the interwar years still believed in having a head of the family with authority—usually the father or husband. Unfortunately, both in America and the Muslim world, women were still subordinate.

In the USA women did not get the vote until after a Constitutional Amendment in 1920. The coming of the franchise for women was sometimes as slow in coming to the Western world as it was in the Muslim world.⁹ For many Americans in the interwar period, the idea of a female president was unthinkable. In 1936 the percentage of Americans who would vote for a woman if she were qualified to be president was at about 31%.¹⁰ The first stirrings of anti-colonial sentiment brought forth a slew of male leaders in much of the Muslim world who would go on to lead their future countries in the immediate aftermath of the post-colonial era.

In the economic sectors of society, both in the USA and in the Muslim world, female participation was also very low. In 1936 only 18% of Americans approved of a married woman working even if she didn’t have to do so for economic reasons.¹¹ World War II and the rise of ‘Rosie the Riveter’ as an icon of female participation in the labour force was an immediate catalyst for

significant female participation in the US labour force.¹² But the return of the men after World War II reversed many of these gains.¹³

The point here is that, on the issue of women's liberation, the USA and the Muslim world were at the same stage of relative sexism early in the 20th century.

Against alcohol

A less enduring normative convergence was *the ban on alcoholic drinks in the history of the USA*. This value was truly neo-Islamic. Initially, prohibition of alcohol was by individual states. The first state law against alcohol was passed in Maine in 1850,¹⁴ and was soon followed by a wave of comparable legislation in other states—rising to 33 states affecting 63% of the population by the end of World War I. Orthodox Muslims around the world probably cheered when they heard about this trend against alcohol in America.

Meanwhile, a campaign for alcoholic prohibition at the *federal* level had been gathering momentum. A constitutional amendment against alcohol needed a two-thirds majority in Congress and approval by three-quarters of the states. Such a constitutional change was ratified on 29 January 1919, and went into effect on 29 January 1920, as the Eighteenth Amendment of the US constitution.¹⁵ On the issue of alcohol, the USA had become almost Islamic.

Death penalty

Another area of convergence between Islamic and US values has been in the acceptance of capital punishment as one of the answers to human depravity.

The most controversial elements of the *Sharia* are the *hudud* (Islamic physical punishments for criminal offenders). One of the principles the US judicial system continues to share with majority opinion in the Muslim world is the acceptance of the death penalty.

The most controversial of Islamic applications of the death penalty relates to the sexual offence of adultery. The most controversial of US applications of the death penalty relates to killing the mentally retarded and to the execution of juvenile offenders.

At least in Muslim countries there appears to be little favouritism in the application of the death penalty. Saudi Arabia has been known to put to death even a princess on charges of adultery.¹⁶ On the other hand, one of the more pernicious practices in the USA is the disproportionate number of African Americans who have been subjected to the death penalty or are on 'Death Row'.¹⁷

Attitudes to differences of race and religion

On the single pervasive issue of racism and race-relations, the USA has behaved much worse than the Muslim world both in the years between the two world wars and in today's world after the Cold War. But the USA itself was much more racist in the 1920s than it is today. This was the era of sweeping segregationist measures, the rise of racist leaders to high political office, and

'Jim Crow' laws designed to subjugate African Americans. Lynchings and the 'Tuskegee Experiment' (this was an experiment that the US Public Health Service secretly conducted for 40 years (1932–1972) on 399 Black men in the last stage of syphilis. These men, from Alabama, USA, were not informed of what disease they were suffering from or of its seriousness) typified the parlous condition of African Americans. There were also laws forbidding sex and marriage across the racial divide, and it took a Supreme Court decision (*Loving v the State of Virginia*)¹⁸ to make them unconstitutional. The decline of racism also led to greater tolerance of interracial marriage.¹⁹

Religious minorities also suffered from prejudice. In the latter part of the 18th century and even during the beginning of the 20th century, Jews and Roman Catholics were victims of violence by the Ku Klux Klan (KKK), and discriminated against in university admissions, while anti-Semitic statements by prominent authors such as HL Mencken were hardly questioned. In this environment the American lack of tolerance towards Muslims was not surprising. Muslims were profiled as a different race,²⁰ and various depictions of 'Mohammedans' were often viciously pejorative.

Of course, race in the Muslim world was not much of an issue. It must be remembered that Bilal, one of the closest associates of the Prophet Mohammad, was probably black. The coming together of various races who comprised the Islamic *ummah*, manifested in the diverse array of colours gathered at the Hajj in Mecca, was not affected even by the centuries of colonial rule and white supremacy. Indeed, for many in the world, this was one of the more attractive features of Islam.²¹

When it came to religious minorities under Islam, the Muslim world practised the tolerance emphasised by the Qur'an. Religious minorities such as Jews and Christians lived and flourished in much of the Islamic world.²² The millet system of the Ottoman Empire exemplified the openness of Muslim societies towards Jews and Christians. Although there were some discriminatory measures (such as the *jizya* tax), religious minorities such as the Jews did not face organised mass murder, mass pogroms or state-directed genocides in any Muslim state but did face them in Eastern Europe and Germany. Even in the USA there was resistance to Jewish immigration.²³

Overall, in this first phase, the major convergences between the Islamic world and the USA occurred in the areas of sexual behaviour, sex roles, alcohol consumption and the death penalty. The major divergence was on the treatment of racial and religious minorities. The social conservatism of the USA permitted these strands of convergence and divergence with the Islamic world. However, the fabric of some of these conservative values began to fray in the second half of the 20th century.

The Second Phase

In the second half of the 20th century, Euro-American values and Islamic values began to diverge. Of course, many of the seeds for these divergences were laid earlier, but they really began to bear fruit in this period. Again, we may look at the issues of sexual behaviour, sex roles, alcohol and drugs, the death penalty, race and religion.

Sexuality

Personal mores and family values have changed rapidly in America since the two world wars. The norms and mores have become less and less akin to Islamic values. Sex before marriage, with parental consent, became common.²⁴ The erosion of social disapproval of premarital and extramarital sex, and advances in contraception, played a large role in contributing to sexual freedom. The 'sexual liberation' of the 1960s was largely confined to the Western world. The invention of the birth control pill contributed to the sexual empowerment of women, who were free from the fears of pregnancy. Sexuality has been cheapened in the USA and female bodies are exploited in a wider range of ways than ever—from easily available pornographic movies on television to techniques in advertising that promote an idealised version of female beauty, from high class prostitution to the objectification of women.²⁵ This is more distant from Islamic values.

While American culture does give greater freedom to women than does Muslim culture, American culture extends less dignity to women than does Muslim culture.

Sons in America respect their mothers less than sons in the Muslim world; husbands in America respect their wives more than husbands in the Muslim world.

Sex roles

American culture on gender has become more and more different from Muslim culture on gender. On the positive side, American women are more active in the economy and in the political process and have made enormous progress in the quest for equality. For instance, between 1936 and 1996 the percentage of Americans who approved of a married woman working even if she doesn't have to do so for economic reasons has gone from 18% to 81%.²⁶ And in the same time period, the percentage of Americans who would vote for a woman if she were qualified to be president has increased from 31% to 96%.²⁷

By the measurement of women's liberation the USA has now outstripped the Muslim world; but by the yardstick of the empowerment of women, has the Muslim world outstripped America?

The USA has never had a female president. Yet two of the most populous Muslim countries—Pakistan and Bangladesh—have had women prime ministers. Benazir Bhutto headed two governments in Pakistan, and Khaleda Zia and Hassina Wajed have served consecutively in Bangladesh.

Turkey too had a woman Prime Minister, Tansu Ciller. And Indonesia, the most populous Muslim country of them all, now has a woman Head of State, President Megawati Sukarnoputri. Muslim countries seem to be ahead in female empowerment, though still behind in female liberation. Four Muslim countries have experienced the highest female political leadership long before the USA, France, Italy and Russia have had a female president, and long before Germany has had a female chancellor.

Alcohol and drugs

The Prohibition movement in the USA did not last for very long, and early in the 20th century the movement began to repeal the 18th Amendment. In February 1933 Congress adopted a resolution proposing a new constitutional amendment to this effect. On 5 December 1933 Utah cast the 36th ratifying vote in favour of the 21st Amendment. At the federal level alcohol was legal again²⁸—breaking the link with Islamic culture.

A few states in the Union continued to be ‘dry states’, and chose to maintain a state-wide ban. But the disenchantment that the federal-level prohibition had created adversely affected attitudes to temperance even in those states, which had once led the way in favour of prohibition. It is arguable that prohibition at the state level might have lasted much longer if the original asymmetry (some states for and some states against) had been respected and allowed to continue. The 18th Constitutional Amendment was a pursuit of national symmetry in American attitudes to alcohol. It sought a premature national moral consensus on alcohol—and thereby hurt the cause of temperance in the country as a whole. By 1966 virtually all the 50 states of the Union had legalised alcoholic drinks—though some preferred that drinking be restricted to homes and private clubs rather than that alcohol be served in public bars and saloons.

Drugs have become a major issue in both urban areas and rural areas in the USA, despite several ‘drug wars’, incarceration of drug users and dealers, and attempts to interdict supplies from Latin America, Southeast Asia and Southwest Europe. While drugs are not absent in Islamic societies (qat, for example, in Yemen and Somalia), parents in many Islamic societies do not have to worry about their offspring using drugs—to the extent that parents in the West do—unless they send their children abroad for education.

Death penalty

As mentioned above, the USA had been executing the mentally retarded and juveniles who committed crimes as minors. Indeed, as one liberal critic has pointed out, in the execution of mentally retarded and juveniles, the USA shares the practices of only five Islamic countries—Iran, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Yemen.²⁹ Various Supreme Court decisions provide hope to those who wish to change these practices.³⁰

Although Muslim countries do share in the imposition of the death penalty, there are encouraging signs where the penalty is not pursued. Nigeria, for example, has decided not to execute Amina Lawal on the charge of adultery.³¹

The USA is still divided on the death penalty, with some states upholding it and others rejecting it as ‘cruel and unusual punishment’. It seems almost certain that the USA will abolish the death penalty long before the Muslim world as a whole is similarly converted to the proposition that the death penalty in the 21st century is not the best solution to human depravity.

Secularism and political action

The First Amendment permits religious minorities to practice their religions in relative peace. Of course, like all doctrines, secularism has its fanatics who sometimes want to degrade the sacred rather than permitting it.³² But at its best a secular state is a refuge of safety for minority religions. It is in that sense that American secularism is a friend of Muslims living in the USA.

But while secularism is a divorce from formal religion, *Muslims see socio-sexual libertarianism as a dilution of spirituality*. Socio-sexual libertarianism makes America less and less Islamic. One can be without a formal religion and still be deeply spiritual in a humanistic sense. John Stuart Mill and Bertrand Russell were without formal religion, yet each had deeply spiritual values. Albert Schweitzer, the Nobel Laureate for Peace, was at times an agnostic, but he was deeply committed to the principle of reverence for life—even protecting the lives of insects in Africa.³³

In discussing the role of American Muslims *qua* Muslims (heirs of the Hijrah), we have to look more closely at their moral concerns in relation to American culture. Curiously enough, and in spite of Muslim opinion, American secularism is indeed good news for Muslims in the USA. The bad news is the expanding arena of American socio-sexual libertarianism, which has resulted in greater divergence in values. Secularism in the political process does indeed help to protect minority religions from the potentially intrusive power of the Christian Right. On the other hand, expanding American socio-cultural libertarianism in such fields as sexual mores alarms both the Christian Right and Muslim traditionalists in the USA. It is social libertarianism that has eroded what American values have in common with Islamic values.³⁴

These moral concerns in turn have consequences for how American Muslims relate to the wider political divide between Republicans and Democrats in both foreign and domestic policies. From the 1990s onwards more and more American Muslims have apparently been registering to vote and seeking to influence candidates in elections.³⁵ On such social issues as family values and sexual mores, Muslims often find themselves more in tune with Republican rhetoric and concerns. On the need for a more strict separation of church and state, which helps to protect religious minorities, it is the more liberal Democrats who offer a better protection to Muslims. Let us look at these contradictions more closely.

The Democratic Party in the USA is more insistent on separating church from state, including its opposition to prayer in schools. This draws African American Muslim parents even more towards the Democrats, since the Muslim parents do not want their kids to be under peer pressure to attend Christian prayers. More recent immigrant Muslims from the Middle East or of Asian descent regard prayer in school as potentially more Islamic.³⁶ These latter Muslims may be drawn to the Republicans.

On the other hand, the Republicans are stronger on traditional family values and are more opposed to sexual libertarianism. This draws many Muslims (especially immigrant Asians) to the Republican Party. Most Muslims share Republican concerns about abortion and gay rights.³⁷

In the USA Western secularism has protected minority religious groups by

insisting on separation of church and state. This is a major reason why the Jews in the USA have been among the greatest defenders of the separation of church and state.³⁸ Any breach of that principle could lead to the imposition of some practices of the religious majority—like forcing Jewish children to participate in Christian prayers at school.³⁹

Religion has been declining in influence in the West since the days of the Renaissance and the Enlightenment.⁴⁰ But it is mainly in the 20th century that *spirituality* in the West has taken a nose-dive. From an Islamic perspective, America has become not only less religious, but also dangerously less spiritual. America has become not only more secular but dangerously more socially libertarian.⁴¹ Again we use the term libertarianism more in the sense of minimum ethical restraint and not in the sense of minimum political control.

Muslim parents particularly fear that American socio-cultural libertarianism is likely to influence the socialisation and upbringing of the next generation of Muslim children—excessive levels of acquisitiveness, consumerism and diverse forms of sexuality.⁴²

It is because of all these considerations that Islam within the USA feels threatened less by American secularism than by American socio-sexual libertarianism. And American socio-sexual libertarianism is what has made US mores more and more un-Islamic.

However, in a few other respects relations between the Euro-American people and the Islamic *ummah* have converged. Let us look more closely at some of these convergences.

Convergence of political and economic interests

In the post-war period, and especially during the Cold War, much of the devout regions of the Muslim world had a deep antipathy toward the atheistic Communist ideology propagated by the USSR and, to a lesser extent, China. The USSR and other Western countries were happy to build military and strategic alliances with anti-communist regimes in Muslim countries to prevent communism from spreading. Of course, especially in the case of the Middle East and North Africa, there was also a convergence of economic interests between Western countries and regimes in Muslim countries. Western consumers' demand for oil and gas could not be met cheaply enough from domestic resources, while Middle Eastern ample oil and gas supplies could only be extracted with the help of Western corporations.

There were a few exceptions to this convergence. Much of the Muslim world and the USA found themselves on opposite sides of the Arab–Israeli dispute, and the 1973 oil embargo threatened the cordial economic ties that had developed between the two sides.

Population movements

Nevertheless, population movements between the two worlds helped to promote greater understanding and tolerance. Many universities in the USA began Middle East Studies and Islamic Studies programmes leading to scholarly visits and

exchange. Trade between some Islamic countries and the West began to boom. Unlike in the past, where Westerners ventured into the Muslim world with the gun and/or the Bible, in the second half of the 20th century Western visitors appeared with aid, trade, books and technology. Guns and tanks and aeroplanes were only brought at the request of the regime in control.

From the other side, the need for cheap labour in the West and the pull of economic benefits began to attract Muslim immigrants to the Western world. Germany, France, and the UK were the destinations for Muslims from Turkey, North Africa and South Asia. Europe and the USA also attracted Muslim students, scholars and elite tourists from the oil-rich countries.

In the USA the formerly European-dominated immigration flows decreased as people from the Third World were permitted easier entry into the USA after passage of the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1965. IRCA allowed immigration from every country and gave each country the same amount of immigration. Significant Asian and African immigration resulted.⁴³ The civil rights movement, the decline of racism and the recognition of the important contributions of immigrant Muslims in America have all contributed to greater tolerance of Islam.

The years under President Bill Clinton were a measure of the growing American acceptance of Islam in fits and starts. President Clinton sent greetings to Muslims during the fast of Ramadhan from 1996. We should also note how Hillary Clinton hosted a celebration of Idd el Fitr (the Festival of the End of Ramadhan) in the White House in April 1996 and 1998. Vice President Al Gore visited a mosque in autumn 1995. And the first two Muslim chaplains (one in the Army and the other in the Navy) to serve the 10 000 Muslims in the US armed forces were sworn in under Clinton's watch.⁴⁴

President Clinton received in the White House a delegation of Arab Americans to discuss wide-ranging issues, domestic and international. The National Security Advisor, Anthony Lake, received a delegation of Muslims (including this author) in 1996 to discuss the ramifications of the Bosnian crisis.

The Clinton gestures towards Muslims were sufficiently high-profile that a hostile article in the *Wall Street Journal* in March 1996 raised the spectre of 'Friends of Hamas in the White House'—alleging that some of President Clinton's Muslim guests were friends of 'Arab terrorists', and supporters of the Palestinian movement. The critic in the *Wall Street Journal* (Steve Emerson) had a long record of hostility towards US Muslims. His television programme on PBS, entitled 'Jihad in America' (1994), alleged that almost all terrorist activities by Muslims world-wide were partially funded by US Muslims. President Clinton's friendly gestures to Muslims probably infuriated this self-appointed crusader of Islamophobia.⁴⁵ Yet Clinton's Muslim-friendly strategy continued. This friendliness was also apparent in the larger population. Generally speaking, there was acceptance of American Muslim women wearing headscarves or *hijab* in their day-to-day lives, unlike in France.

Normative divergence between Islam and Euro-American values once coincided with a convergence of tolerance between Muslims and Americans. Should American Muslims help to reverse this divergence in values without triggering off the return of those darker forces of racism and intolerance of the past? Can

American Muslims help to remind America of what was best in its own quality of life once upon a time—without completely negating the pre-September 11 trend in tolerance which America had once achieved?

If such is the destiny which awaits American Muslims, theirs will be a marriage of the heritage of the Hijrah with the legacy of the Mayflower.

The Third Phase: Divergences

In the 21st century there has been an increasing gap between Islamic values and Euro-American values, especially in the area of norms relating to homosexuality and gender roles, and the death penalty. Some of these areas have been dealt with earlier, but let us survey some potential areas of discord between Islam and Euro-American values.

Attitudes towards homosexuality have also changed in the West. Indeed, a majority of Americans and Europeans would say today that laws against homosexual sexuality are a violation of the rights of gays and lesbians.⁴⁶ There has been speculation that the *Lawrence* decision may mean that North America may be edging towards same-sex marriages within a decade or two.⁴⁷ Religious bodies such as the Episcopalians have struggled with the ordination of openly gay bishops.⁴⁸

There have been no comparable pressures on Islamic societies, marriages and the *ulema*, apart from gay Muslims who live in the West.⁴⁹ Although the Qur'an is explicit in its condemnation of homosexuality, in practice, temporally and spatially, there appears to be tolerance of homosexuality. The prevailing attitude appears to be a variation of the Catholic Church's treatment of homosexuality and homosexuals, urging the homosexual to confess and be celibate. In Islam there appears to be more of an emphasis on repentance than confession.⁵⁰ There are, in fact, some interpretations that argue that the Prophet Muhammad did not view sexual relations between men as severely as other offences against sexual propriety such as adultery and fornication.⁵¹

On gender roles the divide between Islam and the West continues to bedevil relations among Muslim women themselves, as well as between Muslim women and their Western counterparts. An outstanding example of this is the controversy over the proposal to ban headscarves in French public schools. Muslim women were on both sides of this issue, as were various Western women.⁵² While Muslim women continue to rule and run for political office, there has been a backsliding in the position of women in some countries such as Iraq and Algeria.⁵³ American women themselves are beginning to question the two-earner household, and some professional women are beginning to abandon their careers to get on the 'Mommy Track'.

While the divide between Islamic values and Euro-American values in these areas of social values may not be immediately harmful to the tolerant convergence of Muslims and Americans, the aftermath of September 11 and accompanying political changes have interrupted or reversed the trend towards convergence. Muslims and Westerners—particularly Americans—in many areas are regrettably heading towards mutual distrust, if not hostility. We can briefly

survey these under three areas: the violence of terrorism, the violence of occupation, and an environment of harassment.

The violence of terrorism

By 2000 it appeared as if violence against Americans and terrorism against American interests was low in comparison with previous years.⁵⁴ But 11 September 2001 changed this perception violently. Not since the Civil War had American lives been lost in such magnitude on a single day.⁵⁵ The images were horrific, and imprinted on the nation's psyche.

Americans had to get used to the kind of surveillance and lifestyle of people in many other countries—such as the UK and Israel—that have had to deal with terrorism on a much more intimate level. Subsequent bombings, kidnappings and other acts of violence have made many Muslim countries such as Indonesia and Saudi Arabia dangerous for Americans to visit, and the routine subject of travel advisories from the State Department.⁵⁶

Muslims have also been the victims of violence resulting from terrorism. Indeed, the bombings in Saudi Arabia claimed more Muslim lives than American lives. In a sermon in early 2004 the Imam of the Grand Mosque in Mecca asked Muslims to foreswear violence. Islam seeks moderation. Those who deviate from moderation and try to incite Muslims against their rulers are seeking discord and anarchy through destruction, terrorism, bombings and shedding the blood of Muslims and those under the protection of the state.⁵⁷

American and Israeli responses to terrorism have often led to the death of innocent civilians in the West Bank, Gaza, Iraq and Afghanistan. In addition, the practice of 'rendition', where people who are suspected of terrorism are turned over to governments who have less qualms about torturing them, has also led to Muslims being victimised by the security services of these governments. A prime example of this was the September 2002 incident of a Syrian-born Canadian citizen, Maher Arar, who was sent to Syria where he was reportedly tortured and imprisoned for 10 months.⁵⁸

Violence of occupation

Recent revelations about the lack of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) in Iraq have left the Bush and Blair administrations struggling to come up with alternative rationalisations for the rush to war in Iraq. The Bush administration cited intelligence to assert that Iraq had not destroyed WMDs and had enough of a stockpile to present an imminent danger. However, former chief weapons inspector David Kay's investigation revealed not only that Iraq did not have stockpiles of WMDs at the time of war, but also that the Hussein regime had destroyed these weapons well before the war.⁵⁹

The violence of occupation has resulted in both American and Iraqi casualties during the Iraq war and subsequent occupation. The number of Americans and Iraqis wounded is likely to be much higher.⁶⁰ Although Afghanistan has been overshadowed in the news, Americans and Afghans are also getting killed and wounded there regularly. The relatives and friends of those Americans killed or

wounded in Iraq and Afghanistan are not likely to become the best friends of Muslims.

Americans, however, also have reason to worry about the lack of friendship from Muslims in many other countries—not just Iraq and Afghanistan—who feel that US aid and support for their enemies is perpetuating violence and hardship for them. Muslims under direct military occupation include Iraq, Palestine and Afghanistan. Muslims militarily struggling for self-determination include those in Chechnya and Kashmir. Muslim countries on the radar screen for possible military intervention by Western powers include Iran, Syria and Somalia. Muslims being harassed under new anti-terrorist legislation already include those in Tanzania, Kenya, potentially South Africa, and a host of other countries under pressure from the Bush administration.

Environment of harassment

It has now almost become a cliché to say ‘September 11 changed everything’—particularly in regards to the attitudes of Americans toward Muslims. But what is perhaps more worrisome is the official attitudes and policies that may even be encroachments on the Bill of Rights and leave dark smudges on the beacon of American democracy.

The number of Muslims harassed at American and international airports is beginning to multiply.⁶¹ On 3 August 2003, on arrival from overseas, I was detained at Miami airport for seven hours and subjected to repeated interrogation.⁶²

The aftermath of September 11 has already been compromising some civil liberties in the USA to ominous proportions: Muslims have been particularly targeted, as the examples below show.⁶³

I. The US Senate Finance Committee has asked the Internal Revenue Service to turn over financial records, including donor lists, of Muslim charities and foundations. The list of organisations includes several that are under separate investigation by the Treasury Department, the FBI, and other agencies. Muslim leaders feel that this will chill charitable giving by donors to legitimate causes.⁶⁴

II. Visitors to the USA from countries in Africa, the Middle East, Asia and South America are being digitally photographed and fingerprinted on arrival, but visitors from European countries are being exempted. Privacy advocates are disturbed by this plan and by another plan to collect personal information on passengers on domestic flights to assess their security risks.⁶⁵

III. On and off there are hundreds of people in detention without trial under American jurisdiction. They are overwhelmingly Muslim.⁶⁶ The great majority of those in detention are not publicly announced as being in detention.⁶⁷ Out of the hundreds in detention, only a handful show any evidence of knowing any particular terrorist suspect or being associated with any movement or charity accused of terrorism. Muslims are targeted.⁶⁸

IV. Out of the millions of illegal immigrants in the USA, and those whose visas have expired, the people chosen for detention without trial or for instant deportation are almost certainly those with Muslim names or who come from the Middle East.⁶⁹ The Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS) has been singling out particular nationalities (mainly Muslim) in the USA for discriminatory treatment, illegal harassment and unconstitutional imprisonment.⁷⁰

V. The USA has considered having military tribunals and secret trials for those suspected of terrorism. Many of these suspects are lodged in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, and the level of justice envisaged for them has led to searing critiques. As a leading British judge, Johan Steyn, has said:

The question is whether the quality of justice envisaged for the prisoners at Guantánamo Bay complies with the minimum international standards for the conduct of fair trials...The answer can be given quite shortly. It is a resounding, 'No'.⁷¹

Even the leaders of Nazi Germany were given a public trial at Nuremberg after World War II with access to counsel and proper representation. Some of those tried at Nuremberg had been responsible for the death of millions of people.⁷²

VI. The USA has supported Israel's search for old Nazi militants so that they can be tried today in a court of law in Israel. Yet just as Israel kills Palestinian militants instead of capturing them for trial, the USA has started killing al-Qaeda suspects in Afghanistan, Iraq and Yemen.⁷³ Israel tried Adolf Eichmann in 1961 and protected him at the trial with a bulletproof glass cage so that he would not be assassinated.⁷⁴ Yet both the USA and Israel from 2001 onwards have killed terrorist suspects instead of capturing them. And even when Israel has illegally captured Palestinian or Lebanese suspects from across its own borders, the purpose has almost never been to give them a fair trial (Adolf Eichmann-style) but to detain those suspects indefinitely *without trial*.

VII. US Attorney General John Ashcroft has given the green light to the FBI to spy on churches, mosques and other sacred places to an extent not envisaged in the country for a long time.⁷⁵ Places of prayer were once protected from close police scrutiny. However, mosques especially may soon be fair game for police raids in American cities, while synagogues may enjoy *de facto* protection even if there is militant Zionism or fundamentalist Judaism being preached inside.

VIII. Attorney General Ashcroft also wants to breach attorney-client confidentiality if the client is suspected of terrorism.⁷⁶ In the case of the detainees at Guantánamo Bay, some regulations relating to the eavesdropping between lawyers and clients have been relaxed, although their day in court is still a long way away.⁷⁷ The Attorney General and President Bush repeatedly talk as if those *suspected* of terrorism were already *proven* terrorists. What happened to the US principle that a person is innocent until proven guilty?⁷⁸

IX. CNN and other major TV networks in the USA were summoned to the White House and warned against giving Osama bin Laden propaganda advantage with his videos. Whatever happened to editorial independence and freedom of the press? Self-censorship by the American media is still disconcertingly rampant.

X. The Patriot Act provides the US government with a lot of power against its own citizens, including permission for federal agents to 'sneak and peek' at citizens' private records; enter citizens' homes in secret; and hold citizens indefinitely without access to legal counsel or a hearing before a judge.⁷⁹

The administration of George W Bush humiliated Muslims in the White House at the beginning of his administration. At a meeting of US Muslims with the Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives, Secret Service agents removed an American citizen who was Muslim.⁸⁰ In the aftermath of 9/11, while President Bush did take pains to assure Muslims that the war against terrorism was not a war against Islam, other administration officials were not so charitable. Lt Gen William G Boykin, the Pentagon's deputy undersecretary for intelligence, discussing a 1993 battle with a Muslim militia leader in Somalia, said: 'I knew that my God was bigger than his. I knew that my God was a real God, and his was an idol.'⁸¹

Many Americans may have to brace themselves for a less free America than the

one which closed the 20th century, but an America more *religion-conscious* than the one which opened the third millennium. If the erosion of civil liberties is justified on the grounds of the war against terrorism, this is a war with no recognisable finality of either a peace treaty with the enemy, or a demand of unconditional surrender.

What would constitute the end of this war? Would we be able to have a victory parade, open bottles of halal champagne or hug each other with joy in the streets? After World War II there were VE Day (Victory in Europe) and V-J Day (Victory in Japan). What would constitute such finality in the war on terrorism?

We must not forget that if America's own democracy decays, it makes it easier for the Third World's own dictators (Muslim and non-Muslim) to justify their tyranny.⁸² When the American government itself erodes American freedoms, its credibility in promoting freedom and democracy abroad is substantially eroded.⁸³ People have begun to question whether the Bush administration is really committed to promoting democracy: as Fred Hiatt has pointed out, 'the struggle against intolerant and violent strains of Islamism is going to be a long one, and it is set back when the United States falters in supporting democratic values'.⁸⁴

The Fourth Phase: democratising the USA, empowering Islam

This fourth phase is a scenario for the future rather than a report of historical trends. The USA needs greater political democratisation and reduced social libertarianism. US policy, even when cloaked in the benevolent clothes of

promoting democracy abroad and preventing terrorism at home, must be restrained. Minorities may play a crucial role in view of their own experience with the American democratic experiment. Corporate and media power to promote rampant consumerism and sexuality will need to be countered.

The Muslim world needs greater doctrinal liberalisation and deeper intellectual modernisation. On the path of empowering Islam, the varieties of Islam must be enlisted to reinterpret Islam for the modern era. Crucial in this regard will be promoting an Islam that is not obscurantist and promotes knowledge and intellectual freedom; an Islam progressive in relation to gender roles and basic human freedoms; and perhaps even an Islam tolerant about difference on such matters as sexual orientation.

Rolling back American socio-sexual libertarianism would require new discipline in the following areas.

Greed, corporate and personal

This would require stricter controls over corporate corruption, accounting fraud and exorbitant compensation paid to CEOs. The scandals at Enron, WorldCom, Tyco and other companies have been examples of such greed.⁸⁵ Personal greed has been manifested in the culture of cheating that results in people cutting corners to get ahead.⁸⁶

Consumerism and depletion of the world's resources

Any comparative survey of the consumption of Americans *vis-à-vis* other cultures points to the huge appetite of Americans for consumption of the world's resources. For instance, per capita US energy consumption in 1996 was 43 times that of Yemen.⁸⁷

The rules of sexuality

Perhaps the extreme level of this has been Massachusetts, which has moved towards declaring that gay marriages have to be allowed to avoid the 'separate but equal' classification of 'civil unions' that some states such as Vermont have permitted for gay unions.⁸⁸ On the other hand, there appears to be a backlash in other states, such as Ohio, which recently became the 38th state to ban same-sex unions.⁸⁹ The Alliance for Marriage, a bipartisan coalition of more than 50 religious leaders, including Roman Catholics, Protestants, Jews and Muslims is seeking a constitutional amendment that would ban gay marriage but not stop states from enacting civil unions for same-sex couples.⁹⁰ Also, according to the Centers for Disease Control, there has been a 30% decrease in the teenage birthrate over the past decade, and this is not just the result of better protection. Recent studies have shown that teenagers are having less sex than their parents think, and are more conservative on sex than their parents.⁹¹

Hedonistic inebriation and medical lifestyle enhancements (alcoholism and drugs)

Colleges and universities are confronting issues of binge drinking by young people. Some regions of the USA have considered decriminalising the use of marijuana, especially for medical reasons. Commercials on television advocate the use of drugs, although with prescriptions, to combat impotence.

Democratisation

As for the greater democratisation of America, it is tied up with 'America as Empire'.⁹² Although Americans are reluctant to think of their actions as that of an imperial regime, as Dimitri K Simes has put it, 'Whether or not the United States now views itself as an empire, for many foreigners it increasingly looks, walks, and talks like one'.⁹³

The USA as an empire can only be checked by the USA as a democracy. African Americans, Latinos and Muslim Americans have a lot to learn from Jews about how to be empowered Americans. So indeed do women of America of all races. American women are substantially liberated, but they have yet to penetrate the citadels of power. Jews have been staggeringly successful not only politically in America, but also economically, educationally and culturally.⁹⁴ Jews are the supreme example and ideal model of an American minority that has successfully used the American system to its full advantage. Jews have also exploited the American system for the benefit of Israel.⁹⁵

If African Americans, Muslim Americans, Arab Americans, Latinos and women of all races became half as successful as the Jews in influencing the directions of American policy, their effect would probably be towards liberalising the foreign policy of the USA. Many African Americans and Native Americans are quite aware of the excesses of America as empire themselves. As the renowned African American novelist Walter Mosley said recently:

Blacks do not see America as the great liberator of the world. Blacks understand how the rest of the world sees us, because we have also been the victims of American imperialism.⁹⁶

At the moment America is torn between a domestic philosophy based on *rights* and a foreign policy based on *might*. America is an empire abroad and struggling to be a democracy at home. Demographic changes in the USA may tilt the balance towards a better and more humane equilibrium.⁹⁷

A new global clash of civilisations has indeed begun, with the USA at the centre of it. But the seeds of redemption may also lie in America. Those seeds are carried by emerging populations potentially more responsive to other cultures and civilisations than the contemporary US power-elites seem to be. The imperial tunnel is still dark—but the light of a more inclusive American democracy can be seen at the end of this tunnel.

A particularly important issue is whether Muslims can use their present pain

and anguish as a basis of a new sense of unity. The unity needs to be constructive rather than destructive, benevolent rather than malevolent, determined to protect Muslims rather than harm others.

Who knows? Perhaps out of such unity of anguish there will subsequently emerge the unity of achievement, a triumphant American Muslim identity at long last, combining faith in Islam with what is best about America.

As for a future Islamic Renaissance and liberalisation, this may one day have to be led by Muslims receptive to other cultures, like those in the West. For our purposes in this article we may distinguish among three schools of Islam—Orthodox, modernist and liberal.⁹⁸

Orthodox Islam is literalist in its interpretation of the Qur'an and the Sunna, ritualistic in its observances, traditionalist in gender relations, with an emphasis on a *God of Justice*. On the whole, Orthodox Muslims are far less receptive to other cultures.⁹⁹

Modernist Islam seeks to bring Islamic beliefs closer to modern science, technology and the expansion of human knowledge. Modernist Muslims put less emphasis on Islamic rituals and more emphasis on Islamic rationalism. The modernist Allah is a *God of Enlightenment*. Beliefs about Satan, jinn, devils and spirits are interpreted metaphorically rather than literally. Even angels are seen as figurative manifestations of God. Perhaps 'Abdolkarim Soroush of Iran is a modernist Muslim.¹⁰⁰ Modernist Muslims also include most theorists of the Islamisation of knowledge.

Liberal Islam is less concerned with updating Islam *scientifically* and more concerned with updating Islam *ethically*.¹⁰¹ The Liberal Muslim is less worried about whether Iblis (Satan) exists physically or only figuratively. Islamic liberalism is anxious that Muslim women be treated as equals; that slavery be declared *haram* under *any* circumstances; that the amputation of hands of thieves be relegated totally to history; and that the death penalty be either abolished completely or be limited to such egregious offences as first-degree murder (and never be imposed on adulterers). To liberal Muslims, Allah is a *God of Compassion*. Perhaps Fatima Mernissi of Morocco is a liberal Muslim.¹⁰²

The modernisation of Catholicism has been relatively easy because the Roman Catholic Church has a spiritual head who enjoys some 'divine infallibility' in some of his interpretations of the faith. The modernisation of other branches of Christianity had to ride on the immense cultural revolution of the Protestant Reformation. The modernisation of Judaism occurred mainly in the Jewish Diaspora as the Jews engaged in brilliant cultural synthesis. Modernisation in Islam could occur in the Muslim Diaspora in those countries where Muslims have freedom to speak and debate intellectual and theological matters without fear of physical harassment.

In search of Islamic constitutionalism

How can Muslims either modernise or liberalise Islam without having a Muslim Pope, or a Muslim Protestant Revolution or a new Muslim cultural synthesis? First and foremost, Muslim liberal thinkers and modernist theologians need to be

assured greater intellectual freedom, without the fear of harassment or the risk of violent bigotry. Second, the liberal thinkers and modernist theologians need to invoke *idjithad* (individual effort to re-interpret Islamic law; personalized judicial review) more systematically in order to address the contradictions between ancient doctrine and modern realities. Third, these new ideas should be made more accessible to the wider Muslim *ummah*, taking advantage of the new 'information superhighway' and the computer revolution.

The three schools of Islam (Orthodox, Modernist and Liberal) are not to be conceived as *madhahib* (religious denominations). They can be reformulations of some of the existing *madhahib*. It is possible to modernise Sunni Islam and liberalise Shiism.¹⁰³

Let us agree that a good Muslim cannot deny, disobey, contradict or neglect Allah's commands. But the whole point of this debate is whether a good Muslim can *re-interpret* God's command in the light of new evidence or changed circumstances.

Of course the word of God is infallible, but those who interpret it are *not*. Unlike Christians, Muslims do not believe that God walked among men and conversed with human beings directly (Jesus as 'the word of God made flesh'). But even for Christians, God is not personally available on earth *today* to give lessons on how to interpret their scripture.

The Qur'an is infallible, but those who have interpreted it are fallible human beings. The USA's constitution was drafted by Founding Fathers who were not themselves necessarily lawyers. However, those who interpret the Constitution *today* are judges who live in the 21st century. Since the adoption of the US Constitution in the 18th century, slavery has been declared unconstitutional, segregated schools declared illegal, women and Blacks have been given the vote, and the right to privacy has been read into the Constitution through judicial review. The fundamental law of the country has been repeatedly re-interpreted by its judges without abandoning the sanctity and dignity of the Constitution.

There is a debate about the US Constitution comparable to our own debate about how to interpret the Qur'an. There are conservative jurists even in the Supreme Court itself who insist that the text of the Constitution should be interpreted as closely as possible to the original intent of the founders. There are others who believe that the US Constitution is a *living guide* to the nation and is therefore subject to reinterpretation according to changing social and political realities.¹⁰⁴

Minorities like Black people and Muslims in the USA have benefited far more from the second juridical school (historically relative) than from the first (constructionist and orthodox). The gains of the Civil Rights Movement were mainly under the Warren Supreme Court, which was historically relative and reformist. Since then the US Supreme Court has been moving back to rightwing orthodoxy.¹⁰⁵

We need to distinguish between rules of evidence and fairness of punishment. Even if one of our loved ones had adversely satisfied the rules of evidence on adultery, would we still be comfortable with their being executed for adultery? We must remember that such sins as adultery or homosexuality in Dar el Islam might have been committed by one's cousin or one's brother, or even by one's

father. We must remember the words of the Prophet. The relevant Qur'anic verse that is cited in the case of homosexuality is:

If two men among you
Are guilty of lewdness
Punish them both.
If they repent and amend
Leave them alone; for Allah
is oft-Returning, Most Merciful. (Qur'an, 4: 16)

Quranic verses 4: 15 and 24: 4 suggest that for the severe punishments envisaged for adultery, four witnesses are required. Even if the rules of evidence were satisfied, would one still regard such punishments as fair in the 20th or 21st century? Individual Muslims must reflect carefully and be honest with themselves before they answer. Would they be prepared to kill one of their brothers for adultery if four witnesses had witnessed his sin physically? Islamic modernism and Islamic liberalism would not seek to end a human life for a sexual offence, however revolting.

The Qur'an and the Sunnah are the sources of the Islamic Constitutional Order. The Qur'an is older than the US Constitution by more than a thousand years. If things in the world have changed a lot since the days of Thomas Jefferson, how much more have they changed since the days of the Prophet Muhammad (pbuh)? If American jurisprudence is allowing itself to learn from the lessons of 200 years of history, why cannot Islamic jurisprudence learn from 14 centuries of historical change? Muslims must always remember once again that, while the word of God is infallible and immutable, the human interpreters of the word of God are not. New Muslim intellects should review the doctrines once again.

Is religion in conflict with science?

Narrow orthodoxy is precisely what has left Muslims behind and made them vulnerable to being humiliated and brutalised by others. Nor must we forget that Black people have also been under-achievers and that women have been left below the commanding heights of science and philosophy.

However, there has never been a time when women were at the pinnacle of global power, or when Black people were at the centre of the global equation. But there was a time in history when *Muslims* were globally triumphant. Why did Muslims decline so disastrously? And why have they continued to be marginalised? Is it possible that the Muslim refusal to let the message of Islam be reinterpreted is at the core of the retardation of the Muslim world? Is orthodoxy a disservice to Islam?¹⁰⁶

During the one hundred years of the existence of the Nobel Prize, Muslim winners of it in the Sciences (chemistry, physics and medicine) can be counted on the fingers of one hand. Jewish winners are in their dozens. Christian winners are probably in their hundreds. The few Muslim winners of the scientific Nobel Prizes are not products or alumni of Islamic universities. They are almost always products of Western education.

A publication of the Third World Academy of Sciences has estimated that less than 1% of world scientific publications are published in the Arab world, in spite of oil wealth. Even rich Arab states spend one seventh of the global average spent by other nations on research and development.¹⁰⁷

There are indeed two ways for Muslims to judge themselves. One is to look at those who have outperformed us—such as Jews and Euro-Christians. The other is to look at those who have performed worse than ourselves in the sciences, such as Black people, women and perhaps the Chinese. Are Muslims sure that they would like Islam to be judged on the basis of below-average performance? Women and Black people have a more solid excuse for under-performance than Muslims have. The Chinese may be facing the same dilemmas as the Muslim *ummah*. Why has China been outperformed by the much smaller Japan? The Muslim world has also been outperformed by Japan, which has less than a tenth of the Muslim population of the world. Muslims need to address the issue of why we are so far behind. Liberal Muslims believe that the *ummah* has refused to change in the light of expanding knowledge and changing circumstances. What do Orthodox Muslims believe are the causes of our retardation?

My late father of blessed memory used to argue that Muslims were left behind when they stopped observing the tenets of their religion. But Jews and Christians observe the tenets of Islam even *less*. Why have Jews and Christians forged ahead in science and technology in spite of their not being Muslims at all? Modernist Muslims are urging a review of our dogmas.

Muslim doctrines, which have hurt our progress, have included the concept of *bid'a*. Originally intended to protect the young religion from premature reform and distortion, *bid'a* became a symbol of Muslim distrust of all kinds of innovations and inventions. While the word *innovation* has positive connotations in the English language, the word *bid'a* in Islamic discourse carries negative and sinful implications. The concept of *bid'a* came to symbolise a fundamental Muslim resistance to change. Orthodoxy defended itself against innovation.

On the other hand, the highly progressive Muslim principle of *idjihad* has been grossly under-utilised. Indeed, among Sunni Muslims, the doors of *idjihad* have been closed in reality, though not necessarily in theory. Had the doors been open, there would have been more than four Sunni denominations in Islam by now.

Sudan's Mahmoud Muhammad Taha should be counted among Muslim *ulamaa* who invoked *idjihad* in a bid to reinterpret Islam. Taha paid with his life in 1985 under Jaafar Nimeiry's version of the *hudud*.¹⁰⁸

The future of the human race may depend upon the gradual restraint of the USA, on one side, and the gradual empowerment of the Muslim world on the other. But the Muslim world will never be empowered until it understands the dynamics of human knowledge.

The origins of Islam rest on *the miracle of wisdom without formal qualifications*. Islam is the religion of a man who could not read or write and yet helped to produce the most influential book in its original language in human history. (The Bible is the most influential book in translation.) Islam is a religion of a man who, when commanded by an angel to read ('*Iqra*'), confessed meekly

that he could not read. That exchange between Gabriel and Muhammad broke the link between inspiration and instruction forever. Illiteracy can be the mother of supreme wisdom. I affirm this in spite of my being a professor with multiple degrees and the author of more than 20 books.

But the future of Islam needs to narrow the gap between religious ritual and intellectual rationalism, and bridge the gap between faith and reason. Only then will Muslims be able to defend Islam not just with word of mouth but also with the power of knowledge. Only then will Muslims be able to fight for Islam not by terrorising the enemy but by educating the adversary.

Conclusion

We have tried to identify in this essay four phases in the history of relationships between Islam and the Western world, with particular reference to the Americo-Islamic interaction. The paradox of the first half of the 20th century was a convergence in values between Islam and Euro-America, but a divergence of empathy between Muslims and Westerners.

The sanctity of the family, the distrust of extramarital sex, the rejection of homosexuality, the emphasis on modesty and chastity, were all values shared by Islam and the Euro-American experience. The USA even went to the extent of prohibiting alcohol through a constitutional amendment in the years between the two world wars—a major convergence with Islam as a profoundly anti-alcohol culture.

Yet those years of Americo-Islamic convergence in values were also the years when Americans regarded Islam as the equivalent of the anti-Christ. American racist culture dismissed Muslims among the darker and ominous races of humankind. Similarity of values coincided with hostility in relationships between the two peoples.

In the second half of the 20th century, the paradox was reversed. Euro-American political values became more and more liberal, improving the relationship between Westerners and Muslims as human beings. On the other hand, the social, sexual and family values of Westerners (including Americans) became more permissive and open. In the West premarital sex, extramarital fornication, homosexuality and lesbianism, alcoholism and marijuana moved closer to cultural acceptance. Dress culture for women became less modest as miniskirts, tight trousers and low necklines became the order of the day. A cultural divergence was occurring between the new Euro-American norms and the more conservative values of Islamic traditions.

On the other hand, the relationship between the American *people* and the Muslim *people* in the second half of the 20th century became increasingly positive. America seemed to be in the process of accepting Islam not as an alien intrusion but as part and parcel of the American mosaic. Islam was becoming ‘indigenous’ to American pluralism.¹⁰⁹

The third phase in Americo-Islamic relations has been unfolding since 11 September 2001. The new Bush administration would like to trade in the currency of *fear* in order to mobilise political support. This is a far cry from the anguish of Franklin D Roosevelt after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Roosevelt proclaimed: ‘The only thing we have to fear is fear itself.’

With George W Bush's administration, it has become a different silent imperative—'The only thing we have to *sell* to the American people is fear itself.' Former Vice President Al Gore put it bluntly: 'The last three years have seen the politics of fear raise its ugly head again.'¹⁰ As Thomas L Friedman has noted in his column in *The New York Times*:

We have stopped exporting hope, the most important commodity America has. We now export only fear, so we end up importing everyone else's fears right back.¹¹

In spite of assurances that the war on terrorism is not a war on Islam, Muslims are paying a disproportionate price for this latest American campaign—from the war on Afghanistan and Iraq to the harassment of Muslim citizens of the USA.

The fourth phase of Americo-Islamic relations requires the taming of the imperial power of the new USA following the collapse of the USSR and the end of the Cold War. America's own internal democracy needs to develop the skills of restraining America as an empire. In the final analysis, only America as a democracy can effectively control America as an empire.

Yet one additional force is needed for restraining the USA. That other future force is the potential power of the Islamic civilisation when its petro-wealth is combined with a truly emergent Islamic renaissance. Such an Islamic rejuvenation may be needed to help the global system realise the virtues of checks and balances once again.

Insha Allahu Taala

Notes

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¹ See Samuel P Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996.

² Unlike in previous immigration legislation, the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1965 did not have race as a category for immigration and naturalisation decisions; a detailed analysis of this Act may be found in Cheryl Shanks, *Immigration and the Politics of American Sovereignty, 1890–1990*, Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2001, pp 144–186.

³ Compelling histories of sexual customs in the USA are drawn in Jon D'Emilio & Estelle Freedman, *Intimate Matters: A History of Sexuality in America*, New York: Harper & Row, 1988; David Allyn, *Make Love, Not War: The Sexual Revolution, An Unfettered History*, Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 2000; and Kevin White, *Sexual Liberation or Sexual License? The American Revolt Against Victorianism*, Chicago, IL: Ivan R Dee, 2000.

⁴ For example, Bertrand Russell's appointment to the City College of New York was rescinded because of his defence of sex before marriage. See Allyn, *Make Love Not War*, p 16.

⁵ These limits are explored in D'Emilio & Freedman, *Intimate Matters*, pp 256–265; and White, *Sexual Liberation or Sexual License?*, pp 77–78.

⁶ Many of the laws against adultery were enacted under pressure from female moral reformers. See D'Emilio & Freedman, *Intimate Matters*, pp 144–145.

⁷ See Geraldine Brooks, *Nine Parts Of Desire: The Hidden World Of Islamic Women*, New York: Doubleday/Anchor, 1995, p 54. For a more general survey of 'honour killings', consult LA Odeh, 'Crimes of honour and the construction of gender in Arab societies', in Mai Yamani & Andrew Allen (eds), *Feminism and Islam: Legal and Literary Perspectives* (Berkshire, UK: Ithaca Press, 1996), pp 141–194.

⁸ The Supreme Court decision in *Lawrence v Texas* (2003), striking down anti-sodomy laws, alarmed conservatives. See report in the *Washington Post*, 27 June 2003, p 1.

⁹ For a chronology of female suffrage, consult Jane Hannan, Mitzi Auchterloine & Katharine Holden, *International Encyclopedia of Women's Suffrage*, Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-Clío, 2000, pp 339–340.

- ¹⁰ Richard G Niemi, John Mueller & Jon W Smith, *Trends in Public Opinion: A Compendium of Survey Data*, New York: Greenwood Press, 1989, p 22; and Susan Mitchell, *American Attitudes: Who Thinks What About the Issues That Shape Our Lives*, Ithaca, NY: New Strategist Publications, 2000, p 334.
- ¹¹ Niemi *et al*, *Trends in Public Opinion*, p 225; and Mitchell, *American Attitudes*, p 340.
- ¹² For some fascinating stories about female workers in the World War II period, see Nancy Wise & Cheryl Wise, *A Mouthful of Rivets: Women At Work in World War II*, San Francisco, CA: Jossey Bass, 1994. For a scholarly analysis, consult Maureen Honey, *Creating Rosie the Riveter: Class, Gender and Propaganda During World War II*, Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 1994.
- ¹³ Wise & Wise, *A Mouthful of Rivets*, pp 188–206. Over the longer period, the reversal after World War II in female participation was temporary, as evinced by statistics covering the 1870–1986 period in Barbara Bergman, *The Economic Emergence of Women*, New York: Basic Books, 1984, p 20.
- ¹⁴ See K Austin Kerr, *Organizing for Prohibition: A New History of the Anti-Saloon League*, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1985, p 35.
- ¹⁵ Consult Thomas M Coffey, *The Long Thirst: Prohibition in America 1920–1933*, New York: WW Norton, 1975; and Kerr, *Organizing for Prohibition*, p 185.
- ¹⁶ Based on this incident, a docudrama entitled *Death of A Princess* (1980), directed by Antony Thomas, caused a major controversy when it was shown in the West.
- ¹⁷ Statistics on race and the death penalty can be found at <http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org>. According to recent estimates, about 45% of death row inmates are African American.
- ¹⁸ For an overview of this case, see Allyn, *Make Love, Not War*, pp 85–92. Excerpts from the decision may be found in Abraham L Davis & Barbara Luck Graham, *The Supreme Court, Race, and Civil Rights*, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1995, pp 214–216.
- ¹⁹ Public opinion has changed dramatically in this regard. The number of whites who thought that there should be laws against interracial marriage has declined from 59% in December 1963 to 11% in 1996. See Niemi *et al*, *Trends in Public Opinion*, p 170, and Mitchell, *American Attitudes*, pp 194–195.
- ²⁰ Racism towards immigrant Muslims was exacerbated by immigrant legislation, which was racist. See Richard Wormser, *American Islam: Growing Up Muslim in America*, New York: Walker & Co, 1994, 2002, p 13. For a quick overview of the history of Islam in the USA, consult Bret E Carroll, *The Routledge Historical Atlas of Religion in America*, New York: Routledge, 2000, pp 102–103.
- ²¹ Malcolm X was one such example. On the religious transformation of Malcolm, see Louis A DeCaro, Jr, *On the Side of My People: A Religious Life of Malcolm X*, New York: New York University, 1996.
- ²² Relatedly, consult Youssef Courbage & Philippe Fargues, *Christians and Jews Under Islam*, London: IB Tauris, 1997.
- ²³ This resistance was in the context of European refugees fleeing the war and persecution of the Nazi advances, and many of these refugees were Jewish. See the note in Shanks, *Immigration and the Politics of American Sovereignty*, p 333.
- ²⁴ Indeed, as late as the 1970s, only 26% of surveyed Americans thought sex before marriage was not morally wrong, but this had increased to 42% in 1996. Niemi *et al*, *Trends in Public Opinion*, p 193; and Mitchell, *American Attitudes*, p 416.
- ²⁵ Relatedly, consult Martha A Fineman & Martha T McCluskey (eds), *Feminism, Media, and the Law*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997; and Lisa M Cuklanz, *Rape on Prime Time: Television, Masculinity and Sexual Violence*, Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2000. For one alternative example, see Lori M Irving & Susan K Berel, 'Comparison of media-literacy programs to strengthen college women's resistance to media images', *Psychology of Women Quarterly*, 25 (2), 2001, pp 103–111.
- ²⁶ Niemi *et al*, *Trends in Public Opinion*, p 225; and Mitchell, *American Attitudes*, p 340.
- ²⁷ Niemi *et al*, *Trends in Public Opinion*, p 22; and Mitchell, *American Attitudes*, p 334.
- ²⁸ Coffey, *The Long Thirst*, p 315.
- ²⁹ Michael Moore, *Stupid White Men: And Other Sorry Excuses for the State of the Nation*, New York: Regan Books, 2001, p 206.
- ³⁰ The Supreme Court has decided to take up the issue of the death penalty for juvenile offenders. *New York Times*, 27 January 2004, p 1.
- ³¹ Amina may not have been in any danger of being executed at all and, even under the Shariah, the case against her was flawed. See the opinion piece by Helon Habila, 'The politics of Islamic law: Shariah in Nigeria', *International Herald Tribune*, p 7.
- ³² At this time the French National Assembly has decided to ban the headscarves worn by Muslim females in public schools. For a French explanation of the feelings behind the ban, see the op-ed piece by Guy Coq, 'Scarves and symbols', *New York Times*, 30 January 2004, p 21.
- ³³ Consult David Kingsley, *Ecology and Religion: Ecological Spirituality in Cross-Cultural Perspective*, Englewood-Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1995, p 123.
- ³⁴ Jane I Smith, *Islam in America*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1999, p 127.
- ³⁵ See *Christian Science Monitor*, 2 November 2000, p 18. More recently, Arab Americans have been approached for their political support, since their numbers may be pivotal in some battleground states

- in the 2004 presidential race. See the reports in the *Washington Post*, 18 October 2003, p 7, 19 October 2003, p 5, 7 December 2003, p 1 and David Broder's op-ed piece, 'Mobilizing Arab Americans', *Washington Post*, 22 October 2003, p 29.
- ³⁶ According to one survey of US Muslims, 30% are black, 33% South Asian and 25% Arab (the survey did not include followers of the Nation of Islam). *Baltimore Sun*, 27 April 2001, p 4.
- ³⁷ A poll by the American Muslim Council in 1999 showed that 53% of Muslims identified with the Democratic Party, while 47% identified with the Republican Party. *Denver Post*, 18 December 1999, p 26.
- ³⁸ A key tenet of American liberalism is the separation of Church and State, and Jewish political activity has tended to be more liberal. See Lena Stein, 'American Jews and their liberal political behavior', in Wilbur Church (ed), *The Politics of Minority Coalitions*, Westport, CT: Praeger, 1996, p 196.
- ³⁹ For some instances in the 1990s, see Frank S Ravitch, *School Prayer and Discrimination: The Civil Rights of Religious Minorities and Dissenters*, Boston, MA: Northeastern University Press, 1999, pp 9–12. Relatedly, on the Jewish position on religion in public schools, see Jonathan D Sarna & David G Dalin, *Religion and State in the American Jewish Experience*, Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1997, pp 239–240.
- ⁴⁰ There has been a decline of religion—particularly Christianity—in Europe. See *New York Times*, 13 October 2003, p 1.
- ⁴¹ See Kambiz Ghanea Bassiri, *Competing Visions of Islam in the United States: A Study of Los Angeles*, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1997, pp 44–45.
- ⁴² For some discussions of these fears, see Smith, *Islam in America*, p 120; GhaneaBassiri, *Competing Visions of Islam in the United States*, pp 78–84; and *San Francisco Chronicle*, 17 January 1999, p 1.
- ⁴³ Shanks, *Immigration and the Politics of American Sovereignty*, p 144.
- ⁴⁴ Groups and organisations established by Muslims in the USA to correct stereotypes and influence policy include the Council for American Islamic Relations, based in Washington, DC and the Muslim Public Affairs Council. See 'Muslims learn to pull political ropes in US', *Christian Science Monitor*, 5 February 1996, p 10. Also, on the chaplains, see Smith, *Islam in America*, p 159.
- ⁴⁵ Emerson's article appeared in the *Wall Street Journal*, 13 March 1996, p 14.
- ⁴⁶ Leading human rights publications now routinely survey the state of laws against gays and lesbians. See, for example, Human Rights Watch, *World Report 2002*, New York: Human Rights Watch, 2002, pp 602–608. Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris have argued, in 'The true clash of civilizations', *Foreign Policy*, 135, 2003, pp 62–70, that a country's treatment of homosexuals is indicative of its level of tolerance, and that the differences between the Islamic world and the West on this issue and on gender rights mark the dividing line between Islam and the West.
- ⁴⁷ There is a strong effort in Canada to legalise same-sex marriages, although there has been opposition, notably from the Catholic Church. *International Herald Tribune*, 11 August 2003, p 7.
- ⁴⁸ On the decision by the Episcopalians, see Michael Massing, 'Bishop Lee's choice', *New York Times Magazine*, 4 January 2004, pp 32–40.
- ⁴⁹ One such person, a lesbian Canadian Muslim, Irshad Manji, has recently been in the news with her *The Trouble With Islam: A Muslim's Call For Reform In Her Faith*, New York: St Martin's Press, 2004.
- ⁵⁰ See Khalid Durani, 'Homosexuality and Islam', in Arlene Swidler (ed), *Homosexuality and World Religions*, Valley Forge, PA: Trinity Press International, 1993, p 184. For a longer study of Islamic homosexuality, see Stephen O Murray, Will Roscoe *et al*, *Islamic Homosexualities: Culture, History, and Literature*, New York: New York University Press, 1997.
- ⁵¹ Jim Wafer, 'Muhammad and male sexuality', in Murray *et al*, *Islamic Homosexualities*, pp 87–90.
- ⁵² *New York Times*, 4 February 2004, p 8.
- ⁵³ For an example in Iraq, see *Washington Post*, 3 February 2004, p 2.
- ⁵⁴ See the op-ed piece by Larry Johnson, 'The declining terrorist threat', 10 July 2001.
- ⁵⁵ The September 11 attack caused the largest loss of American lives on a single day on American soil since the Civil War, when there were battles that claimed thousands of lives on a single day, and the war itself claimed 623 000 lives. See Philip S Paludan, *A People's Contest: The Union and Civil War, 1861–1865*, Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 1996, p 316 for a comparative casualty count of major US wars.
- ⁵⁶ A majority of the countries under US travel advisories currently have Muslim majority populations or substantial Muslim populations. A list of the advisories may be found at http://travel.state.gov/warnings_list.html, p 16 of 27. Americans are advised to avoid traveling to these countries.
- ⁵⁷ *New York Times*, 2 February 2004, p 3.
- ⁵⁸ See *Washington Post*, 19 November 2003, p 28 for a report on the incident.
- ⁵⁹ The Kay revelations may be found in *Washington Post*, 28 January 2004, p 1.
- ⁶⁰ In an NBC interview with President George W Bush, 7 February 2004, the number of US deaths and casualties was put by interviewer Tim Russert at about 530 deaths and 3000 'injuries and woundings'. A full transcript of the interview is at <http://msnbc.msn.com/id/4179618/>. An estimate of Iraqi civilian deaths ranges between 8000 to 10 000, according to <http://www.iraqbodycount.net/>.

- ⁶¹ Many Muslims from other countries who have been subjected to a special registration procedure, including the taking of fingerprints and photographs, have decided to boycott visiting the USA. For instance, a Pakistan-born Canadian citizen professor who was asked to go through this procedure on his way to the USA decided to stay away until the procedure was removed. See *Washington Post*, 11 November 2003, p 17.
- ⁶² For a report on the difficulties faced by Muslim travellers—including this author—at airports, see *Washington Post*, 14 September 2003, p 8.
- ⁶³ For general accounts of the encroachment on civil rights, see Nat Hentoff, *The War on the Bill of Rights, and the Coming Resistance*, New York: Seven Stories Press, 2003; David Cole, *Enemy Aliens: Immigrants' Rights and American Freedoms in the War on Terrorism*, New York: New Press 2003; David Cole & James X Dempsey, *Terrorism & the Constitution: Sacrificing Civil Liberties in the Name of National Security*, New York: New Press, 2002; and Wendy Kaminer, *Free For All: Defending Liberty in America Today*, Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 2002. For a specific report on the circumstances of the arrests, flimsy evidence, and post-arrest treatment of the September 11 detainees, see the highly critical report of the Justice Department's own Inspector General, *The September 11 Detainees: A Review of the Treatment of Aliens Held on Immigration Charges in Connection With the Investigation of the September 11 Attacks*, at <http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/0603/full.pdf> (2003).
- ⁶⁴ *Washington Post*, 14 January 2004, p 1.
- ⁶⁵ *Washington Post*, 12 January 2004, p 1.
- ⁶⁶ See the op-ed piece by Jean AbiNader & Kate Martin, 'Just the facts, Mr Ashcroft', *Washington Post*, 25 July 2002, p 21.
- ⁶⁷ The Supreme Court has refused to hear challenges to the arguments proffered by the US government against releasing the names of prisoners. See *Washington Post*, 13 January 2004, p 18.
- ⁶⁸ Also, of the 762 detainees investigated in the Department of Justice report cited above, none was found to have links with terrorism. See the op-ed piece by Richard Cohen, 'Ashcroft's attitude problem', *Washington Post*, 10 June 2003, p 21.
- ⁶⁹ See the concerns raised by critics in a report in the *New York Times*, 29 December 2002, p B7.
- ⁷⁰ Chisun Lee writes that Sin Yen Ling, a lawyer for the New York-based Asian American Legal Defense and Education Fund pointed out that 'Since December [2001], Ling says, she has personally represented as many as 40 immigrants, all but one of Middle Eastern or Muslim extraction. And the flow has not lessened.' 'The name game', *Village Voice*, 14–20 August 2002. Further, demographics of the 762 detainees in the report of the Department of Justice, *The September 11 Detainees*, illustrated in Figure 2, p 21, are completely different from those of the 9/11 hijackers. For instance, the largest number of detainees (254) were Pakistanis and, while the largest number of the hijackers were Saudi Arabians, more Indians and Turks were arrested than Saudi Arabians!
- ⁷¹ Quoted in *New York Times*, 1 December 2003, p 5.
- ⁷² For one discussion of the issues at Nuremberg, consult Alan S Rosenbaum, *Prosecuting Nazi War Criminals*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993.
- ⁷³ Although the word 'assassination' is rarely used, the Bush administration is not coy about using targeted strikes to kill those who may be perceived as 'terrorists'. Indeed, Bush himself said in his 2003 State of the Union Address: 'All told, more than 3000 suspected terrorists have been arrested in many countries. Many others have met a different fate. Put it this way: they're no longer a problem to the United States and our friends and allies.' See http://abcnews.go.com/sections/nightline/World/iraq_assassination030315.html for more.
- ⁷⁴ For details, see Moshe Pearlman, *The Capture and Trial of Adolf Eichmann*, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1963.
- ⁷⁵ New guidelines were issued permitting these activities, although FBI Director Robert S Mueller III denied that the guidelines would be used to do widespread surveillance of mosques. *Washington Post*, 6 June 2002, p 1.
- ⁷⁶ See the press release from the American Civil Liberties Union, and other members of a coalition regarding this issue at <http://archive.aclu.org/news/2001/n122001a.html>
- ⁷⁷ A report on the relaxation of the rules may found in *Washington Post*, 6 February 2004, p 11.
- ⁷⁸ See relatedly, the op-ed piece by AbiNader & Martin, 'Just the facts, Mr Ashcroft'.
- ⁷⁹ *Washington Post*, 12 November 2003, p 2. Even New York City, the site of the 9/11 attacks, has formally condemned the Patriot Act. *Washington Post*, 5 February 2004, p 11.
- ⁸⁰ See the report in the *New York Times*, 29 June 2001, p 14.
- ⁸¹ An investigation was launched into the general's remarks. *Washington Post*, 22 October 2003, p 2. Boykin is supposed to work with Muslim countries on anti-terrorism efforts, and quite apart from being inflammatory, his words displayed appalling ignorance about the essentially same God that Muslims, Jews and Christians worship. See John Kearney, 'My God is your God', *New York Times*, 28 January 2004, p 25.
- ⁸² A Human Rights Watch report pointed out that country leaders were taking advantage of the anti-terror campaign to suppress dissent and abuse human rights. *Washington Post*, 18 January 2001, p 12.

- ⁸³ See Tom Malinowski, 'Absent moral authority', *Washington Post*, 2 February 2004, p 17.
- ⁸⁴ See Fred Hiatt, 'Democracy on hold', *Washington Post*, 6 October 2003, p 23.
- ⁸⁵ A readable account of some of these misdeeds may be found in Roger Lowenstein, *Origins of the Crash: The Great Bubble And Its Undoing*, New York: Penguin, 2004. For a briefer example, see his 'The fall of the House of Rigas', *New York Times Magazine*, 1 February 2004, pp 26–32, 42–43, 62.
- ⁸⁶ See David Callahan, *The Cheating Culture: Why More Americans Are Doing Wrong To Get Ahead*, New York: Harcourt Press, 2004.
- ⁸⁷ This example is cited in Rafael Reuveny, 'Economic growth, environmental scarcity and conflict', *Global Environmental Politics*, 2 (1), 2002, p 93.
- ⁸⁸ A report on the Massachusetts Supreme Court's decision may be found in the *Washington Post*, 5 February 2004, p 1.
- ⁸⁹ The Ohio bill was sweeping—it would also prohibit state agencies from giving benefits to both gay and heterosexual domestic partners. *New York Times*, 3 February 2004, p 12.
- ⁹⁰ The Alliance was in the news recently when one more mainstream Islamic organisation, the Islamic Society of North America, withdrew after being accused of links to extremism. *Washington Post*, 8 February 2004, p 15.
- ⁹¹ See the comment by Charles McGrath, 'Arrested developments', *New York Times Magazine*, 4 January 2004, p 8.
- ⁹² Critical discussions on the American empire may be found in Chalmers Johnson, *Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire*, New York: Henry Holt, 2001; and Michael Parenti, *Against Empire*, San Francisco, CA: City Lights Books, 1995.
- ⁹³ Dimitri K Simes, 'America's imperial dilemma', *Foreign Affairs*, 82 (6), 2003, p 93.
- ⁹⁴ For a discussion about the successes and reasons for Jewish success in American society, see Steven J Gold & Bruce Phillips, 'Mobility and continuity among Eastern European Jews', in Silvia Pedraza & Rubén G Rumbaut (eds), *Origins and Destinies: Immigration, Race, and Ethnicity in America*, Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1996, pp 186–188.
- ⁹⁵ An overview of the American Jews' role in American foreign policy toward Israel may be found in Steven L Spiegel, 'Israel and beyond: American Jews in US foreign policy', in L Sandy Maisel & Ira N Forman (eds), *Jews in American Politics*, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001, pp 251–269. For an alternative argument positing that the extent of their influence on US policy towards Israel may be declining, consult Steven T Rosenthal, *Irreconcilable Differences? The Waning of the American Jewish Love Affair With Israel*, Hanover, NH: Brandeis University Press/University Press of New England, 2001.
- ⁹⁶ This quote is from an interview with Walter Mosley in the *New York Times Magazine*, 8 February 2004, p 17.
- ⁹⁷ The demographic changes in the USA of the 21st century pose several challenges. See, for example, Nancy A Denton & Stewart E Tolnay (eds), *American Diversity: A Demographic Challenge for the Twenty-First Century*, Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2002; and Neil Smelser, William Julius Wilson & Faith Mitchell (eds), *America Becoming: Racial Trends and Their Consequences*, 2 vols, Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 2001.
- ⁹⁸ For a slightly different discussion of the 'Islamic spectrum', see Seyyed Hossein Nasr, *The Heart of Islam: Enduring Values for Humanity*, San Francisco, CA: HarperSanFrancisco, 2002, pp 57–112.
- ⁹⁹ Wahhabi Islam in Saudi Arabia, and The Taliban in Afghanistan may be examples of such Orthodox Islam. Brief descriptions of the rise of the Wahhabis in Saudi Arabia may be found in William L Cleveland, *A History of the Modern Middle East*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994, p 116; and Nasr, *The Heart of Islam*, pp 69–70.
- ¹⁰⁰ Readers interested in Soroush may consult *Reason, Freedom, & Democracy in Islam: Essential Writings of 'Abdolkarim Soroush*, translated, edited, and with a critical introduction by Mahmoud Sadri & Ahmad Sadri, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.
- ¹⁰¹ Guides to some of the views in liberal Islam may be found in Charles Kurzman (ed), *Liberal Islam: A Sourcebook*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1998.
- ¹⁰² Ms Mernissi has been a prolific author on issues involving Islam, women, and Morocco. Some of her major works include *Scheherazade Goes West: Different Cultures, Different Harems*, New York: Washington Square Press, 2001; *Islam and Democracy: Fear of the Modern World*, trans Mary Jo Lakeland, Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1992; *The Veil and the Male Elite: A Feminist Interpretation of Women's Rights in Islam*, trans Mary Jo Lakeland, Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1991; *Women and Islam: An Historical and Theological Enquiry*, trans Mary Jo Lakeland, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991; *Doing Daily Battle: Interviews With Moroccan Women*, trans Mary Jo Lakeland, London: Women's Press, 1988; *Beyond The Veil: Male–Female Dynamics in Modern Muslim Society*, Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1987.
- ¹⁰³ Iranian President Mohammad Khatami may be an example of a Shiite cleric and politician who is attempting to bring about change in Islam; see his *Hope and Challenge: The Iranian President Speaks*, Binghamton, NY: Institute of Global Cultural Studies, 1997.
- ¹⁰⁴ Relatedly, consult the following: Keith E Whittington, *Constitutional Interpretation: Textual Meaning*,

Original Intent, And Judicial Review, Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1999; Terry Eastland (ed), *Benchmarks: Great Constitutional Controversies in The Supreme Court*, Washington, DC/Grand Rapids, MI: Ethics and Public Policy Center and WB Eerdmans, 1995; and William F Harris, II, *The Interpretable Constitution*, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, c1993.

- ¹⁰⁵ In comparison to the Warren Supreme Court, the Rehnquist Court has become more conservative, for the most part. See, for instance, David Kairys, *With Liberty and Justice for Some: A Critique of the Conservative Supreme Court*, New York: The New Press and Norton's, 1993; William Mishler & Reginald S Sheehan, 'The Supreme Court as a countermajoritarian institution? The impact of public opinion on Supreme Court decisions', *American Political Science Review*, 87 (1), 1993, pp 87–101; Tracey E George & Lee Epstein, 'On the nature of Supreme Court decision making', *American Political Science Review*, 86 (2), 1992, pp 323–337; and Richard C Kearney & Reginald S Sheehan, 'Supreme Court decision making: the impact of court composition on state and local government litigation', *Journal of Politics*, 54 (4), 1992, pp 1008–1025.
- ¹⁰⁶ Perhaps the most well known—but also controversial—explanation for the stagnation of the Muslim world is Bernard Lewis, *What Went Wrong? Western Impact and Middle Eastern Response*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. See also Hilal Khashan, *Arabs at the Crossroads: Political Identity and Nationalism*, Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 2000; Michael Field, *Inside the Arab World*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995; and Olivier Roy, *The Failure of Political Islam*, trans Carol Volk, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994.
- ¹⁰⁷ Ehsan Masood, 'Faith, reason, and science', *TWAS Newsletter*, 15 (2), 2003, p 5. See also Thomas L Friedman, 'Courageous Arab thinkers', *New York Times*, Week in Review Section, 20 October 2003, p 11.
- ¹⁰⁸ On Taha's views and execution, consult Abdel Salam Sidahmed, *Politics and Islam in Contemporary Sudan*, New York: St Martin's Press, 1996, pp 122–123, p 136.
- ¹⁰⁹ The harassment of Muslims seems to have mobilised several groups to involve themselves politically. See the reports in the *Washington Post*, 7 December 2003, p 1, 18 October 2003, p 7, 19 October 2003, p 5; and Broder, 'Mobilizing Arab Americans', p 29.
- ¹¹⁰ Gore made these comments in a Tennessee Democratic gathering in a fiery speech. See the report in the *New York Times*, 8 February 2004, p 18.
- ¹¹¹ Thomas L Friedman, 'On listening', *New York Times*, 16 October 2003, p 31.