UGANDA BETWEEN DOMESTIC POLICY AND REGIONAL POWER: THE ROLE OF IDEOLOGY

by

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In Africa's experience it is worth distinguishing between externally-oriented ideologies and internally-oriented ideologies. An ideology which is focused on transforming the mode of production or system of government within an African country is internally oriented in our sense. On the other hand, an ideology which seeks to change a country's relations with its neighbours or a country's role in the world is externally-focused.

Pan-Africanism as an ideology is oriented towards relations with other African countries or with the rest of the world. Pan-Africanism is, in that sense, an exogenous vision.

Julius K. Nyerere's Ujamaa, on the other hand, was an ideology which aspired to transform the nature of Tanzanian society. To that extent Ujamaa was an endogenous and domestically focused ideology.

Obote and Museveni: Comparative Leadership

In the case of Uganda since independence, each durable government has had to grapple with both kinds of ideologies - and tried to seek a balance between the two. Uganda under the first leadership of A. Milton Obote (1962-1971) was the least Pan-African of the three members of the East African Community. It was quite suspicious of greater union with the other two countries of the Community (Kenya and Tanzania), and was only modestly involved in the politics of liberation in Southern Africa. This relatively low level of Uganda's Pan-Africanism was inspite of Milton Obote's apparent admiration for Kwame Nkrumah and subsequent friendship with Julius K. Nyerere.

Uganda under the leadership of Yoweri Museveni (who captured power in 1986) has

become the most Pan-African of the former members of the East African Community, and the most regionally active and interventionist in the Great Lakes area. This has constituted quite a sharp transition from the relative national parochialism of Milton Obote's first administration to the wide ranging regional activism and Pan-African interventionism of the Museveni years.

But how did these differences in the external policies of the two governments relate to their domestic policies? Obote's first administration started off as market-oriented and pluralistic. But from 1966 onwards, in response to both constitutional upheavals in Uganda and ideological trends in neighbouring Tanzania, Milton Obote and his Uganda People's Congress began to manifest a shift in rhetoric. By 1969, this shift had certainly become a "move to the left". Uganda was in the early stages of trying to build a socialist state, guided by The Common Man's Charter. The influence of Julius K. Nyerere's Arusha Declaration was unmistakable.

In contrast, Yoweri Museveni started on the left ideologically. In the 1970s he was virtually a Marxist-Leninist. People like Robert Mugabe were radicalized by armed struggle. Yoweri Museveni was deradicalized by armed struggle. Robert Mugabe became more and more of a socialist in the heat of the liberation war. Yoweri Museveni became less and less of a socialist in the tensions of armed struggle against the Obote regime. It took a while for this de-socialization of Museveni to translate into policies after he captured power in Uganda in 1986. While Obote's first administration was characterized by a "Move to the Left", Museveni's years in the twentieth century have been inspired by a "move to the right."

These then are the twin-paradoxes of the ideological orientations of Milton Obote and Yoweri Museveni. Obote displayed relative parochialism towards his neighbours but

increasingly leftist radicalism in domestic policies. Museveni displayed adventurous Pan-Africanism towards neighbours but cautious pro-market pragmatism in domestic policies.

Were the external and internal ideological orientations mutually related? To some extent they were. In his first Administration, Milton Obote became even less Pan-East African as he tried to become more socialist. This is because Milton Obote - like Julius K. Nyerere before him - interpreted socialism as self-reliance rather than as interdependence with neighbours.

In the case of Nyerere, the logic of the Arusha Declaration on Socialism and Self-Reliance of 1967 seemed to force him to take action against free movement of labour and capital between Tanzania and the other two members of the East African Community, Kenya and Uganda. As Tanzania became more socialist, it became less Pan-East African. Similarly, Obote's first administration demonstrated a trade-off between rising socialism and diminishing Pan-Africanism. It was during the leftist atmosphere of Obote's "Move to the Left" that he expelled from Uganda Kenyan workers (mainly Luo).

On the other hand, it was during his pro-market capitalist pragmatism that Yoweri Museveni opened the doors to the old Asian bourgeoisie who had been expelled by the Idi Amin regime in 1972. Yoweri Museveni has also taken the lead in trying to resuscitate the East African Community and has agreed to the formula of a regional passport for citizens of Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania to cover travel among themselves. Capitalist Museveni has been Pan-Africanist Museveni - and the two positions are related.

With regard to only one of Uganda's neighbours was Milton Obote's first administration more Pan-Africanist than Museveni's government. The neighbour is the Sudan. In Obote's last

full year in office in his first administration (1969-1971), he led the way in trying to improve relations with Khartoum. He handed over to the Sudanese government in 1970 one of the Key German mercenaries supporting the southern Anya Nya movement. Obote put Pan-Africanism above pan-tribalism in the concluding year of his first administration.

Yoweri Museveni, on the other hand, has presided over the worst relations between Uganda and Sudan since independence. Khartoum and Kampala have been supporting each other's rebels in newer and more brutal ways. Pan Africanism has given way to narrower and less honourable loyalties. There is yet another external orientation affecting the two governments. Obote was originally in power at the height of the Cold War between the capitalist world led by the United States and its NATO allies on one side, and the communist world led by the Soviet Union and its allies in the Warsaw Pact, on the other.

Yoweri Museveni came into power when the Cold War was coming to an end. Idi Amin was in-between. Let us now look at all these three leaders in relation to the dialectic between capitalism and communism both domestically and internationally in Uganda's unique experience.

Ideology and the Cold War

A curious ideological paradox was played out in Uganda under its three most important presidents - Milton Obote, Idi Amin and Yoweri Museveni. In the First Republic under Milton Obote (1966-1971) the country flirted with socialism at home while remaining basically part of the Western camp in foreign policy. In the so-called "Second Republic" under Idi Amin Dada (1971-1979) the country flirted with the Soviet Union in foreign policy, while trying to

Africanize capitalism at home. Under Yoweri Museveni capitalism at home and pro-Westernism in foreign policy converged.

Obote tried to turn the country into a socialist country without distancing himself too far from the West. Idi Amin acted in ways which did distance him from the West, but in pursuit of the indigenization of capitalism. Museveni was less worried about whether capitalism was indigenized or not - provided it was quite unrestricted.

In reality Milton Obote's "Move to the Left" (1969-1971) was influenced more by Julius K. Nyerere than by Karl Marx. As we indicated, Obote's Common Man's Charter was inspired more by the Arusha Declaration in neighboring Tanzania than by The Communist Manifesto in European history. In his last two years in office Obote's first administration sounded more leftist in rhetoric. The stage was being set for some nationalization measures, for a national service, and for a more centralized economy.

The actual socialist rhetoric did not gather momentum until 1969. But it is arguable that the move to the left began in 1966-7 with the moves against the monarchies. Before Milton Obote declared himself against capitalism in 1969, he declared himself against "feudalism" in 1966. Vladimir Lenin went radically socialist before he abolished the monarchy in Russia. Milton Obote reversed the order. He abolished the monarchies in Uganda in 1967 complete with a republican constitution before he declared himself a radical socialist.

Idi Amin did not restore the monarchies, but for a while he restored the pride of the Baganda by giving a state-funeral to Sir Edward Mutesa, the deposed Kabaka who had died in Britain while Obote was in power. Yoweri Museveni did restore most of the monarchies of

Uganda - though he did not restore all their powers and properties.

In his socialist phase Milton Obote was indeed basically pro-Western in foreign policy, but did draw the line on American involvement in Vietnam and in the Congo (formerly Zaire) in the 1960s and on soft British policies towards the Republic of South Africa and towards Rhodesia under Ian Smith. Milton Obote was in fact the first African leader to publicly criticize the American military involvement in Vietnam. And his eagerness to put Prime Minister Edward Heath in the dock over Britain's policies towards Southern Africa took Milton Obote and his friend at the time, Julius Nyerere, to the Commonwealth conference of Heads of State and Government in Singapore in 1971. The trip to Singapore probably cost Obote his first presidency. He was overthrown in his absence by Idi Amin Dada on January 25, 1971.

Idi Amin's administration started as quite popular with the West and with Israel. His first trips abroad as president were, in part, to meet two very distinguished women - Prime Minister Golda Meir in Israel and Queen Elizabeth II in Britain. In his first year in office Idi Amin received one Western diplomatic hug after another.

His troubles with the West had three major causes. Firstly, his regime became increasingly and embarrassingly repressive. Secondly, Idi Amin - who was helped into power by Israel in January 1971 - turned against his Israeli benefactors in 1972 and expelled them from Uganda lock, stock, and barrel. The third factor which alienated Idi Amin from the West was paradoxically his quest to indigenize capitalism. The effort went wrong when the strategy adopted by Idi Amin included the expulsion of the Asian population of Uganda, most of whom were of British nationality. Later on, Idi Amin also taunted the West with repeated public insults

and abuse.

His alienation from the West made Idi Amin increasingly dependent on the oil-rich Arabs economically, on the one hand, and on the Soviet Union for military and diplomatic support, on the other hand. By the concluding years of the 1970s the Soviet Union's closest friend in Eastern Africa after Ethiopia was, in fact, Uganda.

Yoweri Museveni, once the most anti-Western of all those, lived to become almost totally uncritical of Western powers. Scholars have traced the origins of the sovereign nation-state to the Treaty of Westphalia of 1648. Museveni became both a challenge to the sovereignty of Westphalia and a symbol of Westphilia. He challenged the sovereign state by regional interventionism; He manifested Westphilia by excessive admiration of the West.

The ideological ironies of the different regimes of Uganda were now complete. Pro-Soviet Idi Amin had succeeded pro-socialist Milton Obote; the leader of the "Move to the Left" had been overthrown by a future client of Moscow. Museveni became a pro-marketeer par excellence. Underlying all those years was a more enduring ideological reality in Uganda - a profound distrust of socialism as an answer to Uganda's problems.

Marx, Milton and Museveni

But have most Ugandans distrusted socialism because they associated it with Marxism? And do they distrust Marxism because they have reduced it to Leninism? Has Uganda's hostility towards socialism been a case of mistaken identity? Such a question could be addressed to many other countries as well.

Long before the collapse of communism in Europe, public opinion in Uganda has been consistently unimpressed by the new fangled ideas of Marxism-Leninism. When in much of post-colonial Africa, radical socialism was intellectually respectable, most Ugandans refused to be mobilized behind Milton Obote's Move to the Left (1969-1971). Obote's strategy had the support of some leftist intellectuals, but did not arouse great enthusiasm at the grassroots. Even young Museveni in exile was fascinated by this lure of the Left, but he was unrepresentative of Ugandan opinion.

Were Ugandans against Marxism? Or only against Leninism? We shall never know for certain, because in the twentieth century Marxism has so often been linked to Leninism - and Marx has seldom had a chance to be evaluated on his own.

When Marx was alive he certainly did not think that Russia was anywhere near a socialist revolution. Marx did not think that the Czars (or Kings of Russia) had outlived their role. It is conceivable that Karl Marx, on being resurrected, would have concluded that Uganda in the 1960s was not yet ready for the abolition of the monarchies either. The country had not yet reached a proper bourgeois stage. It was Leninism which was impatient for revolution in Russia, even if it meant executing the Czar and his family. Neo-Leninists in Africa also demanded the abolition of African monarchies.

Marxism on its own could have accommodated some devolution of power to the kingdoms in Uganda in the 1960s and an acceptance of evolutionary change. It was impatient Leninism which insisted on what it called "democratic centralism" as a basis of the highly centralized state. Many African socialists were influenced by this.

Marxism on its own could have accepted a multiparty system in Uganda. It was Leninism and its influence which insisted on a vanguard party in a socialist country, virtually monopolizing political power. Obote's first administration seemed to be moving inexorably towards a one-party state, so popular at the time elsewhere in eastern Africa. While Obote himself was hardly a Leninist, he was surrounded by intellectuals who had been influenced by pseudo-Leninism. They were urging him on towards what would have been, to all intents and purposes, a vanguard party in Uganda - the Uganda People's Congress (UPC). Is Museveni's "No-Party" doctrine a retreat from partism. Or is the "no-party" doctrine just another version of the vanguard party?

Nobody in Africa attempted to have Marxism without Leninism. Nobody attempted to de-Leninize the package of Marxism sponsored by the Soviet Union. But Ugandans at any rate discovered quite early that there was a serious flaw in the whole ideological package. Long before Mikhail Gorbachev, Ugandans already believed in a kind of Nilostroika of their own - putting pragmatism before centralizing ideology. Historical pragmatism was much more compatible with Marxism on its own rather than with Leninism. On the whole, Marx was a historical relativist; Lenin was a historical absolutist. Theoretically Ugandans might have given Marx a chance - but would never have given approval to Lenin. Anti-socialist sentiment in Uganda was, at its core, a de facto opposition to the Leninist disrespect for gradual change, to the Leninist impatience with monarchy, to the Leninist promotion of strong statism, to the Leninist championing of centralism, and to the Leninist invention of a vanguard monopolistic party. But in the end Ugandans were forced to throw out the Marxist baby with the Leninist bathwater, perhaps the socialist baby with the pseudo-Marxist bathwater. Even Yoweri Museveni got

radically de-socialized.

There was something even in Marxism itself that Ugandans would have been opposed to anyhow - and that is the atheistic component of Marxism, with or without Leninism. Certainly the churches and religious leaders in Uganda were alienated more by Marxist atheism and "ungodliness" than by any other part of the ideology.

In a country like Uganda where political parties are conscious of religion, and churches are politically conscious, the anti-religious component of Marxism would have been a severe ideological flaw even without the marriage with Leninism. But the cultural impatience of Leninism, and its centralizing tendency, made the entire leftist package almost unredeemable in Uganda.

Once again a series of questions reassert themselves. Have Ugandans distrusted socialism because of its presumed links with Marxism? Have they distrusted Marxism because of its marriage to Leninism? Is it due to a deep seated British acculturation among the Baganda? Or is Uganda's apparent aversion to socialism a case of mistaken ideological identity?

The struggle continues in Uganda to find a domestically oriented ideology which does justice to the continuities of history and the compatibilities of culture. Yoweri Museveni has tried to find the balance in an economy without the state; a state without political parties; and in monarchies without power. Keeping the state out of the economy is designed to maximize market returns; keeping political parties out of the state system seeks to minimize ethnic rivalries; withholding power from the kings seeks to promote constitutional monarchies in an African context. It remains to be seen if Yoweri Museveni has got the <u>domestic</u> equation right.

As for Museveni's Pan-African and regionally interventionist activities, they need to be placed within the wider world of Pax Africana , the pursuit of Africa's peace by Africans themselves even if it sometimes involves using force. Museveni has become a one-man ECOMOG of Eastern Africa, an interventionist force comparable to the role of the military arm of the Economic Organization of West African States (ECOWAS).

What Museveni has attempted to do in Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the 1990s has been comparable to Nigeria's role in Liberia and Sierra Leone also in the 1990s. Both sets of cases have involved tough peace enforcement, as well as peacekeeping. Let us look at this wider Pan-African picture more closely.

Interventionism and Pax Africana

As we indicated, the pursuit of Africa's peace by Africans themselves is a process of Pax Africana. But what are its wider implications?

Most studies of regional peacekeeping and peacemaking view them simply as alternatives to international peacekeeping or peacemaking. We aspire to take the analysis at least two steps further. First, to what extent does the participation of African countries in peacemaking and peacekeeping in their regions contribute to their own national demilitarization domestically? Secondly, to what extent is such regional military peacemaking a contribution to the regional and national development of the countries involved?

Two of the most striking illustrations of the 1990s have indeed been Uganda in East Africa and Nigeria in West Africa. Is there evidence to suggest that Uganda's involvement in the

quest for pacification in Rwanda and (in a different sense) in the quest for a solution in the Congo and in the Sudan has contributed to a conciliatory spirit within Uganda itself and to a greater Ugandan commitment to domestic development? Does regional Pax Ugandanica help the cause for domestic national integration? What about misbehaving Ugandan soldiers? Are they now held more accountable for their behaviour?

Nigerian soldiers have helped restore stability and electoral governance to both Liberia and Sierra Leone. Has the attitude of such soldiers to military rule in their own country been fundamentally changed? Certainly before General Sani Abacha died in June 1998 Nigerians at home were startled to hear such former military rulers as General Ibrahim Babangida and General Muhammad Buhari declare military rule as "outdated and out-of-tune with the times". To what extent was this attitude partly forged by Nigeria's own new found role as a regional peacemaking power and regional custodian of democracy? Will such demilitarizing attitudes contribute to economic and political development in Nigeria? Now a former military ruler of the 1970s, General Olusegun Obasanjo, has been elected civilian president for the new millennium. Was this domestic democratization helped by Nigeria's regional role?

In reality it is too soon to be sure of the long term consequences of military intervention for either the target country (like Sierra Leone or Congo) or the intervening country (like Nigeria or Uganda). But it is never too soon to start asking questions about the cause and effect of policy options. This essay seeks to ask such questions and to solicit at least tentative answers.

The case-studies available are diverse. The Great Lakes area affords examples of diverse forms of intervention. Somalia combined the intervention of the United Nations with the

military intervention of a superpower (the United States). Mozambique and Angola are cases of intervention by the United Nations without the military engagement of Washington. Sierra Leone and Liberia were cases of intervention by a regional body (ECOMOG) with a regional vanguard (Nigeria). Tanzania's intervention in 1979 into Idi Amin's Uganda was a case of single-power international vigilantism. The 1998 conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia raises the spectre of inter-state conflicts in Africa – starting with high propensity in the Horn of Africa (also Ethiopia vs. Somalia; Eritrea vs. Sudan). And Yoweri Museveni has continued his one-man ECOMOG role in Democratic Republic of Congo and Sudan. The struggle to contain such conflicts by regional powers may be part of the process of domestic demilitarization and national development.

When I started the debate about inter-African colonization in 1992, few people took me seriously. By the time Archie Mafeje, the South African Scholar, discovered my thesis about self-colonization, Archie went vitriolic and abusive in CODESRIA Bulletin! Other critics internationally have argued that my thesis was either evil or unreal. Yet by the second half of the decade it was evident that history was indeed turning in my direction. Africans were beginning to assert control over their unruly neighbours, though sometimes bungling the worthy mission, and sometimes getting in each other's way.

The most dramatic of these events was Uganda's role in helping the Tutsi to reassert control over Rwanda in 1994. This was a kind of "Bay of Pigs" operation, African style. The original Bay of Pigs project launched by President John F. Kennedy in 1961 consisted of Cuban exiles trained by the United States to invade Cuba in the hope of overthrowing Fidel Castro.

They were intended to land in the Bay of Pigs in Cuba and start an anti-Castro revolution. The whole operation was a total fiasco.

More than thirty years later exiled Rwandans trained in Uganda invaded Rwanda in order to overthrow the Hutu regime there and to end the genocide against the Tutsi. The aim of the Rwanda Patriotic Front from Uganda was not counter-genocide but conquest and control. This particular "Bay of Pigs" operation--African style--was completely successful in 1994.

In the face of the anti-Tutsi genocide in Rwanda, Westerners have sometimes asked: "Why don't Africans themselves stop this kind of carnage?". The answer in 1994 was: "The Africans did stop it. The genocide was ended not by French troops, but by the Rwanda Patriotic Front, aided by Uganda." It was an impressive case of Pax Africana, at least for a while.

Then came the problems of 1996 and early 1997 in what was then Zaire. The Mobutu regime over-reached itself when it tried to empower remnants of the Hutu Umtirahamwa in refugee camps in Zaire, and strip indigenous Zairean Tutsi of their Zairean citizenship. The Zairean Tutsi--helped by Rwanda--decided to resist the intimidation of the Zairean armed forces. To the astonishment of everybody, the then Zairean armed forces were a paper monkey, even less than a paper tiger. They were easily defeated by the Tutsi resisters. (Zaire has of course since been renamed the Democratic Republic of Congo.)

Before long the Tutsi rebellion became multi-ethnic. Enter Laurent Kabila with his rendezvous with history. The rebellion also became multinational, aided by Rwanda, Uganda and also Angola. The anti-Mobutu movement was both Pan-African and trans-ethnic. It finally culminated in the overthrow of a dictatorship which had lasted from 1965 to 1996. At least in

ousting Mobutu Sese Seko, this was a triumph for Pax Africana, though we still did not know how much of an improvement over Mobutu Laurent Kabila would become.

The optimists saw him as another Yoweri Museveni. Museveni too had created a private army to challenge the official army of the state. Museveni's army--like that of Kabila--had defeated the army of the state. And then Museveni in power embarked on three strategies of change--first, stabilization of the country; second, restoring the economic health of the country; and third, initiating cautious democratization.

Museveni has had remarkable success in the first two goals--the quest for stability and the restoration of the economic health of Uganda. His progress in both has been faster than most observers (and most Ugandans) ever expected. His third goal of cautious democratization is still in its early stages--but so far, so good. (Museveni has had less success in stabilizing Northern Uganda.)

Would Laurent Kabila be another Yoweri Museveni? The answer still is--only if Kabila is lucky. What is clear is that Kabila's initial triumph would probably not have occurred without the help of Museveni, both directly, and through Rwanda. Kabila was also aided by Angola and others. For the time-being this was a success story for Pax Africana, though its future may be shorter than originally anticipated.

A different kind of successful Pax Africana is the story of Liberia and the role of ECOMOG in ending its civil war and leading Liberia towards a relatively peaceful general election in July 1997. Once again this was a case of neighboring African countries accepting responsibility for a malfunctioning brotherly state, and going into the weaker state to try and do

something about it.

ECOMOG's lack of experience, along with disarray in Lagos, initially resulted in a lot of disastrous false starts in peacekeeping in Liberia. But in the end the mission was relatively successful, and Liberians had their say at the ballot box. While the overwhelming choice of Liberians for Charles Taylor (the architect of the civil war) puzzled most observers, it was at least a free democratic choice. Behind that choice was the fumbling but historic role of ECOMOG in pioneering Pax Africana.

In Search of Moral Legitimacy

How do we discourage African armies from staging military coups against democratically elected governments? The dilemma arose with the first Black African military coup. This was the coup against Sylvanus Olympio in Togo, which was also postcolonial Africa's first presidential assassination. This was in 1963. The initial Pan-African response was in boycotting the successor regime in Togo. At the inaugural meeting of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1963, there was one vacant seat. It was Togo's--originally intended for the assassinated Sylvanus Olympio. Julius K. Nyerere of Tanzania wept publicly for Olympio. And the Charter of the newly formed O.A.U. explicitly included a clause "condemning political assassination in all its forms". But was anybody prepared to use force to oust the regime which had assassinated Sylvanus Olympio? At that time no one was. Pax Africana was alive but underdeveloped.

Almost exactly ten years later (to the month) a coup took place in Uganda. Idi Amin Dada overthrew the government of Milton Obote. Again one of those most deeply shattered by

the event was President Julius K. Nyerere of Tanzania. He roundly condemned the coup, and personally refused to have any dealings with Idi Amin Dada. But was anybody prepared to use force to try and reverse the coup? At that time not even Nyerere was! Pax Africana was indeed sensitive, but not yet forceful.

Eight years later Julius Nyerere was indeed prepared to use force against Idi Amin's persistent national and regional destabilization. In 1979 Nyerere was at last ready to order Tanzania's army to march all the way to Kampala to overthrow Idi Amin. Nyerere was successful in ousting the Ugandan dictator and in establishing a temporary Tanzanian protectorate in Uganda before multiparty elections could be held. Nyerere made two mistakes in his protectorate over Uganda. He made his Pax Africana too brief, and he tried too hard to ensure the return of Milton Obote to power. Both decisions were catastrophic for Uganda. The interlude of Pax Africana was good but not well-focussed. And the second Obote administration in Uganda turned out to be a tragedy, only to be ended by Yoweri Museveni's triumph in 1986. By 1999 Julius K. Nyerere was asking that no delegation be recognized at the Organization of African Unity if it represented a military government. He said this in a speech in Abuja, Nigeria, prior to the presidential inauguration of General Obasanjo in May 1999.

This was of course long after the military coup in Sierra Leone in 1997, which overthrew the elected government of Ahmad Tejan Kabbah. In this case Pax Africana took a wholly unexpected turn. A military government in Nigeria decided to defend, and attempt to reinstate, a democratically elected government in Sierra Leone. Nigeria had intervened on behalf of ECOMOG.

This was certainly an improvement on the older story of Western democracies propping up military regimes like that of Mobutu Sese Seko--which was twice saved militarily by the West in the face of a domestic challenge from its own Shaba province.

I personally would rather see a military regime like that of Nigeria in 1997-1998 defending democracy in Sierra Leone, than see a democracy like that of France or the United States propping up military dictatorships in Less Developed Countries. Yet for the time being the story of Sierra Leone seems to be a stalemate. Pax Africana has not yet fully triumphed, though the whole of Africa has condemned the June 1997 coup in Freetown.

The idea of a Pan African emergency force is also gathering momentum in the 1990s. Uganda has been centrally involved. The Blue Eagle Project in southern Africa involved training the troops of at least eight African countries to be in readiness for special responsibilities in situations of political crisis. Much of the training initially occurred in Zimbabwe. The Blue Eagle could develop into the ECOMOG of Southern Africa, but with more appropriate training for a peace-keeping role. Here again is a potential arm of Pax Africana.

President Bill Clinton's tour of Africa in 1998 used Kampala as a major focus. The Clinton Administration in Washington has been championing a rapid crisis response African force. It has also been involved in training troops from countries like Senegal and Uganda for peace-keeping roles. The United States is also creating a Center of Strategic Studies for Africa. My own disagreement with the Clinton paradigm concerns the accountability of the African rapid deployment force. The Clinton Administration would like to trace accountability ultimately to the Security Council of the United Nations, which is itself controlled by Western powers. I

believe that the Pan African Emergency force should be accountable to Africa itself, through such revised institutions of the O.A.U. as Africa may be able to devise. Alternatively, accountability should be towards relevant sub-regional organizations in Africa--to ECOWAS in West Africa, to SADEC in Southern Africa, and to a newly evolving Eastern African Community. Only such an Afrocentered accountability would save Pax Africana from becoming a mere extension of Pax Americana.

Also relevant to the unfolding saga of self-colonization in Africa is the hesitant hegemonic role of the Republic of South Africa. Within the wider picture of Pan-Africanism is an emerging sub-theme of Pax Pretoriana, the muscle of Pretoria in sorting out political crises in neighboring countries. Sorting out Lusotho's problems with its military is one case in point, though South Africa bungled badly in Masero in 1998.

In fact the Republic of South Africa is under pressure to be more active in other African crises--from helping reconstruction in the Democratic Republic of Congo to pressuring UNITA to stop fighting and join the democratic process in Angola. Pax Pretoriana at its best can be a branch of Pax Africana. So indeed can be Pax Ugandanica.

Democratic trends in Africa are real, but still very fragile. The remaining military regimes are under pressure to democratize; single-party systems have been giving way to multiparty systems; authoritarian systems like that in Kenya are facing angry demands for constitutional reform. Uganda is at the constitutional crossroads. Africa is taking hesitant steps towards democracy. But are these regional activities of peacekeeping themselves part of the democratizing process? Museveni’s Uganda is among those which have raised these

fundamental questions for Africa.

Democratization within individual African countries is only part of the process of resuming control over Africa's destiny. Pax Africana is the continental face of this self-determination--provided the motives, goals and means are in tune with Africa's ultimate well-being.

Ideologies which are domestically focused and ideologies which are externally oriented are part of the moving equilibrium of Africa's changing values. What is at stake is good governance and the quest for moral legitimacy. Museveni has sought good governance and legitimacy in keeping the state out of the economy; keeping political parties out of the state; and keeping power out of the monarchies. But the same Ugandan state which is prohibited from intervening in its own economy is permitted to intervene in neighbouring states. Under Yoweri Museveni, the sovereignty of borders has declined; the sovereignty of the market has risen. The quest for a new ideological balance in Uganda continues.