

## Hardware Trojan Implemented on a FPGA

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**Abstract**— Hardware trojans are becoming more of a threat to devices and systems as the number of ICs and chips are being manufactured and fabricated overseas. These overseas facilities often also work with other third party company and it becomes more complex to track down where each step of the design phase takes place. If an attacker was able to gain control of a step in the design phase, a hardware trojan could be inserted to corrupt functionality and reliability, or leak important or secret information. This paper discusses the method of designing a hardware trojan for an FPGA. The most effective method of defending against these hardware trojans is understanding how they are implemented.

**Index Terms**—hardware trojan, data leaking, security, FPGA.

## I. INTRODUCTION

Hardware trojans are a great way for an attacker to leak important information such as encryption/decryption keys because, if well implemented, are hard to detect. Since most of the ICs and chips made today are important from overseas, detecting these hardware trojans is critical. There are a few methods of detecting hardware trojans [1] which include power analysis or side-channel analysis. This paper will discuss the implementation of a hardware trojan on an FPGA which has been synthesized to run a 8051 Intel Microprocessor architecture. This processor has been programmed to function as a dedicated DES crypto device.

### A. Previous Work

There is current and previous research on the implementation of hardware trojans and how they are used to leak information [2]. There are even competitions designed to allow competitors to design a hardware trojan on a microprocessor. This paper will focus on a FPGA hardware trojan implementation to leak the secret key used in the DES algorithm. This paper will try to design a trojan with a small profile, low power requirements, and the ability to remain hidden from detection.

## II. 8051 IP CORE

The Intel 8051 architecture was developed by Intel in the 1980s. Intel has allowed other companies to design their own versions of the 8051 architecture, and as a result, can be found in many embedded system designs. Since the 8051 microcontroller is an older design, it is limited to 8-bit instructions and has a limited amount of peripherals. This is illustrated in Figure 1 and needs to be taken into consideration when designing the hardware trojan.




Fig. 1. System overview of the Intel 8051.

There are free 8051 IP cores available on the internet and the authors chose to use the 8051 VHDL implementation from Oregano Systems [3]. The IP core is able to have three memory modules loaded onto the FPGA design. The 8051 is limited to 128 bits of internal RAM but the ROM and extra RAM can be designed up to 64kB of data.

Once the 8051 IP core has been loaded on the FPGA, a DES program in C needs to be loaded in order to allow encryption and decryption.

### III. TROJAN DESIGN

There are many different ways to characterize a trojan and this paper will use the taxonomy described in the following subsection.

### A. Taxonomy

Hardware trojans will be characterized based on the following metrics:

- Insertion
- Abstraction
- Activation
- Effects
- Location

The proposed hardware trojan, once triggered, will delay the communication lines of the UART module to leak the secret key used for encryption and decryption. Tampering with

the baudrate would likely create errors in the communication. This trojan will maintain the designed baudrate while created different delays after each 8-bit data frame.

The trojan is inserted at the Design and Fabrication stage. It is assumed that the attacker would have access to the netlists and hardware description code to make the necessary changes. The trojan would be extracted at the RT level and gate level because the trojan effects the control logic as well as some gate signals. The trojan will be activated externally by a user which decreased the chance of being detected. The trojan will be triggered when a predetermined 6 byte chunk of the plaintext is entered into the crypto system. The trojan design is shown further in Figure 2.




Fig. 2. Logic design of the hardware trojan

As mentioned previously, the effect of the trojan will be the leakage of secret information. The trojan will be located on parts of the processor and well as some of the I/O such as the RS-232 signals.

#### IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS

- A. Size
- B. Power
- C. Detectability
- D. Measurements

#### V. CONCLUSION

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