
cryptoguru Documentation

Release Beta

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MODULES DOCUMENTATION

1.1 itools : *useful integer fonctions*

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`itools.crt (La, Ln, N=0)`

Uses the Chinese Remainder Theorem to deduct $X = La[i] \bmod Ln[i]$ for all $i < \text{len}(La) = \text{len}(Ln)$ X is computed modulo N which is the product of the elements of Ln .

Args:

- *La (List)*: a list of integers
- *Ln (List)*: a list of integers, which size must be $\text{len}(La)$.

Optional args:

- *N (int)*: the final modulo. Will be computed if omitted.

Returns:

- *(int)*: the result of the reconstruction modulo N .

For all i, the following statement should be true : $La[i] < Ln[i]$

`itools.euclidean_extended (a, b, verbose=False)`

Extended version of Euclide's algorithm.

Args:

- *a (int)*: some integer
- *b (int)*: some integer

Optional args:

- *verbose (bool)*: Set to True to get a display

Returns:

- *(int,int,int)*: Three integers, the first one is the gcd, the others are Bezout coefs.

It doesn't matter if $a < b$, the algorithm switches a and b if necessary. However, if $a < b$, the first coefficient returned will be the one associated to b (gcd,coef_b,coef_a).

`itools.exp_mod (a, n, p)`

An efficient function to compute $a^n \bmod p$.

Args:

- *a (int)*: an integer

- *n (int)*: an integer
- *p (int)*: an integer > a

Returns:

- *(int)*: $a^n \bmod p$

Actually just a custom implementation of fastexp. Uses the binary decomposition of n.

`itools.gcd(a, b)`

Computes the greatest common divisor.

Args:

- *a (int)*: some integer
- *b (int)*: some integer

Returns:

- *(int)*: The GCD.

`itools.get_group(n, verbose=False)`

Generates a “safe” group for the DLP

Args:

- *n (int)*: a prime integer : security modulo / prime seed

Optional Args:

- *verbose (bool)*: set to True if you want a display.

Returns:

- *(int,int)*: g,p with p a prime integer such that $p = k \cdot n$ with some small integer k. And g is a generator of $\mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z}^*$

`itools.get_primes(a, b, k, verbose=False)`

Computes the list of primes between two integers.

Args:

- *a (int)*: an integer
- *b (int)*: an integer such as $b > a$
- *k (int)*: the number of repetitions Rabin-Miller primality test.

Optional Args:

- *verbose (bool)*: set to True if you want a display.

Returns:

- *(List)*: the list of pseudo-prime integers in $[a,b[$

Why “pseudo-prime”? Because you can never be sure that they are prime with RM primality test.

`itools.ilog(x, b)`

Integer logarithm in base b.

Args:

- *x (int)*: an integer
- *b (int)*: a base

Returns:

- *(int)*: The greatest integer l such that $b**l \leq x$.

`itools.inversion_modulaire(a, p)`

Inverts $a \bmod p$.

Args:

- *a (int)*: some integer
- *p (int)*: some integer, greater than a

Returns:

- *(int)*: $1/a \bmod p$ if $\gcd(a, p) = 1$ 0 if $\gcd(a, p) > 1$

`itools.isqrt(n)`

Integer Square Root.

Args:

- *n (int)*: an integer

Returns:

- *(int)*: The greatest int s such that $s*s \leq n$.

Uses Newton's iterative method.

`itools.rabin_miller(n, k=1, verbose=False)`

Rabin-Miller primality test.

Args:

- *n (int)*: the integer which primality you wish to test

Optional Args:

- *k (int)*: number of repetitions of the test
- *verbose (bool)*: set to True if you want a display

Returns:

- *(bool)*: True if n is a pseudo-prime, False if n isn't prime.

If this test returns False, you are 100% sure that n isn't prime. However, if this test returns True, there's a probability of $1/(2**k)$ that n isn't prime.

`itools.rand_prime(a, b, k, verbose=False)`

Generates a random prime number between two integers.

Args:

- *a (int)*: an integer
- *b (int)*: an integer such as $b > a$
- *k (int)*: the number of repetitions Rabin-Miller primality test.

Optional Args:

- *verbose (bool)*: set to True if you want a display.

Returns:

- *(int)*: a random pseudo-prime between a and b .

Why "pseudo-prime"? Because you can never be sure that they are prime with RM primality test.

1.2 pyfacto : *useful factoring tools*

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`pyfacto.facto_fermat` (*n*, *verbose=False*)

Fermat's factoring algorithm.

Args:

- *n* (*int*): an odd integer

Optional Args:

- *verbose* (*bool*): set to True if you want a display.

Returns:

- (*int*): a subfactor of *n*.

Not very efficient.

`pyfacto.lucas_mul` (*v*, *q*, *n*)

Computes an index multiplication in a Lucas sequence.

Args:

- *v* (*int*): $V[m]$
- *q* (*int*): the multiplier of the index
- *n* (*int*): the modulo

Returns:

- (*int*): $V[mq] \bmod n$

V is defined by $V[i] = A \cdot V[i-1] - V[i-2]$ with some *A*.

This function uses the following formulas : $V[2n] = V[n] \cdot V[n] - 2$ $V[m+n] = V[m] \cdot V[n] - V[m-n]$

$V[qm]$ and $V[(q+1)m]$ are computed at the same time to solve the index addition dependency.

`pyfacto.pm1_pollard` (*n*, *B*, *nbRM=20*, *verbose=False*)

Pollard's p-1 factoring algorithm.

Args:

- *n* (*int*): an integer
- *B* (*int*): smooth boundary

Optional Args:

- *nbRM* (*int*): number of repeats of Rabin-Miller primality test.
- *verbose* (*bool*): set to True if you want a display.

Returns:

- (*int*): a subfactor *p* of *n* such that *p*-1 is *B*-smooth if it exists. 0 if attack failed.

`pyfacto.pm1_pollard_auto` (*n*, *Bmax*, *verbose=False*)

Pollard's p-1 factoring algorithm with automatic Boundary adjustment.

Args:

- *n* (*int*): an integer
- *Bmax* (*int*): Maximum smooth boundary

Optional Args:

- *verbose (bool)*: set to True if you want a display.

Returns:

- *(int)*: a subfactor p of n such that $p-1$ is B -smooth if it exists. 0 if attack failed.

`pyfacto.pp1_williams (n, B, nbRM=20, verbose=False)`
Williams' $p+1$ factoring algorithm.

Args:

- *n (int)*: an integer
- *B (int)*: smooth boundary

Optional Args:

- *nbRM (int)*: number of repeats of Rabin-Miller primality test.
- *verbose (bool)*: set to True if you want a display.

Returns:

- *(int)*: a subfactor p of n such that $p+1$ is B -smooth if it exists. 0 if attack failed.

`pyfacto.pp1_williams_auto (n, Bmax, verbose=False)`
Williams' $p+1$ factoring algorithm with automatic Boundary adjustment.

Args:

- *n (int)*: an integer
- *Bmax (int)*: Maximum smooth boundary

Optional Args:

- *verbose (bool)*: set to True if you want a display.

Returns:

- *(int)*: a subfactor p of n such that $p+1$ is B -smooth if it exists. 0 if attack failed.

`pyfacto.rho_pollard (n, verbose=False)`
Pollard's Rho algorithm applied to factoring.

Args:

- *n (int)*: a non-prime integer

Optional Args:

- *verbose (bool)*: set to True if you want a display.

Returns:

- *(int)*: a small factor of n

Simple and efficient.

`pyfacto.rho_pollard_brent (n, verbose=False)`
Brent's improved version of Pollard's Rho algorithm applied to factoring. (source : <http://maths-people.anu.edu.au/~brent/pd/rpb051i.pdf>)

Args:

- *n (int)*: a non-prime integer

Optional Args:

- *verbose (bool)*: set to True if you want a display.

Returns:

- (*int*): a small factor of n

Clearly more efficient than the standard Pollard's Rho algorithm.

`pyfacto.rho_pollard_brent_p(n, jobs=8, verbose=False)`

Brent's improved & parallelized version of Pollard's Rho algorithm applied to factoring. (*source* : <http://maths-people.anu.edu.au/~brent/pd/rpb051i.pdf>)

Args:

- *n (int)*: a non-prime integer

Optional Args:

- *jobs (int)*: number of threads to launch. Should be your number of virtual cores.
- *verbose (bool)*: set to True if you want a display.

Returns:

- (*int*): a small factor of n

Limited efficiency due to no communication between the processes : Acceleration ~ sqrt(jobs)

1.3 pwnrsa : *efficient attacks on RSA*

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`pwnrsa.gen_convergents(a, b, verbose=False, denom_only=True)`

Generates the continued fraction representation of a/b. Very similar to Euclide's extended algorithm.

Args:

- *a (int)*: some integer
- *b (int)*: another integer

Optional args:

- *verbose (bool)*: set to True to get a display.
- *denom_only (bool)*: set to True if you only need the list of denominators.

Returns:

- (*List*): a list of tuples (integers if *denom_only* is set to True) representing the continued fraction.

`pwnrsa.get_pq(n, phi, verbose=False)`

Returns the facorisation of an RSA integer when you know its Euler totient.

Args:

- *n (int)*: a RSA integer ($n = p \cdot q$ with p and q two prime numbers).
- *phi (int)*: Euler's totient for n (or a guess).

Optional Args:

- *verbose (bool)*: set to True to get a display.

Returns:

- **(double,double): two real numbers which are the solution of a simple second degree polynomial equation.**

If those number are integers, then phi was indeed Euler's totient for n.

This function is useful to test if a given phi is a plausible one.

`pwnrsa.weger1(n, e, m, c, verbose=False)`

Trivial implementation of Weger's attack on RSA that uses a plain and a cipher to test potential private exponents.

Args:

- *n (int)*: the modulo
- *e (int)*: public exponent
- *m (int)*: plain
- *c (int)*: cypher ($m^e \% n$)

Optional Args:

- *verbose (bool)*: set to True to get a display.

Returns:

- **(int): the private exponent if the attack succeeded** 0 if attack failed

For this attack to work, the private exponent d must be such that : $d < (n^{(3/4)})/abs(p-q)$ p and q must close to each other.

d is then the denominator of a reduced fraction of $e/(n+1-2*\sqrt{n})$: In this attack we assume $\Phi(n) \sim (n+1-2*\sqrt{n})$ (since we assume $p \sim q \sim \sqrt{n}$)

`pwnrsa.weger2(n, e, verbose=False)`

Trivial implementation of Weger's attack on RSA which computes $\Phi(n)$ to test potential private exponents.

Args:

- *n (int)*: the modulo
- *e (int)*: public exponent

Optional Args:

- *verbose (bool)*: set to True to get a display.

Returns:

- **(int): the private exponent if the attack succeeded** 0 if attack failed

For this attack to work, the private exponent d must be such that : $d < (n^{(3/4)})/abs(p-q)$ p and q must close to each other.

d is then the denominator of a reduced fraction of $e/(n+1-2*\sqrt{n})$: In this attack we assume $\Phi(n) \sim (n+1-2*\sqrt{n})$ (since we assume $p \sim q \sim \sqrt{n}$)

`pwnrsa.weger_ex(n, e, B, jobs=8, verbose=False)`

Parallelized version of the extended Weger attack on RSA.

Args:

- *n (int)*: the modulo
- *e (int)*: public exponent
- *B (int)*: user bound, time complexity is $\sim O(B^2)$

Optional Args:

- *jobs (int)*: number of threads to launch. Should be your number of virtual cores (htop to visualize).
- *verbose (bool)*: set to True to get a display.

Returns:

- *(int)*: the private exponent if the attack succeeded 0 if attack failed

For this attack to work, $n = pq$ must be such that : $q < p < 2p$ $p/q \sim 1 + a/b$ with a, b in $[0, B]$

d is then the denominator of a reduced fraction of e/F , where F is such that : $F = \frac{n+1}{((2+a/b)/\sqrt{1+a/b})*\sqrt{n}}$ -
In this attack we assume $\Phi(n) \sim n+1 - ((2+a/b)/\sqrt{1+a/b})*\sqrt{n}$

`pwnrsa.wiener1 (n, e, m, c, verbose=False)`

Trivial implementation of Wiener's attack on RSA that uses a plain and a cipher to test potential private exponents.

Args:

- *n (int)*: the modulo
- *e (int)*: public exponent
- *m (int)*: plain
- *c (int)*: cypher ($m^e \% n$)

Optional Args:

- *verbose (bool)*: set to True to get a display.

Returns:

- *(int)*: the private exponent if the attack succeeded 0 if attack failed

For this attack to work, the private exponent d must be such that : $d < (1/3)n^{1/4}$

d is then the denominator of a reduced fraction of e/n : In this attack we assume $\Phi(n) \sim n$.

`pwnrsa.wiener2 (n, e, verbose=False)`

Trivial implementation of Wiener's attack on RSA which computes $\Phi(n)$ to test potential private exponents.

Args:

- *n (int)*: the modulo
- *e (int)*: public exponent

Optional Args:

- *verbose (bool)*: set to True to get a display.

Returns:

- *(int)*: the private exponent if the attack succeeded 0 if attack failed

For this attack to work, the private exponent d must be such that : $d < (1/3)n^{1/4}$

d is then the denominator of a reduced fraction of e/n : In this attack we assume $\Phi(n) \sim n$.

1.4 pwndlp : *efficient attacks on the DLP*

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`pwndlp.pohlig_hellman (g, h, n, log_file, verbose=False)`

Pohlig-Hellman's algorithm to solve DLP.

Args:

- *g (int)*: a generator
- *h (int)*: an integer in $\langle g \rangle$
- *n (int)*: the modulo
- *log_file (File)*: an opened file in which results will be written

Optional args:

- *verbose (bool)*: set to True if you want a display.

Returns:

- *(int)*: x such that $[x \bmod n-1]g = h \bmod n$

This functions factors $n-1$ in prime integers in order to be able to call Pollard's Rho on the subgroups and then reconstructs the result with the CRT.

```
pwndlp.rho_pollard_dlp(g, h, p, n, verbose=False)
```

Pollard's Rho applied to DLP.

Args:

- *g (int)*: a generator
- *h (int)*: an integer in $\langle g \rangle$
- *p (int)*: the order of $\langle g \rangle$, must be prime (else call Pohlig-Hellman first).
- *n (int)*: the modulo

Optional args:

- *verbose (bool)*: set to True if you want a display.

Returns:

- *(int)*: x such that $[x]g = h \bmod n$

```
pwndlp.rho_pollard_dlp_adv(g, h, p, n, b, k, verbose=False)
```

Improved version of Pollard's Rho applied to DLP. It uses k-adding walks.

Args:

- *g (int)*: a generator
- *h (int)*: an integer in $\langle g \rangle$
- *p (int)*: the order of $\langle g \rangle$, must be prime (else call Pohlig-Hellman first)
- *n (int)*: the modulo
- *b (int)*: exponent bound used to generate random walks (p seems to be the best)
- *k (int)*: number of partitions (20 or more is advised)

Optional args:

- *verbose (bool)*: set to True if you want a display.

Returns:

- *(int)*: x such that $[x]g = h \bmod n$

```
pwndlp.rho_pollard_dlp_par(g, h, p, n, b, k, jobs=8, verbose=False)
```

Improved parallelized version of Pollard's Rho applied to DLP. Uses distinguished points for optimal efficiency.

Args:

- *g (int)*: a generator
- *h (int)*: an integer in $\langle g \rangle$
- *p (int)*: the order of $\langle g \rangle$, must be prime (else call Pohlig-Hellman first)
- *n (int)*: the modulo
- *b (int)*: exponent bound used to generate random walks (p seems to be the best)
- *k (int)*: number of partitions (20 or more is advised)

Optional args:

- *jobs (int)*: number of threads to launch. Should be your number of virtual cores.
- *verbose (bool)*: set to True if you want a display.

Returns:

- *(int)*: x such that $[x]g = h \bmod n$

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