

# Lecture 16 - Shor's Factoring Alg.!

[[Great! Today we'll do the most famous quantum alg.,  
Shor's efficient quantum alg. for factoring huge #'s.]]

[[Actually, today will be 100% classical # theory  
algs. All the quantum stuff has been covered  
in previous lectures!]]

Rec. from last time: Let  $Q_F$  be a quantum  
circuit implementing some  $F: \{0, 1, 2, \dots, N-1\} \rightarrow \text{class}^{\frac{N}{m}}$   
 $(N = 2^n)$   $\{0, 1\}^m$

which is "L-periodic":

$$F(x) = F(x+L) = F(x+2L) = \dots \quad \& \quad F(x) = F(y)$$

[[And  $x+kL$  is not taken mod  
 $N$ , so L need not divide N.]]

Then w/  $\propto n^2 + \text{size}(Q_F)$  quantum gates, can get  
a "clue" to L, looking like:

[[Actually, "junk" very likely to be another  
integer near  $k \cdot \frac{N}{L}$ , still OK...]]

- random  $0 \leq k < L$  picked
- you see  $\text{NearestInt}\left(k \cdot \frac{N}{L}\right)$
- else you see "junk"

Today: ① [Shor:] How to use clue to find  $L$   
[with decent probability,  
efficiently, using a classical alg.]

② How this ability helps factor #'s  
[This was already known in mid-70s.] [Again, classically & efficiently.]  
[Uses a classically efficient-to-compute  $F$ , hence quantumly effic. QF.]

Rem: • Simple algs:  $\approx m^3$  quantum gates to factor  $m$ -bit integers  
• More carefully:  $\approx m^2 (\log n \log \log n)$   
[Best known. Not quasilinear. I'll point out the bottleneck - which is classical!]

Rec: Naive classical alg.:  $\approx \sqrt{2}^m$  steps  
Sophisticated " " :  $\approx C m^{1/3} (\log \dots)$  steps  
[Still exponential!]

[\$100k to factor RSA-1024.  
Record is < 800 bits, 2048 bits - no way!]

[[We'll start with ②: How to factor, given ability to find the "L" of an "L-periodic" F.]

[[This reduction from factoring to "order-finding" was perhaps folklore in '70s. First(?) published by CMU's Gary Miller in '76. Cf. Long '81, Woll '87.]

Input:  $B$ , a Big number:  $m$  bits (e.g.  $m=1000$ )

Goal: prime factors of  $B$ .

For simplicity today: Assume  $B = P \cdot Q$  for primes  $P, Q$ .

[[Imagine  $P, Q$  both have 512 bits.]

- this is the case of interest for "RSA crypto"
- intuitively, the "hardest case"

[[If  $B$  has  $>2$  prime factors, they're smaller & easier to find. Recall primality testing is doable efficiently,  $\approx m^2$  steps.]

[[General case mainly requires a little more bookkeeping. (And ability to detect perfect powers.)]]

OK: how can we use period-finding to help factor  $B$ ? It's a bit similar to the Miller-Rabin primality test, actually....

Goal: Find a "nontrivial" square-root of  $1 \pmod{B}$ .

$$R : R^2 = 1 \pmod{B}$$

$$R \not\equiv \pm 1 \pmod{B}.$$

[Why does it help?]

If  $B$  is prime, this quadratic can only have 2 roots,  $\pm 1$ , since  $\mathbb{Z}_B$  would be a field. But  $B = P \cdot Q$ . Turns out to imply there are 2 more square roots of  $1 \pmod{B}$ .

$$\Rightarrow R^2 - 1 = 0 \pmod{B}$$

$$\Rightarrow (R-1)(R+1) \equiv 0 \pmod{B} = P \cdot Q$$

$$\therefore P, Q \mid (R-1)(R+1),$$

$$\text{but } PQ \nmid R-1 \text{ or } R+1$$

( $\because R \not\equiv \pm 1 \pmod{B = PQ}$ )

$$\therefore P \mid R-1, Q \mid R+1, \text{ or vice versa.}$$

Either way, take  $R+1$  (say) & gcd it with  $B = PQ \rightarrow$  gives you either  $P$  or  $Q$ . ■ [↑ classically efficient.]

# How to find R?

Recall (HW3, #5; HW4, #6)

$$\begin{aligned}\mathbb{Z}_B^* &= \left\{ \text{integers } A \in \mathbb{Z}_B \text{ with } \gcd(A, B) = 1 \right\} \\ &= \left\{ \quad " \quad " \quad " \quad \text{s.t. } A^{-1} \bmod B \text{ exists} \right\}\end{aligned}$$

① Pick  $A \in \mathbb{Z}_B^*$  uniformly at random. How?

Pick  $A \in \mathbb{Z}_B$  " " " ", compute  $\gcd(A, B)$

If it's 1,  $A \in \mathbb{Z}_B^*$ . ☺

If not, it's P or Q → you're done!

*[This is exponentially unlikely, so don't get too excited ☺.]*

Hypothetically, consider  $\overset{\curvearrowleft}{A \bmod B}$

$A^2 \bmod B$	}	all distinct:
$A^3 \bmod B$		$A^i \equiv A^j, i > j$
$\vdots$		$\Rightarrow A^{j-i} \equiv 1$
$A^L \equiv 1 \bmod B$		( $\because A^{-1}$ exists)

def:  $L$  = "order"  
of  $A$  in  $\mathbb{Z}_B^*$

*[Least  $L$  s.t.  $A^L \equiv 1 \bmod B$ .]*

Then repeats:  
 $A^{L+1} \equiv A^1, A^{L+2} \equiv A^2$ , etc..

[[Remark:  $L$  could be enormous, like an  $\approx \frac{m}{2}$ -bit number. Can't find it naively... Known to be "as hard as factoring. But... ]]

$$F : \{0, 1, 2, \dots, N-1\} \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_B^*, F(x) = A^x \pmod{B}$$

Need not be  $B$ .

Will take it to be a power of 2

• much bigger than  $B$ .

"COLORS",  
 $\subseteq \{0, 1\}^m$

• It's " $L$ -periodic".

• Classically computable

[[Modular exponentiation, HW1, #3]]

in  $\propto m^3$  time

$\tilde{\mathcal{O}}(m^2)$   $\rightarrow$  classical gates.

[[The efficiency bottleneck for Shor, as it turns out! ]]

Can build, make reversible, voila! - get  $Q_F$  quantumly implementing  $F$ .

→ Can find  $L$  with decent prob. (Part ① coming up.)

Given  $L$ , hope for 2 lucky things :  
(based on random choice of  $A$ )

Luck 1:  $L$  is even.

$\Rightarrow L/2$  an integer

$\Rightarrow "A^{L/2}" \text{ mod } B$  (which you can compute  
efficiently  
makes sense.  
knowing  $L, B$ )

$$\& (A^{L/2})^2 \equiv A^L \equiv 1 \pmod{B}$$

$\therefore A^{L/2}$  a square-root of 1!

Luck 2:  $A^{L/2} \not\equiv \pm 1 \pmod{B}$  ("nontriv. sqrt")

Elementary number theory lemma:

$$\Pr[\text{Luck 1 \& Luck 2}] \geq \frac{1}{2}.$$

Proof: [Not hard, will be on homework.]

$\therefore$  can Factor  $B = P \cdot Q$  with decent  
prob. given  $L$ ! [Can check your work, too.  
Now just repeat  $O(1)$  times.]

Part ②: Finding  $L$  given "clue":

$$S = \text{NearestInt}\left(k \cdot \frac{N}{L}\right) \text{ (with prob } \geq 40\%)$$

for random  $0 \leq k < L$ .

(Recall that's what the quantum "approximate period-finding alg." based on QFT & Simon's Alg. over  $\mathbb{Z}_N$  give //)

Rem:  $L$  is  $m$  bits.

We'll choose  $N = 2^n$  for  $n = 10m$ .

// Conceptually clearer if you make  $n = m^{10}$ ,  
which would still lead to "polynomial time" //

Note: •  $L \leq 2^m \ll 2^{10m} \sim N$ .

- $\frac{N}{L}$  not an integer

//  $N$  is an enormous power of 2.

Think of  $L$  as "smallish" now! //

Get  $S \stackrel{!}{\approx} k \cdot \frac{N}{L}$ ,  $0 \leq k < L$  rand. int. (Basically w/prob  $\geq 40\%$ .)

[My new notation for super-duper-close-to.]

$$\frac{S}{N} \stackrel{!}{\approx} \frac{k}{L} . \text{ Error is } \pm \frac{.5}{N} .$$

Alg knows numer. & denom.

Alg. wants to know L.

Key Claim: From  $\frac{S}{N}$ , classical alg. can efficiently figure out the frac.  $\frac{k}{L}$  in lowest terms.

⇒ We're done!

Method ①: Hope random  $k$  is prime (or coprime to  $L$ ).

Method ②: Repeat a few times.

With high prob., LCM of denominators is  $L$ . (Exercise.)

Then  $\frac{k}{L}$  is in lowest terms

⇒ alg. knows  $L$ .

$\Pr[k \text{ prime}] \gtrsim \frac{1}{m}$ .

(By Prime # Theorem. Now can repeat  $\approx m$  times in expectation, get  $L$ . Efficient!)

[[Last step: how to figure out  $k/L$ ?]]

Imagine  $N = 10^n$ , not  $2^n$ .

Alg gets  $S$ ,  $\frac{S}{N} \approx \frac{k}{L}$  to  $\pm 5/N$

$\Rightarrow \frac{S}{N} = 0.S$  is frac  $\frac{k}{L}$  to  $n$  decimal places!

[[Only  $M \ll S_n$  bit number.]]  $\nearrow$  [[to  $n$  binary digits for  $N = 2^n$ ]]

e.g. imagine  $L \leq 50$ ,  $N = 1,000,000$ .

Say quantum circuit returns  $S = 666,667$ .

Alg. knows  $\frac{k}{L} \approx 0.666667$  [[to 6 decimal places]]

Obviously,  $\frac{k}{L} = 2/3$ . [[Remember, just want it in lowest terms now.]]

[[Still imagine  $N=1,000,000$  &  $L \leq 50$ .]]

Say  $S = 181,818$ , so  $\frac{k}{L} \stackrel{!}{\approx} 0.181818$ .

$$\leadsto \frac{k}{L} = \frac{2}{11}$$

Say  $S = 142,857$ , so  $\frac{k}{L} \stackrel{!}{\approx} 0.142857$ .

$$\leadsto \frac{k}{L} = \frac{1}{7}.$$

Say  $S = 309,524$ . so  $\frac{k}{L} \stackrel{!}{\approx} 0.309524$ .

$$\leadsto \frac{k}{L} = ??$$

[[Remark: Go to Maple (or Mathematica, etc.)

& type "identify(.309524);"

It will give the answer!! How does it do it?]

[[Let's go back to easier cases, try to "discover" the answer.]]

$$S = 142857? \quad \text{Know } S \div N \approx \frac{k}{l}.$$

Can (efficiently) do integer division

$N \text{ div } S.$  ~ Yields 7  
remainder... 1.

!!!!  
↑

[[From algorithm's perspective, this is a preposterously small remainder!]

Could have been anything in 0... 142856, and it was 1??!

Not a coincidence! Alg. surely now sees that  $\frac{S}{N} \approx \frac{1}{7}$ . ]]

[[How about...]]  $S = 181818$ .  
 $\Downarrow S_1$

[[Alg can first try for same miracle.]]

$$N \text{ div } S_1 = 1000000 \text{ div } 181818$$

$$= 5, \text{ remainder } \dots 90910. \stackrel{\uparrow}{=} S_2$$

You & I secretly

know  $\frac{S_1}{N} \doteq \frac{2}{11} \Rightarrow \frac{N}{S_1} \doteq 5.5$ . So that remainder

$S_2$  is  $\approx .5 \cdot S_1$ . That is,  $S_1 \div S_2 \approx 2!$

Alg now does  $S_1 \text{ div } S_2$ .

$$= 181818 \text{ div. } 90910$$

$$= 1 \text{ remainder } 90908,$$

or 2 remainder -2

$\uparrow$   
 [[preposterously small!!]]

So surely  
 sees  
 $S_1/N = \frac{2S_2}{11S_2}$   
 $\uparrow = \frac{2}{11!}$

Now surely knows:  $S_1 \approx 2S_2$ ,  $N \approx 5S_1 + S_2 = 10S_2 + S_2 = 11S_2$ .

Alg is... do  $\text{GCD}(N, S)$  till  
you hit a preposterously small #!

Back to  $N = 1000500$ ,  $S = "S_1" = 309,524$ .

$$N \text{ div } S_1 = 3 \text{ remainder } 71428 \quad \cdots \quad "S_2"$$

$$S_1 \text{ div } S_2 = 4 \text{ remainder } 23812 \quad \cdots \quad "S_3"$$

$$S_2 \text{ div } S_3 = 2 \text{ remainder } 23804$$

or 3 remainder -8 !!!

$$S_0 \quad S_2 \approx 3S_3$$

$$S_1 = 4S_2 + S_3 \approx 13S_3$$

$$N = 3S_1 + S_2 \approx 39S_3 + 3S_3 = 42S_3$$

$$\therefore \frac{S_1}{N} \approx \boxed{\frac{13}{42}}$$

$\therefore$  [Indeed, it's  
 $0.3095238095\dots$ ]

Analysis? Let's recap...  $\xrightarrow{\text{to } \pm \frac{y_2}{N}}$ .

Did  $\text{GCD}(N, S)$ ,  $S \approx \frac{13}{42}N$ .

$$\begin{aligned} & N \\ &= \frac{13}{42}N && (\text{quotient 3}) && 42 \\ &= \frac{3}{42}N && (\text{quotient 4}) && 13 \\ &\approx \frac{1}{42}N && (\text{quotient 3}) && 3 \\ &\approx 0 && && 1 \\ & & & & & 0 \end{aligned}$$

$\xleftarrow[\text{GCD}(42, 13)]{\text{same steps as}}$

↓

Broad steps like doing GCD on  $L, K$ ,  
which are  $m$ -bit #'s

$\Rightarrow \leq 2m$  steps.

$\curvearrowleft$  "smallish"

[error analysis?]

$$\begin{aligned}
 & N \\
 & \approx \frac{13}{42} N \stackrel{\pm \frac{1}{N}}{=} \text{(quotient } 3 = q_1) & 42 \\
 & \approx \frac{3}{42} N \stackrel{\pm \frac{3}{N}}{=} \text{(quotient } 4 = q_2) & \xleftarrow[\text{GCD}(42, 13)]{\text{same steps as}} 13 \\
 & \approx \frac{1}{42} N \stackrel{\pm \frac{13}{N}}{=} \text{(quotient } 3 = q_3) & 3 \\
 & \approx 0 \stackrel{\pm \frac{42}{N}}{=} & 1 \\
 & & 0
 \end{aligned}$$

↑ First error " $e_1$ " at most  $\pm \frac{1/2}{N} < \pm \frac{1}{N}$ .

Second error  $e_2$ :  $\leq q_1 \cdot e_1 = q_1 \cdot (\pm \frac{1}{N}) = \pm \frac{3}{N}$

Third error  $e_3$ :  $\leq q_2 \cdot e_2 + e_1 = 4 \cdot (\pm \frac{3}{N}) \pm \frac{1}{N} = \frac{13}{N}$

Fourth error  $e_4$ :  $\leq q_3 \cdot e_3 + e_2 = 3 \cdot (\pm \frac{13}{N}) \pm \frac{3}{N} = \frac{42}{N}$  !

Final error is actually  $\leq \pm \frac{L}{N} \leq \frac{2^m}{2^n} = \frac{1}{2^{n-m}}$ ,  $\because n=10m$ .  
 our algorithmic threshold for "≈ 0".

Follow chain back  $\Rightarrow N = \frac{13}{42} S$  deduction correct  
 up to  $\pm \frac{L^2}{N} \leq \frac{2^{2m}}{2^n}$

Could  $\frac{K}{L} = \frac{K'}{L'}$  up to  $\pm \frac{L^2}{N}$ ?  $\left| \frac{K}{L} - \frac{K'}{L'} \right| \geq \frac{1}{L \cdot L'} \geq \frac{1}{2^{2m}}$ .

So no, provided  $\frac{1}{2^{2m}} > \frac{2^{2m}}{2^n} \Leftrightarrow 4^m < n := 10m$ . ■