

Leveraging LLMs for Memory Forensics

A Comparative Analysis of Malware Detection

Key takeaway: Memory forensics with LLMs is feasible: reasoning boosts detection, false positives remain high, and the human analyst remains responsible.

Jan-Hendrik Lang & Thomas Schreck, September 16th - 17th, 2025



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30	2924	AggregatorHost	0xa8800003c240	3		0	False	2025-02	-24 1	10:40:21	. 00000	0 UTC	N/A	Disabled	
108	820	svchost.exe	0xa88000041080	4		0	False	2025-02	-24 1	10:40:56	.00000	0 UTC	N/A	Disabled	
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716	820	svchost.exe	0xce09fc4d1080	10		0	False	2025-02	-24 1	10:40:15	.00000	0 UTC	N/A	Disabled	
900	820	svchost.exe	0xce09fc4f1080	10		0	False	2025-02	-24 1	10:40:15	.00000	0 UTC	N/A	Disabled	
728	820	svchost.exe	0xce09fc4f5080	6		0	False	2025-02	-24 1	10:40:15	.00000	0 UTC	N/A	Disabled	
2	4	Registry	0xce09fc524080	4		N/A	False	2025-02	-24 1	10:40:08	.00000	0 UTC	N/A	Disabled	
848	820	svchost.exe	0xce09fc591080	2		0	False	2025-02	-24 1	10:40:15	.00000	0 UTC	N/A	Disabled	
860	820	svchost.exe	0xce09fc593080	5		0	False	2025-02	-24 1	10:40:15	.00000	0 UTC	N/A	Disabled	
808	4	MemCompression	0xce09fc599040	42		N/A	False	2025-02	-24 1	10:40:15	.00000	0 UTC	N/A	Disabled	
744	820	svchost.exe	0xce09fc5c8080	3		0	False	2025-02	-24 1	10:40:15	.00000	0 UTC	N/A	Disabled	
28	4	smss.exe	0xce09ff4a9040	2		N/A	False	2025-02	-24 1	10:40:12	.00000	0 UTC	N/A	Disabled	
640	820	svchost.exe	0xce09ff662080	7		0	False	2025-02	-24 1	10:40:39	.00000	0 UTC	N/A	Disabled	
472	820	svchost.exe	0xce09ff6e1300	2		0	False	2025-02	-24 1	10:40:16	.00000	0 UTC	N/A	Disabled	
32	624	csrss.exe	0xce09ff8c3140	10		0	False	2025-02	-24 1	10:40:13	.00000	0 UTC	N/A	Disabled	
20	700	services.exe	0xce0a001c3080	7		0	False	2025-02	-24 1	10:40:13	.00000	0 UTC	N/A	Disabled	
00	624	wininit.exe	0xce0a001ca080	1		0	False	2025-02	-24 1	10:40:13	.00000	0 UTC	N/A	Disabled	
08	692	csrss.exe	0xce0a001cd140	12		1	False	2025-02	-24 1	10:40:13	.00000	0 UTC	N/A	Disabled	
28	700	lsass.exe	0xce0a0081c080	9		0	False	2025-02	-24 1	10:40:13	.00000	0 UTC	N/A	Disabled	
56	692	winlogon.exe	0xce0a0084f140	6		1	False	2025-02	-24 1	10:40:13	.00000	0 UTC	N/A	Disabled	
12	756	fontdrvhost.ex	0xce0a0085a080	5		1	False	2025-02	-24 1	10:40:13	.00000	0 UTC	N/A	Disabled	
04	700	fontdrvhost.ex	0xce0a0085f2c0	5		0	False	2025-02	-24 1	10:40:13	.00000	0 UTC	N/A	Disabled	
72	820	svchost.exe	0xce0a008c7240	29		0	False	2025-02	-24 1	10:40:13	.00000	0 UTC	N/A	Disabled	
016	820	svchost.exe	0xce0a009112c0	18		0	False	2025-02	-24 1	10:40:13	.00000	0 UTC	N/A	Disabled	
12	820	svchost.exe	0xce0a00968240	6		0	False	2025-02	-24 1	10:40:13	.00000	0 UTC	N/A	Disabled	
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128	820	svchost.exe	0xce0a00a662c0	2		0	False	2025-02	-24 1	10:40:14	.00000	0 UTC	N/A	Disabled	
168	820	sychost exe	0xce0a00a7a300	3	_	0	False	2025-02	-24 1	10.40.14	00000	O LITC	N/A	Disabled	



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4	System 0x7ff9		False	False		ws\System32\vertdll.dll	
4	System 0x7ff9		False	False		ws\System32\ntdll.dll	
528	smss.exe	0x7ff94c190000	True	True	True	\Windows\System32\ntdll.dll	
528	smss.exe	0x7ff70d350000	True	False	True	\Windows\System32\smss.exe	
632	csrss.exe	0x10e6ab80000	False	False	False	\Windows\System32\de-DE\csrss.exe.mui	
632	csrss.exe	0x10e6ab90000	False	False	False	\Windows\System32\de-DE\winsrv.dll.mui	
632	csrss.exe	0x7ff949810000	True	True	True	\Windows\System32\csrsrv.dll	
632	csrss.exe	0x7ff74ff70000	True	False	True	\Windows\System32\csrss.exe	
632	csrss.exe	0x7ff9497d0000	True	True	True	\Windows\System32\winsrv.dll	
632	csrss.exe	0x7ff949790000	True	True	True	\Windows\System32\sxssrv.dll	
632	csrss.exe	0x7ff949560000	True	True	True	\Windows\System32\sxs.dll	
632	csrss.exe	0x7ff9497a0000	True	True	True	\Windows\System32\winsrvext.dll	
632	csrss.exe	0x7ff9497f0000	True	True	True	\Windows\System32\basesrv.dll	
632	csrss.exe	0x7ff94a330000	True	True	True	\Windows\System32\kernel32.dll	
632	csrss.exe	0x7ff949c60000	True	True	True	\Windows\System32\cfgmgr32.dll	1
632	csrss.exe	0x7ff9499a0000	True	True	True	\Windows\System32\gdi32full.dll	
632	csrss.exe	0x7ff949830000	True	True	True	\Windows\System32\ucrtbase.dll	
632	csrss.exe	0x7ff949c30000	True	True	True	\Windows\System32\win32u.dll	
632	csrss.exe	0x7ff949ba0000	True	True	True	\Windows\System32\bcryptprimitives.dll	
632	csrss.exe	0x7ff949cb0000	True	True	True	\Windows\System32\KernelBase.dll	
632	csrss.exe	0x7ff94a110000	True	True	True	\Windows\System32\msvcp_win.dll	
632	csrss.exe	0x7ff94bf20000	True	True	True	\Windows\System32\user32.dll	
632	csrss.exe	0x7ff94ba30000	True	True	True	\Windows\System32\combase.dll	
632	csrss.exe	0x7ff94aac0000	True	True	True	\Windows\System32\rpcrt4.dll	
632	csrss.exe	0x7ff94c190000	True	True	True	\Windows\System32\ntdll.dll	
632	csrss.exe	0x7ff94c120000	True	True	True	\Windows\System32\gdi32.dll	
700	wininit.exe	0x7ff61bb20000	True	False	True	\Windows\System32\wininit.exe	



- Expertise-Intensive: requires deep specialist knowledge & manual effort
- Data Overload: numerous plugin outputs, subtle IoCs to correlate
- Steep Learning Curve: difficult for less-experienced analysts
- Memory Forensics Importance: essential for detecting fileless malware & APTs
- Analyst Fatigue: overload increases errors and slows detection
- Underexplored Al Potential: unclear if LLMs can reduce effort while preserving accuracy

Research Questions



- **1. Detection Performance:** How do different LLMs perform in detecting malware from Volatility3 data?
- **2. Impact of Reasoning:** Do reasoning-enabled ("thinking mode") configurations yield statistically significant improvements in detection quality?
- **3. Limitations & Error Sources:** What drives false positives and false negatives, and can adding baseline system knowledge reduce these errors?

Methods: MemoryInvestigator



Proof-of-Concept Prototype Goals

- Volatility3 automated
- Volatility3 output prepared for an LLM
- forwarding the processed output to an LLM and displaying the results
- to recognize anomalies on its own in the best case

Result


- Development of a Streamlit app
- Available at: https://github.com/jan-hendrik-lang/MemoryInvestigator

Features

- Automation Volatility3 Version 2.8.0
- Display and search of data as table and graph
- Preparation of the data as a user-defined tree-of-table¹ for further use of the LLM
- LLM-supported analysis of the tree-of-table
- Dynamic creation of a RAG using PDF files or Malpedia Thread Reports

Methods: Tree-of-Table





Volatility3 Modules:

- Process modules like psscan, cmdline, dlllist.
- Network modules like netscan.
- Malware-specific plugins like malfind, processghosting, suspicious_threads.
- Privilege and persistence indicators like getsids and svcdiff.



Processes

```
System (pid=4, ppid=0)
SID: S-1-5-18, S-1-5-32-544, ...
Idrmodules: ntdll.dll [InInit=False, InLoad=False, InMem=False]
netscan: UDPv4, 192.168.10.210:137 → LISTENING
Registry (pid=92)
SID: S-1-5-18, S-1-5-32-544, ...
Idrmodules: ntdll.dll [InInit=False, InLoad=False, InMem=False]
netscan: UDPv4, 192.168.10.210:137 → LISTENING
smss.exe (pid=328)
```



System Message:

You are a forensic RAM analyst assistant specializing in Windows memory analysis. Analyze the JSON tree of Windows memory artifacts to detect intrusions or malicious activities. Cross-check your findings with known threats and provide clear, specific reasons for flagging any anomalies (e.g., unusual parentchild relationships, code injection, execution from nonstandard locations). If you are unsure, ask clarifying questions, and if you don't know, say so. Generate a structured forensic report highlighting confirmed threats while minimizing noise. Data: "Tree-of-Table Data"

User Message: Analyze the data and determine whether there is an anomaly.



Test Scenarios:

- Clean Image,
- Process Injection (msfvenom),
- o PowerShell Empire,
- QuasarRAT (Remote Access Trojan),
- MassLogger (keylogger),
- DarkCloud (trojan),
- LockBit (ransomware),
- LokiBot (stealer).

LLMs for Comparison:

- OpenAl GPT-4o,
- OpenAl o1,
- Google Gemini 2.0 Flash,
- Google Gemini 2.0 Flash-Thinking,
- o Grok 3,
- Grok 3 with enabled thinking mode.






Performance Metrics:

- Accuracy,
- Precision,
- Recall,
- F1-score,
- ANOVA,
- t-tests.



- Experiment scale: 240 trials (8 scenarios × 1 image × 6 LLMs × 5 runs)
- Detection: All LLMs found malicious evidence in most scenarios
- Reasoning helps: "Thinking" modes consistently outperformed standard modes
- **Different strengths:** Models excel at different artifact types (e.g., network vs. script decoding)
- **Performance pattern:** Very high recall (often ≈100%) low precision (precision often <20%)
- Blind spot: LockBit IoCs were outside available inputs → missed detections
- Common FP source: malfind outputs (e.g., MsMpEng.exe) frequently mis-flagged





Limitations



- Dataset Scope: one memory image per scenario; limited to Windows 10
- Data Coverage: only selected Volatility3 plugins; no registry hives, EVTX logs, or raw strings
- Model Dependence: results bound to specific LLM versions & modes (non-deterministic behavior)
- Precision Gap: high false positive rate; not suitable as a standalone detection system
- Generalizability: performance on other OS, larger datasets, or different attack techniques remains untested

Future Work



- Broader Data Sources: include registry hives, event logs, and memory strings
- Improve Precision: integrate baseline system² knowledge to filter benign processes
- Advanced LLM Integration: fine-tune models on forensic data; evaluate next-gen LLMs
- User Studies & Deployment: measure analyst time savings, detection gains, usability
- **Tool Enrichment:** expand from Volatility3 towards MemProcFS or Velociraptor
- **Protocol Experimentation:** test Model Context Protocol (MCP) as an alternative to tree-of-tables

Conclusion



- Feasibility & Value: LLMs can sift memory data and highlight likely IoCs
- Recall vs. Precision: strong recall, but very low precision (many false alarms)
- Context Matters: success depends on the breadth of forensic input data
- Human Essential: analysts remain critical due to false positives & blind spots
- LLMs as Support: assist in triage, improve interpretability, not a replacement

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GitHub Repo:

https://github.com/ jan-hendrik-lang/ MemoryInvestigator

