MODE: Loss Function for Deep Steganalysis at Low False Positive Rate

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Abstract—Deep steganalysis has been crucial in detecting hidden messages in digital media for nearly a decade. However, its common security evaluation criterion-the probability of error under equal prior-fails to reflect real forensic challenges. In practice, low False Positive (FP) rates matter most but are only adjusted empirically post-training. Standard classifiers, trained with cross-entropy loss, optimize balanced error rates rather than minimizing FPs.

We propose a framework that integrates the likelihood ratio test into the loss function to optimize deep classifiers for low FP rates. Our method outperforms standard crossentropy and other modern approaches, as demonstrated on the BOSSBase dataset across FP rates of 10^{-3} to 10^{-1} in both uncompressed and JPEG domains. The code is available at https://github.com/janbutora/MODE-loss.

Index Terms—steganalysis, Neyman-Pearson, false positive rate, deep learning

I. INTRODUCTION

Steganography [8] covertly embeds messages within digital objects, modifying a cover object into a stego object with undetectable changes. A secret message can be retrieved using the correct stego key. Steganalysis aims to detect such hidden data, primarily in digital images. Due to the absence of robust statistical models for natural images, deep learning classifiers [3], [17], [18] dominate this binary classification task.

While convolutional neural networks (CNNs) outperform feature-based methods [9], [11], they are typically optimized with cross-entropy loss, which balances False Positive (FP) and False Negative (FN) rates. However, forensic applications demand ultra-low FP rates (below 10^{-3}), as false detections can lead to costly investigations and wrongful targeting. Despite this, research on optimizing detectors for low FP rates remains scarce [7], [16], with prior steganalysis efforts focusing on linear classifiers.

Pevny and Ker [15] introduced loss functions (e.g., exponential and logistic loss) for optimizing the FP50 metric—FP rate at 50% FN rate—by maximizing feature separation. More recently, alternative evaluation metrics have emerged. The ALASKA [5] challenge introduced the MD5 metric (FN at 5% FP rate), but even the winning team [19] selected model post-training rather than optimizing for this criterion. ALASKA 2 [6] introduced weighted AUC (wAUC) to empha-

size low FP regions, yet top teams still relied on cross-entropy loss [20].

To bridge this gap, we propose a novel loss function leveraging the Neyman-Pearson lemma [14], inspired by anomaly detection methods such as PatMat [1] and DeepTopPush [13]. Unlike prior work, our approach directly optimizes deep learning detectors for low FP rates, improving forensic reliability while maintaining accuracy.

II. PRELIMINARIES AND PRIOR ART

Let $X \in \mathbb{R}^N$ be an image with N pixels and label $y \in \{0,1\}$ (0 for cover, 1 for stego). Let \mathcal{C}_{Λ} , and \mathcal{S}_{Λ} denote the cover and stego images in a set $\Lambda \in \{\text{train,val,test}\}$. Steganalysis is a binary hypothesis problem:

$$\mathcal{H}_0: X \text{ is cover}, \quad \mathcal{H}_1: X \text{ is stego.}$$
 (1)

Since a purely statistical solution is infeasible, machine learning is used instead. Let $f: \mathbb{R}^N \to \mathbb{R}^2$ be a CNN outputting logits ϕ_c (cover) and ϕ_s (stego). Defining $\phi = \phi_s - \phi_c$, the probability of an image being stego is approximated using the sigmoid function:

$$\hat{y} = \sigma(\phi) = \frac{1}{1 + e^{-\phi}}.$$
 (2)

With this in mind, we assume that a detector outputs only a single logit ϕ . The detector then decides that a given image is a stego image when $\hat{y} > 1/2$, or equivalently when $\phi > 0$. This gives an implicit decision threshold at zero, though it can be adjusted via the ROC curve. The detector is typically optimized for this threshold, balancing FP and FN rates.

To optimize the classifier's weights with gradient-based methods, a binary cross-entropy loss function is used:

$$l(y, \hat{y}) = -y \log(\hat{y}) - (1 - y) \log(1 - \hat{y}). \tag{3}$$

For stego images, this minimizes $\log(1+e^{-\phi})$, while for covers, it maximizes the same function. This introduces a logistic transformation:

$$L(x) = \log(1 + \exp(-x)),\tag{4}$$

whose derivative $\partial L(x)/\partial x = \sigma(x) - 1$, reduces emphasis on correctly classified samples. This prevents over-optimization on easy cases, enhancing detection of harder samples.




Fig. 1: Proposed estimation of the $(1-\alpha_0)$ -quantile from an empirical cdf $F_c(x)$. B denotes the size of a cover minibatch, and C is the cover training dataset. Solid lines are the empirical cdfs, and dashed lines represent their linear approximations. Blue: empirical cdf estimated from a minibatch of B samples, green: empirical cdf with the top sample added to the minibatch, red: empirical cdf with the two top samples added to the minibatch. The spacing between the green cdf values should be 1/(B+1), which is omitted for simplicity. The true $(1-\alpha_0)$ -quantile is denoted by τ^* , t_{α} denotes PatMat's threshold, and t_0 is the top sample used as a threshold for DeepTopPush.

A. Neyman-Pearson lemma

In this work, we build upon previously proposed methods of optimization at low FP rates, both of which are based on the Neyman-Pearson lemma [14]. Let's consider the observed logit ϕ as a realization of a random variable. Under the null (cover) hypothesis, we will denote the cumulative distribution function (cdf) of this variable as $F_c(x)$. Similarly, we will denote $F_s(x)$ the cdf under the stego hypothesis. Let us further denote α_0 the FP rate that we are willing to tolerate. It follows that the decision threshold associated with this FP rate is given by the cover $(1 - \alpha_0)$ -quantile:

$$\tau^* = F_c^{-1}(1 - \alpha_0). \tag{5}$$

To optimize for this threshold, the Neyman-Pearson lemma states that the optimal test is the Likelihood Ratio Test, which, in this context, maximizes the stego distribution above τ^* , which is equivalent to minimizing $F_s(\tau^*)$.

For convenience, let $\phi(x)$ be the output logit of an image x, and define $T_{n,\Sigma}(\phi)$ as the *n*-th top sample among $\phi(x), x \in \Sigma$:

$$\sum_{x \in \Sigma} [\phi(x) > T_{n,\Sigma}(\phi)] = n. \tag{6}$$

B. Pat&Mat

Pat&Mat [1] (Precision At the Top & Mainly Automated Tuning) is a framework for binary classification focused on maximizing accuracy in low FP rate regions. For a given FP rate α_0 , it estimates the threshold τ^* using the nearest cover logit at the $(1 - \alpha_0)$ -quantile, denoted as t_{α} . Optimization then maximizes the separation between stego logits and this threshold:

subject to
$$t_{\alpha} = T_{[\alpha_0 \cdot | \mathcal{C}_{train}|], \mathcal{C}_{train}}(\phi),$$
 (8)

where $l(\cdot)$ is a convex surrogate of a 0-1 loss, set as the logistic function (4). While t_{α} approximates τ^* , it remains the closest cover logit rather than an exact estimate.

A key limitation is the need to estimate the $(1 - \alpha_0)$ quantile across the dataset, restricting the original method to linear classifiers. A minibatch-based stochastic gradient descent was proposed, but optimization was limited to FP rates of 10^{-2} . This was improved in [13] by using larger (20k-sample) minibatches for malware detection. However, for CNN steganalyzers, GPU memory constraints significantly reduce batch size, making quantile estimation unreliable for smaller FP rates.

C. DeepTopPush

DeepTopPush [13] addresses the issue of insufficient batch samples for quantile estimation by maximizing the true positive (TP) rate at $\alpha_0 = 0$. The algorithm iteratively tracks the top cover sample, denoted t_0 , adding it to every minibatch during training. If a cover image with a higher logit appears, t_0 is updated accordingly for subsequent training. The optimization problem is formulated as:

minimize
$$\sum_{s \in \mathcal{S}_{\text{train}}} l(t_0 - \phi(s)), \tag{9}$$
subject to
$$t_0 = T_{0, \mathcal{C}_{\text{train}}}(\phi), \tag{10}$$

subject to
$$t_0 = T_0 c_{\text{min}}(\phi),$$
 (10)

As in Pat&Mat, we use (4) as the convex surrogate of $l(\cdot)$.

III. PROPOSED METHOD

A. Motivation

As shown in Section IV, PatMat and DeepTopPush effectively optimize for low FP rates compared to cross-entropy loss (3). However, both have limitations.

PatMat requires large minibatches to estimate thresholds accurately, needing $\sim \frac{10}{\alpha_0}$ images for an FP rate α_0 , which is infeasible for $\alpha_0 \leq 10^{-3}.^1$ With a batch size B, it we can only estimate (1-s/B)-quantile, where $s \in \{0,\dots,B-1\}$ (B=32 in our experiments). Consequently, choosing the nearest sample of τ^* will always select the largest sample in the minibatch, whenever $\alpha_0 < 1/B$. This can be problematic since the probability of randomly choosing a cover image whose logit is above the τ^* is α_0 . This means that in a vast majority of optimization steps, the algorithm optimizes, in fact, for much higher FP rates than prescribed.

DeepTopPush avoids this issue by tracking the running maximum across all cover images, making it effective for extremely low FP rates. However, for cases where a small but nonzero FP rate (e.g., 10^{-6}) is acceptable, optimizing for those rates directly may yield better results.

Finally, both methods rely on a single cover sample to compute gradients per optimization step, while the rest are used only to estimate the threshold t_{α} .

B. The MODE Loss

We propose a new loss function for low-FP-rate optimization with two key improvements over previous methods:

- 1) Optimization for any given FP rate.
- 2) Leveraging all images (including covers) to better estimate the threshold for FP rate α_0 .
- 1) Threshold estimation: Like Pat&Mat, we estimate the $(1-\alpha_0)$ -quantile τ_α from cover images but introduce two key modifications. First, instead of selecting the nearest sample t_α , we compute a linear approximation of the cover empirical cumulative distribution function (cdf) $\hat{F}_c(x)$. Second, unlike DeepTopPush which tracks only the top cover sample, we track the top two to estimate the cdf slope for very small α_0 . Note that we manually set the value of the cdf at the second-highest sample to $1-1/|\mathcal{C}_{\text{train}}|$.

Figure 1 illustrates this approach. In blue, we see an empirical cdf from a given minibatch with B cover images, which has 1/B spacing between the cdf values. Having the linear approximation (dashed), we find the decision threshold by inverting the cdf $\tau_{\alpha} = \hat{F}_c^{-1}(1-\alpha_0)$. From the discussion in the previous section, this estimate will in many cases underestimate the actual threshold we are looking for. We therefore add the top cover sample over the whole training dataset to the minibatch and use its linear approximation (green). Finally, a better estimate τ_{α} of τ^* can be obtained by adding the two top cover samples over the whole training dataset (red).

We want to emphasize that various enhancements to this linear cdf approximation are possible. On one hand, we can consider a non-linear approximations, and on the other hand, we can add more top samples to the minibatch to obtain the correct quantile. To do so, we would need approximately $k \sim \alpha_0 \cdot |\mathcal{C}_{\text{train}}|$ top samples. In our experiments, $|\mathcal{C}| = 7000$, so

we would need 7 top samples for $\alpha_0 = 10^{-3}$. For simplicity, we restrict ourselves only to the 2 top samples and linear approximation of the cdf, leaving further improvements for future work.

2) Optimization: Having estimated the threshold τ_{α} , we formulate the steganalyst's test with the detector's logits as:

$$\mathcal{H}_0: \quad \phi \le \tau_{\alpha},$$

$$\mathcal{H}_1: \quad \phi > \tau_{\alpha}. \tag{11}$$

We then model the classifier's output conditioned on the observation $x=\phi-\tau_{\alpha}$ with Bernoulli distribution $P(Y=1|x=\phi-\tau_{\alpha})=p$. Employing logistic transformation on p to obtain the shifted logits x, we obtain $p=\sigma(\phi-\tau_{\alpha})$.

Maximizing the likelihood $\prod_i P(Y = y_i | X = \phi_i - \tau_\alpha)$ over all images is then equivalent to minimizing the cross-entropy:

minimize
$$\sum_{i} y_i \log p_i + (1 - y_i) \log(1 - p_i),$$
 (12)

such that
$$\tau_{\alpha} = \hat{F}_c^{-1}(1 - \alpha), \tag{13}$$

where the minimization (12) can be written as

min.
$$\sum_{i} y_i \log(1 + e^{\tau_{\alpha} - \phi_i}) + (1 - y_i) \log(1 + e^{\phi_i - \tau_{\alpha}})$$
.(14)

This resembles PatMat (7),(8) with the exception that the optimization is done on cover images too, and the threshold τ_{α} is found from an approximation of the cdf $\hat{F}_c(x)$. In fact, this differs from a cross-entropy minimization (3) that uses a zero threshold, only by considering a different threshold τ_{α} , computed from the cover samples. We believe the proposed strategy leads to a more stable estimation of the threshold τ^* and thus a better separation of the cover and stego distributions. Indeed, using only the top two samples to estimate τ^* can lead to a very noisy estimate in the case of heavy tail distributions. A case which is circumvent by penalizing the outlier cover images. We name the proposed loss function (14) MODE: Maximizing Optimal Detector's Efficiency.

IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS

We now describe the dataset used to generate the datasets, as well as the training strategy of the steganalyzer.

A. Setup

We use 10,000 grayscale uncompressed images (512×512) from BOSSBase [2], split into training (7000), validation (1000), and testing (2000) sets. Cover images are embedded using HILL [12] at 0.3 bpp.

For JPEG images, covers are compressed with Libjpeg² at QFs 75, 95, and 100, then embedded with UERD [10] at 0.1 bpnzac.

We choose the JIN-pretrained [4] SRNet [3] as it allows us to only refine the detector on a limited amount of data, instead of training all of its parameters from a random initialization. For every tested algorithm and loss function, we first train this detector for 50 epochs using the Cross-Entropy (CE) loss function (3), with 64 randomly selected images in every mini-batch. The learning rate starts at 10^{-3} and is halved if

 $^{^1 \}rm Using$ an NVIDIA V100 GPU (32GB RAM), we can fit up to 64 images of size 512×512 per batch.

²http://libjpeg.sourceforge.net/




Fig. 2: ROC curves for the tested loss functions with $\alpha_0 = 10^{-3}$. From left to right: UERD, QF 75, QF 95, QF 100; HILL.

Loss	α_0	$P_{ m E}$	10-3	$\frac{P_{\rm D}(\alpha)}{10^{-2}}$	10-1
CE	-	0.1520	0.3505	0.5205	0.7765
DTP [13]	0	0.1577	0.4505	0.5645	0.7715
Pat&Mat	10^{-2}	0.1617	0.4420	0.5730	0.7595
[1]	10^{-3}	0.1577	0.4195	0.5635	0.7610
MODE	10^{-2}	0.1483	0.4475	0.5815	0.7860
MODE	10^{-3}	0.1500	0.4550	0.5810	0.7805

TABLE I: Results for various FP rates. HILL, 0.3 bpp.

validation loss stagnates for 3 epochs. We then refine the CE-trained detectors for 50 more epochs with an initial learning rate of 10^{-4} , keepin all other hyperparameters as in [4].

Detection performance is measured by the TP rate $P_D(\alpha)$ (Detection probability), at FP rates $\alpha \in \{10^{-1}, 10^{-2}, 10^{-3}\}$.

B. Optimization at low FP rates

We now compare the proposed MODE with the standard cross-entropy loss function (3), PatMat (7), and DeepTopPush (DTP) (9). As mentioned in Section II, both PatMat and DTP use the logistic surrogate loss function (4). Since we only have 2k testing images, we only target FP rates $\alpha_0 \in \{10^{-3}, 10^{-2}\}$ for PatMat and MODE. This is because we can get quite noisy results for smaller α_0 due to the lack of training/testing data. It is important to point out that we used PatMat with a linear approximation of the cdf, similarly as for MODE, however, the minibatches are not augmented the same way. In practice, we use the threshold τ_α , instead of t_α visualized in blue in Figure 1. Without this approximation, PatMat would behave the same for the two testing FP rates based on the discussion in Section III-A.

The specific values of true positives for given FP rates, as well as $P_{\rm E}$ are listed in Tables I,II,III, and IV. For uncompressed images embedded with HILL (Table I), and UERD at QF 100 (Table IV), MODE provides the overall best performance with 2-5% improvement over PatMat. Table II

Loss	α_0	P_{E}		$P_{\mathrm{D}}(\alpha)$	
Loss	α0	1 E	-10^{-3}	10^{-2}	10^{-1}
CE	-	0.1090	0.4945	0.6675	0.8815
DTP [13]	0	0.1162	0.5525	0.6830	0.8625
Pat&Mat	10^{-2}	0.1095	0.5645	0.6920	0.8770
[1]	10^{-3}	0.1123	0.5890	0.7010	0.8720
MODE	10^{-2}	0.1085	0.5600	0.6945	0.8805
MODE	10^{-3}	0.1075	0.5530	0.6775	0.8835

TABLE II: Results for various FP rates. UERD, QF 75.

shows that for UERD at QF 75, all methods outperform crossentropy for $\alpha=10^{-3}$ for at least 6%, while PatMat being overall best by 1-2% over MODE. For QF 95 (Table IV), PatMat and MODE perform very similarly for the smaller FP rate, while MODE gets a 3% boost for $\alpha=10^{-2}$.

The full ROC curves for $\alpha_0 = 10^{-3}$ are shown in Figure 2 and we can see that DeepTopPush is indeed more optimized for very low FP rates compared to the other methods, with an exception at QF 95, although these values are extremely noisy due to the testing set size of 2k images. A larger-scale experiment will have to be performed in the future to further validate our finding for smaller FP rates.

To summarize, the cross-entropy loss provides the best results on $P_{\rm E}$, which for the given problems is quite close to the FP rate at $\alpha=10^{-1}$. However, the proposed method improves the detection over the cross-entropy at $\alpha=10^{-3}$ by 10%, 6%, 3%, and 14%, for HILL and the 3 quality factors with UERD, respectively. For images compressed with QF 75, PatMat provides the best results, while for higher-quality JPEGs and uncompressed images, MODE outperforms all the other methods.

V. CONCLUSIONS

We have proposed MODE, a new method of optimizing deep steganalyzers for small false positive rates. We add two top cover samples to each minibatch during the detector's

Loss	α_0	$P_{ m E}$	10-3	$\frac{P_{\rm D}(\alpha)}{10^{-2}}$	10-1
CE	-	0.2280	0.1535	0.2680	0.5990
DTP [13]	0	0.2760	0.1315	0.2745	0.5265
Pat&Mat	10^{-2}	0.2357	0.1555	0.3105	0.5860
[1]	10^{-3}	0.2390	0.1830	0.3020	0.5970
MODE	10^{-2}	0.2395	0.1760	0.3375	0.5955
MODE	10^{-3}	0.2402	0.1815	0.3320	0.5825

TABLE III: Results for various FP rates. UERD, QF 95. $\frac{P_{\rm D}(\alpha)}{10^{-2}}$ $P_{\rm E}$ 10^{-1} 10^{-3} 0.15200.7830 CE 0.2250 0.5440 DTP [13] 0 0.3595 0.5600 0.17100.7445Pat&Mat 10^{-2} 0.1593 0.3090 0.5690 0.7720 10^{-3} 0.16070.31800.5590 0.7730[1] 10^{-2} 0.15780.3295 0.5710 0.7815MODE 0.16180.36950.58300.7715

TABLE IV: Results for various FP rates. UERD, QF 100.

training. The logits from these two samples are used to estimate the right tail of the cover distribution and find a decision threshold given by a desired FP rate. Using a surrogate logistic function, this decision threshold is then used to optimize a shifted cross-entropy loss function, which puts emphasis on the desired FP rate.

We demonstrate on several JPEG quality factors, and on uncompressed images that if the problem requires FP rates close to 0, it seems that using DeepTopPush to optimize the detector is the steganalyst's best choice. However, as soon as we can allow small FP rates, MODE leads to better true positive rates outperforming, although by a small margin, other state-of-the-art methods for deep learning steganalysis. Due to a potential computational overhead on a large dataset, we only considered targeting FP rates of 10^{-3} and 10^{-2} .

Since the experiments were performed on a rather small BOSSBase dataset, we plan to evaluate the method further with more data in order to validate the method for small FPs such as 10^{-5} . Furthermore, the effect of batch size, and the effect of using top K>2 cover samples on the estimate of the quantile will also be studied. Finally, non-linear approximations of the empirical cdf will be investigated.

Our work contributes to the ongoing discussion surrounding steganalysis as a security evaluation metric, highlighting the need for more nuanced approaches that prioritize accuracy over simplicity in real-world forensic scenarios. By exploring novel optimization techniques and empirical evaluations of DL models, we aim to provide actionable insights for researchers seeking to improve their understanding of this complex field.

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