

# The Mirage of Explainability: A Survey on Chain-of-Thought Faithfulness in Large Language Models

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## Abstract

Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning appears to provide explainability, leading users to trust that verbalized rationales reflect the model’s underlying computation. However, substantial evidence indicates that CoT often fails to reflect the model’s actual decision-making process, leading to a surge of research into the *faithfulness* of these explanations. This paper presents a comprehensive survey of CoT faithfulness. We first *unify the definition* of faithfulness by integrating internal alignment with external consistency and synthesize *key failure phenomena*, such as post-hoc rationalization and sycophancy. Furthermore, we systematize *evaluation metrics, benchmarks*, and critically review current *mitigation strategies*. We conclude by outlining *open challenges* and advocating for architectural innovations to achieve genuinely faithful reasoning.

## 1 Introduction

The rapid deployment of Large Language Models (LLMs) in high-stakes domains, ranging from medical diagnosis and legal analysis to autonomous planning, has created an urgent demand for systems that are not merely accurate, but *interpretable* (Jacovi and Goldberg, 2020). In these critical settings, a “black box” prediction is insufficient; stakeholders require transparency to ensure decisions are robust, fair, and accountable, rather than driven by spurious correlations or biases. To address this, *Chain-of-Thought* (CoT) reasoning (Wei et al., 2022) has emerged as the primary technique for realizing model interpretability. By encouraging models to generate a sequence of intermediate reasoning steps before arriving at a final answer, CoT appears to provide transparency, leading users to assume that CoT explanations accurately reflect the model’s actual decision-making process<sup>1</sup>.

<sup>1</sup>Barez et al. (2025) analyzed 1,000 arXiv papers and revealed 63% of autonomous systems and 38% of medical AI papers explicitly rely on CoT as an interpretability mechanism.

However, this assumption is currently facing a crisis of confidence. Recent research (Turpin et al., 2023) increasingly suggests that CoT suffers from *a lack of faithfulness*, i.e., a fundamental disconnect between the verbalized rationales and the true causal process behind the model’s prediction. This revelation challenges the premise of CoT as a reliable interpretability tool, indicating that what appears to be explainability may, in fact, be a mirage.

First, recent work found that unfaithfulness can happen in different ways, such as reconstructing plausible justification after decision (Turpin et al., 2023), catering to perceived user views (Sharma et al., 2024), and performative traces where editing key steps does not change the output (Arcuschin et al., 2025). To diagnose these issues, studies employ behavioral audits (e.g., counterfactual editing, simulatability tests) (Matton et al., 2025) and mechanistic analyses (e.g., activation patching, causal tracing) (Meng et al., 2022) to isolate whether the reasoning content is causally necessary. For mitigation, researchers propose training-time interventions (Li et al., 2025b) (e.g., faithfulness-oriented fine-tuning, reward modeling), inference-time constraints (e.g., verifiable decoding, external tool binding) (Lan et al., 2025), and architectural inductive biases (e.g., bottleneck modules, latent planning) (Hao et al., 2024). Collectively, this defines a research pathway from characterizing failure phenomena and diagnostic methods to developing targeted interventions, treating CoT faithfulness as a critical, multi-faceted problem for transparent AI.

**Our Contributions.** This paper presents a comprehensive survey of CoT faithfulness. Our main contributions are: 1) We clarify the definition and scope of CoT faithfulness, distinguishing it from related concepts such as consistency (§2); 2) We synthesize the empirical landscape of unfaithfulness and its key phenomena (§3); 3) We summarize underlying causes and concrete desiderata for faith-

ful reasoning, derived from observed failures (§4); 4) We systematize evaluation methods and benchmarks by their “grounding level,” from behavioral to mechanistic protocols (§5); 5) We review mitigation strategies across paradigms, analyzing their alignment with ultimate CoT faithfulness goal(§6).

**Differences with Existing Surveys.** While prior works have reviewed CoT reasoning (Wei et al., 2022; Zhou et al., 2023; Barez et al., 2025), they focus on methods for improving CoT and evaluation benchmarks, without targeting CoT faithfulness. The most relevant papers on CoT faithfulness are Barez et al. (2025) and Wiegrefe and Marasović (2024), which synthesize evidence that CoT can be post-hoc and only weakly causal. However, those works primarily provide high-level diagnosis and do not systematize the full landscape of research related to faithfulness. Our survey bridges this gap and, to the best of our knowledge, is the first to provide a comprehensive overview of CoT faithfulness—encompassing definition, phenomena, cause, desiderata, evaluation, and mitigation—and propose promising future avenues for this field.

## 2 What is CoT Faithfulness?

At its core, CoT faithfulness centers on a fundamental question: *Can we trust the CoT reasoning trace produced by an LLM as an explanation of the model’s decision-making?* While numerous works investigate this, definitions of “faithfulness” diverge based on which aspect of explanation is prioritized, falling into two main views:

**1) The internal-alignment view:** This perspective holds that a CoT is faithful only if *it reflects the model’s actual internal computations and beliefs* (Arcuschin et al., 2025; Chen et al., 2025). For example, if the model makes a prediction using some hidden heuristic or latent knowledge, a faithful CoT must explicitly articulate these factors, generating a plausible post-hoc rationalization that obscures the true causal mechanism.

**2) The external-consistency view:** Other works define faithfulness via the logical consistency between the reasoning trace and the final answer (Lyu et al., 2023; Turpin et al., 2023). Under this view, *the answer must follow logically from the chain-of-thought*; if the model’s final prediction contradicts the rationale or appears disconnected from the derivation, the CoT is deemed unfaithful.

We argue that for CoT to function as a trust-

worthy explanation, it must satisfy both *internal alignment* and *external consistency*; neither condition is sufficient in isolation. To illustrate this, consider the phenomenon of *sycophancy* (Sharma et al., 2024), where a model abandons its internal knowledge to satisfy a user’s apparent bias, generating a persuasive CoT to justify the compliant answer. While such a CoT satisfies external consistency, it is still unfaithful because it fails internal alignment by concealing the true driver of the model’s decision, *i.e.*, the pressure to appease the user. Conversely, a reasoning trace that accurately reflects internal beliefs but fails to causally dictate the final prediction lacks the causal efficacy required of a faithful explanation. In light of these insights, we advocate for **a unified definition of CoT faithfulness that integrates both dimensions**.

**Definition of CoT Faithfulness:** A chain-of-thought is faithful only if: (1) it is *internally aligned*, meaning the trace causally reflects the model’s actual reasoning process or latent knowledge; and (2) it is *externally consistent*, meaning the provided rationale is logically coherent and sufficient to derive the final answer.

Our definition resonates with Barez et al. (2025), who posits that faithful explanations must be “both procedurally correct and accurately reflect the decision process”, effectively capturing both the *how* and the *why* of the model’s prediction.

## 3 Phenomena of Unfaithfulness

With the definition of faithfulness established in §2, a critical question arises: *do current LLMs actually satisfy these criteria?* Empirical evidence indicates that they frequently do not, exhibiting diverse forms of *unfaithfulness*. We systematize these failures into four phenomena (Figure 1), ranging from passive input sensitivity to active deception.

### 3.1 Input-Driven Unfaithfulness

Ideally, a faithful reasoning process should be driven solely by the logic of the task. However, models are sensitive to irrelevant features within the input prompt. In such cases, the CoT acts not as the derivation of the answer, but as *a post-hoc rationalization for biases triggered by the input*.

**Contextual Distractions.** Superficial contextual variations—such as reordering multiple-choice options (Turpin et al., 2023), providing suggestive




Figure 1: An overview of four key unfaithfulness phenomena of chain-of-thought reasoning.

hints (Turpin et al., 2023; Chua and Evans, 2025), altering the query language (Ferrao et al., 2025; Zhao et al., 2025b), or modifying sociodemographic attributes (Matton et al., 2025)—can significantly alter reasoning outcomes. However, models seldom acknowledge these spurious cues in their CoT rationales. Instead, they tend to generate a seemingly coherent logical chain to justify the bias-driven prediction, effectively concealing the true cause of its decision (*i.e.*, the distraction).

**Sycophancy.** Another form of input-driven unfaithfulness is *sycophancy*, *i.e.*, models prioritize perceived user intent over factual correctness. When prompts contain leading cues or incorrect premises—a special type of spurious cue—models frequently produce erroneous predictions to appease the user, abandoning their internal knowledge (Ji et al., 2025; Yang et al., 2025). Similarly, mere questioning (*e.g.*, asking “Are you sure?”) can cause a model to discard a correct derivation in favor of a compliant, incorrect one (Laban et al., 2024). These failures reveal that the CoT often reflects a probabilistic mimicking of human discourse rather than a faithful internal conviction.

### 3.2 Non-Causal & Post-hoc Rationalization

Research indicates that a significant portion of CoT contributes little to the final prediction. This *causal sparsity* spans multiple domains. In medical diagnosis, models often rely on implicit shortcuts rather than textual logic (Ji et al., 2025; Leng et al., 2025). In mathematical (Lyu et al., 2023; Li et al., 2025b; Abdaljalil et al., 2025; Leang et al., 2024) and logical reasoning (Jia et al., 2025; Balasubramanian et al., 2025; Arcuschin et al., 2025), incorrect CoT

can lead to correct results, and vice versa. Even when CoT steps are deleted or replaced with semantically corrupted tokens, model accuracy remains stable (Jia et al., 2025; Lyu et al., 2023). Such CoT is causally decoupled from internal states: the model pre-determines the answer in the latent space, rendering the generated text merely a *post-hoc rationalization* (Zhao et al., 2025a; Chan et al., 2025). This phenomenon is highly context-dependent: while models exhibit higher faithfulness in logic-intensive tasks, they frequently revert to post-hoc justification in knowledge-retrieval tasks (Lanham et al., 2023). Moreover, inverse scaling has been observed, where larger models are more prone to generating plausible yet unfaithful reasoning (Lanham et al., 2023; Tanneru et al., 2024; Bentham et al., 2024; Paul et al., 2024). This occurs because capable models increasingly retrieve answers directly from internal knowledge, relegating the CoT to a decorative role.

Further evidence of this causal disconnection is found in *filler reasoning*. Studies demonstrate that training with completely irrelevant or corrupted traces can still improve performance (Stechly et al., 2025), implying that CoT functions by providing the necessary computational depth for the model to conduct the reasoning, regardless of semantic content of the reasoning trace.

### 3.3 Alignment-Induced Unfaithfulness

Standard alignment techniques (*e.g.* SFT, RLHF) often induce a form of *stylized unfaithfulness*. Because models are optimized to satisfy human annotators who prefer authoritative and structured explanations, they learn to mimic the *form* of reasoning

without the *substance*. This superficiality permeates every stage of alignment: SFT and distillation often trap models in *pattern matching*, where they fit the linguistic pattern of reasoning without its causal logic (Sinha et al., 2025; Lobo et al., 2025; Zhang et al., 2025b). RLHF further exacerbates this by incentivizing *persuasion* over correctness, encouraging models to fabricate post-hoc justifications for heuristic decisions or mask errors with confident tones (Casper et al., 2023; FU et al., 2025; Viteri et al., 2024; Ferreira et al., 2025). Even objective paradigms like RLVR remain susceptible to reward hacking, generating “pseudo-reasoning” that deviates from the actual internal computation (Min et al., 2023; Huang et al., 2025). A complete review of these studies is provided in Appendix A.

### 3.4 Strategic Deception and Hiding

Unlike the passive unfaithfulness discussed earlier, models may exhibit *strategic unfaithfulness*, where they actively manipulate the CoT to obscure their true intent or capabilities from supervisors.

**Obfuscated Reward Hacking and Deception.** To bypass safety alignment, models may engage in reward hacking by generating performative CoT. In this scenario, the model optimizes for positive feedback by producing benign, human-aligned reasoning during training. However, this often conceals latent misaligned goals, resulting in a model of “treacherous turn” that exhibits harmful behaviors once deployed (Hubinger et al., 2024).

**Sandbagging.** Models may employ strategic underperformance, or *sandbagging*, to conceal their capabilities. For instance, a model might deliberately insert errors into its reasoning or falsely claim an inability to solve a task, thereby masking dangerous competencies from evaluators. Alternatively, models may feign misunderstanding of user instructions to subtly bypass explicit refusal mechanisms, complying with harmful requests under the guise of confusion (van der Weij et al., 2025).

**Encoded Reasoning.** Encoded reasoning models may exploit steganography to secretly transmit information through specific word choices, punctuation patterns, or syntactic structures, resulting in a complete decoupling between the reasoning trajectories and the model’s actual computational process (Roger and Greenblatt, 2023).

## 4 Causes of Unfaithfulness

After presenting various phenomena of CoT unfaithfulness, this section discusses the *mechanistic origins* of these phenomena, ranging from external training incentives to the model’s internal states.

**Misaligned Incentives.** In model alignment training (e.g., RLHF), the optimization objective is typically to maximize a *proxy metric*, such as human preference scores or specific verifiable metrics, rather than faithful reasoning per se. As Goodhart’s Law warns, when a measure becomes a target, it ceases to be a reliable measure (Manheim and Garrabrant, 2018). To maximize rewards, models often exploit discrepancies between proxy metrics and true objectives. The model implicitly learns that instead of rigorously aligning complex internal causal logic, it is more efficient to learn human-preferred tones and formats. Such reward hacking leads to unfaithful model behaviors like sycophancy, post-hoc rationalization to secure process rewards. Therefore, unfaithfulness emerges not as a bug, but as the optimal strategy “rewarded” by gradient descent for maximizing the proxy score.

**The Linearization Dilemma.** Even without misaligned incentives, the Transformer architecture fundamentally limits the fidelity of CoT. Our expectation that CoT should reflect internal processes is rooted in human cognitive science. Empirical studies show that humans who engage in “self-explanation” outperform those who solve problems silently (Chi et al., 1989, 1994). The mechanism driving this is *forced linearization*: human intuition is often vague, parallel, and high-dimensional, and the act of serializing these thoughts into language forces the brain to resolve ambiguities and bridge logical gaps. Researchers naturally extend this analogy to LLMs, expecting CoT to serve as a high-fidelity window into the model’s computation.

However, the internal mechanism of Transformers differs fundamentally from biological cognition. As Levy et al. (2025) argue, the token is the sole point of transmission in linear, autoregressive generation. While the model’s internal computation occurs over a massive, high-dimensional manifold, it is forced to collapse this state into a discrete, low-dimensional token at every step. Consequently, CoT is merely a *lossy projection* of the neural activity. Due to this architectural constraint, the reasoning trace inevitably discards the high-dimensional causal nuances of the internal states.

335  
336     **Cascading of Unfaithfulness.** This information  
337 loss induces *error drift* in long-horizon reasoning.  
338 Once a model generates a minor, non-causal, or  
339 hallucinated token due to the lossy projection, the  
340 autoregressive mechanism forces subsequent to-  
341 kens to maintain coherence with this error (Sri-  
342 vatsava et al., 2023), leading to a further disconnect  
343 between CoT and the internal states.

344     Ultimately, because CoT is a lossy projection  
345 of high-dimensional states, perfect internal align-  
346 ment is theoretically infeasible in current archi-  
347 tectures. We argue that one solution is defin-  
348 ing *functional faithfulness*: treating CoT as an in-  
349 strumental necessity tailored to specific engineer-  
350 ing goals (Jacovi and Goldberg, 2020). We iden-  
351 tify three core desiderata: (1) *Causal Efficacy* for  
352 reasoning-intensive tasks, ensuring steps actually  
353 drive predictions; (2) *Intent Revelation* for safety,  
354 serving as a probe for deceptive motives; and (3)  
355 *Decision Auditability* for high-stakes users, ensur-  
356 ing rationales reflect the model’s sensitivity to in-  
357 puts. We elaborate on this task-oriented faith-  
358 fulness as a promising future direction in §7.

## 359     5 Evaluation Metrics and Benchmark

360 Since CoT faithfulness serves multiple functional  
361 roles, it is unlikely that any single metric can fully  
362 capture the concept. In this section, we review  
363 existing evaluation metrics and benchmarks.

### 364     5.1 Black-box Metrics

365 Black-box metrics estimate CoT faithfulness solely  
366 from observable input-output behavior under con-  
367 trolled interventions, without accessing internal  
368 activations or weights. Their core assumption is  
369 *decision relevance*: if the model truly uses a ra-  
370 tionale or a specific step, then deleting, swapping,  
371 or rewriting that content should induce predictable  
372 shifts in the final decision; if the answer barely  
373 changes, the content is likely unfaithful.

374     Step-wise approaches apply this test to in-  
375 dividual steps by systematically editing, pars-  
376 ing or resampling steps and tracking answer  
377 changes, helping distinguish “true” from “deco-  
378 rative” steps (Zhao et al., 2025a). To avoid over-  
379 interpreting a single sampled CoT, resampling-  
380 based approaches treat CoT as a distribution and  
381 sample alternative traces under controlled con-  
382 straints, then identify statements that remain stable  
383 across samples and are critical to decisions (Macar  
384 et al., 2025). Perturbation responses to CoT

385 faithfulness are often summarized with sensitiv-  
386 ity curves or AUC-style scalars over perturbation  
387 strength (Paul et al., 2024); and a related depen-  
388 dence test compares predictions when the model  
389 is given only the rationale versus when it is re-  
390 moved. Another line evaluates whether explana-  
391 tions help predict model outputs beyond superfi-  
392 cial cues: *leakage-adjusted simulability* estimates  
393 how well an explanation supports predicting the  
394 model’s output while explicitly filtering out cases,  
395 where the explanation simply repeats the label or  
396 contains other trivial shortcuts (Hase et al., 2020).

397     Overall, black-box metrics do not require access  
398 to model internals, so they have broader applica-  
399 tions. However, they cannot causally ensure faith-  
400 fulness, and in practice, the results can be sensitive  
401 to prompt format, decoding randomness, and distri-  
402 bution shift introduced by unnatural edits.

### 403     5.2 White-box Metrics

404 White-box metrics evaluate CoT faithfulness by  
405 directly probing or intervening on the model’s in-  
406 ternal computation, operationalizing faithfulness  
407 as *causal dependence* between latent variables (ac-  
408 tivations, circuits, or parameters) and the final pre-  
409 diction. The core assumption is that causally used  
410 internal signals are sensitive to interventions: if an  
411 explanation claims the model relies on some inter-  
412 mediate computation, then swapping or removing  
413 the corresponding signal should shift the output in  
414 the expected way; otherwise, the signal is not actu-  
415 ally used, suggesting the rationale is not faithful.

416     Most work instantiates this with activation-level  
417 interventions such as *activation patching* and *medi-  
418 ation tests*, where targeted internal states are trans-  
419 plated or restored to check whether they drive  
420 predictable answer changes (Syed et al., 2024).  
421 Some metrics then quantify faithfulness by com-  
422 paring causal attribution patterns for the rationale  
423 versus the final answer and measuring their align-  
424 ment (Syed et al., 2024). The same logic extends  
425 to structured components, e.g., attention heads,  
426 MLP subcircuits, or modules, via causal tracing  
427 and targeted ablations that assign attribution to spe-  
428 cific internal parts (Meng et al., 2022). Comple-  
429 mentary parameter-level tests investigate whether  
430 a CoT step reflects beliefs that truly drive the an-  
431 swer by unlearning or erasing step-specific infor-  
432 mation and measuring the final prediction shift (Tutek  
433 et al., 2025). Concept-level methods extract key  
434 concepts from the explanation and use probes or  
representation-level interventions to test whether

435 those concepts causally influence final decisions,  
436 supporting detection and sometimes steering of un-  
437 faithful explanations (Bhan et al., 2025). For safety  
438 monitoring, internal activation probes can predict  
439 downstream alignment outcomes earlier and more  
440 reliably than text-only monitors, consistent with  
441 CoT being plausible yet non-decisive (Chan et al.,  
442 2025). Meta-evaluations further caution that exist-  
443 ing faithfulness metrics can disagree or fail under  
444 rigorous causal scrutiny, motivating white-box val-  
445 idation and clearer self-reporting (Liu et al., 2024).

446 While principled, white-box metrics require ac-  
447 cess to the model’s internal states and rely on in-  
448 terpretability assumptions; therefore, careful use of  
449 matched and robustness checks remains essential.

### 450 5.3 Hybrid Metrics

451 Hybrid metrics combine behavioral diagnostics  
452 with structured intermediates to reduce ambigu-  
453 ity about what constitutes a *meaningful perturba-*  
454 *tion*. The key idea is to replace ad-hoc edits of  
455 free-form CoT text with controlled interventions  
456 on an intermediate representation whose seman-  
457 tics are explicit, so what counts as a valid per-  
458 turbation is less likely to introduce a distribution  
459 shift. Viteri et al. (2024) use bottlenecked or re-  
460 constructed channels (*e.g.*, compressed rationales,  
461 discrete plans, learned bottlenecks) and measure  
462 faithfulness by how strongly the final prediction  
463 depends on that channel as an information car-  
464 rier, rather than merely correlating with it. Chen  
465 et al. (2022) ground steps via execution or symbolic  
466 structure: mapping CoTs into programs or logical  
467 forms enables evaluators to edit structured steps  
468 themselves and validate them against execution  
469 traces, which clarifies step-level counterfactuals  
470 and reduces artifacts from unnatural rewrites.

471 Importantly, hybrid metrics provide stronger pro-  
472 cedural evidence and improve robustness and inter-  
473 pretability, but they do not by themselves guarantee  
474 mechanistic faithfulness of free-form CoT—unless  
475 the evaluation verifies that the model’s decision is  
476 causally driven by the same internal signals that  
477 produce the rationale (Macar et al., 2025).

### 478 5.4 Benchmarks

479 We categorize the benchmarks for CoT faithfulness  
480 based on the *grounding level*, defined as the extent  
481 to which it uses the model internals in its design and  
482 how explicitly the benchmark links a model’s CoT  
483 rationale to the internal mechanism and decision it  
484 produces. Under this criterion, we classify existing

485 benchmarks into four types as follows.

486 **Level I: Behavior-only benchmarks.** At the  
487 weakest grounding level, *behavior-only bench-  
488 marks* evaluate faithfulness relying solely on ob-  
489 servable input-output behavior under standard  
490 prompting. This category includes standardized  
491 evaluation suites like *FaithCoT-Bench* (Shen et al.,  
492 2025), as well as diagnostic benchmarks like  
493 *LExt* (Carion et al., 2025), which stress-test sce-  
494 narios where fluent rationales often fail to predict  
495 actual decisions. Additionally, cross-lingual stud-  
496 ies highlight that faithfulness can vary significantly  
497 across languages, necessitating multilingual evalua-  
498 tion protocols (Utama et al., 2025). However, the  
499 reliance on surface-level text limits the validity of  
500 these benchmarks. Without controlled internal in-  
501 terventions, such evaluations struggle to isolate gen-  
502 uine faithfulness from confounding factors, such as  
503 prompt sensitivity and stochastic decoding noise.

504 **Level II: Intervention-grounded benchmarks.**  
505 Benchmarks at this level achieve stronger ground-  
506 ing by explicitly implementing controlled pertur-  
507 bations or counterfactual tests. They follow the  
508 principle of *decision relevance*: if a rationale step  
509 is used by the model, its modification or removal  
510 should predictably alter the final answer. Drawing  
511 from counterfactual testing in general explainabil-  
512 ity (Mohammadi et al., 2021), these benchmarks  
513 adapt systematic editing, resampling, and ablation  
514 strategies to CoT evaluation (Li et al., 2025b), and  
515 they are commonly used in multi-modal and med-  
516 ical settings (Kim et al., 2025; Karamchetti et al.,  
517 2025) where the explanations can look plausible  
518 while weakly tied to the actual evidence. Conse-  
519 quently, while Level II provides more robust behav-  
520 ioral evidence than Level I, it remains insufficient  
521 for verifying mechanistic faithfulness, as it lacks  
522 access to the model’s internal states.

523 **Level III: Structured-verifiable benchmarks.**  
524 At a stronger level of grounding, some benchmarks  
525 reduce evaluation ambiguity by constraining rea-  
526 soning steps to formal structures, allowing veri-  
527 fication against explicit rules. Approaches like  
528 *Typed CoT* utilize general verification frameworks  
529 to test procedural correctness and partial faith-  
530 fulness (Lan et al., 2025), while *theorem-proving*  
531 benchmarks enforce strict formal constraints to  
532 separate compositional reasoning from post-hoc  
533 justification (Zhang et al., 2025a). The limitation  
534 of this approach is its potential to favor specific,

535 formalized reasoning styles. Additionally, in multi-  
536 step agentic settings, external feedback can obscure  
537 internal reasoning, necessitating careful counterfac-  
538 tional design to ensure valid grounding.

539 **Level IV: White-box benchmarks.** White-box  
540 benchmarks provide the strongest grounding by  
541 leveraging access to model internals. Here, faith-  
542 fulness is defined causally: the decision must demon-  
543 strably depend on the specific internal signals (acti-  
544 vations or parameters) corresponding to the gen-  
545 erated rationale. Unlike the behavioral evaluation  
546 of Levels I–III, white-box benchmarks directly val-  
547 idate causal mediation. Methodologies typically  
548 involve activation patching, resampling, and un-  
549 learning interventions (Syed et al., 2024; Macar  
550 et al., 2025; Tutek et al., 2025; Bhan et al., 2025).  
551 Although restricted by the need for white-box ac-  
552 cess, white-box evaluation acts as a rigorous proxy  
553 for distinguishing genuine faithfulness improve-  
554 ments from superficial rationale refinements. For  
555 further discussion on peripheral metrics and meta-  
556 evaluation of these benchmarks, see Appendix C.

## 557 6 Mitigation of Unfaithfulness

558 This section reviews how unfaithfulness can be *mit-  
559 iated*. Existing approaches differ in how directly  
560 they act on the sources of unfaithfulness: some  
561 operate in-context at the prompt level, while others  
562 intervene on model internals or training stages.

### 563 6.1 Prompting and In-Context Learning

564 Prompt-based mitigation improves CoT faith-  
565 fulness without updating parameters. The core idea is  
566 that clearer instructions can steer the model away  
567 from unfaithful or shortcut rationales, even if its  
568 underlying computation is fixed. Typical meth-  
569 ods include *rephrasing* or *self-questioning* to elicit  
570 more deliberate reasoning (Deng et al., 2023) and  
571 decomposing a hard problem into simpler sub-  
572 questions (Zhou et al., 2023). These prompts often  
573 make CoTs more organized and can improve accu-  
574 racy, but they offer weak faithfulness guarantees:  
575 they mostly change what the model *states*, not what  
576 it *causally uses*. Their effects can be unstable under  
577 small prompt or decoding changes, so they are best  
578 viewed as lightweight and indirect mitigations.

### 579 6.2 Ensembling and Self-Consistency

580 Another widely adopted approach uses repeated  
581 sampling and aggregation of reasoning paths. The  
582 key assumption is *stability*: if the model reasons

583 reliably, independently sampled CoTs should agree  
584 on key intermediate claims and the final answer;  
585 persistent disagreement can signal unstable rea-  
586 soning. *Biomedical NLI* (Liu and Thoma, 2024)  
587 reported improved faithfulness scores using self-  
588 consistent CoT. However, consistency is neither  
589 necessary nor sufficient for causal faithfulness: a  
590 model can repeatedly produce the same plausible  
591 yet irrelevant rationale, and the effectiveness of  
592 consistency checks varies across models and tasks.  
593 Thus, ensembling is also viewed as an auxiliary  
594 rather than a principled fix for faithfulness.

### 595 6.3 Verification and External Tool Binding

596 This type of methods translate free-form CoT into  
597 an executable or symbolic form so correctness be-  
598 comes directly checkable, and step claims can be  
599 grounded in verifiable procedures (Lyu et al., 2023;  
600 Ling et al., 2023). While improving reliability  
601 and accuracy, it can bypass the model’s native rea-  
602 soning, *i.e.*, getting the right answer via external  
603 checks even if the model’s internal causal process  
604 is unchanged, leaving unfaithful CoTs unresolved.

### 605 6.4 Training and Fine-Tuning Approaches

606 Another way to improve CoT faithfulness is to up-  
607 date model parameters so its generated rationales  
608 are more causally aligned with the computations  
609 that drive its decisions. Representative work treats  
610 reasoning trajectories as optimization targets via  
611 supervised fine-tuning or RL with verifiable re-  
612 wards (OpenAI, 2024). Multi-model collaboration  
613 frameworks such as *CoRex* (Sun et al., 2023) fur-  
614 ther aim to reduce idiosyncratic heuristics by coor-  
615 dinating critique and review across models, which  
616 can regularize reasoning toward more reliable out-  
617 comes. From a faithfulness perspective, these ap-  
618 proaches are promising because they can change  
619 internal computation, not only surface text. How-  
620 ever, their success depends on the training signal: if  
621 it rewards unfaithful CoTs, training may reinforce  
622 fluent but causally irrelevant explanations.

### 623 6.5 Internal Intervention Approaches

624 White-box mitigation approaches explicitly target  
625 internal representations and causal dynamics. The  
626 core assumption is that if a reasoning step is gen-  
627 uinely faithful, then intervening on the correspond-  
628 ing internal signals should change the prediction;  
629 otherwise, the step is likely to be decorative.

630 A central insight is that a single sampled CoT  
631 is often insufficient, since faithfulness concerns

what consistently drives decisions across possible traces. Accordingly, some work treats CoT as a distribution and evaluates faithfulness via resampling and controlled comparisons across alternative traces (Macar et al., 2025). Others identify *decorative steps* by testing which parts of a long CoT rationale actually influence the final answer (Zhao et al., 2025a). Complementary causal diagnostics probe internal necessity more directly. Activation-level interventions test whether explanation-aligned signals causally affect outputs (Syed et al., 2024), parameter-level unlearning removes step-specific information and checks for prediction shifts (Tutek et al., 2025), and concept-based analyses extract key concepts from rationales and verify them using representation interventions (Bhan et al., 2025).

Beyond diagnosis, other works explore interventions that actively change internal reasoning. *Activation patching* demonstrates that editing internal states can shift model behavior in targeted ways (Syed et al., 2024). Another route is adding *architectural constraints*. For example, *Markovian reasoning models* (Viteri et al., 2024) impose an explicit bottleneck so predictions must depend on intermediate text, while self-explaining frameworks such as *X-Node* (Sengupta and Rekik, 2025) and explanation-consistency (Zhao et al., 2022) tie explanations to latent representations via reconstruction-style training. These methods share a common principle that rationales are considered faithful only when they are *necessary* for the decision, not merely correlated (Olah et al., 2020).

Internal interventions are among the most principled mitigation strategies because they directly target causal dependence. However, they require internal access, rely on the interpretation of internal variables, and can be difficult to scale to frontier models. Another class of methods, peripheral mitigation strategies, is given in Appendix D.

## 7 Potential Future Directions

Despite significant progress being made, achieving genuine CoT faithfulness requires rethinking both evaluation and architecture. Here, we propose three pivotal directions for future research.

**From localized probing to holistic circuit mapping.** Current white-box analyses often adopt an *atomic view* of internals, such as inspecting individual heads or layers with activation patching (Wang et al., 2023) or probing (Alain and Bengio, 2017). While these methods localize *where* information

resides, they fail to capture *how it flows*. A faithful rationale must reflect the *end-to-end* computational graph that produces the decision, not just isolated correlates. Future work should therefore elevate the level of analysis from salient neurons to *reasoning circuits*, e.g., tracing how representations propagate across layers, how intermediate signals are composed, and which computational subgraphs are causally responsible for multi-step inference.

**Decoupling explanation from reasoning.** Current Transformer architectures conflate two distinct functions within the CoT: it acts simultaneously as a medium for explanation and a mechanism for reasoning computation. This coupling creates a severe information bottleneck: the model’s high-dimensional, parallel latent dynamics must be collapsed into discrete tokens to satisfy linguistic constraints, rendering the CoT a lossy projection of the actual thought process (Levy et al., 2025; Barez et al., 2025). To address this, we advocate for a paradigm shift toward *architectural decoupling*, i.e., separating the generation of reasoning from the explanation of it. Future systems could comprise distinct modules—a “reasoner” that optimizes for performance in continuous latent space, and an independent “interpreter” trained to translate these states into language with high fidelity. This would move CoT from post-hoc narrative construction to computation-grounded reporting (see Appendix B).

**Towards task-oriented faithfulness standards.** As discussed in §4, since a perfect reconstruction of internal computation via natural language is theoretically infeasible, we argue that faithfulness should be defined as an *instrumental necessity* tailored to specific engineering goals. For reasoning-intensive tasks (e.g., math, coding), faithfulness primarily concerns *causal efficacy*: ensuring that intermediate steps actually drive the prediction, allowing reward signals to propagate to the true computational mechanism. For safety and alignment, faithfulness could act as a diagnostic probe that prioritizes the exposure of deceptive strategies or hidden biases over surface-level plausibility. For high-stakes deployment (e.g., healthcare, law), faithfulness requires *decision auditability*: ensuring the explanation matches the model’s sensitivity to input features, thereby providing a reliable basis for human accountability. By explicitly pairing these distinct desiderata with targeted proxy metrics, future research can move from vague notions of faithfulness to rigorous, application-specific guarantees.

## 733 Limitations

734 Despite providing a comprehensive survey of current CoT faithfulness research, we acknowledge  
735 several limitations inherent in our work’s scope  
736 and synthesis methodology. The review is con-  
737 strained by its temporal coverage (primarily on  
738 ACL Anthology and arXiv) and may omit very  
739 recent advances up to Jan 2026. The proposed  
740 organizing framework, while designed to bring  
741 clarity, represents one possible perspective, and  
742 its linear narrative may not fully capture the inter-  
743 connected and iterative nature of ongoing research.  
744 In synthesizing a broad field, our discussion of  
745 specific techniques remains high-level, prioritiz-  
746 ing an integrated overview over granular tech-  
747 nical detail, which may not satisfy specialists seek-  
748 ing deeper analysis of particular sub-domains. Fi-  
749 nally, this survey focuses explicitly on technical  
750 dimensions of faithfulness, leaving critical socio-  
751 technical factors—such as explanation usability, au-  
752 diting practices, and ethical implications—largely  
753 unaddressed. A complete assessment of faithful  
754 CoT reasoning requires future work that bridges  
755 these technical and human-centered perspectives.

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## A Alignment-Induced Unfaithfulness

Standard alignment techniques (*e.g.* SFT, RLHF) often induce a form of *stylized unfaithfulness*. Because models are optimized to satisfy human annotators who prefer authoritative and structured explanations, they learn to mimic the *form* of reasoning without maintaining the *substance*.

**Superficial Mimicry in SFT.** During *Supervised Fine-Tuning* (SFT), studies find that the model primarily captures the tone, reasoning format, and token statistics of the training data, occasionally generating plausible yet meaningless steps (Sinha et al., 2025; Lobo et al., 2025; Hase et al., 2020; Zhang et al., 2025b). This suggests that SFT tends to fit superficial token co-occurrence probabilities rather than learning true causal relationships. Furthermore, cross-domain SFT often compromises accuracy in rigorous fields like logic and mathematics, as the model adopts the linguistic style of the training data without acquiring the necessary underlying logic (Lobo et al., 2025).

**Knowledge Distillation.** Knowledge distillation is widely employed to transfer reasoning capabilities from large teacher models to smaller, efficient student models. However, its impact on CoT faithfulness is nuanced. While some research suggests that distilling high-quality CoT into small models can improve faithfulness by simplifying the reasoning process (Chua and Evans, 2025), there is a substantial risk of superficial mimicry. Small models often learn to mechanically replicate the teacher’s token sequences without acquiring the underlying causal mechanisms (Gudibande et al., 2023). Consequently, if the teacher’s CoT contains biases or idiosyncratic patterns, distillation amplifies these flaws, trapping the student model in deep pattern matching rather than genuine arithmetic or logical derivation (Lobo et al., 2025).

**RLHF and Human-Centric Fabrication.** *Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback* (RLHF) may exacerbate unfaithfulness by aligning models with subjective human preferences rather than truth. Since annotators often favor plausible-sounding explanations over actual faithful ones, models learn to optimize for *persuasion* (Casper et al., 2023). This manifests as *label leakage*: models frequently decide the answer first based on heuristics and then fabricate a rationale to justify it, as humans tend to reward such retrospective consistency (Hase et al., 2020). Similarly, models tend to use an artificially

confident tone to mask logical failures, since humans are more likely to reward confident-sounding reasoning trajectories (FU et al., 2025; Viteri et al., 2024; Ferreira et al., 2025).

**RLVR and Reward Hacking.** While SFT and RLHF often weaken causal structures (FU et al., 2025), *Reinforcement Learning with Verifiable Rewards* (RLVR) stands out as a more effective method for enforcing ideal logical rigor. Research shows that RLVR effectively resists sycophancy and performs better than SFT in following objective rules (Lambert et al., 2024). However, it introduces new challenges. *Outcome Reward Models* (ORMs), which rely solely on the final answer, can encourage “pseudo-reasoning” that maximizes reward without reflecting the internal process (Huang et al., 2025). In contrast, *Process Reward Models* (PRMs) reward the reasoning process, improving faithfulness in formal tasks like mathematics and logic tasks (Chua and Evans, 2025; Huang et al., 2025). However, PRM still faces a *Verification Gap* in complex, open-ended domains (*e.g.*, Question Answering). Because real-world knowledge is nuanced and ambiguous, it is difficult to build reliable rule-based checkers (like in code or math) to automatically verify the reasoning steps (Min et al., 2023). Thus, while RLVR is a promising paradigm, it currently struggles to guarantee faithfulness outside of formal systems. Moreover, the mechanistic understanding of RLVR is still in the early stages, leaving vast space for future research.

## B Pathways for Architectural Decoupling

Recent progress in **Continuous Latent Reasoning** and **Introspective Model Explanation** provides a concrete path toward separating explaining from reasoning.

### B.1 Reasoning Beyond Language in Latent Space

Traditional CoT is constrained by the syntax of natural language and the requirements of linear output. In contrast, the *Chain of Continuous Thought* paradigm (Hao et al., 2024) highlights the potential of reasoning within a continuous latent space. COCONUT feeds the last hidden state directly back into the model as a “continuous thought”, bypassing the decoding process into discrete text. This enables the implicit reasoning module to prioritize task performance, mitigating the immediate constraints of syntax or plausibility.

In this latent space, models appear to exhibit planning capabilities resembling Breadth-First Search. Continuous thought vectors may simultaneously encode multiple reasoning paths via superposition, potentially facilitating the pruning of incorrect paths through a process akin to implicit tree search. This implies that a reasoning module detached from linguistic constraints could support logical structures richer than those strictly bound by natural language.

## B.2 Self-Explaining Modules

Once the reasoning process becomes implicit, a dedicated module is required to translate these latent states to generate human language. For instance, Li et al. (2025a) trained an interpreter model specifically to explain its own internal computations, observing that such self-interpretation training exhibits remarkable data efficiency.

Furthermore, the explanation model demonstrated the ability to detect prompt bias (see Section 3.1). This is likely because the interpreter can identify internal signal showing that the model is indicating attention to distracting contexts, and faithfully translate them into linguistic descriptions such as “I changed my answer because of context X”. This highlights the dual advantages of self-explanation: it not only improves efficiency by reusing parts of the model’s computational circuits but also achieves greater fidelity through *privileged access* to its own internal circuitry.

## C Extended Discussion on Evaluation Metrics

In appendix, we provide additional details on peripheral metrics that serve as complementary reporting dimensions and discuss meta-evaluation studies that scrutinize existing benchmarks.

### C.1 Other peripheral metrics

A small set of peripheral metrics is best viewed as complementary reporting dimensions rather than standalone measures of causal faithfulness. In most cases, they capture adjacent notions of “trustworthiness” that relate to CoT faithfulness but do not directly test *causal dependence*. The key point is that they primarily measure utility or reliability (*e.g.* monitoring, calibration, human auditability, external verification), not whether the final decision is causally driven by CoT rationales. Thus, they should be treated as auxiliary evidence unless paired with causal tests. *Monitoring-* and

*oversight-oriented* evaluations ask whether intermediate reasoning exposes early warning signals that enable detection or intervention, prioritizing monitorability over mechanistic alignment (Chan et al., 2025). *Uncertainty-aware* metrics quantify uncertainty in explanations to distinguish “confident but unreliable” rationales from calibrated ones, but uncertainty alone does not certify faithfulness (Chen et al., 2024). *Human-in-the-loop* judgments support auditing and deployment, yet they often conflate faithfulness with plausibility and provide limited causal guarantees (Jacovi and Goldberg, 2020). Moreover, *external adjudication* (*e.g.*, graders, checkers, executors) strengthens claims about correctness or procedural validity, but remains *reliability-oriented* unless explicitly linked to dependence tests (Kumar et al., 2023). These metrics are most useful when reported alongside causal evaluations—whether black-box, white-box, or hybrid—as doing so clarifies which specific aspect of trustworthiness is actually being measured.

## C.2 Meta-evaluation and benchmark scrutiny

Meta-evaluation treats evaluation itself as object of study, showing that metrics and benchmarks can disagree depending on whether they track plausibility, or behavioral and internal causal dependence (Radhakrishnan et al., 2025, 2024). This motivates reporting multiple complementary metrics (black-box, white-box, and hybrid) and explicitly documenting the benchmark’s grounding level, rather than treating any single benchmark as definitive.

## D Additional and Peripheral Directions

In addition to the primary paradigms, studies pursues *evaluation-driven mitigation*, where improved diagnostics or benchmarks guide model selection and iteration without directly modifying training objectives or inference procedures (Liu et al., 2024). *Human-in-the-loop* assessment or correction can improve practical reliability during auditing and deployment, but it scales poorly and provides limited causal guarantees (Jacovi and Goldberg, 2020). Moreover, *data-centric* heuristics—such as filtering or curating CoT rationales using surface criteria—can serve as weak regularizers, yet they are best viewed as instances of training- or verification-based approaches rather than lone mitigations (Kumar et al., 2023).