

When Populists Deliver on Their Promises: The Electoral Effects of a Large Cash Transfer Program in Poland*

Jan Gromadzki[†], Katarzyna Sałach[‡], Michał Brzeziński[§]

Abstract

We estimate the effects of the introduction of a large cash transfer program on support for the ruling populist party in Poland. We exploit the variation at the municipal level in the annual cash transfer amount received per capita, and use a difference-in-differences research design to study the electoral effects of the transfer. Our results show that a cash transfer amount of \$100 per capita translated into an increase in the vote share for the ruling party of nearly two percentage points. One-third of additional votes came from new voters coming off the sidelines, and the remaining electoral gains were due to voters who had previously voted for other parties. The effects of the program are persistent, as we see no decrease in the magnitude of effects seven years after the introduction.

Keywords: Elections, Voting Behavior, Populism, Unconditional Cash Transfer

JEL Codes: D72, H23, H53, I38, J18

*We would like to thank the Editor and six anonymous referees for their valuable comments and suggestions during the review process. Artur Yaniuk provided excellent research assistance. We benefited from helpful comments and suggestions from Victor Araújo, Paweł Bukowski, Attila Gáspár, Sergei Guriev, Piotr Lewandowski, Karol Madoń, Michał Myck, Arianna Ornaghi, Bilyana Petrova, Sarah Schneider-Strawczynski, and participants at the AEA/ASSA Annual Meeting 2022, EPICS 2022, EPSA 2022, PEDD 2022, RES 2022, EALE 2021, ECINEQ 2021, ESPANET 2021, HSE-EACES Workshop 2021, Max Planck Summer School on the Political Economy of Conflict and Redistribution 2021, IOS/APB/EACES Summer Academy on Central and Eastern Europe 2021, Potsdam PhD Workshop in Empirical Economics 2021. We gratefully acknowledge the use of the Python/Stata template provided by von Gaudecker (2019). Sałach and Brzeziński acknowledge funding from the National Science Centre through grant no. 2019/35/B/HS4/01527. Gromadzki acknowledges funding from the Institute for Structural Research.

[†]Department of Economics, Vienna University of Economics and Business, Email: jan.gromadzki@wu.ac.at

[‡]University of Warsaw, Faculty of Economic Sciences, Email: ksalach@wne.uw.edu.pl

[§]University of Warsaw, Faculty of Economic Sciences, Email: mbrzezinski@wne.uw.edu.pl

1 Introduction

From the US to Brazil, from Italy to Turkey, populist movements have enjoyed a number of surprising successes in recent years. The share of countries with a populist government increased from less than 10% at the turn of the 21st century to more than 25% in 2018. (Funke, Schularick, and Trebesch, 2020). While populists in some countries have lost power relatively quickly, in others they have held on to it for a long time – long enough to profoundly transform their political systems. Some of the most spectacular cases of populist backlash have occurred in the post-communist countries of Eastern Europe (Grzymala-Busse, 2019). For many years, one such country, Poland, was seen as a textbook example of a country that underwent a successful transition from socialist authoritarianism to liberal democracy. This changed in 2015, when the right-wing populist Law and Justice party (*Prawo i Sprawiedliwość*, hereafter ‘PiS’) took power and, within its first two years in office, implemented reforms that severely limited the independence of the judiciary, politicized the governance of public companies and the media, and weakened checks on the executive branch. Why was PiS able to gain and retain such strong support despite massive street protests against its violations of the rule of law and liberal democratic backsliding under its rule? The introduction of a large child benefit program is often mentioned as a factor in the populists’ success, but whether it actually played a role has not previously been studied.

Do voters reward political parties for implementing social welfare programs? Are populist parties able to win elections and retain political power by promising and introducing generous cash transfers? In our paper, we seek to answer the question of how the introduction of cash transfers affects the electoral performance of the ruling party. We also analyze whether the promise of social transfers helps the opposition party win elections. To do so, we investigate the impact of the introduction of a large child benefit program in Poland on the electoral performance of PiS using a difference-in-differences research design.

The proposal for a large child benefit program was the flagship issue of PiS’ successful campaign leading up to the parliamentary elections in October 2015. Once the party achieved a surprising landslide victory, PiS quickly delivered on its promise, and parents began receiving

monthly checks as early as April 2016. The child benefit program was the largest social transfer program since Poland’s transition to a market economy, and it significantly improved the financial situation of families with children. We exploit municipal-level variation in the treatment intensity (the per capita child benefit amount) to study the effects of the cash transfer on changes in levels of support for PiS. Our main results show that a cash transfer amount of \$100 per capita translated into an increase of nearly two percentage points in the vote share for PiS in the parliamentary elections of October 2019. Moreover, the effects remained strong in the 2023 elections despite several large shocks, including the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Figure 1 illustrates our empirical strategy. In the treatment period, we observe a strong positive correlation between the change in support for PiS and the per capita cash transfer amount received (see Figure 1a). This relationship was not observed before the introduction of the child benefit (Figure 1b). In this paper, we show that these descriptive results hold even after controlling for a set of geographic, demographic, political, and economic variables, and for region fixed effects. We also find a significant positive impact on voter turnout. Around one-third of the ruling party’s electoral gains were due to new voters coming off the sidelines. We observe strong effects across all types of the elections, and show that electoral gains attributable to the child benefit program were particularly large for the politicians who were responsible for introducing the child benefit program. These findings suggest that the effects were not driven solely by instrumentalist motives, but were, rather, attributable at least in part to the mechanism of voter reciprocity. We corroborate our main results with an analysis of individual survey data. Finally, we address challenges to identification by showing that our results cannot be explained by differences in deep-rooted social norms, political polarization, cultural change, pre-treatment trends in economic and demographic characteristics, other government policies, or the mobilization of childless voters.

Our paper makes three contributions. Our study is the first to assess the impact of a large unconditional cash transfer on the electoral outcomes of a ruling party in a developed country. We combine revealed preferences data at the municipal level and survey data at the individual level to address the issues of misreporting of political preferences in surveys, and ecological

fallacy in the case of municipal-level studies (Freedman, 1999). The previous literature has mainly focused on conditional cash transfers in developing countries in Latin America (Araújo, 2021; Conover et al., 2020; De La O, 2013; Manacorda, Miguel, and Vigorito, 2011; Zucco Jr, 2013). These studies have consistently found positive effects of cash transfers on support for incumbent parties. Similar effects for conditional cash transfers in European countries have been obtained by Pop-Eleches and Pop-Eleches (2012) using stated preferences data, and by Vannutelli (2020) using election results data. In contrast, we study a largely unconditional cash transfer, which may have different electoral effects than conditional cash transfers. Following the literature (Baird, McIntosh, and Özler, 2011; Banerjee et al., 2017), we define an unconditional cash transfer program as a transfer awarded on purely demographic principles (in our case, age). For example, eligibility does not depend on household income. Conditional cash transfers, on the other hand, create incentives to reduce labor supply in order to be eligible for the transfer, which may strengthen households' reliance on social welfare. However, recent studies show that these labor supply effects are rather small (Banerjee et al., 2017). More importantly, since unconditional cash transfers are received by households regardless of their income, our estimates should be interpreted as average treatment effects for the entire population of families with children, not just the poorest families, as in the case of conditional transfers.¹ We argue that while unconditional cash transfers significantly improve the ruling party's electoral performance, they are a less cost-effective means of gaining additional votes than conditional transfers targeting the poorest voters. While much has been said about the economic costs and benefits of unconditional cash transfers (Banerjee, Niehaus, and Suri, 2019; Bitler, Hines, and Page, 2018; Hoynes and Rothstein, 2019), our study extends the debate on unconditional cash transfers to their impact on electoral outcomes.

Second, we add to the literature investigating the effects of campaign promises to increase transfers. Past work by Elinder, Jordahl, and Poutvaara (2015) found that Swedish voters responded strongly to campaign promises from the Social Democratic party. In this article, we show that PiS' promise to introduce the child benefit program in the 2015 election campaign had no impact on the party's election results that same year. Only after the policy was in-

¹For example, Pop-Eleches and Pop-Eleches (2012) estimate the effects for extremely poor Romanians with monthly income per capita below \$17. By contrast, average monthly income per capita for Polish families with two children amounted to around \$300 prior to the introduction of the child benefit.

troduced in 2016 did the populists make significant electoral gains in the 2019 elections. This may suggest that the effects of campaign promises depend on initial levels of redistribution or trust in political parties. Our findings are in line with a recent study by Cruz et al. (2021) who find that campaign promises affect voting only if incumbents have fulfilled their promises in the past.

Third, our paper relates to the literature on the recent rise of populism (Guriev and Papaioannou, 2021). We follow Mudde and Kaltwasser (2017) in defining populism as an ideology that perceives society as separated into two antagonistic groups: *the pure people* and *the corrupt elite*.² There is relatively little research on the role of social transfers and redistribution in increased public support for populists. Some studies have suggested that the implementation of redistributive policies can prevent the rise of political radicalism or reduce the populist vote (Albanese, Barone, and de Blasio, 2022; Caprettini, Casaburi, and Venturini, 2021). In the absence of redistributive policies, populist parties may fill the void by introducing large cash transfer programs. Poland is a good setting to explore this issue. After the country's transition to a market economy, income inequality in Poland increased sharply, reaching the levels of high-inequality countries such as Germany and the UK (Bukowski and Novokmet, 2021). Poland's increase in inequality was accompanied by declining levels of redistribution. These trends have been reversed to some extent by the populist government (as illustrated in Figure B.2). We provide causal evidence that redistributive policies may boost the support for populists, including right-wing populists. We believe that our findings can be extended to other countries with low levels of redistribution and high levels of income inequality.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the design of the Family 500+ child benefit program and recent political developments in Poland. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 lays out our empirical strategy. Section 5 presents the results. Section 6 concludes.

²PiS is classified as a populist party according to each major classification scheme of political parties – see, e.g., Norris (2020), Rooduijn et al. (2019), and Zulianello and Larsen (2021).

2 Institutional background

Recent political developments in Poland

Since 2005, following the collapse of a post-communist party that was racked by corruption scandals, Polish politics has been dominated by two right-wing parties: the socially conservative populist PiS (in power from 2005 to 2007 and since 2015) and the liberal Civic Platform (in power from 2007 to 2015).³ Both parties have roots in the anti-communist Solidarity movement, but differ in their assessment of Poland’s transition from communism to democracy. While the Civic Platform was enthusiastic about the economic transformation of the 1990s, PiS emphasized the social costs of the structural adjustments, and criticized the accumulation of privatized wealth by post-communist elites and foreign businesses. Between 2005 and 2007, PiS ruled in a coalition of nationalist and agrarian populist parties. But in 2007, PiS broke up the coalition, discredited the leaders of its partner parties, and persuaded some of their members to join PiS. Around the same time, PiS started promoting forms of nationalism and populism based on a vision of illiberal democracy that defends conservative family values against the influence of Western liberalism. While it started out as a party of mainly urban voters, by 2007, PiS had become a party of the rural and small-town electorate. Since then, the policy positions of PiS have remained stable (see Figure B.3). PiS lost two subsequent parliamentary elections in 2007 and 2011.

Figure 2 shows the simplified timeline of events related to the introduction of the child benefit program in Poland. In early 2014, PiS, which was then Poland’s largest opposition party, announced plans to introduce a monthly child allowance for the second and each subsequent child under the age of 18 in a family. The program was given the catchy name *Family 500+*, and became a major theme of the 2015 election campaigns, along with pension age reform and the refugee crisis. While the ruling liberal party argued that the program would be too expensive to implement, PiS attacked the government’s *impossibilism*, and declared that *all you have to do is not steal*. In June 2015, a PiS candidate won the presidential election. Then, in a surprise outcome, PiS also won a majority of seats in the parliamentary elections in Oc-

³See Haggard and Kaufman (2021) and Lindner et al. (2021) for an in-depth discussion of the recent evolution of Polish political and party systems.

tober 2015. This was the first time in the history of modern Poland that a single party had won a majority of seats in parliament. The implementation of the child benefit program was a priority for the new government, and parents received their first checks as early as April 2016.

All households were entitled to a monthly cash transfer of approximately \$125 (500 PLN) per child for their second child and for each subsequent child under age 18. In addition, the child benefit program had a means-tested component, whereby households with a per person monthly income below \$205 were also entitled to receive a child benefit for their first child under age 18.⁴ The amount of the transfer per child was relatively large, as it was equal to 34% of the per capita disposable income in Poland. Local authorities (municipalities) received targeted grants directly from the central budget, and were responsible for distributing the child allowance. The design of the program underwent another change in July 2019, when it was extended to all children under the age of 18. The main source of funding for this large program was increased tax collection. Between 2015 and 2019, the total general government tax revenue as a percentage of GDP grew by 2 percentage points, mostly due to significant improvements in VAT enforcement.

In the 2019 parliamentary election campaign, all parties pledged to maintain the child benefit program. Nevertheless, the ruling party claimed that if it lost power, the opposition parties would abolish the child allowance program, citing their declarations from the previous election campaign. Attacks on the opposition were sharp and aimed at eliciting hostility towards opposition parties, fostering an even greater attachment to PiS among the voters, and potentially reciprocating their support for the party due to the introduction of certain programs. In 2019, PiS again won a majority of seats in parliament. In 2020, the PiS candidate in the presidential election was re-elected.

While the Polish democratic regime is semi-presidential, the president's constitutional powers are very limited. In practice, the Polish model of government is close to the German-style chancellor model and the British parliamentary-cabinet system. For this reason, in our baseline regressions, we investigate the impact of the child benefit on the changes in the vote shares

⁴See Appendix D for a detailed description of the Family 500+ program.

the parties received in national elections for the (more powerful) lower chamber (the Sejm) of the Polish parliament. However, in the sensitivity analysis, we study the program's effects on the results of the presidential and European elections as well.

Both the parliamentary and European elections in Poland are based on a party-list proportional representation system with multi-seat constituencies. Political parties make ranked lists of their candidates to be elected. Citizens vote by marking exactly one candidate from the party of their choice. The Sejm is elected in 41 electoral districts. The national threshold to qualify for representation in the Sejm is 5% for parties and 8% for electoral alliances. Seats are allocated to each party in proportion to the number of votes it receives (using the D'Hondt method). The number of votes received by an individual candidate from the party list is then used to select future members of the parliament from a pool of seats allocated to that party. In the baseline analysis, we study the sum of votes for the candidates on the PiS list divided by the number of eligible voters. In a supplementary analysis, we also investigate the electoral performance of individual candidates.

Economic impact of the child benefit program

The introduction of the Family 500+ child benefit has substantially improved the financial situations of families with children in Poland. In 2016, the program reached 2.7 million families, and it increased the total level of government cash support for families with children by as much as 140% (Myck and Trzciński, 2019). Absolute and relative child poverty have fallen in Poland between 2015 and 2019 from 9.0% to 4.5% and from 20.6% to 16.2%, respectively (Statistics Poland, 2020). The child benefit certainly contributed significantly to these reductions in child poverty (Brzeziński and Najsztub, 2017; Gromadzki, 2023). In the years immediately after its introduction, the child benefit program had some negative effects on maternal labor supply (Magda, Kiełczewska, and Brandt, 2020). While the fertility effects of the program have not been rigorously studied, there were no substantial changes in the birth rate after the introduction of the transfer.

Importantly, the economic policy of the PiS government during its first term caused no short-term negative macroeconomic effects (Brzezinski and Sałach, 2023). This stands in a stark contrast to other populist governments, as Funke, Schularick, and Trebesch, 2020 find the negative economic impact of populism even in the short run immediately after populists assume power. However, the absence of short-term negative impact does not exclude the possibility of negative macroeconomic consequences of populism for Poland in the long run, which could arise, for example, from the erosion of democratic institutions.

3 Data

We combine municipality-level data from multiple sources (see a detailed description of all variables in Tables A.1 and A.2). The election results come from the National Electoral Commission which has published the results of all types of elections at the municipal level since 2005.⁵ Our treatment variable and most of our control variables are calculated based on data from Statistics Poland. Additionally, we calculate geographic variables using GIS software. Finally, we use data on participation in Catholic masses and communion from the Institute for Catholic Church Statistics.

The map in Figure 3 displays our treatment variable, i.e., the child benefit amounts received by Polish municipalities in 2016. The map shows clear spatial patterns in the distribution of the treatment variable. Thus, we account for spatial correlation by applying Conley standard errors in robustness checks (Conley, 1999, 2008).

Table 1 presents summary statistics of the main variables used in the study. On average, municipalities received nearly 150 dollars per capita in 2016. The change in the support for PiS (2011-2019 difference) is positive in each municipality, with the lowest increase of less than 3 p.p. and the highest increase reaching 31.5 p.p. On average, across municipalities, PiS improved its election outcomes by 16.2 p.p. Among the remaining variables, the diversity in the level of support for accession to the European Union, the level of support for PiS in

⁵The data published by the National Electoral Commission is reliable, as all of the elections studied were found to be transparent by international observers. For example, see reports from the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE): <https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/poland>.

2011, as well as the unemployment rate, the incidence of out-of-wedlock births, and the percentage of people with at least secondary education, deserve attention. These statistics show that Poland, although perceived as a relatively homogenous country in terms of religion and ethnicity, actually conceals significant diversity within itself.

We complement our main analysis with a survey data analysis where we examine the individual political choices of respondents. For this analysis, we use data collected by the Public Opinion Research Center (CBOS). Every month, the CBOS surveys a new sample of around 700-1,100 people, asking for their opinions on current political and social issues in Poland. Our outcome variables are based on respondents' answers about how they voted in the last several elections. The parliamentary elections took place in October 2007, 2011, 2015, and 2019. We use data from the first three months following each given election: November 2007 - January 2008 (data on the 2007 parliamentary elections), January - March 2013 (data on the 2011 parliamentary elections), November 2015 - January 2016 (data on the 2015 parliamentary elections), and November 2019 - January 2020 (data on the 2019 parliamentary elections).⁶ The CBOS surveys measure political preferences in a consistent manner. They also include ad-hoc questions related to ongoing events but these questions vary over time. Therefore, in order to analyze the impact of the child benefit program on measures of social norms, trust, and life satisfaction, we use European Social Survey (ESS) data from 2008-2018. ESS data is collected every two years in European countries, and includes a wide range of questions that were asked in the exact same way in each wave of the survey.

4 Empirical strategy

Municipality-level analysis

We exploit municipal-level variation in the treatment intensity to study the effects of cash transfers on the electoral performance of PiS. We construct a measure of treatment intensity at the municipality level, measured as the annual child benefit amount in US dollars in 2016

⁶Between November 2011 and December 2012, the surveys did not include information about the number of children in the household, which is necessary for the construction of the treatment variable. This is why we used the surveys from the beginning of 2013 to study the 2011 elections.

over the municipality population:

$$(1) \quad CT_{m,2016} = \frac{ChildBenefitAmount_{m,2016}}{Population_{m,2016}}$$

Next, we estimate the following equation in the style of difference-in-differences:

$$(2) \quad \Delta Y_{m,2011-2019} = \gamma + \beta CT_{m,2016} + X'_m \kappa + \epsilon_m$$

where $\Delta Y_{m,2011-2019}$ denotes the change in support for PiS (100 * votes for PiS divided by eligible voters), and X'_m is the set of controls measured in 2011. Our continuous treatment variable is measured in the year the child benefit program was introduced. Our reason for this is that the per capita child benefit after 2016 may be partially endogenous if households adjusted their fertility decisions based on the child benefit program. In 2016, the number of children in a family was still the result of fertility decisions made in the pre-treatment period.⁷

In our baseline specification, we control for a rich set of control variables. First, we control for measures of pre-treatment political preferences and social norms: support for PiS in the 2011 elections, support for the EU membership in the 2003 accession referendum, support for populist parties in 2005, incidence of out-of-wedlock births. Although the correlation of fertility with support for PiS is very weak (Figure B.4), these variables are strongly correlated with the change in the support for PiS. The support for PiS was traditionally stronger in Eastern Poland and in small municipalities. Hence, we additionally control for geographical variables: latitude, longitude, distance to Warsaw, distance to the provincial capital, as well as demographic characteristics such as urbanization rate and log population density. We also control for other demographic characteristics which may be correlated with the support for PiS and the treatment intensity: the fraction of the population with at least secondary education, femininity ratio, average age, share of 13-17-year-olds in the 2011 population, and fraction of the population above retirement age. In particular, the share of 13-17-year-olds in the 2011 population is a proxy for deep-rooted fertility preferences. Controlling for a fraction of the population above retirement age is important, as PiS introduced new cash transfers for the elderly. We also control for economic variables that may influence both fertility decisions

⁷As the child benefit was introduced in April 2016, the first "child benefit" children would have been born in January 2017.

and electoral preferences: personal income tax revenue is a proxy for the average income and unemployment rate measures municipalities' labor market situation. Finally, we control for electoral district fixed effects to account for variations in trends regarding the support for PiS between districts (e.g., due to varying quality of PiS candidates).

Additionally, we estimate the same equation for three alternative outcomes: $\Delta Y_{m,2011-2015}$, $\Delta Y_{m,2007-2011}$, and $\Delta Y_{m,2011-2023}$. We use the first outcome to estimate the effects of the promise of a cash transfer, as opposed to the effect of its actual introduction. The second outcome serves as a placebo, in order to study the plausibility of the parallel trends assumption. We use the third outcome to study the persistence of the effects. Our approach is more conservative than the standard DiD method, as we allow the effects of control variables to vary over time.

Our analysis begins with data from 2007, due to the shift in the PiS' political positions in the run-up to the elections in 2007. Nevertheless, we also show results that include the outcomes of the 2005 elections in the appendix. Our baseline outcome variable is the difference in the level of support for PiS between the 2011 and 2019 elections, and not between the 2015 and 2019 elections, because the 2015 election results may be endogenous to the promise of the introduction of the child benefit which was a flagship issue of PiS' electoral campaign. Nevertheless, we also show the results for the 2015-2019 election outcomes in the appendix.

Challenges to identification

Several factors could violate the identifying assumptions of our difference-in-difference strategy. We discuss the challenges to identification in detail in this section and we provide the results of the robustness tests in the results section. First, variation in the child benefit amounts received is largely driven by differences in the number of children in the municipality. High fertility may be correlated with conservative social norms, which may, in turn, have an impact on increases in the vote share for the conservative party. We conduct an event study analysis to show that treatment intensity does not explain changes in the support for PiS before the introduction of the child benefit. However, it is possible that for some conservative voters,

simply declaring a conservative ideology was not enough. The introduction of the child benefit program may have made the conservative values of PiS more salient to these voters, and may have convinced them that PiS would defend traditional family values. We control for the share of 13-17-year-olds in the municipality's population in 2011 to address this issue. Although this variable measures people's preferences for having children, the parents of these children were not eligible to receive the child benefit because their children were already 18 years old in 2016. Thus, our identifying variation is not derived from deep-rooted, municipality-specific fertility preferences, but from temporary fertility patterns. We also control for other proxies of social norms (incidence of out-of-wedlock births, support for the EU membership). In additional checks, we control for revealed measures of religiosity to isolate the influence of the Catholic church. Finally, we use a LASSO double-selection procedure (Belloni, Chernozhukov, and Hansen, 2014) with a large number of additional covariates, in order to address the issue of the incorrect selection of control variables.

Second, the effects may be biased by political polarization and cultural change. For example, Grosfeld et al. (2021) document secularization of the Polish society in recent years. We control for the initial PiS vote shares to address the issue of political polarization, and we control for other proxies of social norms mentioned above to address the issue of cultural change. We also test whether changes in social norms affect our results by controlling for changes in the incidence of out-of-wedlock births and marriage rates between 2011 and 2014. One additional concern is that PiS may have altered its ideology in response to the ideological polarization of the society. However, there was no substantial change in the political positions of PiS during the study period (Figure B.3). Finally, we investigate heterogeneity in the effects depending on voters' support for the EU and initial support for PiS to address the issue of political and ideological polarization.

Local economic conditions may also be correlated with our treatment variable. While the null pre-treatment effects are reassuring, we control for pre-treatment levels of personal income tax revenue and the unemployment rate to further address this issue. Pre-treatment levels do not capture pre-treatment trends in economic outcomes. Hence, we additionally present results controlling for changes in the economic and demographic variables between 2011 and

2014. We also explore the impact of the child benefit program on economic outcomes to test whether the demand shock to local markets can explain the results. Finally, a part of the variation in the treatment variable is due to the conditional child benefit for the first child. Thus, it is possible that our effects reflect changes in the voting preferences of low-income households, irrespective of the introduction of the child benefit program. We address this concern by controlling for a proxy for average income (namely, personal income tax revenue), and by analyzing the effects of the 2019 expansion of the program which replaced the conditional child benefit with an unconditional transfer. The expansion of the child benefit program affected the eligibility of middle- and high-income families only, as low-income families were already receiving the conditional transfer. Therefore, the treatment variable in the analysis of the effects of the expansion is negatively correlated with the share of low-income families, and we should expect to observe a negative effect of the expansion if the effects were due to changes in the preferences of low-income families.

Our results could be biased if the government had provided other grants specifically to high-fertility municipalities. As we have access to complete information on municipal finances, we can analyze the impact of the child benefit program on increases in the investment grant amounts municipalities received from the government, as well as on increases in the financial support municipalities received from the government through European Union investment programs. Another potential issue is that municipalities may have changed their spending decisions in response to the child benefit program. On the one hand, the benefits the program provided may have crowded out some existing forms of support for families provided by municipal authorities. On the other hand, the child benefit program may have made social assistance more popular, and may thus have led to an increase in municipal spending on families, crowding out spending in other areas. We test whether the child benefit program affected the allocation of municipal spending, in order to rule out this potential channel. We also check whether the child benefit program affected access to kindergartens and nurseries.

Our difference-in-differences estimation relies on the assumption that there were no contemporary shocks that differentially affected municipalities with low vs. high treatment intensities. The PiS government introduced several other reforms that could confound our results. First,

it lowered the retirement age, and distributed extra pension payments to the elderly starting in 2019. To address this issue, we control for the share of the population above retirement age. Since extra pensions were distributed in the form of lump-sum payments, the fraction of the population above retirement age should entirely capture the impact of extra transfers to the elderly. Second, the PiS government reduced the independence of the courts, which led the European Commission to launch an infringement procedure against Poland. Unlike the pension reform, the government's judiciary reforms were rather unpopular, and sparked large protests. It is also not clear whether voters' views on the judiciary reforms were correlated with the child benefit intensity. Importantly, we control for voters' attitudes toward the EU, which may approximate their perceptions regarding the importance of an independent judiciary. Finally, the PiS government introduced an education reform. As a result of this reform, the age at which school attendance is compulsory was raised from six to seven years, and lower secondary schools were gradually phased out, which reduced the period of compulsory education by one year. While this education reform affected only a small share of child benefit recipients (i.e., parents of three birth cohorts), the reform would likely bias our results toward zero, as these institutional changes were associated with chaos and overcrowding in schools. To further address this concern, we also estimate the effects of the child benefit program on support for the Minister of Education in the 2019 European elections. Additionally, we use survey data to assess whether the support for the above-mentioned reforms differed between the potential recipients and non-recipients of the child benefit.

Finally, we consider potential violations of the Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption (SUTVA). Positive estimates do not necessarily imply that the child benefit program affected the electoral preferences of the recipients. It is possible that childless individuals punished the government for redistributing income from them to families with children. In this case, the SUTVA assumption would be violated. We study the effects of the child benefit program on voter turnout to mitigate this concern. If the observed effects were due to the mobilization of childless individuals, we should find a negative effect of benefit intensity on voter turnout; whereas a positive effect on turnout would be inconsistent with the childless mobilization hypothesis.

5 Results

Our results indicate that the introduction of the child benefit program had a significant positive impact on the changes in the vote share for the ruling party (see Table 2). We find that an annual transfer of \$100 per capita increased the ruling party’s vote share by 1.8 percentage points. The gains from the cash transfers in the average municipality are equal to a 2.7 pp. increase in the vote share for the ruling party: i.e., to 17% of the average increase in the vote share for the governing party. Our back-of-envelope calculations suggest that PiS would not have retained its majority in parliament after the 2019 elections without the introduction of the child benefit program (see Appendix E for detailed calculations). The magnitude of the coefficient changes significantly between the specification with no control variables and the full specification, giving rise to certain concerns regarding the role of unobserved characteristics. In the robustness section, we test the sensitivity of our baseline estimate, presented in column 5, to additional control variables, including through the LASSO selection procedure (Table B.1).

Figure 4 suggests that the parallel trends assumption is satisfied, as the child benefit payments received in 2016 do not help explain the changes in the vote shares for PiS before 2015. The effects of the promise of child benefit payments in the electoral campaign before the 2015 elections are very small and statistically insignificant. Thus, voters rewarded PiS for introducing the cash transfers only after they were paid, and not in advance. In addition, we observe nearly identical effects in the 2023 elections, despite the COVID-19 pandemic and the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, which led to a significant influx of migrants. This finding indicates that the effects of the transfer are remarkably persistent even during turbulent times.

We find no significant variation in the size of the effect depending on the level of the initial support for PiS (Figure C.1) or municipality size (Figure C.2). We find that effects are largest in municipalities with historically low levels of the support for EU membership (Figure C.3). Similarly, we find that the effects are particularly large in municipalities with less-educated populations (Figure C.4). Finally, we observe that the effects are strongest in low-income municipalities, and are statistically insignificant in the richest municipalities (Figure B.5). This

may reflect the variation in the impact of the child benefit payments on the financial situations of families, which would have been larger for low-income families than for high-income families.

We also analyze the impact of the 2019 expansion of the child benefit program. Starting in July 2019, the eligibility for the transfer for the first child was no longer restricted to low-income families, as the program was made fully universal. In 2019, two elections took place in Poland. This allows us to shed light on the effects of the expansion of the program. In May 2019, just before the expansion, European Parliament elections were held. In October 2019, three months after the expansion, the parliamentary elections were held. Hence, we can construct the outcome variable measuring the difference in the support for PiS in the pre-expansion European Parliament elections and the support for PiS in the parliamentary elections. We construct the treatment variable as the 2018-2019 increase in the per capita child benefit amount received by a municipality. While we find some positive effects of the expansion, they are smaller than the effects of the 2016 introduction of the child benefit (Table B.5). There are two potential explanations for this result. First, only middle- and high-income families who were not previously eligible for the conditional transfer benefited from the expansion. For these families, the effects presumably were smaller due to the lower relative impact of the child benefit on their financial well-being. Second, as plans to expand the child benefit program were announced before the mid-term elections, the outcomes of those elections may have already been affected by the program expansion. This is, however, rather unlikely, as we did not observe a similar effect in the 2015 election. There are also some important limitations of the analysis of the effects of the expansion: the elections to the national parliament and the European Parliament are fundamentally different, and we are unable to verify the parallel trends assumption. Hence, these findings should be interpreted with caution.

Voter turnout

We investigate the impact of the child benefit program on voter turnout to test whether the electoral gains of PiS were due to the party attracting the voters of other parties, or to new voters coming off the sidelines. We see a significant positive effect of the child benefit

program on election turnout (see Table 3). The positive effects on turnout suggest that it is unlikely that the mobilization of childless voters drives our findings regarding the support for PiS. If that mobilization had occurred, we would have observed a negative relationship between child benefit intensity and voter turnout. There is, however, one remaining potential violation of SUTVA that we cannot completely rule out. It is possible that the child benefit program discouraged childless citizens from participating in elections, and this assumption would be consistent with the voter turnout levels. Nevertheless, it seems rather unlikely that the discouragement of childless voters drives our results, given that we observe a substantial increase in voter turnout after the introduction of the transfers.

The positive effects on voter turnout suggest that the ruling party's electoral gains attributable to the introduction of the child benefit program were largely due to the recruitment of previously non-voting individuals, and only partly due to the recruitment of individuals who had previously voted for other parties. We estimate an additional regression in which we control for the endogenous change in voter turnout to shed light on the decomposition of additional support for PiS. Column 1 of Table 4 presents the baseline results. In Column 2, after we additionally control for the change in voter turnout, the remaining effects on the support for PiS were equal to 1.2 percentage points. This suggests that two-thirds of the ruling party's electoral gains were due to voters of other parties changing their preferences, and the remaining one-third of the electoral gains were due to an increased turnout. This also suggests that around half of the additional voters coming off the sidelines voted for the opposition parties (consistent with evidence shown in columns 3 and 4). This explains the finding that the program had only very small negative effects on support for other parties (see Table B.6).

Mechanisms

Theoretical studies have suggested two possible channels through which cash transfers affect the support for incumbent parties. The first channel is instrumental voting: voters may vote for the ruling party because they are interested in continuing the cash transfer programs. The second channel is intrinsic voter reciprocity: recipients of the transfer may vote for the ruling party because they feel obliged to reward the party that helped them improve their family's

financial situations (Finan and Schechter, 2012).

Additional evidence shows that the introduction of the child benefit program had very similar effects on the support for PiS in the European Parliament elections (Figure C.5). This suggests that instrumental voting cannot fully explain our results, as the European Parliament has no impact on the design of welfare programs in EU member states.⁸ Thus, it seems that the mechanism of voters' reciprocity at least partly explains the estimated results; i.e., that the implementation of the cash transfer program led to a deeper feeling of identification with the ruling party among transfer recipients.

To further investigate the mechanisms behind the estimated effects, we study the impact of the child benefit program on electoral performance in the 2019 European elections of the two major politicians responsible for the implementation of the program: former Prime Minister Beata Szydło and former Minister of Family, Labor, and Social Policy Elżbieta Rafalska. These two politicians were the ruling party's candidates in the 2019 European Parliament elections (for more on this duo's role in implementing and promoting the program, see Appendix D). The candidates ran in different electoral districts and had different positions on the ruling party's rank-ordered lists. Our empirical strategy analyzes their electoral performance in comparison with that of other PiS candidates. According to the instrumental voting mechanism, the electoral gains from the program should be distributed evenly among the candidates of the ruling party, regardless of their role in its implementation. This is especially likely to be the case in European elections, as whether the candidates in these elections signal support for the program should not matter, given that the European Parliament members have no impact on the program's design. In contrast, the voter reciprocity mechanism predicts that those politicians responsible for the implementation of the program should benefit from it more than other candidates of the ruling party in all types of elections.

⁸The fact that turnout in the European Parliament elections is consistently much lower shows that voters seem to be aware of the very limited power of the European Parliament.

We estimate the following equation to study the impact of the introduction of the child benefit program on support for the former prime minister:

$$(3) \quad \Delta Y_{m,2009-2019}^{PiS,1} - \Delta Y_{m,2009-2019}^{PiS,other} = \\ \gamma + \beta CT_{m,2016} + \theta CT_{m,2016} \times d_m^{10} + X'_m \kappa + \eta_m + \epsilon_m$$

The outcome variable is the difference in differences in support for candidates running from the first and remaining positions on the PiS lists in the 2009-2019 European Parliament elections. It measures how the support for the leading candidates of the ruling party changed in relation to support for the candidates in lower positions on the list. Since the former prime minister ran in the 10th electoral district, the coefficient θ identifies the effect of the introduction of the child benefit program on her electoral support. Our results are not affected by the regional variation in the impact of the child benefit program on the support for the ruling party because we analyze the support for PiS candidates only. The effects of the transfer may vary depending on the candidate's position on the party list (e.g., if the additional voters predominantly vote for the top candidate), and this is captured by the β coefficient. Finally, we control for electoral district fixed effects, η_m , to account for district-specific changes in the distribution of votes on the ruling party's list (e.g., the party placed a more popular candidate as the top candidate in a given district in 2019 than in 2009). We identify the impact of the child benefit program on support for the former minister of family in a similar way (in this case, our outcome variable measures the difference in differences in support for candidates running from the third and remaining positions on the PiS lists in the 2009-2019 European Parliament elections).

We find that the additional votes for the ruling party due to the introduction of the child benefit were not evenly distributed, with the former prime minister and the former minister of family both receiving large additional premiums (Table 5). This is further evidence in favor of the voter reciprocity mechanism. As we discussed above, instrumental motives should not matter in European elections, and instrumental voters should be indifferent about particular candidates, as long as they are from the ruling party. We conducted additional placebo tests to confirm that the effects are not observed for ministers of ministries unrelated to family policy (Table B.7), nor are they specific to the municipalities in the districts where the two

politicians ran (Table B.8).

However, we can not completely rule out that the additional electoral gains for the former prime minister and the former minister of family in the European Parliament elections result from effects other than voter reciprocity. For instance, voters could reward these politicians for competence shown in the efficient implementation of the child benefit or may have thought (even mistakenly) that voting for them in the European elections would improve their position within the party and increase the chance that the Family 500+ program would be sustained in the future. Therefore, we cautiously conclude that we found some evidence in favor of voter reciprocity, but we do not rule out that instrumental or other motives also played a role.

Alternative explanations

We address empirically the challenges to identification mentioned above. First, we show that the results remain unchanged when we additionally control for measures of religiosity (Table B.9).⁹ The results are also robust to the LASSO double-selection procedure (Belloni, Chernozhukov, and Hansen, 2014) with a large number of additional covariates (Table B.1). Thus, it seems that the effects we observe are not affected by differences in pre-treatment social norms. Our findings that the size of the effect does not depend on initial support for PiS suggests that the effects of the child benefit program are not driven by political polarization (Figure C.1). There is little variation in the size of the effects depending on the municipality size, suggesting that our results are not driven by the urban/rural divide (Figure C.2). In addition, there is no evidence of a differential evolution of social norms in municipalities with low vs. high treatment intensity during the treatment period (see Panel A of Figure 5). We control for the occurrence of a campaign rally in a given municipality to test whether the electoral campaign efforts drive our results, and we find that our results remain unchanged (Table B.10).

The effects are not driven by differential evolution of economic outcomes and cultural change: we control for changes in economic outcomes and proxies for social norms (incidence of out-of-wedlock births and marriage rates) between 2011 and 2014, and the effects remain statistically

⁹We do not control for religiosity in the baseline version because data are missing for some small municipalities (mostly municipalities without a Catholic parish).

significant (Table B.11). The demand shock associated with the introduction of the child benefit program had no impact on municipal-level variation in unemployment rates or firm profits (Panel B of Figure 5). This is not surprising, given that we control for electoral district fixed effects. If anything, the demand shock likely affected whole local markets, and not differences in economic outcomes within small regions. We find some statistically significant labor supply responses: a decrease in personal income tax revenue and an increase in firm creation. This is in line with the results obtained by Gromadzki (2023). Nevertheless, these labor supply responses do not explain our results (Table B.12).

We find no evidence suggesting that the government provided other grants specifically to high-fertility municipalities. We also find no significant relationship between the child benefit intensity and municipal revenues from government investment grants, EU funds, or government contributions to EU-funded projects (Panel C of Figure 5). Moreover, we observe no effects on access to kindergartens and nurseries following the introduction of the program (Panel D of Figure 5). Finally, we find no evidence that municipalities changed their spending in other areas in response to the child benefit program (Figure B.6).

Robustness

Our results are robust to the various robustness checks shown in the appendix. We find strong effects also for the 2015-2019 change in the vote share for PiS (Table B.13) which further proves that the introduction of the program was essential for the effects (as opposed to a campaign promise). In the baseline, we perform unweighted regressions. The regressions using municipality population weights yield similar results (Table B.14). The results remain unchanged when an alternative outcome variable definition (share of valid votes, see Table B.15) or alternative treatment measures are applied (child benefit amount divided by eligible voters, the number of recipients divided by population, 2016-2019 average annual child benefit per capita, see Tables B.16-B.18). In our baseline approach, we use separate regressions with long differences as outcomes and not the fixed effect estimator. The leads and lags of the effects obtained from a panel fixed effect estimator are virtually the same as our baseline estimates

(Figure B.7). Callaway, Goodman-Bacon, and Sant'Anna (2021) argue that the interpretation of the results of the difference-in-differences estimation with a continuous treatment variable as average treatment effects requires stronger assumptions than in the case of a dummy treatment variable. Hence, we use dummy treatment variables to apply the doubly robust difference-in-differences estimator by Sant'Anna and Zhao (2020), and the results remain significant (Table B.19). We cluster standard errors at the level of municipality. The results also remain significant with standard errors clustered at a different level or with Conley standard errors which account for spatial correlation (Table B.20). The effects are significant under alternative choices of region fixed effects: NUTS-2 region, commuting zone, or county (Table B.21). Randomization inference confirms the p-value of the main effect (Figure B.8). We compute the Approximate Maximum Influence Perturbation following Broderick, Giordano, and Meager (2021), and show that our results are also robust to the removal of a small fraction of the sample (Figure B.9). Finally, we find no differential pre-treatment trends when the 2005 election is included (Figure B.10).

Survey data evidence

We supplement our study with an analysis of individual-level survey data. Although stated preferences can differ from revealed preferences (exit polls consistently underestimated the support for PiS), survey data allow us to both overcome the issue of ecological fallacy, and to provide more insights into the mechanisms of the effects of the child benefit program. We use two survey data sources: CBOS for the analysis of the effects of the child benefit program on the support for PiS and voter turnout, and ESS for additional outcomes. We construct two treatment variables. First, we impute the annual unconditional child benefit amount received by the family of a respondent after the introduction of the program to compare the estimates from the municipal-level data with those obtained using survey data. Since the unconditional child benefit was paid for the second and each subsequent child under age 18 in the family, the imputed annual child benefit amount equals zero for families with no children and families with one child, \$1,125 for families with two children, \$2,500 for families with three children, etc.¹⁰ We then divide it by the number of adult members of the household. Our second

¹⁰In our analysis, the monthly amount of \$125 is multiplied by 9 instead of 12 to be consistent with the child benefit variable in the main analysis (in 2016, benefits were paid for 9 months because the program was introduced in April of that year). Since we have no reliable data on household income, we cannot impute the

treatment variable is a dummy variable that equals zero for families with a zero imputed child benefit amount, and one for families with a non-zero imputed child benefit amount (families with two or more children).

We estimate the following difference-in-differences equation:

$$(4) \quad y_{it} = \gamma + \beta_1 CT_i \cdot Post_t + \beta_2 CT_i + \beta_3 Post_t + X'_{it}\kappa + \lambda_t + \epsilon_{it},$$

where y_{it} is an outcome variable (Voted for PiS or Turnout) for respondent i in election year t , CT_i is our treatment variable (continuous imputed child benefit amount or a binary treatment group variable), $Post_t$ takes the value of zero for the 2007 and 2011 elections and the value of one for the 2019 elections, and X_{it} is a set of individual characteristics (gender, age, urban/rural area, region fixed effects¹¹). We also control for election year fixed effects, λ_t . Coefficient β_1 measures the impact of the child benefit program on a given outcome. We restrict our sample to respondents aged 25-49 so that the treatment and control group are similar in terms of age distribution.

The survey data estimates confirm the results from the municipality-level analysis (Table 6). The effect of the transfer on voting for PiS is sizeable and statistically significant for both treatment variables: an annual transfer of \$100 increases the probability of voting for PiS by 1.6 percentage points, and the support for PiS among treated families increases by almost nine percentage points compared to that of the control group. Hence, the point estimate of the effect of the child benefit amount on the support for PiS is almost identical to that from the municipal-level analysis. In addition, we find that the child benefit amount had a positive impact on turnout in parliamentary elections (Table 7).

We find that differences in the support for PiS and turnout were constant in the pre-treatment period, which suggests that the parallel trends assumption is satisfied (Figures F.1-F.2). This can be also seen in the event study graphs (Figures F.3-F.6). Although families with one child

conditional cash benefit amount for the first child. See Table F.1 for details on the construction of the child benefit amount variable.

¹¹Region fixed effects refer to 16 provinces (voivodeships).

were not eligible for the unconditional transfer, they could receive a means-tested transfer for the first child. We show that including one-child households in the treatment group or excluding them from the sample does not affect our results (Tables F.4-F.5).

We also investigate the mechanism of the effects of the child benefit program at the individual level. First, we see that the introduction of the cash transfer significantly improved their financial situation, and increased recipients' life satisfaction, as well as their assessment of the country's economic situation (Figure 6). We find no such effects on recipients' satisfaction with the state of education, which once again suggests that our results are not confounded by the education reform. Second, we find strong positive effects of the program on satisfaction with the national government and trust in the parliament.¹² Generalized trust is not affected by the transfer. We also find no significant impact on norms and attitudes promoted by the ruling party. Finally, the program caused no change to recipients' attitudes towards redistribution. We also take a look at the effect heterogeneity (Figures F.7-F.8). We show that the support for PiS was growing among voters who had previously voted for almost every party and among people who did not participate in the 2015 elections, although these are only short-term effects and due to a low statistical power Figure F.8 should be treated as a suggestive evidence only.

Lastly, we examined individual-level measures of the support for major reforms introduced by PiS, in order to check whether our results may have been affected by these confounding events. Except for the Constitutional Tribunal assessment - our proxy for the opposition to judiciary reforms - the support for the PiS reforms was measured in the post-treatment period only, so we test for significant differences in the support for the reforms between the treatment and control groups. We show that benefit recipients do not differ from the control group's respondents in their support for retirement age reform, education reform, or the assessment of Constitutional Tribunal activity (Figure F.9). We also study the effects of child benefit on the assessment of the Constitutional Tribunal using difference-in-differences design and we find no significant effects (Table F.6).

¹²We also find strong effects of the child benefit on trust in the Prime Minister Beata Szydło (Table F.7).

Cost of a vote in Europe: comparison with previous studies

Finally, we can relate our results to the literature measuring the cost of a vote in Europe.¹³ Between 2016 and 2019, the overall cost of the Family 500+ program, has been approximately \$24.7 billion. Given that our estimates imply that the implementation of the child benefit program led to PiS attracting approximately 810,000 additional votes in 2019, the average cost of a vote was equal to around \$30,000. This estimate is very similar to that estimated by Vannutelli (2020) for the Italian tax credit program (see Table 8). Cost of a vote estimated by Pop-Eleches and Pop-Eleches (2012) for the Romanian voucher program was much smaller, perhaps because that program targeted extremely poor families (with per capita incomes 15 times lower than the average per capita income for Polish child benefit recipients). Our results indicate that spending an additional one percent of GDP on an unconditional cash transfer leads to a 0.5 percentage point increase in the incumbent's vote share (see the fourth column of Table 8). This elasticity was higher for conditional cash transfers in Italy and Romania. The elasticity appears to depend on the position of the recipients in the income distribution: the Romanian program targeted a small group of the poorest voters with the elasticity exceeding 7, the Italian program targeted the lower-earning half of the labor force achieving elasticity of around 1.5, and the Polish program reached virtually all families with children, regardless of their income. Hence, it seems that largely unconditional cash transfers are a less cost-effective way to gain additional votes than conditional cash transfers.

6 Conclusion

The rise of illiberal populism in Poland since 2015 has been a surprising development that remains largely unexplained. In this paper, we showed that the populist party PiS was able to maintain political power in Poland through the implementation of a large child benefit program. We exploited the variation in the per capita cash transfer amounts received at the municipal level using a difference-in-differences research design, and we found that PiS achieved sizable gains in the 2019 parliamentary elections. Cash transfer of \$100 per capita

¹³These other studies analyzed one type of election only. Hence, in our comparison, we make an implicit assumption that the spillovers to other types of elections are similar to our estimates for the Polish child benefit program.

translated into an increase in the vote share for PiS of nearly two percentage points. We thus conclude that, without these transfers, the ruling party would not have been able to retain its parliamentary majority after 2019. Importantly, voters responded to the transfer only after the program was introduced, as we find no effect of the campaign promise to introduce the transfer in the 2015 elections.

This paper is the first to provide causal evidence of the effect of a largely unconditional cash transfer on support for incumbent party in a high-income country. Our findings indicate that the effects of the cash transfers operated mainly through increases in families' incomes, and these effects were especially strong in smaller and poorer municipalities. Around one-third of additional votes for the ruling party came from new voters coming off the sidelines, and the remaining electoral gains were due to voters who had previously voted for other parties. Our results suggest that the effects of the program were not entirely driven by instrumental motives but were associated with a deeper sense of identification with the ruling party. Specifically, we found that the effects were virtually the same for all types of elections, and were particularly strong as measured by support for the politicians responsible for the implementation of the program. We ruled out other mechanisms through which the program might have affected electoral outcomes, such as better local labor market conditions, changing social norms, and the provision of public goods. The main findings were shown to be robust to a number of sensitivity checks.

This study's results are in line with previous literature that reported positive effects on electoral outcomes for parties that have implemented conditional cash transfer programs. However, we show that the elasticity of voting in the case of the largely unconditional cash transfer program studied in this paper is lower than for conditional cash transfers studied in the past. Hence, it seems that targeting poorest voters with means-tested transfers is a more cost-effective way to obtain additional votes than distributing transfers to citizens regardless of their income. We have no reason to believe that the estimated positive effects are limited to populist parties. Indeed, recent studies have shown that mainstream parties have benefited from implementing redistributive policies in the past (Acemoglu et al., 2021; Caprettini, Casaburi, and Venturini, 2021). Nevertheless, in the context of Poland, we have shown that

the introduction of a generous cash transfer program allowed the populist government to stay in power, and to further dismantle the independence of the courts, the freedom of the media, and minority rights.

References

- Acemoglu, Daron, Tuomas Pekkarinen, Kjell G Salvanes, and Matti Sarvimäki (2021). “The Making of Social Democracy: The Economic and Electoral Consequences of Norway’s 1936 Folk School Reform”. In: *Working Paper*.
- Albanese, Giuseppe, Guglielmo Barone, and Guido de Blasio (2022). “Populist voting and losers’ discontent: Does redistribution matter?” In: *European Economic Review* 141.
- Araújo, Victor (2021). “Do anti-poverty policies sway voters? Evidence from a meta-analysis of Conditional Cash Transfers”. In: *Research & Politics* 8.1, pp. 1–9.
- Baird, Sarah, Craig McIntosh, and Berk Özler (2011). “Cash or condition? Evidence from a cash transfer experiment”. In: *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 126.4, pp. 1709–1753.
- Banerjee, Abhijit, Paul Niehaus, and Tavneet Suri (2019). “Universal Basic Income in the Developing World”. In: *Annual Review of Economics* 11, pp. 959–983.
- Banerjee, Abhijit V, Rema Hanna, Gabriel E Kreindler, and Benjamin A Olken (2017). “Debunking the stereotype of the lazy welfare recipient: Evidence from cash transfer programs”. In: *The World Bank Research Observer* 32.2, pp. 155–184.
- Belloni, Alexandre, Victor Chernozhukov, and Christian Hansen (2014). “High-dimensional methods and inference on structural and treatment effects”. In: *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 28.2, pp. 29–50.
- Bitler, Marianne P, Annie Laurie Hines, and Marianne Page (2018). “Cash For Kids”. In: *RSF: The Russell Sage Foundation Journal of the Social Sciences* 4.2, pp. 43–73.
- Broderick, Tamara, Ryan Giordano, and Rachael Meager (2021). “An Automatic Finite-Sample Robustness Metric: Can Dropping a Little Data Change Conclusions?” In: *arXiv preprint arXiv:2011.14999*.
- Brzezinski, Michał and Katarzyna Sałach (2023). “Prudent populists? The short-term macroeconomic impact of populist policies in Poland”. In: *Working Paper*.
- Brzeziński, Michał and Mateusz Najsztub (2017). “The impact of „Family 500+” programme on household incomes, poverty and inequality”. In: *Polityka Społeczna* 44.1, pp. 16–25.
- Bukowski, Paweł and Filip Novokmet (2021). “Between Communism and Capitalism: Long-Term Inequality in Poland, 1892–2015”. In: *Journal of Economic Growth* 26, pp. 187–239.
- Callaway, Brantly, Andrew Goodman-Bacon, and Pedro HC Sant’Anna (2021). “Difference-in-Differences with a Continuous Treatment”. In: *Working Paper*.
- Caprettini, Bruno, Lorenzo Casaburi, and Miriam Venturini (2021). “Redistribution, Voting and Clientelism: Evidence from the Italian Land Reform”. In: *Working Paper*.
- Conley, Timothy G (1999). “GMM estimation with cross sectional dependence”. In: *Journal of econometrics* 92.1, pp. 1–45.
- (2008). “Spatial Econometrics”. In: *Microeconomics*. Ed. by Steven N Durlauf and Lawrence E Blume. Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 303–313.

- Conover, Emily, Román A Zárate, Adriana Camacho, and Javier E Baez (2020). “Cash and Ballots: Conditional Transfers, Political Participation, and Voting Behavior”. In: *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 68.2, pp. 541–566.
- Cruz, Cesi, Philip Keefer, Julien Labonne, and Francesco Trebbi (2021). “Making policies matter: Voter responses to campaign promises”. In: *Working paper*.
- De La O, Ana L (2013). “Do conditional cash transfers affect electoral behavior? Evidence from a randomized experiment in Mexico”. In: *American Journal of Political Science* 57.1, pp. 1–14.
- Elinder, Mikael, Henrik Jordahl, and Panu Poutvaara (2015). “Promises, policies and pocket-book voting”. In: *European Economic Review* 75, pp. 177–194.
- Finan, Frederico and Laura Schechter (2012). “Vote-buying and reciprocity”. In: *Econometrica* 80.2, pp. 863–881.
- Freedman, David A (1999). “Ecological inference and the ecological fallacy”. In: *International Encyclopedia of the social & Behavioral sciences* 6.4027-4030, pp. 1–7.
- Funke, Manuel, Moritz Schularick, and Christoph Trebesch (2020). “Populist leaders and the economy”. In: *Working Paper*.
- Gaudecker, Hans-Martin von (2019). “Templates for Reproducible Research Projects in Economics”. <https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.2533241>.
- Gromadzki, Jan (2023). “Labor Supply Effects of a Universal Cash Transfer”. In: *IZA Discussion Paper*.
- Grosfeld, Irena, Etienne Madinier, Seyhun Orcan Sakalli, and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya (2021). “Independent Media and Religiosity”. In: *Working Paper*.
- Grzymala-Busse, Anna (2019). “The failure of Europe’s mainstream parties”. In: *Journal of Democracy* 30.4, pp. 35–47.
- Guriev, Sergei and Elias Papaioannou (2021). “The political economy of populism”. In: *Journal of Economic Literature*.
- Haggard, Stephan and Robert Kaufman (2021). *Backsliding: Democratic Regress in the Contemporary World*. Cambridge University Press.
- Hoynes, Hilary and Jesse Rothstein (2019). “Universal Basic Income in the United States and Advanced Countries”. In: *Annual Review of Economics* 11, pp. 929–958.
- Lindner, Attila, Filip Novokmet, Thomas Piketty, and Tomasz Zawisza (2021). “Political conflict, social inequality and electoral cleavages in Central-Eastern Europe, 1990–2018”. In: *Political Cleavages and Social Inequalities*. Ed. by Amory Gethin, Clara Martínez-Toledano, and Thomas Piketty. Harvard University Press.
- Magda, Iga, Aneta Kiełczewska, and Nicola Brandt (2020). “The effect of child benefit on female labor supply”. In: *IZA Journal of Labor Policy* 10.1.
- Manacorda, Marco, Edward Miguel, and Andrea Vigorito (2011). “Government transfers and political support”. In: *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics* 3.3, pp. 1–28.

- Mudde, Cas and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser (2017). *Populism: A very short introduction*. Oxford University Press.
- Myck, Michał and Kajetan Trzciński (2019). "From Partial to Full Universality: The Family 500+ Programme in Poland and its Labor Supply Implications". In: *ifo DICE Report* 17.03, pp. 36–44.
- Norris, Pippa (2020). "Measuring populism worldwide". In: *Party Politics* 26.6, pp. 697–717.
- Pop-Eleches, Cristian and Grigore Pop-Eleches (2012). "Targeted government spending and political preferences". In: *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 7.3, pp. 285–320.
- Rooduijn, M., S. Van Kessel, C. Froio, A. Pirro, S. De Lange, D. Halikiopoulou, P. Lewis, C. Mudde, and P. Taggart (2019). "The PopuList: An Overview of Populist, Far Right, Far Left and Eurosceptic Parties in Europe". In: www.popu-list.org.
- Sant'Anna, Pedro HC and Jun Zhao (2020). "Doubly robust difference-in-differences estimators". In: *Journal of Econometrics* 219.1, pp. 101–122.
- Statistics Poland (2020). *Zasięg ubóstwa ekonomicznego w Polsce w 2019 r.* Tech. rep. Statistics Poland.
- Vannutelli, Silvia (2020). "Eighty Euro for a Vote? The Electoral Effects of Stimulus Transfers in Italy". In: *Working Paper*.
- Zucco Jr, Cesar (2013). "When payouts pay off: Conditional cash transfers and voting behavior in Brazil 2002–10". In: *American Journal of Political Science* 57.4, pp. 810–822.
- Zulianello, Mattia and Erik Gahner Larsen (2021). "Populist parties in European Parliament elections: A new dataset on left, right and valence populism from 1979 to 2019". In: *Electoral Studies* 71, p. 102312.

Figures




Figure 1: Child benefit and changes in the vote share for PiS

Notes: Figure presents the relationship between the per capita child benefit and the changes in the support for PiS (between 2011 and 2019 in Figure 1a and between 2007 and 2011 in Figure 1b) at the municipality-level. The per capita child benefit is the total amount of child benefit received in 2016 divided by the municipality's population. Vote shares for PiS are calculated as percentages of eligible voters. Figure B.1 shows the support for PiS over time for municipalities with high and low treatment intensity.




Figure 2: Introduction of child benefit: timeline

Notes: Figure presents a timeline of events related to the introduction of the child benefit program in Poland. The red bar denotes the period in which PiS was in the opposition, and the green bar denotes the period in which PiS was in the government.




Figure 3: Child benefit per capita (USD)

Notes: Map displays the amount of child benefit per capita received in 2016 at the municipality level. See Figure A.1 for a map that shows the main outcome variable: the changes in the vote share for PiS (2011-2019).




Figure 4: Leads and lags of the treatment effect

Notes: Figure shows the event-study coefficients from three regressions of the change in the vote shares between elections in year t (shown on the horizontal axis) and the 2011 parliamentary elections on the per capita child benefit. We control for political, geographic, demographic, and economic variables measured in the initial year as well as for electoral district fixed effects (see the note of Table 2 for the list of control variables). Tables 2, B.2, B.3, and B.4 show detailed regressions results. 95% confidence intervals are constructed based on standard errors clustered at the municipality level.




Figure 5: Alternative mechanisms

Notes: Figure shows the treatment effects for alternative outcome variables (2011-2019 differences). Figure shows the point estimates of the treatment effects and 95% confidence intervals. For ease of interpretation, outcome variables were standardized to a zero mean and a standard deviation of one. We control for the 2011 values of outcome variables and baseline control variables. In each regression, we control for political, geographic, demographic, and economic variables measured in the initial year as well as for electoral district fixed effects (see the note of Table 2 for the list of control variables). Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. The description of the variables can be found in Tables A.1-A.2, and the descriptive statistics can be found in Table 1.




Figure 6: Individual-level mechanisms, survey data

Notes: Figure shows the treatment effects for alternative outcome variables (coefficients of the interaction term of the treatment variable and the post-treatment dummy variable). Figure shows the point estimates of the treatment effects and 95% confidence intervals. The continuous treatment variable (annual child benefit amount) is imputed based on the number of household members under the age of 18. For ease of interpretation, outcome variables were standardized to a zero mean and a standard deviation of one. The pre-treatment period includes the 2007 and 2011 parliamentary elections. The post-treatment period includes the 2019 parliamentary elections. The sample is restricted to respondents aged 25-49. In each regression, we control for gender, age, urban/rural area dummy, and region fixed effects. Robust standard errors were calculated. The sources and description of the variables can be found in Tables F.9-F.10 and their descriptive statistics can be found in Table F.11.

Source: ESS.

Tables

Table 1: Descriptive statistics

	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
ΔY_m , 2011 – 2019	2473	16.24	4.62	2.86	31.51
Child benefit p.c.	2473	149.36	31.40	14.08	293.50
Populist vote share (2005)	2473	10.08	4.35	1.58	46.58
Support for the EU accession (2003)	2473	35.89	10.42	8.70	65.95
PiS vote share (2011)	2473	13.38	5.92	1.48	44.27
Incident of out-of-wedlock births	2473	0.20	0.12	0.00	0.64
Secondary education (2002)	2473	0.42	0.10	0.17	0.83
Log population density	2473	4.29	1.19	1.46	8.31
Femininity ratio	2473	0.50	0.01	0.47	0.55
Average age	2473	38.53	1.98	32.36	52.41
Population aged 12-17	2473	0.06	0.01	0.04	0.09
Population above retirement age	2473	0.19	0.03	0.10	0.47
Urbanization rate	2473	0.24	0.36	0.00	1.00
Longitude	2473	19.55	2.33	14.22	24.01
Latitude	2473	51.80	1.36	49.15	54.81
Distance to provincial capital	2473	54.54	25.11	0.00	145.32
Distance to Warsaw	2473	225.98	100.36	0.00	485.51
Log PIT revenue p.c.	2473	5.75	0.50	4.46	7.84
Unemployment rate	2473	0.37	0.16	0.01	0.82
Catholic Mass participation (2008)	2424	0.29	0.13	0.02	1.06
Catholic Communion reception (2008)	2424	0.11	0.05	0.01	0.42
Catholic groups membership (2008)	2419	0.08	0.06	0.00	0.54

Notes: This table presents the following statistics for each variable: Number of Observations, Average Value, Standard Deviation, Maximum and Minimum Value. All variables are measured in 2011 unless specified otherwise. The sources and description of the variables can be found in Tables A.1 and A.2.

Table 2: Main results: child benefit and the support for PiS

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Child benefit p.c.	0.070*** (0.003)	0.035*** (0.003)	0.029*** (0.004)	0.024*** (0.004)	0.018*** (0.004)
Political controls	no	yes	yes	yes	yes
Geographic controls	no	yes	yes	yes	yes
Demographic controls	no	no	yes	yes	yes
Economic controls	no	no	no	yes	yes
Electoral district FE	no	no	no	no	yes
Adj. R-Squared	0.23	0.63	0.65	0.66	0.72
Mean of outcome	16.24	16.24	16.24	16.24	16.24
Mean of child benefit p.c.	149.36	149.36	149.36	149.36	149.36
Observations	2473	2473	2473	2473	2473

Notes: Table shows the effects of the child benefit on the changes in the vote share for PiS at the municipal level (2011-2019). The per capita child benefit is the total amount of child benefit received in 2016 divided by the municipality's population. Vote shares for PiS are calculated as percentages of eligible voters. Political variables include PiS' vote share in 2011, vote shares for the right-wing populist parties in 2005, "yes" vote shares in the 2003 EU membership referendum, and the share of out-of-wedlock births. Geographic controls include latitude, longitude, distance to the provincial capital, and distance to Warsaw. Demographic controls include log population density, mean age, femininity ratio, fraction of the population with at least secondary education, share of the population aged 13-17, share of the population above retirement age, and urbanization rate. Economic controls include registered unemployment rate, and log tax revenue from personal income tax per capita. All control variables are measured in 2011 unless otherwise specified. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. The description of the variables can be found in Tables A.1-A.2, and the descriptive statistics can be found in Table 1.

* p<.10; ** p<.05; *** p<.01

Table 3: Child benefit and voter turnout

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Child benefit p.c.	0.024*** (0.002)	0.023*** (0.003)	0.016*** (0.004)	0.021*** (0.004)	0.014*** (0.004)
Political controls	no	yes	yes	yes	yes
Geographic controls	no	yes	yes	yes	yes
Demographic controls	no	no	yes	yes	yes
Economic controls	no	no	no	yes	yes
Electoral district FE	no	no	no	no	yes
Adj. R-Squared	0.14	0.39	0.44	0.47	0.57
Mean of outcome	15.62	15.62	15.62	15.62	15.62
Mean of child benefit p.c.	149.36	149.36	149.36	149.36	149.36
Observations	2473	2473	2473	2473	2473

Notes: Table shows the effects of the child benefit on the changes in the turnout in parliamentary elections at the municipal level (2011-2019). The per capita child benefit is the total child benefit amount received in 2016 divided by the municipality's population. Vote shares for PiS are calculated as percentages of eligible voters. We control for political, geographic, demographic, and economic variables measured in the initial year as well as for electoral district fixed effects (see the note of Table 2 for the list of control variables). Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.

* p<.10; ** p<.05; *** p<.01

Table 4: Decomposition of the effects on the support for PiS and voter turnout

	(1) Support for PiS	(2) Support for PiS	(3) Voter turnout	(4) Voter turnout
Child benefit p.c.	0.018*** (0.004)	0.012*** (0.004)	0.014*** (0.004)	0.007** (0.003)
Political controls	yes	yes	yes	yes
Geographic controls	yes	yes	yes	yes
Demographic controls	yes	yes	yes	yes
Economic controls	yes	yes	yes	yes
Electoral district FE	yes	yes	yes	yes
Voter turnout (change)	no	yes	no	no
Support for PiS (change)	no	no	no	yes
Adj. R-Squared	0.72	0.77	0.57	0.65
Mean of outcome	20.31	20.31	20.31	20.31
Mean of child benefit p.c.	149.36	149.36	149.36	149.36
Observations	2473	2473	2473	2473

Notes: Table shows the effects of the introduction of child benefit on the support for PiS and voter turnout. Column 1 shows the baseline estimates of the effects on the support for PiS from Table 2. In column 2, we additionally control for the change in voter turnout. Hence, this column shows the effects of the child benefit program on the support for PiS coming from voters of other parties changing their preferences. The difference between estimates in columns 1 and 2 shows the effects on the support for PiS due to attracting previously non-voting individuals. Column 3 shows the estimates of the effects on voter turnout from Table 3. In column 4, we additionally control for the change in the support for PiS. Hence, this column shows the effects of the child benefit program on voter turnout excluding the voters coming off the sidelines to support PiS. The difference between estimates in columns 1 and 2 shows the effects on voter turnout driven by new PiS voters. The set of control variables is described in the note under Tables 2 and 3. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.

* p<.10; ** p<.05; *** p<.01

Table 5: Child benefit and support for the Prime Minister and Minister of Family

	(1) 1st position	(2) 1st position	(3) 3rd position	(4) 3rd position
Child benefit p.c.	-0.000 (0.019)	-0.006 (0.021)	-0.023* (0.013)	-0.026* (0.013)
Prime Minister		0.051*** (0.015)		
× Child benefit p.c.				
Minister of Family				0.032*** (0.008)
× Child benefit p.c.				
Political controls	yes	yes	yes	yes
Geographic controls	yes	yes	yes	yes
Demographic controls	yes	yes	yes	yes
Economic controls	yes	yes	yes	yes
Electoral district FE	yes	yes	yes	yes
Adj. R-Squared	0.38	0.39	0.59	0.60
Observations	2473	2473	2473	2473

Notes: Table shows the effects of the child benefit on the support for the Prime Minister and Minister of Family. The per capita child benefit is the total child benefit amount received in 2016 divided by the municipality's population. Columns 1 and 2 show the effects of the child benefit on the difference in 2009-2019 differences in the support for candidates running in the first position and the remaining positions on the lists of PiS in the elections to the European Parliament. Prime Minister × Child benefit p.c. denotes the interaction of the child benefit variable with the 10th electoral district dummy (in which the Prime Minister was running). Columns 3 and 4 show the effects of the child benefit on the difference in 2009-2019 differences in the support for candidates running in the third position and the remaining positions on the lists of PiS. Minister of Family × Child benefit p.c. denotes the interaction of the child benefit variable with the 13th electoral district dummy (in which the Minister of Family was running). Vote shares are calculated as percentages of eligible voters. All control variables are measured in 2009 unless otherwise specified. Standard errors are clustered at the level of the electoral districts (the districts in the European elections).

* p<.10; ** p<.05; *** p<.01

Table 6: Child benefit and support for PiS, survey data

	(1) Vote for PiS	(2) Vote for PiS	(3) Vote for PiS	(4) Vote for PiS
Post-treatment period × Child benefit amount	0.016*** (0.004)	0.016*** (0.004)		
Post-treatment period × Treatment group			0.084** (0.036)	0.086** (0.036)
Ind. characteristics	no	yes	no	yes
Election year FE	no	yes	no	yes
Region FE	no	yes	no	yes
Adj. R-Squared	0.04	0.06	0.03	0.06
N	3240	3240	3240	3240

Notes: Table shows the effects of the child benefit on voting for PiS. The child benefit amount is imputed based on the number of household members under the age of 18. The binary treatment group variable equals one for households with a non-zero imputed child benefit (households with at least two members under the age of 18), and equals zero for households not eligible for the unconditional cash transfer. The pre-treatment period includes the 2007 and 2011 parliamentary elections. The post-treatment period includes the 2019 parliamentary elections. The sample is restricted to respondents aged 25-49. Individual characteristics variables include gender, age and urban/rural area. Robust standard errors were calculated. The sources and description of the variables can be found in Table F.1 and their descriptive statistics can be found in Table F.3. Figure F.7 shows the heterogeneity of the effects depending on gender, age, education, and urban/rural area.

* p<.10; ** p<.05; *** p<.01

Source: CBOS.

Table 7: Child benefit and turnout, survey data

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Turnout	Turnout	Turnout	Turnout
Post-treatment	0.009** (0.004)	0.008* (0.004)		
period × Child benefit amount			0.056 (0.037)	0.045 (0.037)
Post-treatment			0.056 (0.037)	0.045 (0.037)
period × Treatment group				
Ind. characteristics	no	yes	no	yes
Election year FE	no	yes	no	yes
Region FE	no	yes	no	yes
Adj. R-Squared	0.01	0.04	0.01	0.04
N	3240	3240	3240	3240

Notes: Table shows the effects of child benefit on the probability of voting in parliamentary elections. Child benefit amount is imputed based on the number of household members under the age of 18. The binary treatment group variable equals one for households with a non-zero imputed child benefit (households with at least two members under the age of 18), and equals zero for households not eligible for the unconditional cash transfer. The pre-treatment period includes the 2007 and 2011 parliamentary elections. The post-treatment period includes the 2019 parliamentary elections. The sample is restricted to respondents aged 25-49. Individual characteristics variables include gender, age and urban/rural area. Robust standard errors were calculated. The description of the variables can be found in Table F.1 and their descriptive statistics can be found in Table F.3.

* p<.10; ** p<.05; *** p<.01

Source: CBOS.

Table 8: Comparison of effect sizes in Europe

Country	Eligibility criteria	Additional votes (% of eligible voters)	Program cost (% of GDP)	Add. Votes / % of GDP	Cost of a vote
Poland	Families with children Not means-tested	2.69%	5.23%	0.51	\$30,000
Italy	Employees Annual earnings: 24%-75% of average earnings	3.95%	2.50%	1.58	\$36,000
Romania	Families with children Monthly income per capita: below \$17 (35% of average earnings)	0.04%	0.006%	7.33	\$1,300

Notes: Table shows the comparison of effects sizes of three cash transfer programs in Europe: the Polish child benefit program analyzed in this paper, Italian tax credit studied by Vannutelli (2020), and Romanian computer vouchers studied by Pop-Eleches and Pop-Eleches (2012). Data on average earnings in Italy in 2014 and in Romania in 2002 was obtained from Eurostat (based on the European Structure of Earnings Survey). For Romania, we show the % of average monthly earnings for a family of four with a single earner (monthly earnings below \$68). Program costs are expressed in the relation to the country's GDP in the year of the introduction of the program. For Poland, the program cost is the cumulative total cost of the program from 2016 to 2019. For Italy, the program cost is the cumulative total cost of the program from 2014 to 2019. For Romania, the program cost is the cumulative total cost of the program from 2004 to 2005. The "Add. votes / % of GDP" column shows the elasticity of voting to spending calculated by dividing the additional votes as % of eligible voters by the program cost expressed as % of GDP.

Appendix A Sources and descriptive statistics




Figure A.1: Support for PiS (2011-2019 difference)

Notes: Map displays the changes in the vote share for PiS at the municipal level (2011-2019).

Table A.1: Variable descriptions (i.)

Variable	Description	Source
Treatment Variables		
Child benefit p.c.	the 2015-2016 difference in the amount of earmarked grants from the state budget for government administration purposes divided by population in 2016	Statistics Poland
Dependent Variables		
Support for PiS	the number of votes for PiS in parliamentary elections divided by the number of eligible voters (multiplied by 100)	National Electoral Commission (2005, 2007, 2011, 2015, 2019)
$\Delta Y_{m,2011-2019}$	the difference between the support for PiS in 2011 and 2019 parliamentary elections	National Electoral Commission
Turnout	the number of valid votes divided by the number of eligible voters (multiplied by 100)	National Electoral Commission (2005, 2007, 2011, 2015, 2019)
Support for PiS (presidential elections)	the number of votes for the PiS official candidate in the presidential elections divided by the number of eligible voters (multiplied by 100). Jarosław Kaczyński was the candidate of PiS in the 2010 presidential elections. Andrzej Duda was the candidate of PiS in the 2015 and 2020 presidential elections.	National Electoral Commission (2010, 2015, 2020)

Notes: Description of variables used in the analysis.

Table A.2: Variable descriptions (ii.)

Variable	Description	Source
Control variables		
Populist vote share (2005)	the number of votes for populist parties (Samoobrona and LPR) in the 2005 parliamentary elections divided by the number of eligible voters (multiplied by 100)	National Electoral Commission
Support for the EU accession (2003)	the number of 'yes' votes in the 2003 Polish European Union membership referendum divided by the number of eligible voters (multiplied by 100)	National Electoral Commission
incidence of out-of-wedlock births	the number of births outside marriage divided by the number of all births	Statistics Poland
Secondary education (2002)	the number of individuals with at least secondary education divided by the municipality's population	Statistics Poland (2002 census)
Log population density	log of population per square kilometre	Statistics Poland
Femininity ratio	the number of females divided by the municipality's population	Statistics Poland
Average age	average age in municipality	Statistics Poland
Population aged 13-17	population aged 13-17 divided by the municipality's population	Statistics Poland
Population above retirement age	population aged 65 or more divided by the municipality's population	Statistics Poland
Urbanization	fraction of the population that lives in urban area	Statistics Poland
Longitude	longitude of municipality centroid	own calculations using Geopandas and shapefiles from https://gis-support.pl/
Latitude	latitude of municipality centroid	own calculations using Geopandas and shapefiles from https://gis-support.pl/
distance to the provincial capital	distance to the nearest province (województwo) capital in kilometers	own calculations using Geopandas and shapefiles from https://gis-support.pl/
Distance to Warsaw	distance to Warsaw (Poland's capital city) in kilometers	own calculations using Geopandas and shapefiles from https://gis-support.pl/
Log PIT revenue p.c	log of personal income tax revenue divided by the municipality's population	Statistics Poland
Unemployment rate	registered unemployment rate	Statistics Poland
Catholic Mass participation (2008)	the number of participants of Sunday mass in parishes located in a municipality (12 October 2008) divided by the municipality's population	Institute for Catholic Church Statistics (ISKK)
Catholic Communion reception (2008)	the number of individuals who received Communion during a Sunday mass in parishes located in a municipality (12 October 2008) divided by the municipality's population	Institute for Catholic Church Statistics (ISKK)
Catholic groups membership (2008)	the number of Catholic groups members (altar servers, rosary groups, choirs, etc.) divided by the municipality's population	Institute for Catholic Church Statistics (ISKK)

Notes: Description of variables used in the analysis.

Measurement of the treatment variable

Our main treatment variable is per capita child benefit received by Polish municipalities in 2016 (in 2016, the number of children in a family was still the result of fertility decisions made in the pre-treatment period). However, the direct measure of total child benefit amount received by municipalities in 2016 is not available. The direct measure is available from 2017 onwards. Nevertheless, we exploit information about sources of municipalities' revenues in order to construct our treatment variable. The funds for the child benefit program were classified as "targeted grants from the state budget for government administration purposes". Figure A.2 shows that, after remaining stable, the amount of these targeted grants received by Polish municipalities increased sharply in 2016.¹⁴ The funding for the child benefit program was the only change within this category of targeted grants. Hence, we construct our treatment variable as the 2015-2016 difference in the amount of targeted grants from the state budget for government administration purposes divided by population in 2016. Since we have the direct measure of the total child benefit amount received by municipalities in 2017, we can validate our treatment variable. Table A.3 shows that the relationship between our treatment variable and the direct measure of the 2017 per capita child benefit is very strong (R-squared of 0.94), and almost as strong as the relationship between the direct measures of the 2017 and 2018 per capita child benefit.

¹⁴There were further increases between 2016 and 2017 (because the program covered only the last nine months of 2016) and between 2018 and 2019 (due to the 2019 expansion of the program).




Figure A.2: Targeted grants from the state budget for government administration purposes (USD billions)

Notes: Figure shows the total amount of targeted grants from the state budget for government administration purposes received by Polish municipalities in the years 2010-2019.

Table A.3: Validating the child benefit measure

	(1) Child benefit p.c. (2017)	(2) Child benefit p.c. (2018)
Child benefit p.c. (2016)	1.097*** (0.009)	
Child benefit p.c. (2017)		0.957*** (0.003)
R-Squared	0.94	0.97
Observations	2473	2473

Notes: Column 1 shows the results of the regression of the 2017 per capita child benefit (direct measure) on the 2016 per capita child benefit (defined as the 2015-2016 difference in the amount of targeted grants from the state budget for government administration purposes divided by population in 2016). For comparison, column 2 shows the results of regression of the 2018 per capita child benefit (direct measure) on the 2017 per capita child benefit (direct measure). Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.

* p<.10; ** p<.05; *** p<.01

Appendix B Additional results




Figure B.1: The support for PiS over time: municipalities with treatment intensity above and below median

Notes: Figure shows the average support for PiS in parliamentary elections in two groups of municipalities. The dark blue line shows the average support for PiS in municipalities with child benefit per capita higher than the median. The bright blue line shows the average support for PiS in municipalities with child benefit per capita equal or smaller than the median.




Figure B.2: Relative income redistribution in Poland versus Eastern Europe and non-Eastern Europe

Notes: Relative redistribution is measured as a percentage reduction in the pre-tax pre-transfer Gini index due to social transfers and taxes. "Eastern Europe" is the average for Eastern European countries excluding Poland (Bulgaria, Czechia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia), while "Non-Eastern Europe" is the average for other European countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom). The red vertical line denotes the year of the introduction of the child benefit program.

Source: Own calculation using data from the World Inequality Database (<https://wid.world/>).





Figure B.3: Evolution of PiS ideology over time

Notes: Figure shows the position of PiS on a number of ideological and policy issues using data from the 1999-2019 Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) trend file. The Chapel Hill Expert Survey (available from www.chesdata.eu) provides party position data on several ideological dimensions, European integration, policy issues, and other party characteristics. It covers 28 European countries from 1999-2019. The estimates of party positions are based on averaged expert evaluations. In 2019, 1803 experts were contacted and 421 expert surveys were completed. The specific question wordings for the items depicted in the figure are as follows: LRGEN = position of the party in YEAR in terms of its overall ideological stance (0 = Extreme left .. 5 = Center .. 10 = Extreme right), LRECON = position of the party in YEAR in terms of its ideological stance on economic issues. Parties can be classified in terms of their stance on economic issues such as privatization, taxes, regulation, government spending, and the welfare state. Parties on the economic left want government to play an active role in the economy. Parties on the economic right want a reduced role for government (0 = extreme left .. 5 = center .. 10 = extreme right), REDISTRIBUTION = position on redistribution of wealth from the rich to the poor (0 = Strongly favors redistribution .. 10 = Strongly opposes redistribution), CIVLIB_LAWORDER = position on civil liberties vs. law and order (0 = Strongly promotes civil liberties .. 10 = Strongly supports tough measures to fight crime), SOCIALLIFESTYLE = position on social lifestyle (e.g. rights for homosexuals, gender equality) (0 = Strongly supports liberal policies .. 10 = Strongly opposes liberal policies), URBAN_RURAL = position on urban vs. rural interests (0 = Strongly supports urban interests .. 10 = Strongly supports rural interests).

(a) Change in birth rates (2011-2016) and the support for PiS (2011) (b) Birth rate (2007) and changes in the support for PiS (2007-2011)



(c) Birth rate (2007) and support for PiS (2007) (d) Birth rate (2011) and support for PiS (2011)




Figure B.4: Pre-treatment relationship between birth rates and the support for PiS

Notes: Figure B.4a presents the relationship between the pre-treatment change in birth rates (2011-2016) and the support for PiS in the 2011 elections. Figure B.4b presents the relationship between the initial level of birth rates (2007) and the change in the support for PiS (2007). Figure B.4c presents the relationship between the 2007 levels of birth rates and the 2007 levels of the support for PiS. Figure B.4d presents the relationship between the 2011 levels of birth rates and the 2011 levels of the support for PiS.




Figure B.5: Treatment effect by quartile of average income

Notes: Table shows the effects of the child benefit on the changes in the vote share for PiS at the municipal level for quartiles of municipality average income. The coefficients are obtained from a regression with the interaction of the treatment dummy and income quartile dummies. Since direct measure of average or median income at the municipality level is not available, we approximate average income by average revenue from personal income tax. We see that there is a negative relationship between average income and the effects size. No such relationship is found for the pre-treatment period (see Figures B.11 and B.12). We control for political, geographic, demographic, and economic variables measured in the initial year as well as for electoral district fixed effects (see the note of Table 2 for the list of control variables). 95% confidence intervals are constructed based on standard errors clustered at the municipality level.




Figure B.6: Elasticity of municipality spending

Notes: Figure shows child benefit elasticity of municipality spending divided into categories. Figure shows point estimates of the treatment effects and 95% confidence intervals. For ease of interpretation, treatment variables is log child benefit per capita and outcomes are differences in log spending per capita. In each regression, we control for political, geographic, demographic, and economic variables measured in the initial year as well as for electoral district fixed effects (see the note of Table 2 for the list of control variables). Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.




Figure B.7: Leads and lags of the treatment effect: fixed effects estimator

Notes: Figure shows the event-study coefficients of the interactions of election year dummy variable with the child benefit per capita variable obtained using a panel fixed effects estimator. We control for interactions of election years dummy variables with political, geographic, demographic, and economic variables measured in the initial year of the analysis as well as with electoral district fixed effects (see the note of Table 2 for the list of control variables). 95% confidence intervals are constructed based on standard errors clustered at the municipality level.




Figure B.8: Child benefit and the support for PiS: randomization inference

Notes: Figure shows kernel density plot of t-statistics from a randomization test with 10000 permutations. In each permutation, child benefit per capita variable was randomly drawn from the distribution of the variable and baseline difference-in-differences regression was estimated. For 0 random permutations, the absolute value of estimated t-statistic was greater than the absolute value of the baseline t-statistic. We control for political, geographic, demographic, and economic variables measured in the initial year as well as for electoral district fixed effects (see the note of Table 2 for the list of control variables). Standard errors were clustered at the level of the municipality.




Figure B.9: Sensitivity of the treatment effect to the removal of a small fraction of the sample

Notes: Figure illustrates the Approximate Maximum Influence Perturbation for the effect of child benefit on the change in the vote share for PiS (2011-2019) following Broderick, Giordano, and Meager (2021). Values of $\hat{\beta}$ (treatment effect) are on the vertical axis; values of α (proportion of the data removed) are on the horizontal axis. The dark blue line shows the original $\hat{\beta}$ value. The red lines show how $\hat{\beta}$ can be altered by adversarial removal in both directions; the light blue shaded area is the 95% confidence interval. Figure shows that removal of 1% observations cannot change the direction or the significance of the effect. We control for political, geographic, demographic, and economic variables measured in the initial year as well as for electoral district fixed effects (see the note of Table 2 for the list of control variables). Standard errors were clustered at the level of the municipality.




Figure B.10: Leads and lags of the treatment effect including the 2005 elections

Notes: Figure shows the event-study coefficients from five regressions of the change in the vote shares between elections in year t (shown on the horizontal axis) and 2011 parliamentary elections on child benefit per capita. We control for political, geographic, demographic, and economic variables measured in the initial year as well as for electoral district fixed effects (see the note of Table 2 for the list of control variables). Tables 2, B.2, B.3, B.22, and B.4 show detailed regressions results. 95% confidence intervals are constructed based on standard errors clustered at the municipality level.




Figure B.11: Pre-treatment: effects by quartile of average income, 2007-2011

Notes: Table shows the effects of the child benefit on the changes in the vote share for PiS at the municipal level for quartiles of municipality average income. The coefficients are obtained from a regression with the interaction of the treatment dummy and income quartile dummies. Since direct measure of average or median income at the municipality level is not available, we approximate average income by average revenue from personal income tax. We control for political, geographic, demographic, and economic variables measured in the initial year as well as for electoral district fixed effects (see the note of Table 2 for the list of control variables). 95% confidence intervals are constructed based on standard errors clustered at the municipality level.




Figure B.12: Pre-treatment: effects by quartile of average income, 2011-2015

Notes: Table shows the effects of the child benefit on the changes in the vote share for PiS at the municipal level for quartiles of municipality average income. The coefficients are obtained from a regression with the interaction of the treatment dummy and income quartile dummies. Since direct measure of average or median income at the municipality level is not available, we approximate average income by average revenue from personal income tax. We control for political, geographic, demographic, and economic variables measured in the initial year as well as for electoral district fixed effects (see the note of Table 2 for the list of control variables). 95% confidence intervals are constructed based on standard errors clustered at the municipality level.

Table B.1: Child benefit and the support for PiS, covariates selected by LASSO

	(1) Baseline, excl. Electoral district FE	(2) Baseline, incl. Electoral district FE	(3) Extended, excl. Electoral district FE	(4) Extended, incl. Electoral district FE
Child benefit p.c.	0.032*** (0.004)	0.026*** (0.004)	0.024*** (0.004)	0.023*** (0.004)
Number of potential control variables	17	58	81	122
Number of selected control variables	13	30	38	51
Mean of outcome	16.24	16.24	16.24	16.24
Mean of child benefit p.c.	149.36	149.36	149.36	149.36
Observations	2473	2473	2472	2472

Notes: Table shows the effects of the child benefit on the changes in the vote share for PiS (2011-2019), where the set of covariates is selected using a double-selection LASSO procedure (see Belloni, Chernozhukov, and Hansen, 2014). Column 1 presents the results for the baseline set of covariates. Column 2 presents the results for the baseline covariates including electoral district fixed effects. Column 3 presents the results for the extended set of covariates (baseline variables and variables listed in Tables B.24-B.26). Column 4 presents the results for the extended set of covariates and electoral district fixed effects. The per capita child benefit is the total child benefit amount received in 2016 divided by the municipality's population. Vote shares for PiS are calculated as percentages of eligible voters.

* p<.10; ** p<.05; *** p<.01

Table B.2: Effects of the announcement of child benefit plans: (2011-2015)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Child benefit p.c.	0.021*** (0.001)	0.012*** (0.002)	0.003 (0.003)	0.004 (0.003)	0.001 (0.003)
Political controls	no	yes	yes	yes	yes
Geographic controls	no	yes	yes	yes	yes
Demographic controls	no	no	yes	yes	yes
Economic controls	no	no	no	yes	yes
Electoral district FE	no	no	no	no	yes
Adj. R-Squared	0.08	0.37	0.38	0.39	0.47
Mean of outcome	5.41	5.41	5.41	5.41	5.41
Mean of child benefit p.c.	149.36	149.36	149.36	149.36	149.36
Observations	2473	2473	2473	2473	2473

Notes: Table shows the effects of the child benefit on the changes in the vote share for PiS at the municipal level (between the 2011 and 2015 parliamentary elections). The introduction of the child benefit program was the key element of the electoral campaign of PiS in the 2015 parliamentary elections. The per capita child benefit is the total child benefit amount received in 2016 divided by the municipality's population. Vote shares for PiS are calculated as percentages of eligible voters. Political variables include the PiS vote share in 2011, the vote shares for the right-wing populist parties in 2005, "yes" vote shares in the 2003 EU membership referendum and the share of out-of-wedlock births. Geographic controls include latitude, longitude, distance to the provincial capital, and distance to Warsaw. Demographic controls include log population density, mean age, femininity ratio, fraction of the population with at least secondary education, share of the population aged 13-17, share of the population above retirement age, and urbanization rate. Economic controls include registered unemployment rate and log tax revenue from personal income tax per capita. All control variables are measured in 2011 unless otherwise specified. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.

* p<.10; ** p<.05; *** p<.01

Table B.3: Pre-treatment: (2007-2011)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Child benefit p.c.	0.002 (0.001)	0.006*** (0.002)	0.004* (0.002)	0.004* (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)
Political controls	no	yes	yes	yes	yes
Geographic controls	no	yes	yes	yes	yes
Demographic controls	no	no	yes	yes	yes
Economic controls	no	no	no	yes	yes
Electoral district FE	no	no	no	no	yes
Adj. R-Squared	0.00	0.29	0.32	0.32	0.44
Mean of outcome	-2.79	-2.79	-2.79	-2.79	-2.79
Mean of child benefit p.c.	149.36	149.36	149.36	149.36	149.36
Observations	2473	2473	2473	2473	2473

Notes: Table shows the effects of the child benefit on the changes in the vote share for PiS at the municipal level (between the 2007 and 2011 parliamentary elections). The per capita child benefit is the total child benefit amount received in 2016 divided by the municipality's population. Vote shares for PiS are calculated as percentages of eligible voters. Political variables include the PiS vote share in 2005, the vote shares for the right-wing populist parties in 2005, "yes" vote shares in the 2003 EU membership referendum and the share of out-of-wedlock births. Geographic controls include latitude, longitude, distance to the provincial capital, and distance to Warsaw. Demographic controls include log population density, mean age, femininity ratio, fraction of the population with at least secondary education, share of the population aged 13-17, share of the population above retirement age, and urbanization rate. Economic controls include registered unemployment rate and log tax revenue from personal income tax per capita. All control variables are measured in 2007 unless specified differently. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.

* p<.10; ** p<.05; *** p<.01

Table B.4: Persistence: (2011-2023)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Child benefit p.c.	0.084*** (0.003)	0.033*** (0.003)	0.036*** (0.005)	0.025*** (0.005)	0.018*** (0.004)
Political controls	no	yes	yes	yes	yes
Geographic controls	no	yes	yes	yes	yes
Demographic controls	no	no	yes	yes	yes
Economic controls	no	no	no	yes	yes
Electoral district FE	no	no	no	no	yes
Adj. R-Squared	0.21	0.66	0.70	0.72	0.76
Mean of outcome	17.14	17.14	17.14	17.14	17.14
Mean of child benefit p.c.	149.36	149.36	149.36	149.36	149.36
Observations	2473	2473	2473	2473	2473

Notes: Table shows the effects of the child benefit on the changes in the vote share for PiS at the municipal level (between the 2011 and 2023 parliamentary elections). The per capita child benefit is the total child benefit amount received in 2016 divided by the municipality's population. Vote shares for PiS are calculated as percentages of eligible voters. Political variables include the PiS vote share in 2011, the vote shares for the right-wing populist parties in 2005, "yes" vote shares in the 2003 EU membership referendum and the share of out-of-wedlock births. Geographic controls include latitude, longitude, distance to the provincial capital, and distance to Warsaw. Demographic controls include log population density, mean age, femininity ratio, fraction of the population with at least secondary education, share of the population aged 13-17, share of the population above retirement age, and urbanization rate. Economic controls include registered unemployment rate and log tax revenue from personal income tax per capita. All control variables are measured in 2011 unless specified differently. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.

* p<.10; ** p<.05; *** p<.01

Table B.5: Effects of the 2019 expansion of the child benefit program

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Child benefit expansion	-0.003 (0.002)	0.005* (0.003)	0.008** (0.003)	0.008** (0.004)	0.006 (0.004)
Initial child benefit	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Political controls	no	yes	yes	yes	yes
Geographic controls	no	yes	yes	yes	yes
Demographic controls	no	no	yes	yes	yes
Economic controls	no	no	no	yes	yes
Electoral district FE	no	no	no	no	yes
Adj. R-Squared	0.20	0.46	0.47	0.47	0.57
Mean of outcome	6.99	6.99	6.99	6.99	6.99
Mean of child benefit p.c.	44.83	44.83	44.83	44.83	44.83
Observations	2471	2471	2471	2471	2471

Notes: Table shows the effects of the 2019 child benefit expansion on the changes in the vote share for PiS at the municipal level between the elections to the European Parliament (May 2019) and the parliamentary elections (October 2019). The expansion of the child benefit program (replacing the means-tested transfer for the first child with an unconditional transfer) took place in July 2019. The child benefit expansion variable is calculated as the 2018-2019 difference in the amount of the per capita child benefit received. Vote shares for PiS are calculated as percentages of eligible voters. Political variables include the PiS vote share in 2011, the vote shares for the right-wing populist parties in 2005, "yes" vote shares in the 2003 EU membership referendum and the share of out-of-wedlock births. Geographic controls include latitude, longitude, distance to the provincial capital, and distance to Warsaw. Demographic controls include log population density, mean age, femininity ratio, fraction of the population with at least secondary education, share of the population aged 13-17, share of the population above retirement age, and urbanization rate. Economic controls include registered unemployment rate and log tax revenue from personal income tax per capita. All control variables are measured in 2011 unless otherwise specified. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.

* p<.10; ** p<.05; *** p<.01

Table B.6: Child benefit and the support for the remaining parties

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Child benefit p.c.	-0.041*** (0.002)	-0.006** (0.003)	-0.013*** (0.004)	-0.004 (0.004)	-0.004 (0.004)
Political controls	no	yes	yes	yes	yes
Geographic controls	no	yes	yes	yes	yes
Demographic controls	no	no	yes	yes	yes
Economic controls	no	no	no	yes	yes
Electoral district FE	no	no	no	no	yes
Adj. R-Squared	0.10	0.48	0.56	0.60	0.66
Mean of outcome	-0.61	-0.61	-0.61	-0.61	-0.61
Mean of child benefit p.c.	149.36	149.36	149.36	149.36	149.36
Observations	2473	2473	2473	2473	2473

Notes: Table shows the effects of the child benefit on the changes in the vote share for parties other than PiS at the municipality-level (2011-2019) from a regression, in which each observation is weighted by its population in 2011. The per capita child benefit is the total child benefit amount received in 2016 divided by the municipality's population. Vote shares for PiS are calculated as percentages of eligible voters. Political variables include vote share of parties other than PiS in 2011, the vote shares for the right-wing populist parties in 2005, "yes" vote shares in the 2003 EU membership referendum and the share of out-of-wedlock births. Geographic controls include latitude, longitude, distance to the provincial capital, and distance to Warsaw. Demographic controls include log population density, mean age, femininity ratio, fraction of the population with at least secondary education, share of the population aged 13-17, share of the population above retirement age, and urbanization rate. Economic controls include registered unemployment rate and log tax revenue from personal income tax per capita. All control variables are measured in 2011 unless otherwise specified. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.

* p<.10; ** p<.05; *** p<.01

Table B.7: Placebo: child benefit and the support for the ministers of unrelated departments

	(1) 1st position	(2) 1st position	(3) 1st position	(4) 1st position
Child benefit p.c.	-0.000 (0.019)	0.002 (0.021)	-0.000 (0.019)	-0.002 (0.020)
Minister of Education		-0.033 (0.025)		
Minister of the Interior				0.020 (0.015)
Political controls	yes	yes	yes	yes
Geographic controls	yes	yes	yes	yes
Demographic controls	yes	yes	yes	yes
Economic controls	yes	yes	yes	yes
Electoral district FE	yes	yes	yes	yes
Adj. R-Squared	0.38	0.38	0.38	0.38
Observations	2473	2473	2473	2473

Notes: Table shows the effects of the child benefit on the support for the Minister of Education (Anna Zalewska) and Minister of the Interior (Joachim Brudziński). The per capita child benefit is the total child benefit amount received in 2016 divided by the municipality's population. Columns 1-4 show the effects of the child benefit on the difference in 2009-2019 differences in the support for candidates running in the first position and the remaining positions on the lists of PiS in the elections to the European Parliament. Child benefit p.c. × Minister of Education denotes the interaction of the child benefit variable with the 12th electoral district dummy (in which the Minister of Education was running). Child benefit p.c. × Minister of the Interior denotes the interaction of the child benefit variable with the 13th electoral district dummy (in which the Minister of the Interior was running). The vote shares are calculated as percentages of eligible voters. All control variables are measured in 2009 unless otherwise specified. Standard errors are clustered at the level of the electoral districts (the districts in the European elections).

* p<.10; ** p<.05; *** p<.01

Table B.8: Placebo: child benefit and support for the PiS candidates in the parliamentary elections (different candidates, same districts)

	(1) 1st position	(2) 1st position	(3) 3rd position	(4) 3rd position
Child benefit p.c.	0.010 (0.030)	0.012 (0.030)	0.007 (0.017)	0.008 (0.018)
Prime Minister		-0.026		
× Child benefit p.c.		(0.026)		
Minister of Family				-0.008 (0.016)
× Child benefit p.c.				
Political controls	yes	yes	yes	yes
Geographic controls	yes	yes	yes	yes
Demographic controls	yes	yes	yes	yes
Economic controls	yes	yes	yes	yes
Electoral district FE	yes	yes	yes	yes
Adj. R-Squared	0.36	0.36	0.21	0.21
Observations	2473	2473	2473	2473

Notes: Table shows the effects of the child benefit on the support for the PiS candidates in the parliamentary elections. The per capita child benefit is the total child benefit amount received in 2016 divided by the municipality's population. Columns 1 and 2 show the effects of the child benefit on the difference in 2011-2019 differences in the support for candidates running in the first position and the remaining positions on the lists of PiS in the parliamentary elections. Child benefit p.c. × Prime Minister denotes the interaction of the child benefit variable with the 10th electoral district dummy (the electoral district in which the former Prime Minister was running in the 2019 European elections). This is a placebo test because the former Prime Minister was not running in the 2019 parliamentary elections, and electoral districts differ between parliamentary elections and elections to the European Parliament. Similarly, columns 3 and 4 show the effects of the child benefit on the difference in 2011-2019 differences in the support for candidates running in the third position and the remaining positions on the lists of PiS. Child benefit p.c. × Minister of Family denotes the interaction of the child benefit variable with the 13th electoral district dummy (in which the Minister of Family was running in the 2019 European elections). Again, the former Minister of Family was not running in the 2019 parliamentary elections so this is a placebo test. The vote shares are calculated as percentages of eligible voters. All control variables are measured in 2011 unless otherwise specified. Standard errors are clustered at the level of the electoral districts (the districts in the European elections).

* p<.10; ** p<.05; *** p<.01

Table B.9: Additional controls: strength of the Catholic church

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Child benefit p.c.	0.018*** (0.004)	0.018*** (0.004)	0.017*** (0.004)	0.017*** (0.004)
Political controls	yes	yes	yes	yes
Geographic controls	yes	yes	yes	yes
Demographic controls	yes	yes	yes	yes
Economic controls	yes	yes	yes	yes
Electoral district FE	yes	yes	yes	yes
Catholic Mass participation	no	yes	yes	yes
Catholic Communion reception	no	no	yes	yes
Catholic groups membership	no	no	no	yes
Adj. R-Squared	0.73	0.73	0.73	0.73
Mean of outcome	16.23	16.23	16.23	16.23
Mean of child benefit p.c.	149.24	149.24	149.24	149.24
Observations	2419	2419	2419	2419

Notes: Table shows the effects of the child benefit on the changes in the vote share for PiS in the parliamentary elections (2011-2019) at the municipality-level. The per capita child benefit is the total child benefit amount received in 2016 divided by the municipality's population. Vote shares for PiS are calculated as percentages of eligible voters. In all columns, we control for a baseline set of demographic, economic, and social norms variables. In Column 2, we additionally control for the fraction of the population participating in Catholic mass. In Column 3, we add the fraction of the population receiving Catholic communion to the set of the control variables. In Column 4, we add the fraction of the population belonging to Catholic groups (prayer groups, church choirs, altar servers) to the set of the control variables. All variables measuring the strength of the Roman Catholic church were collected in 2008. We removed observations with missing values for at least one of the three variables. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.

* p<.10; ** p<.05; *** p<.01

Table B.10: Additional controls: campaign rallies

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Child benefit p.c.	0.018*** (0.004)	0.018*** (0.004)	0.018*** (0.004)	0.018*** (0.004)	0.018*** (0.004)	0.018*** (0.004)
Political controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Geographic controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Demographic controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Economic controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Electoral district FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Campaign rally: president	no	yes	no	no	no	no
Campaign rally: prime minister	no	no	yes	no	no	no
Campaign rally: party leader	no	no	no	yes	no	no
Campaign rally: Beata Szydło	no	no	no	no	yes	no
Campaign rally: any	no	no	no	no	no	yes
Adj. R-Squared	0.72	0.72	0.72	0.72	0.72	0.72
Mean of outcome	16.24	16.24	16.24	16.24	16.24	16.24
Mean of child benefit p.c.	149.36	149.36	149.36	149.36	149.36	149.36
Observations	2473	2473	2473	2473	2473	2473

Notes: Table shows the effects of the child benefit on the changes in the vote share for PiS in the parliamentary elections (2011-2019) at the municipality-level. The per capita child benefit is the total child benefit amount received in 2016 divided by the municipality's population. Vote shares for PiS are calculated as percentages of eligible voters. In all columns, we control for a baseline set of demographic, economic, and social norms variables. In Column 2, we additionally control for the dummy variable which equals one if the municipality was visited by the president of Poland (Andrzej Duda) during the 2019 electoral campaign, and zero otherwise. In Column 3, we additionally control for the dummy variable which equals one if the municipality was visited by the prime minister (Mateusz Morawiecki) during the 2019 electoral campaign, and zero otherwise. In Column 4, we additionally control for the dummy variable which equals one if the municipality was visited by the PiS leader (Jarosław Kaczyński) during the 2019 electoral campaign, and zero otherwise. In Column 5, we additionally control for the dummy variable which equals one if the municipality was visited by the ex-prime minister responsible for the introduction of the child benefit program (Beata Szydło) during the 2019 electoral campaign, and zero otherwise. In Column 6, we additionally control for the dummy variable which equals one if the municipality was visited by any of the major PiS politicians mentioned above. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.

* p<.10; ** p<.05; *** p<.01

Table B.11: Child benefit per capita and the support for PiS: controlling for trends in covariates

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Child benefit p.c.	0.018*** (0.004)	0.018*** (0.004)	0.017*** (0.004)	0.017*** (0.004)	0.017*** (0.004)
Political controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Geographic controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Demographic controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Economic controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Electoral district FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Political controls (2011-2014 diff)	no	yes	yes	yes	yes
Demographic controls (2011-2014 diff)	no	no	yes	yes	yes
Economic controls (2011-2014 diff)	no	no	no	yes	yes
Adj. R-Squared	0.72	0.72	0.73	0.73	0.73
Mean of outcome	16.24	16.24	16.24	16.24	16.24
Mean of child benefit p.c.	149.36	149.36	149.36	149.36	149.36
Observations	2473	2473	2473	2473	2473

Notes: Table shows the effects of the child benefit on the changes in the vote share for PiS (2011-2019) at the municipality-level. The per capita child benefit is the total child benefit amount received in 2016 divided by the municipality's population. Vote shares for PiS are calculated as percentages of eligible voters. We control for political, geographic, demographic, and economic variables measured in the initial year as well as for electoral district fixed effects (see the note of Table 2 for the list of control variables). We additionally control for 2011-2014 differences in political (the share of out-of-wedlock births), demographic (log population density, femininity ratio, urbanization rate), and economic (unemployment rate, log tax revenue from personal income tax per capita) covariates.

* p<.10; ** p<.05; *** p<.01

Table B.12: Child benefit per capita and the support for PiS: controlling for endogenous labor supply responses

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Child benefit p.c.	0.018*** (0.004)	0.017*** (0.004)	0.017*** (0.004)	0.017*** (0.004)
Political controls	yes	yes	yes	yes
Geographic controls	yes	yes	yes	yes
Demographic controls	yes	yes	yes	yes
Economic controls	yes	yes	yes	yes
Electoral district FE	yes	yes	yes	yes
New firms (2011-2019 diff)	no	yes	no	yes
PIT revenue (2011-2019 diff)	no	no	yes	yes
Adj. R-Squared	0.72	0.72	0.72	0.72
Mean of outcome	16.24	16.24	16.24	16.24
Mean of child benefit p.c.	149.36	149.36	149.36	149.36
Observations	2473	2473	2472	2472

Notes: Table shows the effects of the child benefit on the changes in the vote share for PiS (2011-2019) at the municipality-level. Column 1 shows our baseline results. In column 2, we additionally control for the log change in new firms per capita (2011-2019). In column 3, we additionally control for the log change in personal income tax revenue per capita (2011-2019). In column 4, we control for both variables.

* p<.10; ** p<.05; *** p<.01

Table B.13: Post-treatment: (2015-2019)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Child benefit p.c.	0.049*** (0.002)	0.024*** (0.002)	0.021*** (0.003)	0.016*** (0.003)	0.014*** (0.003)
Political controls	no	yes	yes	yes	yes
Geographic controls	no	yes	yes	yes	yes
Demographic controls	no	no	yes	yes	yes
Economic controls	no	no	no	yes	yes
Electoral district FE	no	no	no	no	yes
Adj. R-Squared	0.21	0.59	0.63	0.64	0.71
Mean of outcome	10.83	10.83	10.83	10.83	10.83
Mean of child benefit p.c.	149.36	149.36	149.36	149.36	149.36
Observations	2473	2473	2473	2473	2473

Notes: Table shows the effects of the child benefit on the changes in the vote share for PiS at the municipal level (between the 2015 and 2019 parliamentary elections). The per capita child benefit is the total child benefit amount received in 2016 divided by the municipality's population. Vote shares for PiS are calculated as percentages of eligible voters. Political variables include the PiS vote share in 2015, the vote shares for the right-wing populist parties in 2005, "yes" vote shares in the 2003 EU membership referendum and the share of out-of-wedlock births. Geographic controls include latitude, longitude, distance to the provincial capital, and distance to Warsaw. Demographic controls include log population density, mean age, femininity ratio, fraction of the population with at least secondary education, share of the population aged 13-17, share of the population above retirement age, and urbanization rate. Economic controls include registered unemployment rate and log tax revenue from personal income tax per capita. All control variables are measured in 2005 unless specified differently. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.

* p<.10; ** p<.05; *** p<.01

Table B.14: Child benefit and the support for PiS, weighted by municipality population

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Child benefit p.c.	0.101*** (0.008)	0.029*** (0.004)	0.022*** (0.005)	0.019*** (0.005)	0.014*** (0.004)
Political controls	no	yes	yes	yes	yes
Geographic controls	no	yes	yes	yes	yes
Demographic controls	no	no	yes	yes	yes
Economic controls	no	no	no	yes	yes
Electoral district FE	no	no	no	no	yes
Adj. R-Squared	0.46	0.78	0.82	0.82	0.86
Mean of outcome	16.24	16.24	16.24	16.24	16.24
Mean of child benefit p.c.	149.36	149.36	149.36	149.36	149.36
Observations	2473	2473	2473	2473	2473

Notes: Table shows the effects of the child benefit on the changes in the vote share for PiS at the municipal level (2011-2019) from a regression, in which each observation is weighted by its population in 2011. The per capita child benefit is the total child benefit amount received in 2016 divided by the municipality's population. Vote shares for PiS are calculated as percentages of eligible voters. Political variables include the PiS vote share in 2011, the vote shares for the right-wing populist parties in 2005, "yes" vote shares in the 2003 EU membership referendum and the share of out-of-wedlock births. Geographic controls include latitude, longitude, distance to the provincial capital, and distance to Warsaw. Demographic controls include log population density, mean age, femininity ratio, fraction of the population with at least secondary education, share of the population aged 13-17, share of the population above retirement age, and urbanization rate. Economic controls include registered unemployment rate and log tax revenue from personal income tax per capita. All control variables are measured in 2011 unless otherwise specified. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.

* p<.10; ** p<.05; *** p<.01

Table B.15: Child benefit and support for PiS (share of valid votes)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Child benefit p.c.	0.070*** (0.005)	0.045*** (0.005)	0.037*** (0.007)	0.020*** (0.007)	0.018*** (0.006)
Political controls	no	yes	yes	yes	yes
Geographic controls	no	yes	yes	yes	yes
Demographic controls	no	no	yes	yes	yes
Economic controls	no	no	no	yes	yes
Electoral district FE	no	no	no	no	yes
Adj. R-Squared	0.08	0.57	0.63	0.67	0.72
Mean of outcome	20.31	20.31	20.31	20.31	20.31
Mean of child benefit p.c.	149.36	149.36	149.36	149.36	149.36
Observations	2473	2473	2473	2473	2473

Notes: Table shows the effects of the child benefit on the changes in the valid votes share for PiS at the municipality-level (2011-2019) from a regression, in which each observation is weighted by its population in 2011. The per capita child benefit is the total child benefit amount received in 2016 divided by the municipality's population. Vote shares for PiS are calculated as percentages of valid votes. Political variables include valid votes share of PiS in 2011, the vote shares for the right-wing populist parties in 2005, "yes" vote shares in the 2003 EU membership referendum and the share of out-of-wedlock births. Geographic controls include latitude, longitude, distance to the provincial capital, and distance to Warsaw. Demographic controls include log population density, mean age, femininity ratio, fraction of the population with at least secondary education, share of the population aged 13-17, share of the population above retirement age, and urbanization rate. Economic controls include registered unemployment rate and log tax revenue from personal income tax per capita. All control variables are measured in 2011 unless otherwise specified. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.

* p<.10; ** p<.05; *** p<.01

Table B.16: Child benefit and the support for PiS, treatment divided by eligible voters

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Child benefit p.c.	0.043*** (0.002)	0.021*** (0.002)	0.015*** (0.003)	0.013*** (0.003)	0.009*** (0.003)
Political controls	no	yes	yes	yes	yes
Geographic controls	no	yes	yes	yes	yes
Demographic controls	no	no	yes	yes	yes
Economic controls	no	no	no	yes	yes
Electoral district FE	no	no	no	no	yes
Adj. R-Squared	0.16	0.62	0.65	0.66	0.72
Mean of outcome	16.24	16.24	16.24	16.24	16.24
Mean of child benefit p.c.	187.21	187.21	187.21	187.21	187.21
Observations	2473	2473	2473	2473	2473

Notes: Table shows the effects of the child benefit on the changes in the vote share for PiS at the municipal level (2011-2019). Child benefit per capita is the total amount of child benefit received in 2016 divided by eligible voters in the 2015 parliamentary elections. Vote shares for PiS are calculated as percentages of eligible voters. Political variables include the PiS vote share in 2011, the vote shares for the right-wing populist parties in 2005, "yes" vote shares in the 2003 EU membership referendum and the share of out-of-wedlock births. Geographic controls include latitude, longitude, distance to the provincial capital, and distance to Warsaw. Demographic controls include log population density, mean age, femininity ratio, fraction of the population with at least secondary education, share of the population aged 13-17, share of the population above retirement age, and urbanization rate. Economic controls include registered unemployment rate and log tax revenue from personal income tax per capita. All control variables are measured in 2011 unless otherwise specified. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.

* p<.10; ** p<.05; *** p<.01

Table B.17: Child benefit recipients and the support for PiS

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Child benefit recipients	1.661*** (0.076)	0.765*** (0.083)	0.834*** (0.121)	0.827*** (0.120)	0.557*** (0.114)
Political controls	no	yes	yes	yes	yes
Geographic controls	no	yes	yes	yes	yes
Demographic controls	no	no	yes	yes	yes
Economic controls	no	no	no	yes	yes
Electoral district FE	no	no	no	no	yes
Adj. R-Squared	0.16	0.62	0.66	0.66	0.72
Mean of outcome	16.24	16.24	16.24	16.24	16.24
Mean of child benefit p.c.	7.20	7.20	7.20	7.20	7.20
Observations	2473	2473	2473	2473	2473

Notes: Table shows the effects of the child benefit on the changes in the vote share for PiS at the municipal level (2011-2019). Child benefit recipients is the number of families that received child benefit in 2017 multiplied by 100 and divided by municipal population. Vote shares for PiS are calculated as percentages of eligible voters. Political variables include the PiS vote share in 2011, the vote shares for the right-wing populist parties in 2005, "yes" vote shares in the 2003 EU membership referendum and the share of out-of-wedlock births. Geographic controls include latitude, longitude, distance to the provincial capital, and distance to Warsaw. Demographic controls include log population density, mean age, femininity ratio, fraction of the population with at least secondary education, share of the population aged 13-17, share of the population above retirement age, and urbanization rate. Economic controls include registered unemployment rate and log tax revenue from personal income tax per capita. All control variables are measured in 2011 unless otherwise specified. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.

* p<.10; ** p<.05; *** p<.01

Table B.18: Child benefit and the support for PiS, average annual child benefit per capita (2016-2019)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Child benefit p.c.	0.060*** (0.003)	0.027*** (0.003)	0.020*** (0.004)	0.018*** (0.004)	0.017*** (0.004)
Political controls	no	yes	yes	yes	yes
Geographic controls	no	yes	yes	yes	yes
Demographic controls	no	no	yes	yes	yes
Economic controls	no	no	no	yes	yes
Electoral district FE	no	no	no	no	yes
Adj. R-Squared	0.19	0.62	0.65	0.66	0.72
Mean of outcome	16.24	16.24	16.24	16.24	16.24
Mean of child benefit p.c.	177.28	177.28	177.28	177.28	177.28
Observations	2473	2473	2473	2473	2473

Notes: Table shows the effects of the child benefit on the changes in the vote share for PiS at the municipal level (2011-2019). Child benefit per capita is the average annual amount of child benefit received between 2016 and 2019 divided by municipal population. Vote shares for PiS are calculated as percentages of eligible voters. Political variables include the PiS vote share in 2011, the vote shares for the right-wing populist parties in 2005, "yes" vote shares in the 2003 EU membership referendum and the share of out-of-wedlock births. Geographic controls include latitude, longitude, distance to the provincial capital, and distance to Warsaw. Demographic controls include log population density, mean age, femininity ratio, fraction of the population with at least secondary education, share of the population aged 13-17, share of the population above retirement age, and urbanization rate. Economic controls include registered unemployment rate and log tax revenue from personal income tax per capita. All control variables are measured in 2011 unless otherwise specified. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.

* p<.10; ** p<.05; *** p<.01

Table B.19: Child benefit and the support for PiS: binary treatment variable

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Child benefit dummy	3.286*** (0.163)	1.125*** (0.426)	0.658* (0.354)	1.039*** (0.393)
Political controls	no	yes	yes	yes
Geographic controls	no	yes	yes	yes
Demographic controls	no	no	yes	yes
Economic controls	no	no	no	yes
N	2473	2473	2473	2473

Notes: Table shows the effects of the child benefit on the vote share for PiS at the municipality-level estimated using doubly robust difference-in-differences estimator (Sant'Anna and Zhao, 2020). Treatment variable is a dummy variable which equals 1 for municipalities with child benefit amount per capita above median and 0 for municipalities below or equal to median. Pre-treatment elections are the elections in 2007 and 2011, post-treatment elections are the elections in 2015 and 2019. We report event-study coefficients on the 2019 elections average treatment effect on treated with the 2011 elections as a reference category for consistency. Vote shares for PiS are calculated as percentages of eligible voters. Demographic controls include log population density, and the female share of the population. Economic controls include registered unemployment rate and log tax revenue from personal income tax per capita. Political variables include the PiS vote share in 2011, the vote shares for the right-wing populist parties in 2005, "yes" vote shares in the 2003 EU membership referendum and the share of out-of-wedlock births (2005). All control variables are measured in 2005 unless specified differently. Compared to the baseline specification, we do not control for mean age, since the inclusion of this variable led to computational error. Standard errors clustered at the level of the municipality were calculated.

* p<.10; ** p<.05; *** p<.01

Table B.20: Alternative standard errors

	(1) Robust	(2) Cluster: municipality	(3) Cluster: county	(4) Cluster: electoral district	(5) Conley (25 km)	(6) Conley (50 km)	(7) Conley (75 km)
Child benefit p.c.	0.018*** (0.004)	0.018*** (0.005)	0.018** (0.007)	0.018*** (0.005)	0.018*** (0.007)	0.018** (0.007)	0.018*** (0.007)
Political controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Geographic controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Demographic controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Economic controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Electoral district FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Adj. R-Squared	0.68	0.68	0.68	0.68	0.68	0.68	0.68
Observations	2473	2473	2473	2473	2473	2473	2473

Notes: Table shows the effects of the child benefit on the changes in the vote share for PiS (2011-2019) at the municipality-level. The per capita child benefit is the total child benefit amount received in 2016 divided by the municipality's population. Vote shares for PiS are calculated as percentages of eligible voters. We control for political, geographic, demographic, and economic variables measured in the initial year as well as for electoral district fixed effects (see the note of Table 2 for the list of control variables). In column 1, robust standard errors were calculated, column 2 shows standard errors clustered at the level of county, column 3 shows standard errors clustered at the level of electoral district, columns 4-7 show Conley standard errors with different choice of the distance cutoff.

* p<.10; ** p<.05; *** p<.01

Table B.21: Fixed effects: region, electoral district, county, commuting zone

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Child benefit p.c.	0.018*** (0.004)	0.015*** (0.004)	0.011*** (0.004)	0.011*** (0.004)
Political controls	yes	yes	yes	yes
Geographic controls	yes	yes	yes	yes
Demographic controls	yes	yes	yes	yes
Economic controls	yes	yes	yes	yes
Electoral district FE	yes	no	no	no
Region FE	no	yes	no	no
Commuting zone FE	no	no	yes	no
County FE	no	no	no	yes
Adj. R-Squared	0.72	0.70	0.80	0.79
Mean of outcome	16.24	16.24	16.24	16.24
Mean of child benefit p.c.	149.36	149.36	149.36	149.36
Observations	2473	2473	2473	2473

Notes: Table shows the effects of the child benefit on the changes in the vote share for PiS (2011-2019) at the municipality-level. The per capita child benefit is the total child benefit amount received in 2016 divided by the municipality's population. Vote shares for PiS are calculated as percentages of eligible voters. We control for political, geographic, demographic, and economic variables measured in the initial year as well as for electoral district fixed effects (see the note of Table 2 for the list of control variables). In column 2, we control for region fixed effects (16 provinces). In column 3, we control for electoral district fixed effects (41 districts). In column 4, we control for commuting zone fixed effects (339 zones). In column 5, we control for county fixed effects (380 counties). Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.

* p<.10; ** p<.05; *** p<.01

Table B.22: Pre-treatment: (2005-2011)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Child benefit p.c.	0.065*** (0.003)	0.013*** (0.003)	0.006* (0.004)	0.007* (0.004)	0.003 (0.004)
Political controls	no	yes	yes	yes	yes
Geographic controls	no	yes	yes	yes	yes
Demographic controls	no	no	yes	yes	yes
Economic controls	no	no	no	yes	yes
Electoral district FE	no	no	no	no	yes
Adj. R-Squared	0.19	0.63	0.66	0.66	0.72
Mean of outcome	5.42	5.42	5.42	5.42	5.42
Mean of child benefit p.c.	149.36	149.36	149.36	149.36	149.36
Observations	2473	2473	2473	2473	2473

Notes: Table shows the effects of the child benefit on the changes in the vote share for PiS at the municipal level (between the 2005 and 2011 parliamentary elections). The per capita child benefit is the total child benefit amount received in 2016 divided by the municipality's population. Vote shares for PiS are calculated as percentages of eligible voters. Political variables include the PiS vote share in 2005, the vote shares for the right-wing populist parties in 2005, "yes" vote shares in the 2003 EU membership referendum and the share of out-of-wedlock births. Geographic controls include latitude, longitude, distance to the provincial capital, and distance to Warsaw. Demographic controls include log population density, mean age, femininity ratio, fraction of the population with at least secondary education, share of the population aged 13-17, share of the population above retirement age, and urbanization rate. Economic controls include registered unemployment rate and log tax revenue from personal income tax per capita. All control variables are measured in 2005 unless specified differently. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.

* p<.10; ** p<.05; *** p<.01

Table B.23: LASSO: lists of selected covariates

Column	Variables Selected by LASSO
(1)	Incident of out-of-wedlock births; Secondary education (2002); Femininity ratio; Distance to Warsaw; Distance to the provincial capital; Latitude; Populist vote share (2005); Average age; PiS vote share (2011); Population aged 13-17; Log PIT revenue p.c.; Unemployment rate; Support for the EU accession (2003)
(2)	Incident of out-of-wedlock births; Secondary education (2002); Femininity ratio; Distance to Warsaw; Distance to the provincial capital; Latitude; Populist vote share (2005); Average age; PiS vote share (2011); Population aged 13-17; Log PIT revenue p.c.; Unemployment rate; Support for the EU accession (2003)
(3)	Agricultural households; Incident of out-of-wedlock births; Commuters; Dwelling age, 1918-1944 (2002); Dwelling age, 1971-1988 (2002); Sewerage access (2002); Water access (2002); Secondary education (2002); Employment rate, female; Family benefit recipients; Households with children, 18-24 years old (2002); Households with children (2002); Medium farms share; Farms: cattle; Farms: cereals; Small farms share; Farms: potatoes; Femininity ratio; Forest area; Distance to big town; Distance to Warsaw; Distance to the provincial capital; Households: 3-4 persons (2002); Rental housing (2002); Latitude; Populist vote share (2005); Marriage rate; Average age; Internal migration, inflow 1989-2002; Marital status: married (2002); Married, not living together (2002); Municipality expenditure: social assistance; New flats; Nurseries availability; PiS vote share (2011); Stove use (2002); Unemployment rate; Urbanization rate; Support for the EU accession (2003)
(4)	Agricultural households; Incident of out-of-wedlock births; Commuters; Dwelling age, 1918-1944 (2002); Dwelling age, 1971-1988 (2002); Sewerage access (2002); Water access (2002); Secondary education (2002); Employment rate, female; Family benefit recipients; Households with children, 18-24 years old (2002); Households with children (2002); Medium farms share; Average farm area; Farms: cattle; Farms: cereals; Small farms share; Farms: pigs; Farms: potatoes; Forest area; Distance to big town; Distance to Warsaw; Distance to the provincial capital; Households: 3-4 persons (2002); Rental housing (2002); Latitude; Populist vote share (2005); Marriage rate; Average age; Internal migration, inflow 1989-2002; Marital status: married (2002); Married, not living together (2002); Municipality expenditure: social assistance; New flats; Nurseries availability; PiS vote share (2011); Stove use (2002); Unemployment rate; Support for the EU accession (2003)

Notes: Table shows the list of covariates selected in the LASSO double-selection procedure presented in Table B.1. The values in the first column correspond to the column numbers of Table B.1, and the second column shows the list of selected covariates. We do not report electoral district fixed effects.

* $p < .10$; ** $p < .05$; *** $p < .01$

Table B.24: Extended list of covariates for LASSO (i.)

Variable	Description	Source
Marriage rate (2011)	the number of new marriages divided by the municipality's population	Statistics Poland
Employment rate (2011)	the number of individuals employed in medium and large firms (10+ workers) divided by working-age population	Statistics Poland
Employment rate, female (2011)	the number of women employed in medium and large firms (10+ workers) divided by working-age female population	Statistics Poland
Unemployment rate, female Firms (2011)	registered female unemployment rate the number of all firms divided by the municipality's population (log)	Statistics Poland Statistics Poland
Firms, new (2011)	the number of firms established in 2011 divided by the municipality's population (log)	Statistics Poland
Firms, removed (2011)	the number of firms removed from the firm register in 2011 divided by the municipality's population (log)	Statistics Poland
Public firms (2011)	the number of public firms divided by the number of all firms	Statistics Poland
Kindergarten availability (2011)	the number of places in kindergarten divided by the number of children aged 3-5	Statistics Poland
Nurseries availability (2011)	the number of places in nurseries divided by the number of children aged 0-3	Statistics Poland
Family benefit recipients (2011)	the number of recipients of family benefits divided by the municipality's population	Statistics Poland
Social benefit recipients (2011)	the number of recipients of social benefits divided by the municipality's population	Statistics Poland
Library readership (2011)	the number of library users divided by the municipality's population	Statistics Poland
Forest area (2011)	forest area divided by municipality area	Statistics Poland
Government investment grants (2011)	the amount of government investment grants received divided by the municipality's population	Statistics Poland
Municipality revenue (2011)	total municipality revenue divided by the municipality's population (log)	Statistics Poland
Municipality expenditure (2011)	total municipality spending divided by the municipality's population (log)	Statistics Poland
Municipality expenditure: education (2011)	municipality spending on education divided by the municipality's population (log)	Statistics Poland
Municipality expenditure: social assistance (2011)	municipality spending on social assistance divided by the municipality's population (log)	Statistics Poland
Municipality expenditure: culture (2011)	municipality spending on culture divided by the municipality's population (log)	Statistics Poland
Municipality expenditure: public administration (2011)	municipality spending on public administration divided by the municipality's population (log)	Statistics Poland
Municipality expenditure: utilities (2011)	municipality spending on utilities divided by the municipality's population (log)	Statistics Poland
Municipality expenditure: health (2011)	municipality spending on utilities divided by the municipality's population (log)	Statistics Poland
Distance to big town	distance to the nearest town with population above 250,000 in kilometers	own calculations using Geopandas and shapefiles from https://gis-support.pl/
Distance to county town	distance to the nearest county town in kilometers	own calculations using Geopandas and shapefiles from https://gis-support.pl/

Notes: Description of variables used in the double-selection LASSO procedure.

Table B.25: Extended list of covariates for LASSO (ii.)

Variable	Description	Source
Dwelling area per capita (2011)	total residential dwelling area divided by the municipality's population	Statistics Poland
New flats (2011)	the number of flats built in 2011 divided by the municipality's population	Statistics Poland
New non-residential buildings (2011)	cubic volume of new non-residential buildings built in 2011 divided by the municipality's population	Statistics Poland
Commuters (2011)	the number of workers commuting to other municipality divided by the municipality's population in the working-age in the 2011 census	Statistics Poland
Community social assistance (2011)	the number of adults who were benefiting from community social assistance in 2011 divided by the municipality's population	Statistics Poland
Pharmacies availability (2011)	the number of pharmacies divided by the municipality's population	Statistics Poland
Hotel availability (2011)	number of beds available in tourist facilities in July 2011 divided by the municipality's population	Statistics Poland
Female municipality councillors (2011)	number of female municipality councillors divided by the total number of municipality councillors	Statistics Poland
Education of municipality council (2011)	number of municipality councillors with tertiary education divided by the total number of municipality councillors	Statistics Poland
Agricultural households (2010)	the number of households with income from agriculture divided by the municipality's population in the 2010 agricultural census	Statistics Poland
Agricultural land share (2010)	the total area of farms divided by total municipality area in the 2010 agricultural census	Statistics Poland
Average farm area (2010)	the total area of farms divided by the number of farms	Statistics Poland
Small farms share (2010)	the number of farms with area below 1 ha divided by the number of all farms in the 2010 agricultural census	Statistics Poland
Medium farms share (2010)	the number of farms with area from 1 ha to 10 ha divided by the number of all farms in the 2010 agricultural census (residual category is large farms with area of more than 10 ha)	Statistics Poland
Farms: cereals (2010)	the number of farms cultivating cereals divided by the number of all farms in the 2010 agricultural census	Statistics Poland
Farms: potatoes (2010)	the number of farms cultivating potatoes divided by the number of all farms in the 2010 agricultural census	Statistics Poland
Farms: cattle (2010)	the number of farms with cattle (non-zero livestock) divided by the number of all farms in the 2010 agricultural census	Statistics Poland
Farms: pigs (2010)	the number of farms with pigs (non-zero livestock) divided by the number of all farms in the 2010 agricultural census	Statistics Poland
Farms: poultry (2010)	the number of farms with poultry (non-zero livestock) divided by the number of all farms in the 2010 agricultural census	Statistics Poland

Notes: Description of variables used in the double-selection LASSO procedure. For municipalities with no farms, farm variables equal to zero.

Table B.26: Extended list of covariates for LASSO (iii.)

Variable	Description	Source
Marital status: married (2002)	the number of married individuals divided by the municipality's population in the 2002 census	Statistics Poland
Married, not living together (2002)	the number of married individuals who do not live together divided by the number of all married individuals in the 2002 census	Statistics Poland
Households with children (2002)	the number of households with at least one dependent child aged 0-24 divided by the number of all households in the 2002 census	Statistics Poland
Households with children, 18-24 years old (2002)	the number of households with at least one dependent child aged 18-24 divided by the number of all households in the 2002 census	Statistics Poland
Households: 2 persons (2002)	the number of households with two household members divided by the number of all households in the 2002 census	Statistics Poland
Households: 3-4 persons (2002)	the number of households with three or four household members divided by the number of all households in the 2002 census	Statistics Poland
Households: 5 persons or more (2002)	the number of households with five household members or more divided by the number of all households in the 2002 census	Statistics Poland
Internal migration, inflow 1989-2002 (2002)	the number of individuals who moved to the municipality between 1989 and 2002 and lived in the municipality in 2002 divided by the municipality's population in the 2002 census	Statistics Poland
Rental housing (2002)	the number of households who live in a rented dwelling divided by the number of all households in the 2002 census	Statistics Poland
Small dwellings (2002)	the number of individuals who live in a dwelling with less than 7 m squared per person divided by the municipality's population in the 2002 census	Statistics Poland
Large dwellings (2002)	the number of individuals who live in a dwelling with at least 30 m squared per person divided by the municipality's population in the 2002 census	Statistics Poland
Dwelling age, 1918-1944 (2002)	the number of dwellings built between 1918-1944 divided by the number of all dwellings in the 2002 census	Statistics Poland
Dwelling age, 1945-1970 (2002)	the number of dwellings built between 1945-1970 divided by the number of all dwellings in the 2002 census	Statistics Poland
Dwelling age, 1971-1988 (2002)	the number of dwellings built between 1971-1988 divided by the number of all dwellings in the 2002 census	Statistics Poland
Dwelling age, 1989-2002 (2002)	the number of dwellings built between 1989-2002 divided by the number of all dwellings in the 2002 census	Statistics Poland
Water access (2002)	the number of dwellings with the access to water-line system divided by the number of all dwellings in the 2002 census	Statistics Poland
Sewerage access (2002)	the number of dwellings with the access to sewerage system divided by the number of all dwellings in the 2002 census	Statistics Poland
Central heating access (2002)	the number of dwellings with the access to central heating divided by the number of all dwellings in the 2002 census	Statistics Poland
Stove use (2002)	the number of individuals in dwellings with stove as the heating equipment divided by the municipality's population in the 2002 census	Statistics Poland

Notes: Description of variables used in the double-selection LASSO procedure.

Appendix C Heterogeneity




Figure C.1: Heterogeneity of the main effect: initial support for PiS

Notes: Figure shows the effects of the child benefit on the change in the vote share for PiS (2011-2019) at the municipality-level obtained from a regression with the interaction of the treatment dummy and initial support category dummies. Figure shows point estimates of the treatment effects and 95% confidence intervals. The per capita child benefit is the total child benefit amount received in 2016 divided by the municipality's population. Vote shares for PiS are calculated as percentages of eligible voters. We control for political, geographic, demographic, and economic variables measured in the initial year as well as for electoral district fixed effects (see the note of Table 2 for the list of control variables). Horizontal axis labels denote the range of the support for PiS in the 2011 parliamentary elections in municipalities. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.




Figure C.2: Heterogeneity of the main effect: municipality size

Notes: Figure shows the effects of the child benefit on the change in the vote share for PiS (2011-2019) at the municipality-level obtained from a regression with the interaction of the treatment dummy and municipality size category dummies. Figure shows point estimates of the treatment effects and 95% confidence intervals. The per capita child benefit is the total child benefit amount received in 2016 divided by the municipality's population. Vote shares for PiS are calculated as percentages of eligible voters. We control for political, geographic, demographic, and economic variables measured in the initial year as well as for electoral district fixed effects (see the note of Table 2 for the list of control variables). Horizontal axis labels denote the range of the municipality population. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.




Figure C.3: Heterogeneity of the main effect: support for the EU membership

Notes: Figure shows the effects of the child benefit on the change in the vote share for PiS (2011-2019) at the municipality-level obtained from a regression with the interaction of the treatment dummy and support for the EU accession (2003) category dummies. Figure shows point estimates of the treatment effects and 95% confidence intervals. The per capita child benefit is the total child benefit amount received in 2016 divided by the municipality's population. Vote shares for PiS are calculated as percentages of eligible voters. We control for political, geographic, demographic, and economic variables measured in the initial year as well as for electoral district fixed effects (see the note of Table 2 for the list of control variables). Horizontal axis labels denote the range of the municipality population. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.




Figure C.4: Heterogeneity of the main effect: secondary education

Notes: Figure shows the effects of the child benefit on the change in the vote share for PiS (2011-2019) at the municipality-level obtained from a regression with the interaction of the treatment dummy and secondary education categories dummies (% of population with at least secondary education in the 2002 census). Figure shows point estimates of the treatment effects and 95% confidence intervals. The per capita child benefit is the total child benefit amount received in 2016 divided by the municipality's population. Vote shares for PiS are calculated as percentages of eligible voters. We control for political, geographic, demographic, and economic variables measured in the initial year as well as for electoral district fixed effects (see the note of Table 2 for the list of control variables). Horizontal axis labels denote the range of the municipality population. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.




Figure C.5: Treatment effects by elections level

Notes: Figure shows the effects of the child benefit on the change in the vote share for PiS at the municipality-level in parliamentary, presidential and European Parliament elections. Figure shows point estimates of the treatment effects and 95% confidence intervals. The outcome variable in the parliamentary elections is the main outcome: change in the vote share for PiS (2011-2019) in the parliamentary elections. The outcome variable in the presidential elections is the change in the vote share for the official PiS candidate (Jarosław Kaczyński in 2010 and Andrzej Duda in 2020). The outcome variable in the European Parliament elections is change in the vote share for PiS (2009-2019) in the election to the European Parliament. Vote shares are calculated as percentages of eligible voters. We control for political, geographic, demographic, and economic variables measured in the initial year as well as for electoral district fixed effects. Tables 2, C.1, and C.2 show detailed regression results. We find smaller and statistically insignificant effects in the Senate elections (Table ??). However, in these elections, there are no party lists, and in several districts, PiS did not select its candidate either in 2011 or 2019. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.

Table C.1: Treatment effects: presidential elections (2010-2020)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Child benefit p.c.	0.035*** (0.002)	0.036*** (0.003)	0.027*** (0.004)	0.022*** (0.004)	0.018*** (0.004)
Political controls	no	yes	yes	yes	yes
Geographic controls	no	yes	yes	yes	yes
Demographic controls	no	no	yes	yes	yes
Economic controls	no	no	no	yes	yes
Electoral district FE	no	no	no	no	yes
Adj. R-Squared	0.09	0.47	0.54	0.55	0.58
Mean of outcome	11.99	11.99	11.99	11.99	11.99
Mean of child benefit p.c.	149.36	149.36	149.36	149.36	149.36
Observations	2473	2473	2473	2473	2473

Notes: Table shows the effects of the child benefit on the changes in the vote share for the official PiS candidate in the presidential elections (2010-2020) at the municipality-level. The per capita child benefit is the total child benefit amount received in 2016 divided by the municipality's population. Jarosław Kaczyński was the candidate of PiS in the 2010 presidential elections. Andrzej Duda was the candidate of PiS in the 2020 presidential elections. Vote shares are calculated as percentages of eligible voters. Political variables include the PiS vote share in 2011, the vote shares for the right-wing populist parties in 2005, "yes" vote shares in the 2003 EU membership referendum and the share of out-of-wedlock births. Geographic controls include latitude, longitude, distance to the provincial capital, and distance to Warsaw. Demographic controls include log population density, mean age, femininity ratio, fraction of the population with at least secondary education, share of the population aged 13-17, share of the population above retirement age, and urbanization rate. Economic controls include registered unemployment rate and log tax revenue from personal income tax per capita. All control variables are measured in 2010 unless specified differently. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.

* p<.10; ** p<.05; *** p<.01

Table C.2: Treatment effects: European Parliament elections (2009-2019)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Child benefit p.c.	0.081*** (0.003)	0.032*** (0.003)	0.032*** (0.004)	0.030*** (0.004)	0.017*** (0.004)
Political controls	no	yes	yes	yes	yes
Geographic controls	no	yes	yes	yes	yes
Demographic controls	no	no	yes	yes	yes
Economic controls	no	no	no	yes	yes
Electoral district FE	no	no	no	no	yes
Adj. R-Squared	0.23	0.71	0.72	0.72	0.79
Mean of outcome	11.99	11.99	11.99	11.99	11.99
Mean of child benefit p.c.	149.36	149.36	149.36	149.36	149.36
Observations	2473	2473	2473	2473	2473

Notes: Table shows the effects of the child benefit on the change the vote share for PiS in the elections to the European Parliament (2009-2019) at the municipality-level. The per capita child benefit is the total child benefit amount received in 2016 divided by the municipality's population. Vote shares are calculated as percentages of eligible voters. Political variables include the PiS vote share in 2011, the vote shares for the right-wing populist parties in 2005, "yes" vote shares in the 2003 EU membership referendum and the share of out-of-wedlock births. Geographic controls include latitude, longitude, distance to the provincial capital, and distance to Warsaw. Demographic controls include log population density, mean age, femininity ratio, fraction of the population with at least secondary education, share of the population aged 13-17, share of the population above retirement age, and urbanization rate. Economic controls include registered unemployment rate and log tax revenue from personal income tax per capita. All control variables are measured in 2009 unless specified differently. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.

* p<.10; ** p<.05; *** p<.01

Table C.3: Treatment effects: Senate elections (2011-2019)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Child benefit p.c.	0.060*** (0.005)	0.045*** (0.005)	0.012* (0.007)	0.013** (0.007)	0.005 (0.005)
Political controls	no	yes	yes	yes	yes
Geographic controls	no	yes	yes	yes	yes
Demographic controls	no	no	yes	yes	yes
Economic controls	no	no	no	yes	yes
Electoral district FE	no	no	no	no	yes
Adj. R-Squared	0.10	0.49	0.51	0.52	0.78
Mean of outcome	17.51	17.51	17.51	17.51	17.51
Mean of child benefit p.c.	149.35	149.35	149.35	149.35	149.35
Observations	2447	2447	2447	2447	2446

Notes: Table shows the effects of the child benefit on the change the vote share for PiS candidates in the elections to the Senate (2011-2019) at the municipality-level. The Senate members are elected in the single-member districts and in some districts PiS did not field its candidate. The per capita child benefit is the total child benefit amount received in 2016 divided by the municipality's population. Vote shares are calculated as percentages of eligible voters. Political variables include the PiS vote share in 2011, the vote shares for the right-wing populist parties in 2005, "yes" vote shares in the 2003 EU membership referendum and the share of out-of-wedlock births. Geographic controls include latitude, longitude, distance to the provincial capital, and distance to Warsaw. Demographic controls include log population density, mean age, femininity ratio, fraction of the population with at least secondary education, share of the population aged 13-17, share of the population above retirement age, and urbanization rate. Economic controls include registered unemployment rate and log tax revenue from personal income tax per capita. All control variables are measured in 2009 unless specified differently. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.

* p<.10; ** p<.05; *** p<.01

Appendix D The design of the child benefit program

The Family 500+ program was introduced by the PiS government in April 2016. In its initial form, the program provided a payment of 500 PLN per month for the second and every subsequent child aged from 0-17 in each family. Poor families with disposable net monthly incomes of up to 800 PLN per capita were also eligible for a 500 PLN transfer for the first (oldest) child in the family. For families with a disabled child, the threshold for receiving the child benefit for the oldest child was set at 1,200 PLN. The means test thresholds were determined using the average per capita monthly disposable family income from the most recent tax returns of children's parents or guardians. The child benefit is tax-free, and does not affect the eligibility of families for other welfare transfers in Poland, such as family allowances or social assistance benefits. The distribution of the transfer had no discretionary aspects: it was impossible for federal and local governments to exclude selected families from the program.

According to the official position of the Ministry of Family, Labor, and Social Policy, the program has three main objectives: encouraging families to have more children, investing in human capital, and reducing child poverty.

In July 2019, the Family 500+ program was extended to cover all children in all families, regardless of family income. In addition, children placed in foster care and care homes became eligible for these payments. Since then, the program has become a fully universal unconditional child benefit. Since the introduction and subsequent expansion of the child benefit program, Poland has become the developed country with the highest family benefit levels relative to the average wage (see Figure D.6).




Figure D.6: Family benefits as % of average wage

Notes: Figure shows the family cash benefits for a couple aged 40 years old (one employed earning 80% of the average wage, the other unemployed) with two children (ages four and six) in relation to the average wage (gross annual value for a full-time worker).

Data: OECD

Two politicians were especially strongly associated with the implementation and promotion of the child benefit program. Beata Szydło served as prime minister after the success of her party in the 2015 elections, and she oversaw the implementation of the program. The introduction of the child benefit program was a flagship issue of two electoral campaigns in 2015, in which Szydło played a crucial role. She was the chief of staff for the campaign of the PiS candidate in the 2015 presidential elections, and a candidate for prime minister in the campaign before the 2015 parliamentary elections (see a leaflet from the campaign in Figure D.7). Elżbieta Rafalska served as the minister of the Ministry of Family, Labor, and Social Policy. Her ministry was directly responsible for the implementation of the child benefit program. Therefore, she was present at the press conferences related to the program, and personally participated in the child benefit program information campaign (along with Szydło, see Figures D.8 and D.9). The child benefit program was never contested within the PiS party. Therefore, electoral support for the former Prime Minister and the Minister of Family should not be seen as a way to enhance their standing within the party.



Figure D.7: Beata Szydło's leaflet from the campaign before the 2015 parliamentary elections

Translation: "Children are not a cost - they are the best investment."

Program Family 500+.

I have prepared a bill which will allow Polish families to receive PLN 500 a month for each second and next child. In families where the situation is more difficult, also for the first child. This money is real help. Parents will no longer have to take out loans for school starter kits.

Why is the program Family 500+ so necessary. The bill aims to help families bringing up children and to counteract demographic decline in Poland. 900 thousand of Polish children live in extreme poverty. 11% of families with three children live below the minimum subsistence level. 27% of families with four or more children live below the minimum subsistence level. In 2014, the extent of extreme poverty in rural areas was more than twice as high as in urban areas."

Source: <https://300polityka.pl/news/2015/09/07/pis-startuje-z-akcja-rozdawania-ulotek-w-calym-kraju-z-planem-500/>



Figure D.8: Elżbieta Rafalska (to the left) and Beata Szydło in front of the bus used in the information campaign about the child benefit program.

Photo © Franciszek Mazur.

Source: <https://wyborcza.pl/7,75398,24485585,500-plus-dla-kazdego-dziecka-ta-propozycja-pis-goni-opozycje.html>.



Figure D.9: Elżbieta Rafalska (to the left) and Beata Szydło presenting the results of the program after three months since its implementation (1st July 2016).

Photo © Sławomir Kamiński/Agencja Gazeta.

Source: <https://oko.press/szydlo-proponuje-polkom-ciaze-jeza-ratowac-dzietnosc/>

Appendix E Quantifying the size of the effect

To what extent do our results explain recent election outcomes? In 2019, PiS won 43.6% of the popular vote, and 235 of the 460 seats in the lower house of the parliament. We can assess the political importance of the estimated effect by calculating how many seats in the lower house of the parliament PiS would have lost if the child benefit program had not been introduced. Multiplying the baseline estimate of the main effect from Table 2 (0.018) by the per capita value of the child benefit across municipalities in 2016, and then by the number of eligible voters, we can calculate that the additional number of votes received by PiS in 2019 was approximately 810,000. We then subtract the additional votes PiS gained due to the child benefit program from the total number of votes, and apply the rules of the electoral system in Poland to translate the counterfactual vote shares of parties into parliamentary seats. The results indicate that, in the absence of the child benefit program, PiS would have secured 225 seats in the parliament. Thus, the party would have fallen short of winning an absolute majority in the lower chamber of parliament (231 seats), and would have been forced to seek coalition partners.

In addition, we estimate the implications of our findings while taking into account the heterogeneity of the effects we found across municipalities of different sizes. Using estimates displayed in Figure C.2, we find that the additional number of votes PiS gained is approximately 513,000. Without these votes, PiS would have failed to obtain the parliamentary majority, as it would have secured just 227 seats in the Sejm. Overall, these calculations show that the introduction of the Family 500+ child benefit program led to significant political gains for PiS.

Appendix F Survey data

CBOS data




Figure F.1: Vote share for PiS in the treatment and control group, survey data

Notes: Figure shows the vote shares for PiS in the Polish Parliament elections in 2007, 2011, 2015 and 2019, for the treated and control groups, separately. The binary treatment group variable equals one for households with a non-zero imputed child benefit (households with at least two members under the age of 18), and equals zero for households not eligible for the unconditional cash transfer. The sample is restricted to respondents aged 25-49.

Source: CBOS.




Figure F.2: Voter turnout in the treatment and control group, survey data

Notes: Figure shows turnout in the Polish Parliament elections in 2007, 2011, 2015 and 2019, for the treated and control groups, separately. The binary treatment group variable equals one for households with a non-zero imputed child benefit (households with at least two members under the age of 18), and equals zero for households not eligible for the unconditional cash transfer. The sample is restricted to respondents aged 25-49. The sources and description of the variables can be found in Table F.1.

Source: CBOS.




Figure F.3: Leads and lags of the treatment effect: the effects on voting for PiS, survey data

Notes: Figure shows the event-study coefficients from the regression of voting for PiS on the interaction between child benefit amount and election year (reference year: 2011). The child benefit amount is imputed based on the number of household members under the age of 18. The sample is restricted to respondents aged 25-49. We control for gender, age and urban/rural area, as well as region fixed effects (see Table F.1 for the list of control variables). 95% confidence intervals are constructed based on robust standard errors.

Source: CBOS.




Figure F.4: Leads and lags of the treatment effect: the effects on support for PiS, binary treatment group, survey data

Notes: Figure shows the event-study coefficients from the regression of voting for PiS on the interaction between treatment group and election year (reference year: 2011). The binary treatment group variable equals one for households with a non-zero imputed child benefit (households with at least two members under the age of 18), and equals zero for households not eligible for the unconditional cash transfer. The sample is restricted to respondents aged 25-49. We control for gender, age and urban/rural area, as well as region fixed effects (see Table F.1 for the list of control variables). 95% confidence intervals are constructed based on robust standard errors.

Source: CBOS




Figure F.5: Leads and lags of the treatment effect: the effects on turnout, survey data

Notes: Figure shows the event-study coefficients from the regression of turnout on the interaction between child benefit amount and election year (reference year: 2011). The child benefit amount is imputed based on the number of household members under the age of 18. The sample is restricted to respondents aged 25-49. We control for gender, age and urban/rural area, as well as region fixed effects (see Table F.1 for the list of control variables). 95% confidence intervals are constructed based on robust standard errors.

Source: CBOS.




Figure F.6: Leads and lags of the treatment effect: the effects on turnout, binary treatment group, survey data

Notes: Figure shows the event-study coefficients from the regression of turnout on the interaction between treatment group and election year (reference year: 2011). The binary treatment group variable equals one for households with a non-zero imputed child benefit (households with at least two members under the age of 18), and equals zero for households not eligible for the unconditional cash transfer. The sample is restricted to respondents aged 25-49. We control for gender, age and urban/rural area, as well as region fixed effects (see Table F.1 for the list of control variables). 95% confidence intervals are constructed based on robust standard errors.

Source: CBOS.




Figure F.7: Child benefit and support for PiS: effect heterogeneity, survey data

Notes: Figure presents the effects of the child benefit on the probability of voting for PiS for selected subsamples. The treatment variable (annual child benefit amount) is imputed based on the number of household members under the age of 18. We run separate regressions for each subsample and plot the point estimates of the interaction of the treatment variable and the post-treatment period. Figure F.7a shows the treatment effects for women and men. Figure F.7b shows the treatment effects for individuals aged 25-32 years old, 33-40 years old, and 40-49 years old, respectively (age cutoffs selected to obtain similar number of observations for each group). Figure F.7c shows treatment effects for respondents living in rural areas and small towns (with population up to 20,000), and respondents living in towns with population of at least 20,000. Figure F.7d shows the treatment effects for respondents with primary, secondary, and tertiary education. In all regressions, we control for gender, age, urban/rural area dummy, election year fixed effects, and region fixed effects. 95% confidence intervals are constructed based on robust standard errors.

Source: CBOS.




Figure F.8: Child benefit and support for PiS: previous electoral preferences, survey data

Notes: Figure presents the effects of the child benefit on the probability of voting for PiS in the next elections conditional on previous declared voting choices. The dependent variable is: "If parliamentary elections were held this coming Sunday, which party's candidate would you vote for in the Sejm elections?" (1 - PiS, 0 - otherwise). The treatment variable (annual child benefit amount) is imputed based on the number of household members under the age of 18. "PO" denotes the previous voting for PO or Nowoczesna, while "Left" denotes the previous voting for the coalition of "Zjednoczona Lewica" + SLD + TR + PPS + UP + "Zieloni" (Green Party), and "Together". Due to the data constraints, the pre-treatment period covers months from December 2015 to March 2015, and post-treatment period covers months from April 2016 to December 2017. We plot the point estimates of the triple interaction of the treatment variable, the post-treatment period, and voting choices in the parliamentary elections in October 2015. We also plot 95% confidence intervals. The sample is restricted to respondents aged 25-49. We control for gender, age, education, urban/rural area dummy, and region fixed effects. Robust standard errors were calculated. Note that the sample sizes are small, in particular, the number of observations voting for Korwin was 200, and for the Left was 329.

Source: CBOS.




Figure F.9: Support for the selected PiS reforms, survey data

Notes: Figure shows the correlation between treatment variable and the support for the Family 500+ reform and other major reforms that could potentially confound the effect of the child benefit program on electoral outcomes of PiS. Only the selected months are available. The data on the support for the Family 500+ reform includes February 2016 and March 2017. The data on the assessment of the Constitutional Tribunal activity includes March 2015, September 2015, March - December 2016, January 2017, March 2017, July 2017, and September 2017. The data on the support for the retirement age reform includes February 2016, August 2016, and May 2017. The data on the education reform includes only January 2017. Figure shows the point estimates of the treatment variable from the OLS regression and 95% confidence intervals. The treatment variable is treatment group binary indicator. For ease of interpretation, outcome variables were standardized to a zero mean and a standard deviation of one. The sample is restricted to respondents aged 25-49. In each regression, we control for gender, age, education, urban/rural area dummy, and region fixed effects. Robust standard errors were calculated. The sources and description of the variables can be found in Tables F.1-F.2.

Source: CBOS.

Table F.1: Variable descriptions: CBOS survey data (i.)

Variable	Description	Source
Treatment variables		
Child benefit amount	Imputed child benefit amount received by households (per adult): 500 PLN for second and each subsequent child (a person under 18 years old) in the household. The monthly amount of the benefit is first multiplied by 9 (for the annual amount - in 2016 the benefit has been paid for 9 months, since April), then divided by 3.93 (2016 exchange rate between PLN and USD), then divided by the number of adult members of the household, and then divided by 100 for the ease of interpretation.	CBOS
Treatment group	Binary indicator for the treated group: 1 = the respondent lives with at least 2 children in the household, 0 = the respondent lives with at most 1 child in the household.	CBOS
Post-treatment period	Binary indicator for post-treatment period: 1 = 2019 parliamentary elections, 0 = 2007 or 2011 parliamentary elections. 2015 parliamentary elections are disregarded in the main specification.	CBOS
Dependent variables		
Voted for PiS	Binary indicator: did the respondent vote for PiS in Polish Parliament elections in 2007, 2011, 2015 or 2019, respectively.	CBOS
Turnout	Binary indicator: did the respondent vote (invalid or empty votes included) in Polish Parliament elections in 2007, 2011, 2015 or 2019, respectively.	CBOS
Control variables		
Female	Gender of the respondent, binary indicator (1= female, 0 otherwise).	CBOS
Age	Age of the respondent at the time of the survey, continuous.	CBOS
City	Binary indicator: 1 = respondent lives in a city of at least 20 thous. inhabitants, 0 otherwise.	CBOS
Education	Three levels: low, middle, or high.	CBOS

Notes: Description of variables used in the survey data analysis. "CBOS" stands for "Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej" ("Public Opinion Research Center"). In our primary analysis we use CBOS data from surveys from the following months and years: Nov 2007, Dec 2007, Jan 2008 (data on 2007 parliamentary elections), Jan 2013, Feb 2013, Mar 2013 (data on 2011 parliamentary elections), Nov 2015, Dec 2015, Jan 2016 (data on 2015 parliamentary elections), Nov 2019, Dec 2019, and Jan 2020 (data on 2019 parliamentary elections). The parliamentary elections took place in October 2007, 2011, 2015, and 2019. For each of these years, when possible, the surveys from the three subsequent months were taken. This was impossible for the 2011 elections, because in the Nov 2011, Dec 2011, and Jan 2012 surveys we were unable to identify the number of children in each household. This is why, for the 2011 elections, we use surveys from the beginning of 2013. All other variables are standardized with a zero mean and a standard deviation of one. When necessary, the scale was reversed, so that higher numbers mean better assessment/ higher support.

Table F.2: Variable descriptions: CBOS survey data (ii.)

Variable	Description	Source
<i>Other variables</i>		
Trust in prime minister Beata Szydło	Publicly active people - with their behavior, what they say, what they strive for - awaken more or less trust. I will now present you a list of people who are active in politics of our country. For each of them, please assess to what extent you trust this person. Beata Szydło. 10-point scale (0 - deep distrust, 10 - complete trust).	CBOS
Constitutional Tribunal assessment	How would you assess the activity of the Constitutional Tribunal? (1 - very good, 2 - rather good, 3 - rather poor, 4 - very poor)	CBOS
Family 500+ reform	Generally speaking, do you support or are you against the Family 500+ program, under which families receive a child benefit of PLN 500 for the second and each subsequent child under 18, or for each child in the case of families with low income? (1 - I strongly support, 2 - I rather support, 3 - I'm rather against, 4 - I'm strongly against)	CBOS
Retirement age reform	Generally speaking, do you support or are you against the lowering the retirement age to 60 for women and 65 for men? (1 - I strongly support, 2 - I rather support, 3 - I'm rather against, 4 - I'm strongly against)	CBOS
Education reform	Do you think that the education reform, which is to come into force in September this year, has been well prepared? (1 - strongly agree, 2 - rather agree, 3 - rather disagree, 4 - strongly disagree)	CBOS

Notes: Description of variables used in the survey data analysis. "CBOS" stands for "Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej" ("Public Opinion Research Center"). In our primary analysis we use CBOS data from surveys from the following months and years: Nov 2007, Dec 2007, Jan 2008 (data on 2007 parliamentary elections), Jan 2013, Feb 2013, Mar 2013 (data on 2011 parliamentary elections), Nov 2015, Dec 2015, Jan 2016 (data on 2015 parliamentary elections), Nov 2019, Dec 2019, and Jan 2020 (data on 2019 parliamentary elections). The parliamentary elections took place in October 2007, 2011, 2015, and 2019. For each of these years, when possible, the surveys from the three subsequent months were taken. This was impossible for the 2011 elections, because in the Nov 2011, Dec 2011, and Jan 2012 surveys we were unable to identify the number of children in each household. This is why, for the 2011 elections, we use surveys from the beginning of 2013. All other variables are standardized with a zero mean and a standard deviation of one. When necessary, the scale was reversed, so that higher numbers mean better assessment/ higher support.

Table F.3: Descriptive statistics: CBOS survey data

	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Imputed treatment	3240	2.43	4.12	0.00	34.35
Treatment group (baseline definition)	3240	0.34	0.47	0.00	1.00
Treatment group (one-child-households in the treatment group)	3240	0.64	0.48	0.00	1.00
Treatment group (one-child-households excluded)	2266	0.48	0.50	0.00	1.00
Vote for PiS in Polish Parliament elections	3240	0.20	0.40	0.00	1.00
Turnout (voted in Polish Parliament elections)	3240	0.67	0.47	0.00	1.00
2007 elections	3240	0.31	0.46	0.00	1.00
2011 elections	3240	0.36	0.48	0.00	1.00
2019 elections	3240	0.34	0.47	0.00	1.00
Female	3240	0.53	0.50	0.00	1.00
Age	3240	37.39	7.13	25.00	49.00
Lives in a city of at least 20 thous. inhabitants	3240	0.46	0.50	0.00	1.00

Notes: Table presents the following statistics for each variable: Number of Observations, Average Value, Standard Deviation, Minimum and Maximum Value. The sources and description of the variables can be found in Table F.1.

Source: CBOS.

Table F.4: Child benefit and support for PiS: one-child-households in the treatment group, survey data

	(1) Vote for PiS	(2) Vote for PiS	(3) Turnout	(4) Turnout
Post-treatment period × Treatment group	0.091*** (0.034)	0.078** (0.034)	0.070* (0.038)	0.060 (0.038)
Ind. characteristics	no	yes	no	yes
Election year FE	no	yes	no	yes
Region FE	no	yes	no	yes
Adj. R-Squared	0.03	0.05	0.01	0.04
N	3240	3240	3240	3240

Notes: Table shows the effects of the child benefit on voting for PiS and turnout. The binary treatment group variable equals one for respondents living in households with at least one member under the age of 18, and equals zero for respondents living in households with no members under the age of 18. The pre-treatment period includes the 2007 and 2011 parliamentary elections. The post-treatment period includes the 2019 parliamentary elections. The sample is restricted to respondents aged 25-49. Individual characteristics variables include gender, age and urban/rural area. The sources and descriptions of the variables can be found in Table F.1, and their descriptive statistics can be found in Table F.3.

* p<.10; ** p<.05; *** p<.01

Source: CBOS.

Table F.5: Child benefit and support for PiS: one-child-households excluded, survey data

	(1) Vote for PiS	(2) Vote for PiS	(3) Turnout	(4) Turnout
Post-treatment period × Treatment group	0.112*** (0.040)	0.107*** (0.039)	0.081* (0.043)	0.072* (0.043)
Ind. characteristics	no	yes	no	yes
Election year FE	no	yes	no	yes
Region FE	no	yes	no	yes
Adj. R-Squared	0.03	0.06	0.01	0.04
N	2266	2266	2266	2266

Notes: Table shows the effects of the child benefit on voting for PiS and turnout. The binary treatment group variable equals one for respondents living in households with at least two members under the age of 18, and equals zero for respondents living in households with no members under the age of 18. The pre-treatment period includes the 2007 and 2011 parliamentary elections. The post-treatment period includes the 2019 parliamentary elections. The sample is restricted to respondents aged 25-49. Individual characteristics variables include gender, age and urban/rural area. The sources and description of the variables can be found in Table F.1, and their descriptive statistics can be found in Table F.3.

* p<.10; ** p<.05; *** p<.01

Source: CBOS.

Table F.6: Child benefit and the assessment of the Constitutional Tribunal, survey data

	(1) Tribunal assessment	(2) Tribunal assessment	(3) Tribunal assessment	(4) Tribunal assessment
Post-treatment	0.004	0.005		
period × Child benefit amount	(0.010)	(0.011)		
Post-treatment period × Treatment group			-0.019 (0.084)	-0.022 (0.084)
Ind. characteristics	no	yes	no	yes
Region FE	no	yes	no	yes
Adj. R-Squared	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
N	4225	4225	4225	4225

Notes: Table shows the effects of the child benefit on the assessment of the activities of the Constitutional Tribunal in Poland. The child benefit amount is imputed based on the number of household members under the age of 18. The binary treatment group variable equals one for households with a non-zero imputed child benefit (households with at least two members under the age of 18), and equals zero for households not eligible for the unconditional cash transfer. The pre-treatment period includes March 2015, September 2015, and March 2016. The post-treatment period includes April-December 2016, January 2017, March 2017, July 2017, and September 2017. The sample is restricted to respondents aged 25-49. Individual characteristics variables include gender, age, education and urban/rural area. Robust standard errors were calculated. The sources and description of the variables can be found in Table F.1.

* p<.10; ** p<.05; *** p<.01

Source: CBOS.

Table F.7: Child benefit and trust in prime minister Beata Szydło, survey data

	(1) Trust in Szydło	(2) Trust in Szydło	(3) Trust in Szydło	(4) Trust in Szydło
Post-treatment	0.018*** (0.005)	0.020*** (0.005)		
period × Child benefit amount				
Post-treatment period × Treatment group			0.125*** (0.042)	0.133*** (0.041)
Ind. characteristics	no	yes	no	yes
Region FE	no	yes	no	yes
Adj. R-Squared	0.02	0.09	0.01	0.09
N	11154	11154	11154	11154

Notes: Table shows the effects of the child benefit on the standardized indicator of trust in prime minister Beata Szydło. The child benefit amount is imputed based on the number of household members under the age of 18. The binary treatment group variable equals one for households with a non-zero imputed child benefit (households with at least two members under the age of 18), and equals zero for households not eligible for the unconditional cash transfer. The pre-treatment period includes all the months from June 2015 to March 2016. The post-treatment period includes all the months from April 2016 to December 2017. The sample is restricted to respondents aged 25-49. Individual characteristics variables include gender, age, education and urban/rural area. Robust standard errors were calculated. The sources and description of the variables can be found in Table F.1.

* p<.10; ** p<.05; *** p<.01

Source: CBOS.

Table F.8: Effects of the child benefit on support for PiS and voter turnout: controlling for treatment-specific time trends, survey data

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Vote for PiS	Vote for PiS	Turnout	Turnout
Post-treatment period × Child benefit amount	0.008** (0.003)		0.009** (0.004)	
Post-treatment period × Treatment group		0.094 (0.065)		0.080 (0.079)
Ind. characteristics	yes	yes	yes	yes
Election year FE	yes	yes	yes	yes
Region FE	yes	yes	yes	yes
Treatment group-specific time trend	yes	yes	yes	yes
Adj. R-Squared	0.06	0.06	0.04	0.04
N	3240	3240	3240	3240

Notes: Table shows the effects of the child benefit on voting for PiS and turnout. The child benefit amount is imputed based on the number of household members under the age of 18. The binary treatment group variable equals one for households with a non-zero imputed child benefit (households with at least two members under the age of 18), and equals zero for households not eligible for the unconditional cash transfer. The pre-treatment period includes the 2007 and 2011 parliamentary elections. The post-treatment period includes the 2019 parliamentary elections. The sample is restricted to respondents aged 25-49. Individual characteristics variables include gender, age and urban/rural area. We additionally control for the treatment group-specific linear time trend. The sources and description of the variables can be found in Table F.1 and their descriptive statistics can be found in Table F.3.

* p<.10; ** p<.05; *** p<.01

Source: CBOS.

European Social Survey data

Table F.9: Variable descriptions: ESS survey data (i.)

Variable	Description	Source
Treatment variables		
Child benefit amount	Imputed child benefit amount received by households: 500 PLN per second and each subsequent child (a person under 18 years old) in the household. This number is further multiplied by 12 (for the annual amount), divided by 3.93 (2016 exchange rate between PLN and USD), then divided by the number of adult members of the household, and then dived by 100 for the ease of interpretation.	ESS
Post-treatment period		
	Binary indicator for post-treatment period: 1 = 2016, 2018, 0 = 2008, 2010, 2012, 2014.	ESS
Dependent variables		
Satisfaction with household's financial situation	Which of the descriptions on this card comes closest to how you feel about your household's income nowadays? 4-point scale (Finding it very difficult on present income, Finding it difficult on present income, Coping on present income, Living comfortably on present income)	ESS
Satisfaction with life as a whole	All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole nowadays? 0-10 scale (0 means extremely dissatisfied and 10 means extremely satisfied)	ESS
Satisfaction with present state of economy	On the whole how satisfied are you with the present state of the economy in Poland? 0-10 scale (0 means extremely dissatisfied and 10 means extremely satisfied)	ESS
Satisfaction with national government	Now thinking about the Poland's government, how satisfied are you with the way it is doing its job? 0-10 scale (0 means extremely dissatisfied and 10 means extremely satisfied)	ESS
Satisfaction with state of education	Now, using this card, please say what you think overall about the state of education in Poland nowadays? 0-10 scale (0 means extremely dissatisfied and 10 means extremely satisfied)	ESS
Generalized trust	Using this card, generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people? 0-10 scale (0 means you can't be too careful and 10 means that most people can be trusted)	ESS
Trust in the national parliament	Using this card, please tell me on a score of 0-10 how much you personally trust each of the institutions I read out: Poland's parliament. 0-10 scale (0 means you do not trust an institution at all, and 10 means you have complete trust)	ESS
Trust in politicians	Using this card, please tell me on a score of 0-10 how much you personally trust each of the institutions I read out: politicians. 0-10 scale (0 means you do not trust an institution at all, and 10 means you have complete trust)	ESS
Trust in the European Parliament	Using this card, please tell me on a score of 0-10 how much you personally trust each of the institutions I read out: the European Parliament. 0-10 scale (0 means you do not trust an institution at all, and 10 means you have complete trust)	ESS

Notes: Description of variables used in the survey data analysis. ESS (the European Social Survey) is an academically driven cross-national survey that has been conducted across Europe since its establishment in 2001. Every two years (starting in 2002), face-to-face interviews have been conducted with newly selected, cross-sectional samples. We use data from years 2008-2018. All dependent variables are standardized with a zero mean and a standard deviation of one.

Table F.10: Variable descriptions: ESS survey data (ii.)

Variable	Description	Source
Dependent variables		
Religious services attendance	Apart from special occasions such as weddings and funerals, about how often do you attend religious services nowadays? 7-point scale: (Never, Less often than special holy days, Only on special holy days, At least once a month, Once a week, More than once a week, Every day)	ESS
Important to follow traditions	Tradition is important to her/him. She/he tries to follow the customs handed down by her/his religion or her/his family. 6-point scale (Not like me at all, Not like me, A little like me, Somewhat like me, Like Me, Very much like me).	ESS
Against gay men and lesbians	Using this card, please say to what extent you agree or disagree with each of the following statements. Gay men and lesbians should be free to live their own life as they wish. 5-point scale (Agree strongly, Agree, Neither agree nor disagree, Disagree, Disagree strongly)	ESS
Against immigrants of different ethnicity	Now, using this card, to what extent do you think Poland should allow people of a different race or ethnic group from most Polish people to come and live here? 4-point scale (Allow many, Allow some, Allow a few, Allow none)	ESS
Important that people are treated equally	She/he thinks it is important that every person in the world should be treated equally. She/he believes everyone should have equal opportunities in life. 6-point scale (Not like me at all, Not like me, A little like me, Somewhat like me, Like Me, Very much like me).	ESS
Important to help other people	It's very important to her/him to help the people around her/him. She/he wants to care for their well-being. 6-point scale (Not like me at all, Not like me, A little like me, Somewhat like me, Like Me, Very much like me).	ESS
Government should reduce income inequality	Using this card, please say to what extent you agree or disagree with each of the following statements. The government should take measures to reduce differences in income levels. 5-point scale (Disagree strongly, Disagree, Neither agree nor disagree, Agree, Agree strongly)	ESS
Control variables		
Female	Gender of the respondent, binary indicator (1= female, 0 otherwise).	ESS
Age	Age of the respondent at the time of the survey, continuous.	ESS
City	Binary indicator: 1 = respondent lives in a big city, suburbs or outskirts of big city, a town or a small city, 0 = respondent lives in a country village, a farm or home in countryside.	ESS

Notes: Description of variables used in the survey data analysis. ESS (the European Social Survey) is an academically driven cross-national survey that has been conducted across Europe since its establishment in 2001. Every two years (starting in 2002), face-to-face interviews have been conducted with newly selected, cross-sectional samples. We use data from years 2008-2018. All dependent variables are standardized with a zero mean and a standard deviation of one.

Table F.11: Descriptive statistics: ESS survey data

	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Child benefit amount	3968	2.08	4.04	0.00	68.70
Post-treatment period	3968	0.32	0.47	0.00	1.00
Satisfaction with household's financial situation	3930	-0.00	1.00	-3.19	1.83
Satisfaction with life as a whole	3946	-0.00	1.00	-3.51	1.35
Satisfaction with present state of economy	3877	0.00	1.00	-2.17	2.50
Satisfaction with national government	3892	-0.00	1.00	-1.53	2.68
Satisfaction with state of education	3851	0.00	1.00	-2.48	1.97
Generalized trust	3958	-0.00	1.00	-1.73	2.46
Trust in the national parliament	3903	-0.00	1.00	-1.36	3.03
Trust in politicians	3906	0.00	1.00	-1.14	3.82
Trust in the European Parliament	3723	-0.00	1.00	-1.77	2.39
Religious services attendance	3926	0.00	1.00	-2.29	2.37
Important to follow traditions	3940	0.00	1.00	-3.39	1.22
Against gay men and lesbians	3821	0.00	1.00	-1.36	2.19
Against immigrants of different ethnicity	3882	-0.00	1.00	-1.49	2.02
Important that people are treated equally	3937	0.00	1.00	-4.30	1.12
Important to help other people	3923	-0.00	1.00	-4.16	1.43
Government should reduce income inequality	3912	0.00	1.00	-2.66	1.12
Female	3968	0.50	0.50	0.00	1.00
Age	3968	36.51	7.19	25.00	49.00
City	3968	0.58	0.49	0.00	1.00

Notes: Table presents the following statistics for each variable: Number of Observations, Average Value, Standard Deviation, Minimum and Maximum Value. The sources and description of the variables can be found in Tables F.9-F.10.

Source: ESS.