

# Volunteer Report Cité-Unis

## Abstract

This report analyzes survey data for four different cohorts of Cité-Unis volunteers who did their service civique (2020-2024).

## Introduction

This report analyzes survey data for four different cohorts of Cité Unis volunteers who did their service civique in France between 2020 and 2024.

Section provides analyses as to who are the volunteers. In Section , we look at how the service civique has changed the volunteers' attitudes and views? We then look at several outcomes of interest in detail, namely whether volunteers end their contract early (Section ), how satisfied they are (Section ), and how confident they are about their future? (Section ). For these outcomes, we analyze whether there are trends across the different cohorts, and which demographic variables predict them. In Section we investigate differences between different programs offered by Cité Unis. The report ends with a brief conclusion on methodological notes for future questionnaires.

For these analyses, we rely on questionnaires collected by Cité Unis for four different cohorts of volunteers who did their service civique for a year (2020-2021; 2021-2022; 2022-2023; 2023-2024). These questionnaires are very extensive. For the present analyses, we selected a subset of key questions (a full list can be found in the [codebook](#))<sup>1</sup>.

Before diving into the results, a note on caution in interpreting the results presented in this report: Whenever we speak of “predictions”, that simply means statistical associations—mere observations of differences between groups. This report does **not** provide any evidence that would warrant causal conclusions—answers as to **why** we observe these differences.

Because the data underlying this report is observational and—for most of it—does not allow to track opinion change (because most questions have only been asked once per cohort), the main objective of this report is not to provide specific and definitive answers. Instead, the aim is to allow Cité Unis to identify interesting questions. The numeric results presented here can act as pointers, but are not problem diagnoses. They always need to be accompanied by qualitative assessments of *why* we observe certain differences, and what could or could not be done about them.

This report is meant to inform by figures: the text passages do not discuss all the results from the figures. The text is mostly intended to provide guidance—to illustrate how to interpret the figures. The examples for these illustrations are mostly picked at random.

## Who are the volunteers ?

In this section, we review some demographic variables in detail. An extensive summary table with sample demographics across the different cohorts can be found in [Tables](#).

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<sup>1</sup>Note that, in the process of writing this report, this selection of variables was based only on the questionnaire of the first cohort (2020/21). As a result, potentially interesting variables that only appear in later questionnaires will not appear here.


## Geographic location

Volunteers came from 80 different departments (see Figure 1). On average, across the different cohorts, most volunteers came from Bouches-du-Rhône ( $n = 404$ ), followed by Nord ( $n = 350$ ) and Seine-Saint-Denis ( $n = 316$ ).

Overall, there has been a steady increase in volunteers, from 6386 in 20-21 to 7848 in 23-24, and an average increase of 490.4 per year. Since the 20-21 cohort, each department has on average increased by 26.7. There were 51 départements who saw an increase, and 14 who saw a decrease (see Figure 2). For details on the trend of each département, see [Tables](#).

**Figure 1**


*Répartition des volontaires en France à travers le temps.*



**Figure 2**

*Evolution de recrutement pour la promo de 2023-24 par rapport à 2020-21.*

Difference Récrutement entre 2023 et 2020



## Age


As shown in Figure 3, across all promos, the majority of volunteers is between 18 and 20 years old. The share of the age group of 16-17 has been increasing rapidly, doubling the percentage points from 13% in 2020 to 24% in 2024.

**Figure 3**

*Number of volunteers per age group, within the different promos. Note that, in the percentage plot, the percentages are relative to all volunteers from the respective promo.*

(A) (absolute numbers)

(B) (percentages)



## Education

Figure 4 shows that volunteers with a “Bac + 3 et plus” are relatively rare. The share of volunteers with a “Bac à Bac + 2” has been constantly decreasing, from 48% in 2020-21 to 40% in 2023-24. By contrast, volunteers “Infra-bac”, have been increasing from 32% in 2020-21 to 43% in 2023-24.

## Sex

There is a stable difference regarding sex, with more women (~60%) being volunteers than men (Figure 5).

### How have volunteers changed their attitudes?

In the selection of variables made for this report, there are only two questions that volunteers of the same promo have been asked at different time points:


1. “Avez-vous voté lors des dernières élections (locales ou nationales) ?” (Section )
2. “En général, pensez-vous que votre action individuelle peut contribuer à changer la société ?” (Section ).

Before we turn to these two questions, we will look at attrition.


**Figure 4**

*Number of volunteers per education level, within the different promos. Note that in the percentage plot, the percentages are relative to all volunteers from the respective promo.*

(A) (absolute numbers)




(B) (percentages)


**Figure 5**

*Number of male and female volunteers, within the different promos. Note that in the percentage plot, the percentages are relative to all volunteers from the respective promo.*

(A) (absolute numbers)



(B) (percentages)



## Attrition


The term attrition refers to volunteers dropping out of the surveys over time. Attrition can have many causes. Here we distinguish between two explanations: ruptures, i.e. volunteers ending their service civique early (Section 5) and survey fatigue, i.e. volunteers who continue their service civique but do not fill out the questionnaires (Figure 7).

Figure 6 shows attrition generally, while Figure 7 excludes ruptures, thereby giving an estimate of survey fatigue. This latter figure shows that survey fatigue is an issue, but also suggests that there is a slightly positive trend towards reduced survey fatigue: more and more volunteers seem to answer the questionnaires at least for the first two questionnaires (q1 and q2), but less so for the third questionnaire (q3).


**Figure 6**

*Number of volunteers per survey time point. Volunteers who appear under ‘q0’ have participated in the program but have not even filled out the first questionnaire (q1). Note that in the percentage plot, the percentages are relative to all volunteers from the respective promo. This plot includes ruptures.*

(A) (absolute numbers)



(B) (percentages)



## Voting


In this section, we look at how volunteers have changed regarding their voting behavior. Voting behavior was measured with the question: “Avez-vous voté lors des dernières élections (locales ou nationales) ?”, which has been asked at time points q1 and q2. Figure 8 shows that, averaged across all cohorts and time points, the majority of volunteers report having voted.

In the following sections, we investigate how volunteers have changed in answering this question, throughout their service civique. For these analyses, we only consider those volunteers who have answered the question at both time points, q1 and q2. Changes towards “Yes” or “No” can have happened either from the respective other option, or from the third answer option: “Vous n’avez pas l’âge de voter ou vous n’étiez pas inscrit.e sur les listes électorales”, which is abbreviated in the plots below as “Pas sur les listes”. We look at the different cohorts separately (promo 2020-21, Figure 9; promo 2021-22, Figure 10; 2022-23, Figure 11; 2023-24, Figure 12).


**Figure 7**

*Number of volunteers per survey time point, excluding ruptures. Volunteers who appear under ‘q0’ have participated in the program but have not even filled out the first questionnaire (q1). Note that in the percentage plot, the percentages are relative to all volunteers from the respective promo.*

(A) (absolute numbers)




(B) (percentages)


**Figure 8**

*Distribution of whether volunteers reported having voted or not during the last elections, averaged across time points and cohorts.*

(A) (absolute numbers)



(B) (percentages)



The following sections reveal considerable differences between the cohorts. For example, in 2020-21 and 2021-22, many volunteers reported changes in voting behavior, but in opposite directions: In 2020-21, 24% of volunteers changed towards “No”, outweighing those who changed to “Yes” (6%) by far. Inversely, in 2021-22, 35% of volunteers changed towards “Yes”, while only 8% changed towards “No”.


It is not clear why we observe these differences. One explanation might be that volunteers care more about national elections than local ones (or vice versa). If that is the case, we would expect changes in voting behavior to be dependent on whether there were national or local elections happening during the year of a cohort’s service civique.

### **Promo 2020-21**


**Figure 9**

*Promo 2020-21. Change in volunteers reporting whether they voted or not during the last elections, between Q1 and Q2. Note that this analysis considers only answers of volunteers who answered either yes or no at both time points.*

(A) Alluvial plot



(B) Percentages



### **Promo 2021-22**

### **Promo 2022-23**

### **Promo 2023-24**

### **Which demographic factors are associated with change of voting intentions?**


Figure 13 shows how different demographic variables predict changes in voting behavior. For this analysis, we look at all cohorts together. The outcome, changes in voting behavior, is binary (changed to no vs. changed to yes)<sup>2</sup>.

<sup>2</sup>I.e. ignoring all volunteers who did not change


**Figure 10**

*Promo 2021-22. Change in volunteers reporting whether they voted or not during the last elections, between Q1 and Q2. Note that this analysis considers only answers of volunteers who answered either yes or no at both time points.*

(A) Alluvial plot




(B) Percentages


**Figure 11**

*Promo 2022-23. Change in volunteers reporting whether they voted or not during the last elections, between Q1 and Q2. Note that this analysis considers only answers of volunteers who answered either yes or no at both time points.*

(A) Alluvial plot




(B) Percentages




**Figure 12**

*Promo 2023-24. Change in volunteers reporting whether they voted or not during the last elections, between Q1 and Q2. Note that this analysis considers only answers of volunteers who answered either yes or no at both time points.*

(A) Alluvial plot



(B) Percentages



Plotted on the y-axis are the demographic variables, taken to predict change in voting behavior. For each categorical demographic variable, different levels are shown. For example, for the variable `age_category`, the plot shows three levels: `age_category18-20`, `age_category21-23`, `age_category24-30`. Each of these categories has an estimate (x-axis). These estimates are the results logistic regressions<sup>3</sup>. They indicate how being part of a certain category (e.g. being between 18 and 20 years old) predicts the chances of changing one's voting behavior. The estimates are “odds ratios”, which can be conceived of as probabilities: An odds ratio of 1 means that this group has the same chance changing to “no” as changing to “yes”. More than 1 means that this group is more likely to change to “yes”. For example, an odds ratio of 2.0 means twice as likely. Less than 1 means that this group is more likely to change to “no”. An odds ratio of 0.5 means half as likely.


For each categorical variable, one category is chosen as the baseline (or reference) category. The odds ratios of all other categories are relative to that baseline. For example, for the variable `age_category`, the category “16-17” is not appearing in the graph, because it is the (invisible) baseline category. If the odds ratio for `age_category18-20` is 1.43, this means that 18 to 20 year-olds are more likely to change their vote towards “Yes”, compared to 16 to 17 year-olds. More specifically, the odds of changing towards “Yes” among 18-20-year-olds are about 43% higher than among 16-17-year-olds.

To understand this odds ratio, take Figure 14: it shows that among the 16 to 17 year-olds, 285 have changed towards “No”, while only 238 have changed towards “Yes”. That makes the odds of changing towards yes for the youngest age group, chosen as the baseline category in the model,  $238:285 = \sim 0.84$ . By contrast, among the 18 to 20 year-olds, the odds were  $784:658 = \sim 1.19$ . The odds ratio for the 18 to

<sup>3</sup>For each variable, a separate logistic regression has been run. The estimates from the logistic regression are exponentiated, so that the reported estimates can be interpreted as odds ratios (ORs).

**Figure 13**

*Effects of demographic factors on change in voting behavior. The outcome is binary (changed to no vs. changed to yes). The dots and their labels are the estimates of separate logistic regressions for each variable. The lines around the dots represent uncertainty in the estimates (95% confidence intervals). If these confidence intervals cross 1 (the dotted vertical line), the differences are not statistically significant, meaning we might observe them just by chance. The logarithmic scale (on the x-axis) is used so that in the visualization for the positive and negative odds ratio's to be symmetric (i.e. that 2 is as far away from 1 as is 0.5).*




20 year-olds compares their odds to those of the 16 to 17 year-olds odds ratio = 1.19:0.84 = 1.4.

Figure 15 allows to compare the odds ratios to the percentages for the different age groups. Just like for absolute numbers, the odds ratios can be calculated from the percentages. For example, among the 16 to 17 year-olds, 13.8% have changed towards “No”, while 11.5% have changed towards “Yes”, making the odds of changing to “Yes”, as above,  $0.115:0.138 = \sim 0.83^4$ . Among the 18 to 20 year-olds, accordingly, the odds were, as above,  $0.174:0.146 = \sim 1.19$ , resulting in the same odds ratio of ~1.4.

**Figure 14**


*Absolute numbers. Change in volunteers reporting whether they voted or not during the last elections, between Q1 and Q2, for the different age groups. Note that this analysis considers only answers of volunteers who answered either yes or no at both time points.*



<sup>4</sup>Note that in this illustration, we obtain a slightly different value compared to 0.84 above due to rounding imprecision.

**Figure 15**


*Percentages. Change in volunteers reporting whether they voted or not during the last elections, between Q1 and Q2, for the different age groups. Note that this analysis considers only answers of volunteers who answered either yes or no at both time points.*



On a side note, looking at the 16 to 17 age groups shows that some answers were erroneous. In France, the legal voting age is 18. Therefore, the 16 to 17 year olds, at least at the beginning of their service civique (q0/q1), have never been on a voting list before. However, as shown in Figure 16 there are 443 volunteers who answered “No” at q0/q1 (which technically is true, but not the most specific answer option), and 20 who answered “Yes” (probably not reading the question carefully or accidentally clicking on the wrong response). It is unclear whether or how this could have affected our findings on changes in voting behavior.

**Figure 16**

*Distribution of whether volunteers reported having voted or not during the last elections, at different time points, for the youngest age group (16–17 years old). All answers at q0/q1 that are not “Pas sur les listes” are not exactly correct.*



## Individual action for society

In this section, we look at how volunteers have changed regarding their perception on whether their individual action can contribute to changing society. This was measured with the question: “En général, pensez-vous que votre action individuelle peut contribuer à changer la société ?”, which has been asked at time points q1 and q3. We look at the different cohorts separately (promo 2020-21, Figure 17; promo 2021-22, Figure 10; 2022-23, Figure 11; 2023-24, Figure 12)<sup>5</sup>.


Descriptively, there is no clear positive or negative trend either. On average, across all cohorts, slightly more people are changing towards “No” or “Not really”, compared to “Yes”.

### Promo 2020-21


**Figure 17**

*Promo 2020-21. Change in volunteers reporting whether they think their individual action can contribute to changing society, between Q1 and Q3. Note that this analysis considers only answers of volunteers who answered at both time points.*

(A) Alluvial plot



(B) Percentages



### Promo 2021-22

### Promo 2022-23

**Which demographic factors are associated with change in perceptions of one's individual contribution to society?**


Figure 20 shows how different demographic variables predict changes in perceptions of one's individual contribution to society. For this analysis, we look at all cohorts together. The outcome, changes in perceptions of one's individual contribution to society, collapsed into a binary measure (“vers Non/Pas vraiment” vs. “vers Oui”). The plots can be interpreted as described above in the section on voting behavior

<sup>5</sup>Note that for the promo 2023-24, q3 is not yet available, and therefore the promo cannot be included here


**Figure 18**

*Promo 2021-22. Change in volunteers reporting whether they think their individual action can contribute to changing society, between Q1 and Q3. Note that this analysis considers only answers of volunteers who answered at both time points.*

(A) Alluvial plot




(B) Percentages


**Figure 19**

*Promo 2022-23. Change in volunteers reporting whether they think their individual action can contribute to changing society, between Q1 and Q3. Note that this analysis considers only answers of volunteers who answered at both time points.*

(A) Alluvial plot



(B) Percentages



(Section ). An odds ratio of 1 means that a certain group has the same chance of changing to “Non/Pas vraiment” as changing to “Oui”, compared to the baseline group. More than 1 means that this group is more likely to change to “Oui”. Less than 1 means that this group is more likely to change to “Non/Pas vraiment”.

The results suggests that volunteers from the “Relais” program are more likely to change towards “Yes”, than volunteers from the “CŒUR” program. Figure 21 zooms in on those findings.

## Rupture

Not all volunteers work until the end of their contract. In fact, 22.9% of volunteers have a “rupture”, i.e. terminate the contract early (Figure 22). There are various motives for ending one’s contract early (Figure 23). Not all of them are necessarily bad, e.g. “Embauche en CDD d’au moins 6 mois ou CDI”, and some are outside of the influence of the volunteers, e.g. “Fin de validité du Titre de Séjour”.

### Change in rupture

Figure 24 illustrates change regarding how many volunteers have ended their contract early (rupture) by comparing the different promos. There are no clear trends with slightly more than 20% of volunteers having a rupture.

### What predicts whether volunteers end their contract early (rupture)?

For analyses on what predicts ruptures, we focus only on volunteers who ended their contract early for apparently *negative* reasons. We used a binary outcome measure (no negative rupture vs. negative rupture) and ran separate logistic regressions with demographic variables (Figure 25) a selection of other variables (Figure 27).

An odds ratio of 1 means that a certain group has the same chance of having a rupture, compared to the baseline group. More than 1 means that this group is more likely to have a rupture. Less than 1 means that this group is less likely to have a rupture.

### Demographic factors

Figure 25 reveals, for example, that older age groups or refugees are less likely to have a rupture, male volunteers and volunteers with a handicap are more likely. The odds ratios can be interpreted as in previous sections. To provide another example, take the variable whether volunteers were part of the “CŒUR” or of the “RELAIS” program (`type_volontaire`). The odds ratio is 0.9, meaning volunteers of the “RELAIS” program were less likely to have a rupture. More specifically, they only had 90% of the odds to breach their contract, compared to volunteers of the “CŒUR”.

To get a better sense of this, Figure 26 shows descriptive differences (in percentages) regarding rupture for some demographic variables, including `type_volontaire`. The odds ratio can be obtained by dividing the odds of the “RELAIS” program ( $0.161:0.834 = 0.193$ ) by the odds of the “CŒUR” program ( $0.181:0.819 = 0.221$ ) program ( $0.193:0.221 = \sim 0.9$ )<sup>6</sup>.

### Other factors


For non-demographic variables, investigating their relationship with rupture is not possible—simply because, by definition, for questions that have been only asked at “q2” and “q3”, volunteers who had ended their contract early were not available anymore (see Table 1). Only for the two variables that have been asked at “q1”:

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<sup>6</sup>Note that there are slight differences with the reported odds ratio due to rounding errors.


**Figure 20**

*Effects of demographic factors on change in perceptions of how one's individual actions can contribute to society. The outcome is binary ("vers Non/Pas vraiment" vs. "vers Oui"). The dots and their labels are the estimates of separate logistic regressions for each variable. The lines around the dots represent uncertainty in the estimates (95% confidence intervals). If these confidence intervals cross 1 (the dotted vertical line), the differences are not statistically significant, meaning we might observe them just by chance. The logarithmic scale (on the x-axis) is used so that in the visualization for the positive and negative odds ratio's to be symmetric (i.e. that 2 is as far away from 1 as is 0.5).*



**Figure 21**


*Change in volunteers reporting whether they think their individual action can contribute to changing society, between Q1 and Q3, depending on whether they were part of the ‘CŒUR’ or the ‘Relais’ program. Note that this analysis considers only answers of volunteers who answered at both time points.*




**Figure 22**

*Number of volunteers with a rupture (for various possible reasons, including positive ones, such as obtaining a work contract), pooled across all cohorts.*

(A) (absolute numbers)



(B) (percentages)



1. `perception_avenir_num` (Concernant votre avenir, êtes-vous...? Très confiant(e); Assez confiant(e); Peu confiant(e); Pas du tout confiant(e))<sup>7</sup>
2. `action_individuelle_societe` (En général, pensez-vous que votre action individuelle peut contribuer à changer la société ? Oui; Pas vraiment; Non)

Figure 27 shows how these variables predict rupture. The variable `action_individuelle_societe` is categorical and can be interpreted like the demographic variables in the previous results: one category serves as the reference (omitted) category, and the reported odds ratios represent how the odds of rupture differ relative to that reference. The variable `perception_avenir_num` is numeric (on a scale from 1 to 4). For numeric predictors, the estimated odds ratio indicates how much the odds of rupture change, on average, for each one-unit increase on the scale. For example, the resulting estimate of 1.14 in Figure 27 for `perception_avenir_num` means that, on average, a one point increase in confidence about one's future corresponds to 14% higher odds of rupture. In other words, the results suggest that, the more confident volunteers are about their future, the more likely they are to have a rupture, on average. However, Figure 28 zooms in on this finding and suggests that this average effect is mostly driven by those volunteers who are “very confident”.

### Satisfaction


In this section, we look at satisfaction (“D'une manière générale, diriez-vous que votre Service Civique s'est déroulé de façon...” with levels 1, “pas du tout satisfaisante”, to 4, “très satisfaisante”)<sup>8</sup>.

<sup>7</sup>Note \_num in the variable name stands for ‘numeric’: we use a numeric version, from “Pas du tout confiant(e)” = 1, to “Très confiant(e)” = 4.

<sup>8</sup>In all analyses we treat this as a continuous variable

**Figure 23**


*Prevalence of different rupture motives, pooled across all cohorts.*




**Figure 24**

*Number of volunteers with a rupture (for various possible reasons, including positive ones, such as obtaining a work contract).*

(A) (absolute numbers)



(B) (percentages)


**Table 1**

*Candidate variables to evaluating their association with rupture.*

variable	source
perception_avenir	q1
action_individuelle_societe	q1
projet_avenir_concret	q2
comparaison_utilite_autres	q2
fierté	q2
confiance_en_soi	q2
confiance_avenir_personnel	q2
action_individuelle_societe	q3
impact_situation_actuelle	q3
integration	q2


**Figure 25**

*Effects of demographic factors on negative ruptures. The outcome is binary (no negative rupture vs. negative rupture). The dots and their labels are the estimates of separate logistic regressions for each variable. The lines around the dots represent uncertainty in the estimates (95% confidence intervals). If these confidence intervals cross 1 (the dotted vertical line), the differences are not statistically significant, meaning we might observe them just by chance. The logarithmic scale (on the x-axis) is used so that in the visualization for the positive and negative odds ratio's to be symmetric (i.e. that 2 is as far away from 1 as is 0.5).*




**Figure 26**

*Percentages of rupture for (allegedly) negative reasons for different groups, for different variables.*




**Figure 27**

*Effects of demographic factors on negative ruptures. The outcome is binary (no negative rupture vs. negative rupture). The dots and their labels are the estimates of separate logistic regressions for each variable. The lines around the dots represent uncertainty in the estimates (95% confidence intervals). If these confidence intervals cross 1 (the dotted vertical line), the differences are not statistically significant, meaning we might observe them just by chance. The logarithmic scale (on the x-axis) is used so that in the visualization for the positive and negative odds ratio's to be symmetric (i.e. that 2 is as far away from 1 as is 0.5).*



**Figure 28**

*Number of volunteers with a negative rupture, as a function of their confidence in their future.*




As shown in Figure 29, taking all cohorts together, the majority of volunteers thinks their experience is “très satisfaisant”.


**Figure 29**

*Répartition des niveaux de satisfaction*

(A) (absolute numbers)



(B) (percentages)



## Change in Satisfaction

Figure 30 shows how satisfaction with the service civique has changed over time, between the different cohorts. The share of volunteers who are “very satisfied” has decreased over time, but the shares of those who are not or little satisfied have remained broadly stable.

## What predicts whether volunteers are more satisfied ?


For analyses on what predicts satisfaction, we treat satisfaction as a continuous variable (from 1, “Pas du tout satisfaisante”, to 4, “Très satisfaisante”). Because this outcome is continuous, we run linear regressions (and not logistic regressions, as before) on it. The results for demographic variables are displayed in Figure 25, for other variables in Figure 27.

### *Demographic factors*

The results of the linear regressions are more straightforward to interpret. For categorical predictors (i.e., all demographic variables), the estimate is simply the average difference between the shown category and the (again, omitted) baseline category. For example, as shown with the variable `refugie`, refugees tend to be, on average, more satisfied by 0.2 points (on the 4-point satisfaction scale) than non-refugees.


**Figure 30**

*Satisfaction between cohorts.*



**Figure 31**

*Effects of demographic factors on satisfaction.*



### ***Other factors***

Some of the non-demographic variables are numeric<sup>9</sup>, for example, `confiance_en_soi_num` (Pensez-vous avoir gagné en confiance en vous durant votre Service Civique ? 1 - Non, pas du tout; 2 - Non, pas vraiment; 3 - Oui, assez; 4 - Oui, beaucoup).

For numeric variables, the estimates represent how much satisfaction increases or decreases with a one-unit increase in the predictor variable. For example, for `confiance_en_soi_num`, the estimate is 0.33. `confiance_en_soi_num` takes values on a 4-point scale (from 1, “Non, pas du tout”, to 4, “Oui, beaucoup”). This means that, on average, a one unit increase in `confiance_en_soi_num` is associated with a 0.33 point increase in satisfaction (4-point scale).

### **Confidence in one’s future**

In this section, we look at confidence in one’s future (`perception_avenir`: “Concernant votre avenir, êtes-vous...?” with levels 1, “Pas du tout confiant.e”, to 4, “Très confiant.e”)<sup>10</sup>. As shown in Figure 33, taking all cohorts together, the majority of volunteers are “assez confiant.e”.

### **Change in confidence in one’s future**

Figure 34 shows how confidence in one’s future has changed over time, between the different cohorts. The results are very stable, with a majority of volunteers being “assez confiant.e” in all cohorts.

### **What predicts whether volunteers are more confident in their future ?**

As for satisfaction above, for analyses on what predicts confident in their future, we treat it as a continuous variable (1, “Pas du tout confiant.e”, to 4, “Très confiant.e”). As for satisfaction, because this outcome is continuous, we run linear regressions on it. The results for demographic variables are displayed in Figure 35, for other variables in Figure 36.

### ***Demographic factors***

The results suggest that, compared to (the omitted category of 16 to 17 year-olds), 18 to 20 as well as 21 to 23 year-olds are slightly less confident, while 24 to 30 year olds are slightly more confident. Refugees are considerably more competent (0.45, on the 4-point scale) than non-refugees. Male volunteers are also more likely to be confident about their future (0.21), as are volunteers in the “Relais” program (0.13, compared to the “Coeur” program).

### ***Other factors***

The only other variable we consider here is `action_individuelle_societe` (“En général, pensez-vous que votre action individuelle peut contribuer à changer la société ?” Oui; Pas vraiment; Non). Figure 36 shows that volunteers who do not think that they can individually contribute to changing society (the omitted baseline category) are the least confident about their future: both volunteers who are slightly less pessimistic (having answered “Not really”) and volunteers think they can contribute (having answered “Yes”) are more likely to be confident, with those having answered “Yes” being most likely.


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<sup>9</sup>All variable names that end with `_num` have been treated as numeric for the present analyses

<sup>10</sup>In all analyses we treat this as a continuous variable

**Figure 32**

*Effects of other, non-demographic factors on satisfaction.*




**Figure 33**

*Confidence in one's future, pooled across all cohorts.*

(A) (absolute numbers)

(B) (percentages)



### Differences between programs

This section looks at how demographics of volunteers differ between programs.

There are 14 different programs, which can be sorted into 6 different categories (see [Tables](#)). Here, we only distinguish between 7 key program categories, namely: Solidarité Séniors; Médiaterre; Cinéma & Citoyenneté; Solidarité Aidants; Booster; Ecovolonterre; ASM.

The following sections show, for each key program category, how the volunteers of that program differ compared to all the other key program categories combined, in terms of demographic variables. The results are expressed in odds ratios, which can be interpreted as above: If the odds ratio is *larger than 1*, then a certain group is *more likely* to be represented in the target key program category, compared to all other programs. For example, in Figure 37, there are more 18 to 20 year-olds (odds ratio = 1.18, compared to the omitted baseline, 16 to 17 year-olds) in the “Solidarité Aidants” program, than in the other programs, on average. If the odds ratio is *below 1*, this means that a certain group is *less likely* to be represented in the target key program category. For example, refugees are considerably less likely (odds ratio = 0.17, compared to the omitted baseline, non-refugees) to be in the “Solidarité Aidants” program, compared to all other programs, on average.


### Solidarité Aidants

#### Cinéma & Citoyenneté

Volunteers who work in cine-related projects tend to be older and more educated. Refugees are less likely to be cine volunteers. If there is a preliminary end to the contract, cine volunteers are more likely to do so because they were offered a CDD of less than 6 months. Refugees are less likely to be cine volunteers, and women, as well as people from urban areas are more likely.


**Figure 34**

*Confidence in one's future, between cohorts.*




**Figure 35**

*Effects of demographic factors on confidence in one's future.*




**Figure 36**

*Effects of other, non-demographic factors on confidence in one's future.*




**Figure 37**

*Differences in Solidarité Aidants vs. other programs along demographic factors.*



**Figure 38**


*Differences in Cinéma & Citoyenneté vs. other programs along demographic factors*



## Booster

**Figure 39**

*Differences in Booster vs. other programs along demographic factors.*




## Ecivolonterre

Ecivolonterres tend to be older (mostly in the 21 to 23 agegroup) and more educated than other volunteers. They tend to plan for longer volunteer programs. Ecivolonterres tend to be from more rural but also urban areas (compared to QVP).


**Figure 40**

*Differences in Ecovolonterre vs. other programs along demographic factors.*




**Figure 41**

*Differences in MédiaTerre vs. other programs along demographic factors.*



**Médiaterre****ASM****Figure 42**


*Differences in ASM vs. other programs along demographic factors.*

**Solidarité Séniors****Conclusion: Some methodological notes**

This report can only provide snapshots into the extensive survey data that has been collected by Cité Unis. In general, the questionnaires could probably be shorter. Fewer questions would probably reduce

**Figure 43**

*Differences in Solidarité Séniors vs. other programs along demographic factors.*



attrition—if volunteers respond to a very long questionnaire at q1, they might not be motivated to again fill out another very long questionnaire at q2, let alone q3. Including fewer questions would probably also improve the quality of responses, as volunteers might get tired or bored with long questionnaires, thus clicking through very quickly and thoughtlessly at some point. Another option to improve quality in responses could be to add attention checks. However, since volunteers are not forced to take the survey, we can probably assume that those who take it are motivated to fill it out faithfully.

Another lever for improvement is making the questionnaires at different time points more similar. Asking the same questions at all the different time points allow to track how individual volunteers change throughout their service civique (as in Section ).

On a minor note, it might be more interesting to ask volunteers about their voting intentions, rather than their past voting behavior. There is reason to believe that some volunteers do not answer the current question on past behavior as intended (Figure 16). Also, observing change regarding past voting behavior is very dependend on whether elecitons happen to take place for a particular cohort during their year of service civique.