



**BRNO UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY**

VYSOKÉ UČENÍ TECHNICKÉ V BRNĚ

**FACULTY OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY**

FAKULTA INFORMAČNÍCH TECHNOLOGIÍ

**DEPARTMENT OF INTELLIGENT SYSTEMS**

ÚSTAV INTELIGENTNÍCH SYSTÉMŮ

## **EXTENDING AUDIT2ALLOW TO PROVIDE MORE RESTRICTIVE SOLUTIONS**

ROZŠÍŘENÍ NÁSTROJE AUDIT2ALLOW PRO POSKYTOVÁNÍ VÍCE OMEZUJÍCÍCH ŘEŠENÍ

**BACHELOR'S THESIS**

BAKALÁŘSKÁ PRÁCE

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**BRNO 2018**

**Vysoké učení technické v Brně - Fakulta informačních technologií**

Ústav inteligentních systémů

Akademický rok 2017/2018

**Zadání bakalářské práce**

Řešitel: **Žárský Jan**

Obor: Informační technologie

Téma: **Rozšíření nástroje audit2allow pro poskytování více omezujících řešení**  
**Extending audit2allow to Provide More Restrictive Solutions**

Kategorie: Operační systémy

**Pokyny:**

1. Nastudujte technologii SELinux. Nastudujte projekt audit2allow. Seznamte se s existujícími bezpečnostními politikami operačních systémů Fedora a RHEL.
2. Analyzujte současné problémy s méně omezujícími návrhy úprav bezpečnostní politiky poskytované nástrojem audit2allow. Navrhněte rozšíření audit2allow, které bude podporovat více omezující rozšíření bezpečnostní politiky SELinux (např. úprava pouze nekritických částí politiky, úprava politiky na základě hodnot argumentů systémových volání, úprava politiky pouze pro vybraný přístup k souborovému systému).
3. Implementujte vybraná rozšíření bezpečnostních politik v nástroji audit2allow.
4. Ověřte funkčnost řešení na základě umělé testovací sady.

**Literatura:**

- Vermeulen, Sven. Selinux System Administration: Ward Off Traditional Security Permissions and Effectively Secure Your Linuxs Systems with Selinux. second ed. Birmingham, UK: Packt Publishing, 2016.

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Datum zadání: 1. listopadu 2017

Datum odevzdání: 16. května 2018

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## Abstract

The thesis analyzes the role of the audit2allow utility in troubleshooting Security-Enhanced Linux denials and proposes extensions that will provide more restrictive and more secure solutions to the user. Basic concepts of SELinux and SELinux security policy are explained. Situations when audit2allow provides ineffective and insecure solutions are analyzed. Support for generating extended permission access vector rules was implemented. Basic support for checking security labels of files was implemented. Implementation details and testing of both extensions to the audit2allow utility are described.

## Abstrakt

Bakalářská práce rozebírá roli nástroje audit2allow při řešení zamítnutí přístupu systémem Security-Enhanced Linux a navrhuje rozšíření nástroje tak, aby poskytoval více omezující a bezpečnější řešení uživateli. Základní koncepty systému SELinux a jeho bezpečnostní politiky jsou představeny. Rozebrány jsou situace, kdy nástroj audit2allow poskytuje řešení, která jsou neefektivní a potenciálně nebezpečná. Podpora pro generování pravidel udělující rozšířená oprávnění byla implementována. Základní podpora pro kontrolu bezpečnostního kontextu souborů byla implementována. Implementační detaily a testování obou rozšíření nástroje audit2allow jsou popsány.

## Keywords

SELinux, audit2allow, security, mandatory access control, security policy

## Klíčová slova

SELinux, audit2allow, bezpečnost, mandatorní řízení přístupu, bezpečnostní politika

## Reference

ŽÁRSKÝ, Jan. *Extending audit2allow to Provide More Restrictive Solutions*. Brno, 2018. Bachelor's thesis. Brno University of Technology, Faculty of Information Technology. Supervisor Ing. Aleš Smrčka, Ph.D.

## Rozšířený abstrakt

Bakalářská práce se zabývá systémem Security-Enhanced Linux, který poskytuje mechanismus mandatorního řízení přístupu v Linuxu. Práce se věnuje především nástroji audit2allow, který analyzuje zprávy o zamítnutí přístupu a převádí je na pravidla bezpečnostní politiky udělující oprávnění, která byla původně zamítnuta. Cílem práce je analyzovat situace, ve kterých nástroj audit2allow poskytuje řešení, která udělují zbytečně velké množství oprávnění určitým procesům. Vybraná rozšíření byla implementována a v práci jsou popsána.

Kapitola 2 představuje SELinux a nástroj audit2allow. Práce představuje účel SELinuxu a přístupy, na kterých je založen, jako je mandatorní řízení přístupu (mandatory access control, MAC), řízení přístupu založené na rolích (role-based access control, RBAC) a vynucení typu (type enforcement, TE). Představeny jsou základní příkazy bezpečnostní politiky systému SELinux, zejména příkazy udělující subjektům oprávnění provádět operace nad objekty, jelikož tyto příkazy jsou výstupem nástroje audit2allow. Pozornost je věnována způsobu, jakým získávají soubory svůj bezpečnostní kontext, protože soubory se špatným bezpečnostním kontextem často způsobují zamítnutí přístupu, která jsou pak analyzována pomocí nástroje audit2allow. Dále je představen způsob auditování zpráv o zamítnutí přístupu. Nástroj audit2allow je podrobně popsán, jeho účel, schopnosti a implementační detaily.

Kapitola 3 analyzuje situace, kdy audit2allow poskytuje řešení, která jsou neefektivní a potenciálně nebezpečná. Nástroj audit2allow nerozlišuje tzv. rozšířená oprávnění, která umožňují granularnější způsob přidělování oprávnění procesům. Rozšířená oprávnění dokáží například přidělit procesu oprávnění volat jen některá ioctl systémová volání na základě hodnoty parametru request. Práce rozebírá možnosti implementace podpory pro rozšířená oprávnění a ideální výchozí chování nástroje s ohledem na bezpečnost a zpětnou kompatibilitu. Nástroj audit2allow spoléhá při analýze zamítnutí přístupu na to, že objekty, ke kterým byl přístup zamítnut, měly správný bezpečnostní kontext. Práce popisuje problémy, které jsou způsobeny soubory se špatným bezpečnostním kontextem. Podobně jsou popsány problémy způsobené síťovými porty, uzly a rozhraními, které mají špatný bezpečnostní kontext. V práci jsou navrženy způsoby, jak detekovat objekty se špatným bezpečnostním kontextem.

V rámci práce byla implementována dvě rozšíření nástroje audit2allow popsaná v kapitole 4. Pro podporu rozšířených oprávnění bylo potřeba změnit zpracování vstupních zpráv, vytvořit objekty reprezentující rozšířená oprávnění a implementovat generování pravidel povolující rozšířená oprávnění. Nástroj audit2allow je nyní schopen poznat zprávy o zamítnutí přístupu, které mohou být důsledkem použití rozšířených oprávnění a vygenerovat pravidla povolující zamítnutá rozšířená oprávnění. Druhým vylepšením nástroje audit2allow je kontrola bezpečnostních kontextů souborů. Bylo potřeba detekovat cesty k souborům ve vstupních zprávách a využít knihovnu libselinux pro získání výchozích bezpečnostních kontextů. Upozornění na soubor se špatným bezpečnostním kontextem bylo přidáno jako komentář do výstupu audit2allow. Detekci síťových portů se špatným kontextem lze implementovat v budoucnu, implementace detekce síťových uzlů a rozhraní se špatným kontextem by neměla velký dopad na zvýšení bezpečnosti systému.

Testování implementovaných rozšíření je popsáno v kapitole 5. Změny v kódu a nové třídy jsou pokryty jednotkovými testy, které jsou stručně popsány. Obě rozšíření jsou testované také pomocí integračního testu, který spouští audit2allow v reálné situaci.

# Extending audit2allow to Provide More Restrictive Solutions

## Declaration

I hereby declare that this bachelor's thesis was prepared as an original author's work under the supervision of Ing. Aleš Smrčka, Ph.D. The supplementary information was provided by Mgr. Miloš Malík, Petr Lautrbach, Bc. Lukáš Vrabec and Ing. Vít Mojžíš. All the relevant information sources, which were used during preparation of this thesis, are properly cited and included in the list of references.

.....

Jan Žárský  
May 13, 2018

## Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Mgr. Miloš Malík, Petr Lautrbach, Bc. Lukáš Vrabec, and Ing. Vít Mojžíš for valuable advice that helped me with the implementation and writing of this thesis. I would like to thank Ing. Aleš Smrčka, Ph.D., for advice on writing the thesis.

# Contents

<b>1</b>	<b>Introduction</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>2</b>	<b>Security-Enhanced Linux and audit2allow</b>	<b>4</b>
2.1	Security-Enhanced Linux . . . . .	4
2.1.1	Purpose of SELinux . . . . .	4
2.1.2	SELinux Components . . . . .	4
2.2	Basic Concepts . . . . .	6
2.2.1	Subjects and Objects . . . . .	6
2.2.2	Mandatory Access Control . . . . .	7
2.2.3	SELinux and MAC Checks . . . . .	7
2.2.4	SELinux Users . . . . .	7
2.2.5	Role-Based Access Control . . . . .	8
2.2.6	Type Enforcement . . . . .	8
2.2.7	Multi-Level and Multi-Category Security . . . . .	9
2.2.8	SELinux Security Context . . . . .	9
2.2.9	Object Classes . . . . .	10
2.2.10	Labeling Subjects and Objects . . . . .	11
2.2.11	Type Transitions . . . . .	11
2.2.12	SELinux Modes of Operation . . . . .	12
2.3	SELinux Policy . . . . .	12
2.3.1	User, Role and Type Statements . . . . .	13
2.3.2	Access Vector Rules . . . . .	15
2.3.3	Extended Permission Access Vector Rules . . . . .	16
2.3.4	Policy Modules . . . . .	17
2.3.5	Conditional Policy . . . . .	17
2.3.6	Labeling Network Objects . . . . .	18
2.4	File Contexts . . . . .	19
2.4.1	Temporary Changes . . . . .	19
2.4.2	Type Transition . . . . .	19
2.4.3	File Context Configuration Files . . . . .	19
2.4.4	Building File Context Configuration Files . . . . .	20
2.4.5	Changing File Context Configuration Files . . . . .	21
2.5	Auditing Security Events . . . . .	21
2.5.1	Auditing SELinux Denials . . . . .	21
2.6	Troubleshooting SELinux . . . . .	22
2.7	The audit2allow Utility . . . . .	22
2.7.1	Purpose of audit2allow . . . . .	22

2.7.2	Basic Mode of Operation . . . . .	22
2.7.3	Command-Line Options . . . . .	23
2.7.4	How Does audit2allow Work . . . . .	24
2.7.5	Implementation of audit2allow . . . . .	24
<b>3</b>	<b>Problems of the audit2allow Utility</b>	<b>28</b>
3.1	Extended Permission Access Vector Rules . . . . .	28
3.1.1	AVC Denials Caused by Extended Permission AV Rules . . . . .	28
3.1.2	Generating Extended Permission AV Rules in audit2allow . . . . .	29
3.2	Mislabeled Files . . . . .	30
3.2.1	AVC Denial Messages Caused by Mislabeled Files . . . . .	30
3.2.2	Solving Problems With Mislabeled Files . . . . .	30
3.2.3	Improving audit2allow . . . . .	31
3.3	Labeling Network Ports, Nodes, and Interfaces . . . . .	31
3.3.1	Network Ports . . . . .	31
3.3.2	Network Nodes . . . . .	32
3.3.3	Network Interfaces . . . . .	32
<b>4</b>	<b>Implementing Extensions of the audit2allow Utility</b>	<b>33</b>
4.1	Extended Permissions . . . . .	33
4.1.1	Parsing AVC Denial Messages . . . . .	33
4.1.2	Storing Extended Permissions . . . . .	34
4.1.3	Representation of Extended Permission AV Rules . . . . .	34
4.1.4	Generating Extended Permission AV Rules . . . . .	35
4.2	Mislabeled Files . . . . .	35
4.2.1	Parsing File Path . . . . .	36
4.2.2	Checking Default Context . . . . .	36
<b>5</b>	<b>Testing Extensions of the audit2allow Utility</b>	<b>37</b>
5.1	Testing Extended Permissions Implementation . . . . .	37
5.1.1	Testing the audit2allow Script . . . . .	37
5.1.2	Testing the audit.py Module . . . . .	37
5.1.3	Testing the access.py Module . . . . .	38
5.1.4	Testing the policygen.py Module . . . . .	39
5.1.5	Testing the retpolicy.py Module . . . . .	39
5.1.6	Integration Tests of Extended Permissions . . . . .	40
5.2	Testing Implementation of File Contexts Checks . . . . .	40
5.2.1	Testing the audit.py Module . . . . .	40
5.2.2	Testing the policygen Module . . . . .	40
5.2.3	Integration Tests of File Contexts Checks . . . . .	41
<b>6</b>	<b>Conclusion</b>	<b>42</b>
	<b>Bibliography</b>	<b>43</b>
<b>A</b>	<b>Contents of the Enclosed CD</b>	<b>45</b>
<b>B</b>	<b>Manual</b>	<b>46</b>
B.1	Upstream Repository . . . . .	46

B.2	Fedora packages . . . . .	46
B.3	Tests . . . . .	47



# Chapter 1

## Introduction

*Security-Enhanced Linux* (SELinux) is a mandatory access control mechanism used in Linux distributions. It extends the traditional file permissions using a security policy that cannot be overridden by users. The *audit2allow* utility is one of several tools used by system administrators to troubleshoot SELinux denials. Security policy developers use *audit2allow* to create a basis for security policy modules for their products. The *audit2allow* utility analyzes SELinux denials and generates policy rules that can be loaded into the security policy to allow the operations that were denied before.

In certain situations, the *audit2allow* utility fails to provide an effective and secure solution. The utility was designed to solve problems caused by missing rules in the security policy, but users often use *audit2allow* to solve problems that should not be solved by adding new rules to the policy. As a result, the users end up with policy rules that give processes too much permissions, making whole system more vulnerable.

In other situations, the *audit2allow* utility provides nonfunctional solutions because it is not aware of recently added features of SELinux. There are new policy statements that provide more granular control over given permissions. The *audit2allow* utility is unable to detect that the denial was caused by these statements and fails to provide a working solution. Security policy developers cannot use the *audit2allow* utility to generate these statements.

The users, not familiar with SELinux, cannot recognize the limitations of the *audit2allow* utility. They either fail to solve the problem or end up with a workaround that is potentially insecure. This thesis aims to analyze different causes of SELinux denials and evaluate the quality of solutions provided by the *audit2allow* utility. Situations, that are best resolved using other tools, should be detected by *audit2allow* and the user should be warned. Support for new SELinux features should be added to *audit2allow*. As a part of the thesis, two new features were implemented.

The second chapter of the thesis presents Security-Enhanced Linux, introduces the SELinux policy language, describes auditing of security events, and provides a detailed description of the *audit2allow* utility. The third chapter analyzes situations where the *audit2allow* utility generates nonfunctional or insecure solutions. The fourth chapter goes through the implementation details of selected improvements to *audit2allow*. The fifth one describes unit and integration tests of implemented improvements to *audit2allow*.

## Chapter 2

# Security-Enhanced Linux and audit2allow

This chapter describes basic concepts of Security-Enhanced Linux, introduces the SELinux security policy language, provides an overview of the Linux Audit System, and describes in detail the audit2allow utility.

## 2.1 Security-Enhanced Linux

Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) is a mandatory access control mechanism that consists of kernel modifications and user-space tools and is a part of several Linux distributions.

### 2.1.1 Purpose of SELinux

Without SELinux, the operating system relies on traditional access control methods such as the file permissions. Users can grant an insecure file permissions to others or gain access to files that they do not need [14]:

- Users can reveal sensitive information by setting world readable permissions on their files. For example, they can set the read permission for everyone on the SSH keys in the `~/.ssh/` directory.
- Processes can change security properties. For example, a mail client can make the user's mail readable by other users.
- Processes inherit the user's rights. For example, each application, even though it may be compromised, is able to read all user's files.

SELinux enforces a security policy that cannot be overridden by users. Applications are allowed to perform only actions they need for normal operation, everything else is denied by default. The applications do not need to be aware of SELinux. When an action is denied, it is reported via an “access denied” error code to the application [9].

### 2.1.2 SELinux Components

SELinux is composed of kernel and user space parts [11, pp. 19–22]. The main components of SELinux are shown in figure 2.1.



Figure 2.1: Main SELinux components.

**libsepol** and **libsemanage** are libraries for working with the SELinux binary policy and the policy infrastructure. The libsepol library is used for example for loading policy modules into the active security policy. The libsemanage library is used for example for assigning security contexts to TCP or UDP ports.

**libselinux** provides an API for implementing SELinux-aware applications. For example, an SELinux-aware window manager can use the libselinux library to compute security contexts of its objects.

**checkmodule**, **semodule\_package**, **semodule** are utilities that compile the SELinux policy and load it into the kernel.

**semanage** is an utility for configuring various parts of the policy, for example for setting contexts of TCP and UDP ports. It uses mainly the libsemanage library.

**restorecon** and **setfiles** are utilities for restoring the default contexts of files (see section 2.4).

**policycoreutils** is a set of various utilities for working with and troubleshooting of SELinux, for example the audit2allow utility described in section 2.7.

**Modified Linux Commands** are standard Linux commands, such as ls or ps, modified to support SELinux.

**SELinux and proc filesystem** are used by the user space tools to communicate with the kernel security server.

**Security Server** makes security decisions. It is embedded in the kernel and it obtains the security policy via the user space tools. The security server does not enforce the decision, it only states whether the operation is allowed or not.

**Access Vector Cache** caches security decision made by the security server.

**Linux Security Module Hooks** call the security server.

## 2.2 Basic Concepts

This section defines basic terms related to SELinux, such as mandatory access control, type enforcement, multi-level and multi-category security, security context, and others.

### 2.2.1 Subjects and Objects

There are two basic entities in SELinux [11, p. 29]:

**Subject** is an entity that causes information to flow among objects or changes the system state. Within SELinux, a subject is an active process that can access objects. A process can also be an object, for example when a process is sending a signal to another process, the process receiving the signal is treated as an object.

**Object** is a system resource such as a file, a socket, a pipe, a TCP or UDP port, a network interface, a semaphore or shared memory segment.

### 2.2.2 Mandatory Access Control

SELinux provides a mandatory access control mechanism that extends the discretionary access control mechanisms present in the Linux kernel.

#### Discretionary Access Control

*Discretionary access control* (DAC) is defined by *Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria* (TCSEC) standard [10]. System with DAC must enable users to protect their data by controlling access to their data, e.g. by setting permissions for other users or user groups. In DAC, users make security decisions by specifying who can access their data. The disadvantage is that users can propagate sensitive information.

Linux implements the discretionary access control. Each object has an owner that controls the access to that object. Permissions are set in three scopes: user, group, and others. For each scope, permissions to read, write, and execute can be set.

#### Mandatory Access Control

*Mandatory access control* (MAC), defined by TCSEC standard, provides more restrictions than DAC. In this type of access control, the operating system can prevent subjects from performing operations on objects. This is achieved by attaching subjects and objects a set of security attributes. When a subject (usually a process) wants to perform an operation on an object (a file, a directory, a socket, etc.), the operating system first examines these attributes. Then the security policy is used to determine whether this operation should be allowed or not. When using MAC, users do not have the ability to override the security policy and, for example, propagate sensitive information.

There are several implementations of MAC. the Linux kernel currently contains several security modules implemented using the *Linux Security Modules* (LSM) framework [6]. Security-Enhanced Linux, developed by National Security Agency and Red Hat [2], is used in Red Hat Enterprise Linux (RHEL), CentOS, Fedora, and Android [14, 13, 5]. AppArmor, developed by SUSE, is used in SUSE Linux Enterprise, openSUSE, and Ubuntu [8, 7]. There are two other Linux security modules, Smack and TOMOYO Linux.

### 2.2.3 SELinux and MAC Checks

SELinux security checks are carried out after the standard Linux DAC checks. When running an SELinux-enabled system, when a user space process makes a system call, standard file permissions are checked first. Then, if the access is allowed, the Linux Security Module hooks call security checks in SELinux.

### 2.2.4 SELinux Users

SELinux uses its own user names that are different from the standard Linux user names [11, p. 24]. Each Linux user is associated to an SELinux user. For example, Linux user `root` is mapped to an SELinux user `unconfined_u` on Fedora 27. There is a special SELinux user that is mapped to no user: `system_u`.

Available SELinux users can be listed using the `seinfo --user` command:

```
$ seinfo --user
```

```
Users: 8
  guest_u
  root
  staff_u
  sysadm_u
  system_u
  unconfined_u
  user_u
  xguest_u
```

### 2.2.5 Role-Based Access Control

SELinux uses the role-based access control (RBAC) as one of its security mechanisms. RBAC as a general concept is based on users, roles, permissions, and relationships between them. RBAC defines the role-permission, user-role, and role-role relationships.

In SELinux, each user is associated to one or more roles [11, p. 24]. Each role can access only the types that are associated to that role. For example, the `system_u` user is associated to the `unconfined_r` and `system_r` roles on Fedora 27.

Available SELinux roles can be listed using the `seinfo --role` command:

```
$ seinfo --role
```

```
Roles: 14
  auditadm_r
  dbadm_r
  guest_r
  logadm_r
  nx_server_r
  object_r
  secadm_r
  staff_r
  sysadm_r
  system_r
  unconfined_r
  user_r
  webadm_r
  xguest_r
```

### 2.2.6 Type Enforcement

SELinux uses type enforcement for enforcing mandatory access control [11, pp. 25–26]. All subjects and objects are associated to an SELinux type. Processes running with the same type are called a *domain*. The SELinux policy then contains rules that allow domains access types.

Available SELinux types can be listed using the `seinfo --type` command:

```
$ seinfo --type

Types: 4845
      abrt_t
      alsa_t
      antivirus_t
      bin_t
      cluster_t
      crond_t
      ...
```

### 2.2.7 Multi-Level and Multi-Category Security

In addition to the type enforcement and the role-based access control, SELinux also supports multi-level security (MLS) and multi-category security (MCS) [11, pp. 48–53]. For the purposes of MLS and MCS, the security context is extended by a level or range entry.

Security levels conform to the Bell-LaPadula model. For processes, the security levels describe subjects clearance, for objects, they describe objects classification. A process running at a certain security level can

- read and write at their current level,
- read only at lower levels,
- write only at higher levels.

This means that processes cannot read data with a higher security level and cannot leak sensitive information to the lower levels. Multi-level security is not used by default in most SELinux-enabled Linux distributions such as Fedora or RHEL, but it is supported.

### 2.2.8 SELinux Security Context

Security decisions are based on a *security context* that must be assigned to each subject and object [11, pp. 27–28]. The security context is sometimes referred to as a *security label* or just a *label*. The security context is a string in the following form:

```
user:role:type[:range]
```

**user** is the SELinux user (see section 2.2.4).

**role** is the SELinux role used by the role-based access control (see section 2.2.5).

**type** is the SELinux type used by the type enforcement (see section 2.2.6).

**range** is used by MLS or MCS (see section 2.2.7) and is optional.

An example of subject security contexts:

```
$ ps -eZ
LABEL                                PID TTY          TIME CMD
system_u:system_r:init_t:s0          1 ?           00:00:04 systemd
system_u:system_r:kernel_t:s0        2 ?           00:00:00 kthreadd
system_u:system_r:auditd_t:s0       1139 ?          00:00:00 auditd
system_u:system_r:alsa_t:s0         1164 ?          00:00:00 alsactl
...
```

An example of object security contexts:

```
$ ls -Z /etc
      system_u:object_r:etc_t:s0 alsa
system_u:object_r:cupsd_etc_t:s0 cups
      system_u:object_r:dhcp_etc_t:s0 dhcp
system_u:object_r:passwd_file_t:s0 passwd
      system_u:object_r:net_conf_t:s0 resolv.conf
...
```

### 2.2.9 Object Classes

Each object belongs to an object class. Object classes specify operations that can be performed on the object [11, pp. 29–30]. For example, on Fedora 27, there are the following classes:

```
$ seinfo --class

Classes: 97
blk_file
chr_file
dbus
dir
fd
file
filesystem
ipc
...
```

Each class is associated to a set of permissions. For example, on Fedora 27, the `node` class provides the following permissions:

```
$ seinfo --class node -x

Classes: 1
  class node
{
    dccp_send
    enforce_dest
    tcp_recv
    rawip_send
}
```



```

        tcp_send
        udp_recv
        dccp_recv
        sendto
        udp_send
        recvfrom
        rawip_recv
    }

```

SELinux object classes maps to the kernel object classes (files, sockets, etc.) and user space objects (for X-Windows or D-Bus).

### 2.2.10 Labeling Subjects and Objects

Security contexts for subjects and objects are computed by the kernel security server using several policy statements [11, pp. 31–33].

#### Labeling Processes

The first init process usually transitions to its own unique domain, for example `init_t`. On fork, the child process inherits the security context of its parent. On exec, the child process may transition to a different security context. This is achieved by type transition policy statements. SELinux-aware processes may change their context by calling the `setcon()` or `setexeccon()` functions from the `libselinux` library.

#### Labeling Files

Security context for files is computed as follows:

**user** is inherited from the creating process.

**role** defaults to `object_r` unless modified by a `role_transition` statement.

**type** defaults to the type of the parent directory unless modified by a `type_transition` statement.

The file contexts are covered in depth in section 2.4.

### 2.2.11 Type Transitions

To run different processes in different domains, there needs to be a way how to *transition* a process from one domain to another. To attach a specific label to an object, the object needs to be transitioned from one type to another. Both transitions can be achieved using the `type_transition` statement.

#### Domain Transition

Starting a new process with a different security context is called domain transition [11, pp. 43–47]. For example, the `systemd` process running as `init_t` needs to start the Apache HTTP Server as `httpd_t`. Apache executables are labeled `httpd_exec_t`. The following policy rule allows the transition:

```
| type_transition init_t httpd_exec_t:process httpd_t;
```

The `systemd` process does not need to be aware of SELinux. The `type_transition` rule in the policy will cause the `exec` call to automatically perform the transition. There are conditions that need to be met before a domain transition can happen:

1. The source domain has a permission to transition into the target domain. For example:

```
| allow init_t httpd_t:process transition;
```

2. The source domain has a permission to read and execute the binary. For example:

```
| allow init_t httpd_exec_t:file { execute read getattr };
```

3. The context of the executable needs to be set as an entry point into the target domain. For example:

```
| allow httpd_t httpd_exec_t:file entrypoint;
```

## Object Transition

When a new object is created, it inherits the security context of its parent. If a different context of the object is required, the object transition must be used [11, pp. 47–48]. For example when an X server creates a file in the `/tmp` directory (which has the `tmp_t` context), it gets the `user_tmp_t` context. This is achieved by the following `type_transition` rule:

```
| type_transition xserver_t tmp_t:file user_tmp_t;
```

The X server does not need to be aware of SELinux, the kernel computes the label automatically.

### 2.2.12 SELinux Modes of Operation

SELinux has three modes of operation [14]. The default mode is *enforcing*. In this mode, everything, which is not allowed by the policy, is denied. When a process tries to perform an action, which is not allowed by the policy, it is logged. In *permissive* mode, SELinux is not enforcing the policy, it only logs actions. In *disabled* mode, SELinux is turned off.

Running SELinux in permissive mode is useful for catching AVC denials that can be analyzed using the `audit2allow` utility. To perform a single task (for example to save a file), several SELinux checks are usually needed. When running in the enforcing mode, only the first denial would be logged and the troubleshooting would be more difficult.

## 2.3 SELinux Policy

Security decisions made by the security server in the kernel are resolved using the SELinux policy. This section describes the most important SELinux policy statements. The primary output of the `audit2allow` utility are policy statements.

SELinux supports either monolithic (compiled from a single source file) or modular policy. Modular policy, which is used in Fedora and RHEL, consists of a mandatory base policy source file and loadable modules. In Fedora, almost each module contains a policy for one application or service, such as the `apache` or `xserver` module. The `audit2allow` utility can be used to create a loadable policy module.



Figure 2.2: Relationship of the user, role, and type statements.

SELinux policy statements start with a statement keyword, usually followed by several identifiers and a semicolon at the end. Comments start with a “#”. An example of an allow rule:

```
# This is an allow rule
allow httpd_t httpd_exec_t: file { ioctl read getattr lock execute open };
```

### 2.3.1 User, Role and Type Statements

To support mechanisms such as the type enforcement, the role-based access control, and multi-level and multi-category security, SELinux assigns security contexts to subjects and objects. A security context is a combination of a user, a role, a type, and optionally range identifiers (see section 2.2.8). This section describes policy statements that declare these identifiers.

SELinux users are declared using the **user** statement. The users are assigned one or more roles. SELinux roles are declared using the **role** statement. The roles are assigned types that they can access. SELinux types are declared using the **type** statement.

The roles can be grouped together using the **attribute\_role** and **roleattribute** statements. The types can be grouped together using the **attribute** and **typeattribute** statements. Type aliases can be defined using the **typealias** statements. The relationship between various statements is shown in figure 2.2.

#### User Statements

The **user** statement declares an identifier for an SELinux user. Syntax:

```
user seuser_id roles role_id;
```

**seuser\_id** is an SELinux user identifier.

**role\_id** is one or more role identifiers.

An example from Fedora 27:

```
user staff_u roles { system_r unconfined_r sysadm_r staff_r };
```

## Role Statements

The **role** statement declares an identifier for an SELinux role and optionally associates the role to one or more types. Syntax:

```
role role_id;  
role role_id types type_id;
```

**role\_id** is an SELinux role identifier.

**type\_id** is one or more type identifiers.

An example from Fedora 27:

```
role auditadm_r types { auditadm_t auditadm_screen_t auditadm_su_t  
    auditadm_sudo_t chkpwd_t updpwd_t exim_t auditctl_t auditd_t  
    mailman_mail_t user_mail_t postfix_postdrop_t postfix_postqueue_t  
    qmail_inject_t qmail_queue_t run_init_t user_tmp_t vlock_t };
```

## Type Statements

The **type** statement declares an identifier for an SELinux type. Type identifiers usually ends with **'\_t'** to distinguish them from attribute identifiers. Syntax:

```
type type_id;  
type type_id, attribute_id;  
type type_id alias alias_id;  
type type_id alias alias_id, attribute_id;
```

**type\_id** is an SELinux type identifier.

**alias\_id** is one or more optional aliases declared by the **typealias** statement. Multiple aliases must be enclosed in braces.

**attribute\_id** is one or more optional attributes declared by the **attribute** statement. Multiple attributes must be separated by a comma.

An example from Fedora 27:

```
type httpd_sys_content_t alias { httpd_fastcgi_content_t  
    httpd_httpd_sys_script_ro_t httpd_fastcgi_script_ro_t },  
    httpdcontent, httpd_content_type, entry_type, exec_type, file_type,  
    non_auth_file_type, non_security_file_type;
```

## Other Statements

The **attribute\_role** statement declares an identifier for a group of role identifiers. Syntax:

```
attribute_role attribute_id;
```

The **roleattribute** statement associates roles to role attributes. Syntax:

```
roleattribute role_id attribute_id;
```

The **attribute** statement declares an identifier for a group of type identifiers. Syntax:

```
| attribute attribute_id;
```

The **typeattribute** statement associates types to attributes. Syntax:

```
| typeattribute type_id attribute_id;
```

The **typealias** statement declares type aliases. Syntax:

```
| typealias type_id alias alias_id;
```

### 2.3.2 Access Vector Rules

The access vector rules support the type enforcement within SELinux. They control which access processes get. The `audit2allow` utility generates access vector rules as an output.

The **allow** rule grants an access to an object. Syntax:

```
| allow source_type target_type:obj_class perm_set;
```

**source\_type** represents one or more type or attribute identifiers (see section 2.3.1). This field identifies the subject that is performing the operation.

**target\_type** represents one or more type or attribute identifiers. This field identifies the object that is being accessed. When the target type is the same as the source type, the **self** keyword can be used instead of the target type.

**obj\_class** represents one or more object classes (for example `file` or `tcp_socket`).

**perm\_set** represents one or more permissions (for example `read` or `connectto`).

An example:

```
| allow httpd_t samba_share_t:file { getattr open read };
```

In this example, processes running as `httpd_t` are allowed to `getattr`, `open`, and `read` files labeled as `samba_share_t`.

There are three other AV rules that follow the syntax pattern of the **allow** rule:

**dontaudit** stops auditing (logging) of the denials. It is used when the denial is expected to happen and does not cause any issues. The **dontaudit** rules help to keep the audit logs clean.

**auditallow** audits the event. The **auditallow** rule itself does not allow the operation, so the rule must appear together with a standard **allow** rule.

**neverallow** is a compiler statement that stops the compilation of the policy if an **allow** rule with same arguments is found somewhere in the policy. It is used for marking rules that may be insecure.

Internally, access vectors defined by AV rules are stored in the memory as bit arrays that are 32 bits long. Because of this limitation, object classes cannot have more than 32 different permissions. Extended permission AV rules were introduced to overcome this issue.

### 2.3.3 Extended Permission Access Vector Rules

Since policy version 30, there are extended permission access vector rules that expand the permission sets. Standard access vector rules operate with 32 bit permission sets, the extended permission AV rules add arbitrary number of 256 bit increments. The extended permission AV rules are currently (as of policy version 31) used only for filtering of `ioctl` system calls, but they provide generic tool that can be used for more granular control over an operation in the future [16].

Support for the extended permission AV rules by the `audit2allow` utility was implemented as a part of this thesis. Syntax of extended permission AV rules [1]:

```
rule_name source_type target_type : obj_class operation xperm_set;
```

**rule\_name** is one of the following: `allowxperm`, `dontauditxperm`, `auditallowxperm`, or `neverallowxperm`. The meaning is the same as with standard AV rules. The `allowxperm` rule allows the access, the `dontauditxperm` rule denies and logs the access, the `auditallowxperm` rule logs the access, and the `neverallowxperm` rules is a compiler statement to prevent insecure rules from appearing in the policy.

**source\_type**, **target\_type**, **obj\_class** are a source type, a target type, and an object class, the same as with a standard AV rule.

**operation** is a single keyword defining the operation to be implemented by the rule. As of policy version 31, only the `ioctl` operation is supported. In contrast to permissions in standard access vector rules, each extended permission AV rule has only one operation (standard AV rules can have a lot of permissions).

**xperm\_set** are extended permissions represented by numeric values. The meaning of the values depends on the operation. The values can be written in a decimal or hexadecimal form, for example 42 or 0x2a. Multiple values must be separated by a space and enclosed in braces, for example { 1 2 3 }. Value ranges are supported, for example 50-60 (both 50 and 60 are included in the range). To allow all values except for those explicitly listed, the complement operator can be used, for example ~{ 1 2 3 }.

An example of an extended permission AV rule:

```
allowxperm my_app_t my_socket_t : tcp_socket ioctl { 20 30 0x40 50-60 };
```

This rule allows a process running as `my_app_t` to call `ioctl` on a TCP socket labeled `my_socket_t` with parameters 20, 30, 64, or any number from 50 to 60.

#### Filtering the `ioctl` System Call

Filtering `ioctl` calls is as of policy version 31 the only implementation of extended permission AV rules. The `ioctl` system call accepts three parameters: a file descriptor, a request number, and a pointer [3]. The extended permission AV rules allow filtering based on the request number. For `ioctl` calls, the **operation** keyword is `ioctl` and numbers in the **xperm\_set** represent request numbers.

When there is only an `allow` rule for a particular source and a target context and object class, all `ioctl` calls are allowed. With an additional `allowxperm` rule, only the `ioctl` calls with parameters allowed by the `allowxperm` rules are allowed. The `allowxperm` rule alone has no effect, for `ioctl` filtering, both `allow` and `allowxperm` rules must be present.

### 2.3.4 Policy Modules

The **module** and **require** statements are used to support policy modules. The **audit2allow** utility is able to generate these statements when specified by command-line options. Each policy module must start with the **module** statement. Syntax:

```
module module_name version;
```

**module\_name** is the name of the module.

**version** is the version number in format **X.Y.Z**.

This name is used to refer to the module when using user space utilities. For example this command is used to remove a module from the policy:

```
$ semodule -r module_name
```

The **require** statement indicates which parts of the policy are imported from other modules or the base policy. Syntax:

```
require { require_list }
```

**require\_list** represents one or more keywords followed by an identifier separated by a semicolon. The valid keywords are: **role**, **type**, **attribute**, **user**, **bool**, **category**, **sensitivity**, **class**.

An example of the **module** and **require** statements:

```
module my_module 1.2.0;

require {
    type nscd_t, nscd_var_run_t;
    class nscd { getserv getpwd getgrp gethost shmempwd shmemgrp
        shmehost shmemserv };
}
```

When loading this module, the **nscd\_t** and **nscd\_var\_run\_t** types and the **nscd** class with specified permissions must be defined somewhere in the policy (either in the base policy or in another policy module).

### 2.3.5 Conditional Policy

SELinux policy allows turning on and off a set of policy statements without the need for reloading policy. Conditional policy is defined using the **bool** statement that defines a condition. Then an **if/else** construct is used to mark statements that depend on the condition. An example:

```
bool allow_execmem false;

if (allow_execmem) {
    allow sysadm_t self:process execmem;
}
```

Booleans can be turned on and off using the **semanage boolean** command. The **audit2allow** utility is able to detect that certain AVC denials can be solved by turning on a boolean.

### 2.3.6 Labeling Network Objects

The SELinux policy supports labeling of the following network objects:

- TCP and UDP ports identified by a number,
- network nodes represented by IP addresses and subnet masks,
- network interfaces (e.g. `eth0`).

The `audit2allow` utility can be extended to suggest changing labels of network objects, see section 3.3.

#### Network Interfaces

The `netifcon` statement labels network interface statements. Syntax:

```
| netifcon netif_id netif_context packet_context
```

`netif_id` is the name of the network interface (e.g. `eth0`).

`netif_context` is the security context of the interface.

`packet_context` is the security context of the packets.

An example:

```
| netifcon eth0 system_u:object_r:netif_t:s0 system_u:object_r:netif_t:s0
```

#### Network Nodes

The `nodecon` statement labels network addresses. Syntax:

```
| nodecon subnet netmask node_context
```

`subnet` is the IP address of the subnet.

`netmask` is the subnet mask.

`node_context` is the security context of the node.

An example:

```
| nodecon ff00:: ff00:: system_u:object_r:multicast_node_t:s0
```

#### Network Ports

The `portcon` statement labels TCP and UDP ports. Syntax:

```
| portcon protocol port_number port_context
```

`protocol` is either `udp` or `tcp`.

`port_number` is a port number or a range of port numbers.

`port_context` is the security context of the port.

An example:

```
| portcon tcp 22 system_u:object_r:ssh_port_t:s0
```



## 2.4 File Contexts

When accessing files, SELinux relies on the labels stored with those files to make a security decision. SELinux labels can be viewed using the `ls -Z` command:

```
$ ls -Z
unconfined_u:object_r:user_home_t:s0    testdir
unconfined_u:object_r:user_home_t:s0    testfile
```

The labels are stored in *extended attributes* in the security namespace [4]. The extended attributes associated with a file can be viewed using the `getfattr` command:

```
$ getfattr -n security.selinux testfile
# file: testfile
security.selinux="unconfined_u:object_r:user_home_t:s0"
```

Mislabeled files often causes AVC denials that should not be solved using the `audit2allow` utility and `audit2allow` should detect these situations. Proper solutions should be presented to the user. See section 3.2.

### 2.4.1 Temporary Changes

The `chcon` command changes the security context of files [14]. The user must have a permission to relabel files. The changes made by `chcon` are overwritten by a file system relabel or running of `restorecon`.

### 2.4.2 Type Transition

To specify the context of files created by processes, the `type_transition` rules are used. For example, when a process running with the `httpd_t` context creates a file in a directory with the `var_run_t` context, the file will get the `httpd_var_run_t` context:

```
type_transition httpd_t var_run_t:file httpd_var_run_t;
```

Type transitions are explained in section 2.2.11.

### 2.4.3 File Context Configuration Files

There are situations when files get a label that is different than the default one [14]:

1. When moving files, the label is preserved. This does not happen when copying files because a new file is always created.
2. When SELinux is disabled, labels are not assigned to files.
3. When the policy is changed (for example when a module is unloaded), there may be some files left with a type that is no longer defined in the policy.

For these situations, there is the `file_contexts` file which specifies default contexts for each file based on its path. For example:

```
/run/.*      -- system_u:object_r:var_run_t:s0
/var/.*      -- system_u:object_r:var_t:s0
/etc/.*      -- system_u:object_r:etc_t:s0
/lib/.*      -- system_u:object_r:lib_t:s0
```




Figure 2.3: File Context Configuration Files.

```

/usr/.*\.*.cgi    --  system_u:object_r:httpd_sys_script_exec_t:s0
/root(/.*)?      --  system_u:object_r:admin_home_t:s0
/dev/[0-9].*     -c  system_u:object_r:usb_device_t:s0
/dev/.tty[~/]*  -c  system_u:object_r:tty_device_t:s0

```

The `--` means that the context should be applied to all file types (e.g., files, directories, sockets). The `-c` means that the context should be applied only when the file is a character device. Utilities such as `restorecon` and `setfiles` use the `file_contexts` configuration file to relabel files on the filesystem.

#### 2.4.4 Building File Context Configuration Files

Utilities such as `restorecon` and `setfiles` use several files to restore default contexts of the files [11, pp. 165–167]:

- The `file_contexts` file contains default contexts for files.
- The `file_contexts.homedirs` file contains default contexts for files inside the user home directories.
- The `file_contexts.local` file contains local modifications of the default file contexts.
- The `file_contexts.subs` and `file_contexts.subs_dist` files contain file name substitutions. For example, these files can specify that `/usr/lib64` should be treated the same way as `/usr/lib`.

These files are created when building the policy, see figure 2.3. All `.fc` files from the base policy and from policy modules are used to build the `file_contexts.template` file.

This file may contain rules having special keywords inside their path, such as `HOME_ROOT`, `HOME_DIR`, or `USER`. All rules without special keywords are used to build the `file_contexts` file which is used directly by utilities such as `restorecon` or `setfiles`.

Rules with special keywords are used to build the `homedir_template` file. These rules are associated with user home directories and need to be expanded for individual users using the `genhomedircon` utility. For example the following `homedir_template` entry:

```
HOME_DIR/\.ssh(/.*)?      system_u:object_r:ssh_home_t:s0
```

would be expanded to the following rules:

```
/home/[~/*]/\.ssh(/.*)?    system_u:object_r:ssh_home_t:s0
/root/\.ssh(/.*)?          system_u:object_r:ssh_home_t:s0
```

Expanded rules are then stored in the `file_contexts.homedirs` file and used by `restorecon` and `setfiles` utilities [11, pp. 134–140].

### 2.4.5 Changing File Context Configuration Files

The `file_contexts.local` file can be changed using the `semanage fcontext` command [14]. For example:

```
# semanage fcontext -a -t samba_share_t /etc/myfile
# semanage fcontext -l -C
SELinux fcontext      type          Context
/etc/myfile           all files     system_u:object_r:samba_share_t:s0
```

In this example, a new file context entry was added. The rule states that the `/etc/myfile` file should obtain the `system_u:object_r:samba_share_t:s0` context.

## 2.5 Auditing Security Events

The *Linux Audit System* provides an auditing system for tracking security-relevant system events. It is used to track file access, monitor system calls, record commands run by the user, record failed login attempts and others [15]. The Linux Audit System does not provide additional security by itself, it can be only used to discover security violations.

The Linux Audit System consists of kernel and user space parts. The kernel filters the events and sends them to the *audit daemon*. The audit daemon writes the received events to a log file then. There are several user space tools used for interacting with the audit system and for working with the log file.

### 2.5.1 Auditing SELinux Denials

In Fedora and RHEL, SELinux uses the Linux Audit System to log security events. When a process tries to perform an operation without the permissions, an *Access Vector Cache* (AVC) denial message is logged using the audit daemon [14]. This message can be processed by tools such as `setroubleshoot` or `audit2allow` then.

Each AVC denial message contains information about the source context (the context of the process), the object class (for example a file), and the target context (the context of the object). For example, when an `httpd` process running with the `unconfined_u:system_r:httpd_t:s0` context is trying to perform the `getattr` operation on the `/var/www/html/`

file1 file with the `system_u:object_r:samba_share_t:s0` context and fails, the following AVC denial message is generated:

```
type=AVC msg=audit(1223024155.684:49): avc:  denied  { getattr }
for pid=2000 comm="httpd" path="/var/www/html/file1" dev=dm-0
ino=399185 scontext=unconfined_u:system_r:httpd_t:s0
tcontext=system_u:object_r:samba_share_t:s0 tclass=file
```

## 2.6 Troubleshooting SELinux

When SELinux denies an access that is requested by a process, the process may fail to function normally and reports error or crashes. Determining if the failure is related to SELinux is done by switching whole SELinux or just one domain into the permissive mode. For example, for debugging `httpd`, it is advised to set the `httpd_t` domain into the permissive mode:

```
# semanage permissive -a httpd_t
```

SELinux denials caused by the `httpd_t` domain would still be logged but not enforced.

On Fedora and RHEL, SELinux denials are analyzed by the `setroubleshootd` daemon that provides suggestions for resolving the problem using various plugins. Majority of problems are caused by missing `allow` rules in policy. To add missing rules, the `audit2allow` utility is used. However, not every problem requires new policy rules, some issues may require relabeling of objects using `restorecon` or `semanage`.

## 2.7 The audit2allow Utility

The `audit2allow` is a user space tool that scans the AVC messages and generates SELinux policy snippets based on them.

### 2.7.1 Purpose of audit2allow

The `audit2allow` utility is designed for both system administrators and SELinux policy developers. System administrators use `audit2allow` to analyze SELinux denials and to create new policy modules. When suitable, the `audit2allow` utility suggests other options to resolve denials, such as turning on a boolean (see section 2.3.5).

Policy developers use `audit2allow` to create basis for new policy modules for their products. When writing a policy for their program, they can run the programs test suite in the permissive mode, collect AVC denials, create a policy module, and then manually edit the policy module. Policy developers can use the `--reference` option to generate the policy using predefined macros.

### 2.7.2 Basic Mode of Operation

In default mode, `audit2allow` scans AVC denial messages and generates policy rules which allow operations that were denied. For example, when the `httpd` process tries to perform the `getattr` operation on the `/var/www/html/file1` file, the following AVC message is generated:

```
type=AVC msg=audit(1223024155.684:49): avc: denied { getattr }
for pid=2000 comm="httpd" path="/var/www/html/file1" dev=dm-0
ino=399185 scontext=unconfined_u:system_r:httpd_t:s0
tcontext=system_u:object_r:samba_share_t:s0 tclass=file
```

The audit2allow utility would generate the following policy rule:

```
allow httpd_t samba_share_t:file getattr;
```

The audit2allow utility is able to process multiple AVC denial messages, deal with duplicates, and output all rules based on the fields in AVC denial messages.

### 2.7.3 Command-Line Options

The audit2allow utility is able to read AVC messages from stdin, dmesg, audit log, or an arbitrary file (see `--dmesg`, `--all`, and `--input` options). There is `--boot` option which loads only the messages generated since last boot and `--lastreload` option which loads only the messages since last SELinux policy reload.

The audit2allow utility can output the policy rules directly to stdout or a file, or create a policy module which can be loaded directly into the policy (see `--module`, `-M`, and `--output` options).

The audit2allow utility is using the currently loaded policy (or another policy specified with the `--policy` option) to get more information about the denials. For example, audit2allow suggests turning on a boolean that would allow the denied operations.

When run with the `--reference` option, audit2allow tries to match the denials against defined interfaces. An example of audit2allow output without the `--reference` option:

```
#===== httpd_t =====
allow httpd_t samba_share_t:file getattr;
```

An example of audit2allow output with the `--reference` option:

```
require {
    type httpd_t;
}

#===== httpd_t =====
samba_read_share_files(httpd_t)
```

The audit2allow found an interface which contained the same allow rule. Interfaces create more readable code but can contain more rules that are necessary.

The `--why` option does not output any policy rules but provides a text description of why the access was denied. An example of `audit2allow --why` output:

```
type=AVC msg=audit(1223024155.684:49): avc: denied { getattr }
for pid=2000 comm="httpd" path="/var/www/html/file1" dev=dm-0
ino=399185 scontext=unconfined_u:system_r:httpd_t:s0
tcontext=system_u:object_r:samba_share_t:s0 tclass=file
```

Was caused by:

Missing type enforcement (TE) allow rule.

You can use audit2allow to generate a loadable module to allow this access.

The `--dontaudit` option generates `dontaudit` rules instead of `allow` rules (see section 2.3.2).

#### 2.7.4 How Does audit2allow Work

The `audit2allow` collects audit messages from various sources first. The messages are stored based on their type and then parsed. Each AVC denial message is analyzed together with a binary policy file to find out the reason of denial.

From AVC denial messages, source contexts, target contexts, object classes, and permissions are extracted and converted into *access vector sets*. Each access vector in the set contains a unique combination of a source context, a target context, and object class. Permissions from multiple AVC messages are merged into one access vector set. An example of an access vector set:

```
{
  {
    src: 'unconfined_u:system_r:httpd_t:s0',
    tgt: 'system_u:object_r:samba_share_t:s0',
    cls: 'file',
    perms: [ 'getattr', 'open' ]
  },
  {
    src: 'unconfined_u:system_r:httpd_t:s0',
    tgt: 'system_u:object_r:sssd_conf_t:s0',
    cls: 'file',
    perms: [ 'getattr' ]
  }
}
```

Each access vector is converted into an allow rule then. After that all rules are printed to the output. An example:

```
allow httpd_t samba_share_t:file { getattr open };
allow httpd_t sssd_conf_t:file getattr;
```

The `module` and `require` statements (see section 2.3.4) may be optionally written to the output. Various other information is stored during the processing. The `audit2allow` prints comments with helpful messages.

#### 2.7.5 Implementation of audit2allow

The `audit2allow` utility is a part of the SELinux user space. It is written mostly in Python, with several parts written in C. It uses `sepolgen` and `sepolicy` Python packages and `libselinux` and `libsepol` libraries.

The main script, `audit2allow`, parses command-line options, retrieves audit messages, and prints the output. The main logic of converting AVC denial messages to access vector rules is implemented in the `sepolgen` package.

The `sepolgen` package contains the following modules:

**audit.py** defines classes for various audit messages, contains audit message parser.

**access.py** defines access vectors and access vector sets.

`policygen.py` creates policy rules based on access vectors.

`refpolicy.py` contains classes that represent the policy statements.

`output.py` outputs the generated rules.

There are several other modules which are either not significant (e.g. the `utils.py` module) or used only to generate policy using the interfaces (e.g. the `interfaces.py` package).

## The audit2allow Script

The main script does the following steps:

1. Parses command-line arguments and checks potential conflicts.
2. Reads audit messages. Creates an `AuditParser` instance and feeds it with the messages.
3. Filters the messages (if specified by the `--type` option) and converts them to access vectors.
4. Creates a `PolicyGenerator` instance, feeds it with the access vectors, and converts them to policy rules.
5. Writes the output.

## The audit.py Module

The `audit.py` module is used for parsing audit messages. It is not a general purpose library for parsing audit messages, it is meant to parse mainly the AVC messages and policy load messages.

The `AuditParser` class reads strings and creates objects of an appropriate type for each message. The `AuditMessage` class is the base class for all message types. The `AVCMessage` class represents AVC denials and is used for generating access vectors.

After parsing of an AVC message, the denial is analyzed in the `audit2why.c` module (from the `libselinux` library). The `audit2why.c` module tries to find out the reason of the denial by analyzing the policy. The module is written in C and uses the `libsepol` library.

Each message is then converted to an access vector from the `access` module. AVC denial messages can be filtered using regular expressions via the `AVCTypeFilter` class. Only messages that match the regular expression are processed.

Policy load messages are important for the `--lastreload` command-line option. The `AuditParser` processes then only messages after the last policy load message.

## The access.py Module

The `access.py` module defines the `AccessVector` and `AccessVectorSet` classes. The access vector is a basic representation of an access in SELinux. It contains single source and target type, single object class, and a set of permissions. Each AVC denial message can be converted into an access vector. For example this AVC denial message:

```
type=AVC msg=audit(1223024155.684:49): avc: denied { getattr }
for pid=2000 comm="httpd" path="/var/www/html/file1" dev=dm-0
ino=399185 scontext=unconfined_u:system_r:httpd_t:s0
tcontext=system_u:object_r:samba_share_t:s0 tclass=file
```

would be converted into the following access vector:

```
{
    source_context: 'unconfined_u:system_r:httpd_t:s0',
    target_context: 'system_u:object_r:samba_share_t:s0',
    object_class: 'file',
    permissions: [ 'getattr' ]
}
```

Multiple access vectors are aggregated in access vector sets. Access vectors sharing the same source and target type, as well as the object class are merged together, so that there are no duplicates. For example, if we add the following access vector:

```
{
    source_context: 'unconfined_u:system_r:httpd_t:s0',
    target_context: 'system_u:object_r:samba_share_t:s0',
    object_class: 'file',
    permissions: [ 'open', 'read' ]
}
```

to the access vector above, they would be merged into the following access vector (they share the source and target context and the object class):

```
{
    source_context: 'unconfined_u:system_r:httpd_t:s0',
    target_context: 'system_u:object_r:samba_share_t:s0',
    object_class: 'file',
    permissions: [ 'getattr', 'open', 'read' ]
}
```

Access vector sets serve as a basis for generating policy access vector rules in the `policygen.py` module.

### The `policygen.py` Module

The `policygen.py` module defines the `PolicyGenerator` class that generates a policy module from access vectors. `PolicyGenerator` converts an access vector set into SELinux policy statements. For example, this access vector:

```
{
    source_context: 'unconfined_u:system_r:httpd_t:s0',
    target_context: 'system_u:object_r:samba_share_t:s0',
    object_class: 'file',
    permissions: [ 'getattr', 'open', 'read' ]
}
```

would be converted into the following policy statement:

```
allow httpd_t samba_share_t:file { getattr open read };
```

`PolicyGenerator` uses objects from the `refpolicy.py` module to represent policy statements. `PolicyGenerator` provides several configuration methods:

`set_gen_refpol()` turns on generating of interfaces.



**set\_gen\_requires()** turns on generating of the **require** statements that are necessary for creating a standalone policy module (see section 2.3.4).

**set\_gen\_explain()** turns on adding of comments explaining why the policy statements were generated.

**set\_gen\_dontaudit()** turns on generating of the **dontaudit** rules instead of **allow** rules (see section 2.3.2).

The output of **PolicyGenerator** is a tree-like structure containing generated policy statements. The **output.py** module then just prints out each statement.

## The **refpolicy.py** Module

This module contains classes that represent SELinux policy statements. The **Node** and **Leaf** classes are base classes for all policy statements. Each statement is either a node that is a parent of other statements (for example the **Module** class), or a leaf (for example the **AVRule** class). The **refpolicy.py** module contains functions for traversing trees made out of nodes and leaves. These functions are used when printing statements in the **output.py** module.

The **IdSet** class represents a set of arbitrary identifiers and is used by many statements for storing permissions and other sets. The **SecurityContext** class represents an SELinux security context. Classes such as **TypeAttribute**, **RoleAttribute**, **Role**, **Type**, and others represent policy statements as described in section 2.3 and are used mainly for interface generation.

For the basic operation mode, the following classes are used: **AVRule**, **Module**, **Require**, and **ModuleDeclaration**. The **AVRule** class contains the following attributes:

**src\_types** is an **IdSet()** of source types.

**tgt\_types** is an **IdSet()** of target types.

**obj\_classes** is an **IdSet()** of object classes.

**perms** is an **IdSet()** of permissions.

**rule\_type** is one of the following: **ALLOW**, **DONTAUDIT**, **AUDITALLOW**, or **NEVERALLOW**.

The **Module** class serves only as a node that is parent to all statements inside a module. The **ModuleDeclaration** class represents the **module** statement and is generated with the **--module** option. The **Require** class represents the **require** statement inside policy modules and is generated with either **--module** or **--require** options.

## Chapter 3

# Problems of the audit2allow Utility

Issues with the audit2allow utility can be grouped into the following two areas:

1. Several recently introduced types of SELinux policy statements are not recognized by the audit2allow utility. Extended permission access vector rules that allow more granular control are described in section 3.1.
2. Certain SELinux denials are not the result of missing rules in the security policy, they are caused by mislabeled objects. The audit2allow utility is designed to solve problems by adding new rules to the policy and it is not able to detect mislabeled objects or even change the context of the objects. Checking mislabeled files is described in section 3.2, checking mislabeled network objects is discussed in section 3.3.

### 3.1 Extended Permission Access Vector Rules

Since policy version 30, the SELinux policy supports the extended permission access vector rules (see section 2.3.3). Usage of the extended permission AV rules introduces situations when audit2allow is not able to detect the true cause of the denial. As a result, when using the extended permission AV rules, audit2allow may suggest rules that do not solve the denial.

#### 3.1.1 AVC Denials Caused by Extended Permission AV Rules

Suppose there are the following rules present in the policy:

```
allow src_t tgt_t : tcp_socket ioctl;  
allowxperm src_t tgt_t : tcp_socket ioctl 0x42;
```

When a process tries to call `ioctl(fd, 0x1234, argp)`, the operation would be denied, because only the `ioctl(fd, 0x42, argp)` system call is allowed. The following AVC denial message would be generated:

```
type=AVC msg=audit(1515017775.689:1722): avc: denied { ioctl } for  
pid=14587 comm="test" dev="dm-0" ino=8390105 ioctlcmd=0x1234  
scontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:src_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023  
tcontext=unconfined_u:object_r:tgt_t:s0 tclass=tcp_socket permissive=0
```

The `ioctlcmd` field contains the request parameter of the `ioctl` system call that was denied. This value can be used to construct an `allowxperm` rule to allow this operation.

When used for troubleshooting this AVC denial, audit2allow produces the following output:

```
#===== src_t =====  
  
#!!!! This avc is allowed in the current policy  
allow src_t tgt_t:tcp_socket ioctl;
```

which is not helpful. The users are expected to know about the extended permissions to assume that the allow rule was overridden.

### 3.1.2 Generating Extended Permission AV Rules in audit2allow

The audit2allow utility does have all the information to generate extended permission AV rules. There are two situations that may arise when using the extended permission AV rules:

- There is neither an `allow` nor `allowxperm` rule in the policy. The audit2allow utility has two options: either generate only the `allow` rule (current behavior) or generate both `allow` and `allowxperm` rules. Generating `allowxperm` rules is more secure and provides more granular access control. However, for many processes that use lots of different `ioctl` calls it may be inefficient. Generating the `allowxperm` rules automatically also changes the default output of audit2allow and breaks lots of integration tests written using the audit2allow utility.
- There are both `allow` and `allowxperm` rules in the policy. This means that the specific `ioctl` parameter is not allowed. In this case the `allowxperm` rule should be generated.

It is not possible to distinguish these two situations by analyzing the AVC denial itself, because both denials contain the `ioctlcmd` field. The audit2allow utility would need to analyze the binary policy. The audit2allow utility may rather generate extended permission AV rules in all cases (it is a stricter, more secure solution) or only when requested by the user (for example using a command-line option, it is a less secure solution, but it does not break backward compatibility).

In case of using the command-line option, there is still a risk, that the users do not know that they should be using that option. Consider the following example:

```
#===== src_t =====  
  
#!!!! This avc is allowed in the current policy  
allow src_t tgt_t:tcp_socket ioctl;
```

In this example, it is not clear that the denial is caused by an extended permission AV rule. In situations when the denial would be allowed according to the binary policy (there is an `allow` rule) and the AVC denial message contains the `ioctlcmd` field, the user should be warned about the extended permission AV rules. For example:

```
#===== src_t =====  
  
#!!!! This avc is allowed in the current policy  
#!!!! This av rule may have been overridden by extended permission av rule  
allow src_t tgt_t:tcp_socket ioctl;
```

Support for the extended permissions was implemented as a part of this thesis, see section 4.1.

## 3.2 Mislabeled Files

SELinux relies on correctly labeled files. Sometimes, if the files get mislabeled, processes cannot access these files and causes AVC denials. When used for troubleshooting, audit2allow suggests adding new rules to the policy instead of changing the file label.

### 3.2.1 AVC Denial Messages Caused by Mislabeled Files

When a process is trying to access a file that is mislabeled, the operation is usually denied (unless the process has also access to the incorrect label). For example, when the user moves files from the `/root` directory to the `/var/www/html` directory, the files retain their original label:

```
$ ls /var/www/html
unconfined_u:object_r:httpd_sys_content_t:s0 index.html
unconfined_u:object_r:admin_home_t:s0 my_file.html
```

The `index.html` file has the correct label, but the `my_file.html` file has an incorrect one. The `httpd` process cannot access files labeled `admin_home_t`, because there are no allow rules in the policy for this operation:

```
$ sesearch -A -s httpd_t -t admin_home_t -c file -p read
(nothing)
```

As a result, when trying to view `my_file.html`, a similar AVC denial message is generated:

```
type=AVC msg=audit(1226270358.848:238): avc: denied { read }
for pid=13349 comm="httpd" ino=8390105 name="my_file.html"
dev=dm-0 ino=218171 scontext=system_u:system_r:httpd_t:s0
tcontext=system_u:object_r:admin_home_t:s0 tclass=file
```

In this case, there is the `ino` field, which contains the inode number associated with the denial, and the `name` field, which contains the name of the file (but not the full path). In cases of the `getattr` denial, the `path` field is present.

### 3.2.2 Solving Problems With Mislabeled Files

The `restorecon` utility uses the `file_contexts` files to get the default security contexts of files (see section 2.4). For example, when the `/var/www/html/my_file.html` file is mislabeled, the denial should be fixed by running `restorecon` on the file:

```
# restorecon -v /var/www/html/my_file.html
Relabeled /var/www/html/my_file.html from unconfined_u:object_r:
admin_home_t:s0 to unconfined_u:object_r:httpd_sys_content_t:s0
```

When using `audit2allow`, the following rules are generated:

```
allow httpd_t admin_home_t:file getattr;
```

This means that the `httpd` process would gain access to all root's files. This solution is not secure because it contains unnecessary rules to be added to the policy and it does not solve the real problem.

### 3.2.3 Improving audit2allow

The `audit2allow` utility should detect when the AVC message is caused by a mislabeled file and suggest a solution using the `restorecon` utility.

There are three fields in the AVC message that can be used to detect if the file was mislabeled: `path`, `name` and `inode`. When the `path` field is present, `audit2allow` can run `matchpathcon` to get the default context of the file and compare it with the actual file context.

In many cases, the `path` field is not present, only an inode number and the name of the file (without the full path). In this case, it is difficult to find the full path of the file. Ryan Hallisey created a solution [12] that uses the `locate` utility to get all files matching the name and then it stats these files to get the inode number. This solution is only partial, it does not work on files that are not indexed in the database created by `updatedb`.

## 3.3 Labeling Network Ports, Nodes, and Interfaces

The SELinux policy supports labeling of TCP and UDP ports, network nodes (represented by IP addresses and subnet masks), and network interfaces (e.g. `eth0`).

### 3.3.1 Network Ports

SELinux can enforce binding to system ports. For example, in Fedora 27, there are several hundred `portcon` rules that label TCP and UDP ports. An example:

```
$ seinfo --portcon
```

```
Portcon: 615
```

```
portcon tcp 1-511 system_u:object_r:reserved_port_t:s0
portcon tcp 7 system_u:object_r:echo_port_t:s0
portcon tcp 21 system_u:object_r:ftp_port_t:s0
portcon tcp 22 system_u:object_r:ssh_port_t:s0
portcon tcp 53 system_u:object_r:dns_port_t:s0
portcon tcp 80 system_u:object_r:http_port_t:s0
portcon udp 1-511 system_u:object_r:reserved_port_t:s0
portcon udp 1 system_u:object_r:inetd_child_port_t:s0
portcon udp 7 system_u:object_r:echo_port_t:s0
portcon udp 53 system_u:object_r:dns_port_t:s0
portcon udp 67 system_u:object_r:dhcpd_port_t:s0
...
```

Portcon rules can overlap, for example a TCP port number 80 is labeled `http_port_t` but also `reserved_port_t` because it is in the range 1–511. Each port has either a domain-specific label or one of the following labels (based on a range):

1-511	reserved_port_t
512-1023	hi_reserved_port_t
1024-32767	unreserved_port_t
32768-61000	ephemeral_port_t
61001-65535	unreserved_port_t

When a process tries to bind to a port and it is denied by SELinux, an AVC denial message is generated. For example:

```
type=AVC msg=audit(1516026512.648:4191): avc: denied { name_bind } for
pid=6116 comm="test" src=43 scontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:my_app_t:s0
tcontext=system_u:object_r:reserved_port_t:s0
tclass=tcp_socket permissive=0
```

The proper way how to allow the process to bind on the port number 43 would be to label this port with an application-specific context using either a `portcon` rule or the `semanage port` command. For example:

```
# semanage port --add -t system_u:object_r:my_app_port_t:s0 -p TCP 43
```

When used for troubleshooting this denial, the `audit2allow` utility suggests adding the following rule to the policy:

```
allow my_app_t reserved_port_t:tcp_socket name_bind;
```

This rule would grant `my_app_t` access to all reserved ports which is unnecessary and potentially insecure.

The ports can be labeled using the `portcon` rules, but as of policy version 31, these rules are not valid in a policy module, only in the base policy. So `audit2allow` would not be able to generate the `portcon` rules directly. Another way of labeling ports is via the `semanage port` command. The `audit2allow` should suggest using the `semanage port` command when appropriate.

### 3.3.2 Network Nodes

SELinux is capable of labeling network nodes. For example, there can be rules that allow processes to communicate only on a private LAN or even only on the local host. Attempts to violate these rules would then produce AVC denial messages that contain IP addresses of the nodes.

The proper solution would be to modify a label of a certain subnet of the network, for example using the `semanage node` command. The AVC denial messages provide only IP addresses. As IP addresses can often change, labeling a single network node would not be useful. Labeling of network nodes is not used on Fedora and RHEL. Improving the `audit2allow` utility to suggest `semanage node` commands would not make a big impact on the security.

### 3.3.3 Network Interfaces

SELinux is capable of labeling network interfaces (such as `eth0`). In Fedora and RHEL, labeling of network interfaces is not used. Improving `audit2allow` to suggest `semanage interface` commands would not make a big impact on security.

## Chapter 4

# Implementing Extensions of the audit2allow Utility

From the list of possible improvements to audit2allow, the following improvements have been implemented:

- Support for extended permissions. The audit2allow utility can now detect denials that may be caused by extended permission AV rules. With the `--xperms` option, audit2allow generates extended AV rules. Implementation details of this extension are described in section 4.1.
- Checking mislabeled files. The audit2allow utility now parses the `path` field in AVC denial messages and checks if files have the default context. When the context in the AVC denial message is different than the default one, audit2allow produces a warning. This extension is described in section 4.2.

### 4.1 Extended Permissions

Main script `audit2allow` and the `audit.py`, `access.py`, `policygen.py`, `refpolicy.py` modules were modified to support extended permissions. Support for extended permission AV rules with the `--reference` option was not implemented.

In main script, a new command-line option `--xperms` was added to turn on generating of the extended permission AV rules. This option turns on extended permission AV rules generating in `PoligyGenerator`.

#### 4.1.1 Parsing AVC Denial Messages

Despite extended permissions being a general concept, AVC denial messages generated by the Linux Audit System contain operation-specific field `ioctlcmd`. In the future, with introduction of new operation to the extended permissions, the `audit.py` module will need to be updated.

The `audit.py` module was extended to parse the `ioctlcmd` field in AVC denial messages. The `ioctlcmd` field is then converted to fit the general concept of extended permissions and passed to the access vector set. The following code in the `AuditParser.to_access()` method converts operation-specific fields to generic extended permission dictionary:

```

if avc.ioctlcmd:
    xperm_set = refpolicy.XpermSet()
    xperm_set.add(avc.ioctlcmd)
    xperms = { "ioctl": xperm_set }

```

### 4.1.2 Storing Extended Permissions

AVC denial messages are converted to access vectors (see section 2.7.5). Two messages that contains the same source and target context and the object class are merged together. Denials caused by the ioctl system call produce AVC denial messages containing the `ioctlcmd` field. These messages can be treated the same way as any other AVC denial message, but for generating extended permission AV rules, the `ioctlcmd` field must be stored. The `AccessVector` class was extended to store the `ioctlcmd` field and potentially any other extended permission fields introduced in the future.

Single access vector may be product of several AVC denial messages that contain different values in the `ioctlcmd` field. For the purpose of representing extended permission values, new class `XpermSet` was implemented in the `refpolicy.py` module. The `XpermSet` class supports merging of multiple values. It is likely that in the future new extended permission operation will be introduced. Access vector must store values for different operations. For this purpose, `XpermSet` objects are stored in a dictionary where an operation is the key, for example:

```

{
    'ioctl': <refpolicy.XpermSet() object>,
    'other_command': <refpolicy.XpermSet() object>,
    'another_command': <refpolicy.XpermSet() object>,
}

```

When merging two access vectors, the permission sets are merged using the `union()` method. Extended permission dictionary is merged using the following code from the `AccessVector.merge()` method:

```

for op in av.xperms:
    if op not in self.xperms:
        self.xperms[op] = refpolicy.XpermSet()
    self.xperms[op].extend(av.xperms[op])

```

The `av` variable contains access vector that is to be merged with the `self` access vector.

### 4.1.3 Representation of Extended Permission AV Rules

Extended permission access vector rules are represented by new `AVExtRule` class from the `refpolicy.py` module. This class is very similar to the `AVRule` class, but contains attributes specific to extended permission AV rules. The `operation` attribute is a string identifying the operation, e.g. 'ioctl'. The `xperms` attribute is an `XpermSet` instance. Method `to_string()` prints out the rule. An example of an extended permission AV rule:

```

allowxperm my_app_t my_socket_t : tcp_socket ioctl { 20 30 0x40 50-60 };

```

The `AVExtRule` class is initialized from an access vector using the `from_av()` method. This method contains the `op` parameter to select which extended permission operation from the access vector should appear in the rule.



Without extended permissions, each access vector can be converted into a single AV rule. With extended permissions attached to the access vector, to fully convert an access vector to the policy rules, there need to be one AV rule and possibly several extended permission AV rules. For example, this access vector:

```
{
    source_context: 'unconfined_u:system_r:src_t:s0',
    target_context: 'system_u:object_r:tgt_t:s0',
    object_class: 'tcp_socket',
    permissions: { 'getattr', 'ioctl' }
    extended_permissions: {
        'ioctl': { 1, 2, 3 },
        'other_command': { 40, 50, 60 },
        'another_command': { 700, 800, 900 },
    }
}
```

would be converted into these policy rules<sup>1</sup>:

```
allow src_t tgt_t:tcp_socket { getattr ioctl };
allowxperm src_t tgt_t:tcp_socket ioctl { 1 2 3 };
allowxperm src_t tgt_t:tcp_socket other_command { 40 50 60 };
allowxperm src_t tgt_t:tcp_socket another_command { 700 800 900 };
```

#### 4.1.4 Generating Extended Permission AV Rules

A new configuration method `set_gen_xperms()` was added to the `PolicyGenerator` from the `policygen.py` module, to specify whether the extended permission AV rules should be generated.

In the old implementation, method `add_access()` called the `__add_allow_rules()` method which generated AV rules for each access vector set. In new implementation, there are two methods, `__add_av_rule()` and `__add_ext_av_rules()`. Both accept access vector as a parameter, the `__add_av_rule()` method generates single standard access vector rule, `__add_ext_av_rules()` method generates (possibly) several extended permission access vector rules. Both methods are called from the `add_access()` methods:

```
for av in raw_allow:
    self.__add_av_rule(av)
    if self.xperms and av.xperms:
        self.__add_ext_av_rules(av)
```

## 4.2 Mislabeled Files

The `audit2allow` utility was extended to check the default context of a file if the `path` field is present in the AVC denial message. The `audit.py` and `policygen.py` modules were modified.

---

<sup>1</sup>Note that as of policy version 31, only the `ioctl` operation is supported, operations `other_command` and `another_command` were added only as an example.

### 4.2.1 Parsing File Path

The `audit.py` module was modified to parse the `path` field in AVC denial messages. Only paths found directly in AVC denial messages will be analyzed later by `matchpathcon`. As a result, the context will not be checked in many cases, because the AVC denials often does not contain full path, only inode number and file name.

### 4.2.2 Checking Default Context

In the `policygen.py` module, a new option was added to the `PolicyGenerator` to turn on or off checking of mislabeled files. Checking is turned on by default. Each AVC message from each access vector is checked whether it contains the path. The default context of the path is obtained via the `selinux.matchpathcon()` function then. The target context of the access vector is then compared with the default context. In a case of difference, a comment is added to warn the user about the mislabeled file. For example:

```
#===== src_t =====  
  
#!!!! The '/etc/myfile' file has other than the default context  
allow src_t tgt_t:file getattr;
```

## Chapter 5

# Testing Extensions of the audit2allow Utility

The functionality of implemented features to audit2allow was tested by extending existing unit tests and writing integration tests that are focused on interoperability between audit2allow, SELinux, and Linux Audit System.

### 5.1 Testing Extended Permissions Implementation

The unit tests were extended to ensure that the new functionality does not break the existing code. New test cases were added to test the new features.

#### 5.1.1 Testing the audit2allow Script

In main script, new `--xperms` and `-x` option was added to turn on extended permission AV rules generation.

Audit2allowTests class from the <code>test_audit2allow.py</code> module:	
<code>test_xperms()</code>	Tests that <code>audit2allow -x</code> produces at least one <code>allowxperm</code> rule.

#### 5.1.2 Testing the audit.py Module

In this module, the audit message parser have been modified to recognize new field in AVC denial messages and to convert the field to extended permissions.

Testing `AVCMessage.__init__()`:

TestAVCMessage class from the <code>test_audit.py</code> module:	
<code>test_defs()</code>	Tests that <code>AVCMessage.ioctlcmd</code> is <code>None</code> .

Testing `AVCMessage.from_split_string()`:

TestAVCMessage class from the <code>test_audit.py</code> module:	
<code>test_xperms()</code>	Tests that the <code>ioctlcmd</code> field is parsed.

<code>test_xperms_invalid()</code>	Tests a message with an invalid value in the <code>ioctlcmd</code> field
<code>test_xperms_without()</code>	Tests a message without the <code>ioctlcmd</code> field.

Testing `AVCMessage.to_access()`:

TestAuditParser class from the <code>test_audit.py</code> module:	
<code>test_parse_xperms()</code>	Tests that correct access vectors are generated from a set of AVC denial messages.

### 5.1.3 Testing the access.py Module

In this module, the `AccessVector` and `AccessVectorSet` classes have been extended.

Testing `AccessVector.__init__()`:

TestAccessVector class from the <code>test_access.py</code> module:	
<code>test_init()</code>	Tests that <code>AccessVector.xperms</code> is a dictionary.

Testing `AccessVector.merge()`: this method must correctly merge permissions and extended permissions of two access vectors.

TestAccessVector class from the <code>test_access.py</code> module:	
<code>test_merge_noxperm()</code>	Tests merging two AVs without extended permissions.
<code>test_merge_xperm1()</code>	Tests merging AV that contains extended permissions with AV that does not.
<code>test_merge_xperm2()</code>	Tests merging AV that does not contain extended permissions with AV that does.
<code>test_merge_xperm_diff_op()</code>	Tests merging two AVs, both containing extended permissions, but with different operations.
<code>test_merge_xperm_same_op()</code>	Tests merging two AVs, both containing extended permissions with the same operation.

Testing `AccessVector.add_av()`: this method adds an access vector to the set.

TestAccessVectorSet class from the <code>test_access.py</code> module:	
<code>test_add_av_first()</code>	Tests adding the first access vector to the access vector set.
<code>test_add_av_second()</code>	Tests adding the second AV to the set with the same source and the target context and class.
<code>test_add_av_with_msg()</code>	Tests adding an audit message.

Testing `AccessVector.add()`: this method just creates an instance of the `AccessVector` class and passes the AV to the `AccessVector.add_av()` method.

TestAccessVectorSet class from the <code>test_access.py</code> module:	
<code>test_add()</code>	Tests adding access vector to the set.

#### 5.1.4 Testing the `policygen.py` Module

In this module, the `PolicyGenerator` class was extended to generate extended permission access vector rules.

Testing `PolicyGenerator.__init__()`:

TestPolicyGenerator class from the <code>test_policygen.py</code> module:	
<code>test_init()</code>	Tests that extended permission AV rules are not generated by default.

Testing `PolicyGenerator.set_gen_xperms()`:

TestPolicyGenerator class from the <code>test_policygen.py</code> module:	
<code>test_set_gen_xperms()</code>	Tests turning on and off generating of extended permission AV rules.

Testing `PolicyGenerator.add_access()`:

TestPolicyGenerator class from the <code>test_policygen.py</code> module:	
<code>test_av_rules()</code>	Tests that the new implementation of the <code>add_access()</code> method does not break generating of standard AV rules.
<code>test_ext_av_rules()</code>	Tests that correct extended permission AV rules are generated from access vectors.

#### 5.1.5 Testing the `refpolicy.py` Module

The `XpermSet` and `AVExtRule` classes were added to represent extended permission access vector rules.

Testing `XpermSet` class: this class represents extended permission values. The `add()` method adds values or ranges of values, the `extend()` method combines two `XpermSet` objects, and the `to_string()` method prints the rule.

TestXpermSet class from the <code>test_refpolicy.py</code> module:	
<code>test_init()</code>	Tests that all attributes are correctly initialized.
<code>test_normalize_ranges()</code>	Tests that ranges that are overlapping or neighboring are correctly merged into one range.
<code>test_add()</code>	Tests adding new values or ranges to the set.

<code>test_extend()</code>	Tests adding ranges from another <code>XpermSet</code> object.
<code>test_to_string()</code>	Tests printing the values to a string.

Testing `AVExtRule` class: this class is similar to the `AVRule` class. The `from_av()` method creates the rule from an access vector and the `to_string()` method prints the rule to a string.

TestAVExtRule class from the <code>test_refpolicy.py</code> module:	
<code>test_init()</code>	Tests that all attributes are correctly initialized.
<code>test_rule_type_str()</code>	Tests printing the rule type.
<code>test_from_av()</code>	Tests creating the rule from an access vector.
<code>test_from_av_self()</code>	Tests creating the rule from an access vector that has the same source and target context.
<code>test_to_string()</code>	Tests printing the rule.

### 5.1.6 Integration Tests of Extended Permissions

An integration test was written to check audit2allow functionality in real world situation. First, an SELinux policy module with extended permission AV rules is loaded. Then the testing program tries to call `ioctl` on a file with various parameters. AVC denials are collected and sent to the audit2allow utility with different command-line options.

## 5.2 Testing Implementation of File Contexts Checks

New unit tests were written to cover the new functionality.

### 5.2.1 Testing the audit.py Module

In this module, the `AVCMessage.from_split_string()` method was extended to parse a path field.

TestAVCMessage class from the <code>test_audit.py</code> module:	
<code>test_path()</code>	Tests that the <code>path</code> field is parsed.

### 5.2.2 Testing the policygen Module

In this module, a new configuration option was added to the `PolicyGenerator`. For the purposes of testing, `selinux.matchpathcon()` function used for checking the default context was replaced.

TestPolicyGenerator class from the <code>test_policygen.py</code> module:	
<code>test_check_mislabeled_nothing()</code>	Tests no mislabeled files.
<code>test_check_mislabeled_one()</code>	Tests one mislabeled file.

### 5.2.3 Integration Tests of File Contexts Checks

To test checking of mislabeled files, an integration test was written. First, an SELinux policy module that defines a new SELinux type is loaded. Test file is created and labeled with the new type. Testing program then tries to open that file and fails. AVC denials are collected and sent to the `audit2allow` utility. The output is checked for warnings about mislabeled file.

## Chapter 6

# Conclusion

The aim of this thesis was to identify situations when the `audit2allow` utility provides insecure and too permissive solutions. Several situations were found. The `audit2allow` utility relies on objects having the correct labels and it is not able to detect denials caused by mislabeled objects.

In case of mislabeled files, `audit2allow` is only partially able to detect a mislabeled file. There are ways how to check if the file is mislabeled, but in most situations, not enough information is logged using the Linux Audit System to get the full path of the file. Checking of the default file context was implemented as a part of this thesis. This improvement warns users that the file is mislabeled and another tool needs to be used to restore the default context of the file.

The `audit2allow` utility is not aware of recently added support for extended permissions that provide more granular control of permissions given to processes. When used for troubleshooting SELinux denials caused by extended permissions, the `audit2allow` utility is not able to provide a functional solution. The support for generating extended permission access vector rules was implemented as a part of this thesis. The `audit2allow` utility can now detect that the denial was caused by extended permissions and generate extended permission access vector rules to allow the operations that were previously denied. SELinux policy developers can now use `audit2allow` to generate more restrictive rules as a basis of a security policy for their products.

In case of mislabeled TCP or UDP ports, `audit2allow` can detect that the port needs an application-specific label. Creating new labels for ports is a task that requires certain knowledge of SELinux and the solution is not straightforward. Suggesting labels for ports can be implemented in the future.

The `audit2allow` utility can be further improved to detect situations when the correct solution is to use a different tool. This thesis serves as a basis for discussion about new features that would make troubleshooting problems with SELinux easier.



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## Appendix A

# Contents of the Enclosed CD

The contents of the enclosed CD:

**/packages** RPM packages for Fedora 28

**/source-packages** Source RPM packages

**/selinux-xperms** Source codes for extended permission support

**/selinux-restorecon** Source codes for checking mislabeled files

**/patches** Source codes as patches to the upstream repository

**/tests** Integration tests

**/thesis** Sources for building the text of the thesis

**Extending-audit2allow.pdf** Text of the thesis

## Appendix B

# Manual

This chapter describes how to install the modified audit2allow utility and how to run the unit and integration tests.

### B.1 Upstream Repository

Improvements to audit2allow were implemented as a series of patches to the 2.8-rc1 version of the SELinux userspace upstream repository. To install the upstream version of the SELinux userspace, follow the instructions in **README**.

The `/selinux-xperms` directory contains the SELinux userspace repository with support for extended permissions applied on top of the `f04d6401` commit from the upstream repository.

The `/selinux-restorecon` directory contains the SELinux userspace repository with support for checking mislabeled files applied on top of the `f04d6401` commit from the upstream repository.

The `/patches` directory contains patches against the `f04d6401` commit.

### B.2 Fedora packages

Patches for both extended permission support and support for checking mislabeled files were applied to Fedora userspace packages and can be installed on Fedora 28. The `/packages` directory contains RPM packages. The `/source-packages` directory contains SRPM packages with source codes.

These packages can be installed directly using the `dnf` command:

```
# cd packages
# dnf install libselinux-2*.rpm libselinux-utils-2*.rpm
    libsemanage-2*.rpm libsepol-2*.rpm policycoreutils-2*.rpm
    policycoreutils-python-utils-2*.rpm python2-libselinux-2*.rpm
    python3-libselinux-2*.rpm python3-libsemanage-2*.rpm
    python3-policycoreutils-2*.rpm
```

or from a Fedora COPR repository:

```
# dnf copr enable janzarsky/selinux-fedora
# dnf install policycoreutils-python-utils
```

## B.3 Tests

To run unit tests, install the modified packages. Then navigate to the `/selinux-xperms` or `/selinux-restorecon` directory and run tests from the upstream repository. As a part of this thesis, tests in `selinux/python/sepolgen/tests` and `selinux/python/audit2allow/test_audit2allow` were implemented. Package `selinux-policy-devel` is required for successfully running tests in the `test_module.py` module.

The `/tests` directory contains integration tests. These tests require the `beakerlib` library and the `gcc` compiler. To run the tests, install modified packages on the system and execute the `runtest.sh` files.