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# Languages and Machines

## L11: Decidability (Parts II and III)

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## Last Lecture: The Halting Problem

Universal TMs

Semidecidable and Decidable

Problem Reducibility

Rice's Theorem

Gödel's Incompleteness Theorem

# The halting problem for TMs (1/3)



## Theorem

*The halting problem for TMs is undecidable.*

## Idea for a proof by contradiction.

1. Assume there is a TM  $H$  that solves the halting problem.

A string is accepted by  $H$  if

- ▶ the input consists of two strings,  $R(M)$  and  $w$ .  
 $R(M)$  is the **representation** of a TM  $M$ , and  $w$  is the input to  $M$
- ▶ the computation of  $M$  with input  $w$  halts.

Otherwise,  $H$  rejects the input.

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
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Graphically:



## The halting problem for TMs (2/3)




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## The halting problem for TMs (2/3)



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3. Combine  $K$  with a “copy machine” to build another TM, called  $D$ , with  $D(M) = K(M, M)$ :




If the call  $D(M)$  terminates, then the call  $M(M)$  won't terminate

# The halting problem for TMs (3/3)



4. The input to  $D$  may be the representation of any TM, even  $D$  itself. Adapting the diagram in the previous slide:



Thus,  $D(D)$  terminates iff  $D(D)$  doesn't terminate.

A contradiction, derived from the assumption that there is a machine  $H$  that solves the halting problem.

# Some Terminology



Recall: A TM is **always terminating** (or **total**) if it halts on (accepts or rejects) all inputs

A language (set of strings)  $L$  is

- **recursive**  
if  $L = L(M)$  for some always terminating TM  $M$
- **recursively enumerable (r.e.)**  
if  $L = L(M)$  for some TM  $M$

Alternatively, let  $P$  be a **property** of strings.

- $P$  is **decidable**  
if the set of all strings having  $P$  is recursive: there is a total TM that  
accepts strings that have  $P$  and rejects those that don't
- $P$  is **semi-decidable**  
if the set of strings having  $P$  is r.e.: there is a TM that  
accepts  $x$  if  $x$  has  $P$  and *rejects or loops if not*



# Outline



Last Lecture: The Halting Problem

**Universal TMs**

Semidecidable and Decidable

Problem Reducibility

Rice's Theorem

Gödel's Incompleteness Theorem



- A Universal TM can read representations for TMs and their inputs, and simulate running a TM on its input
- $TM_0$ : a very simple class of TMs with acceptance by termination and bits as input alphabet
- Given  $M$ , we write  $R(M)$  to denote its representation
- $M$  terminates on input  $w$  iff the UTM terminates on input  $R(M)w$
- We need to define/establish  $R$  and  $UTM$

## From $M$ to $R(M)$



- Define a **numbering function**  $n$  that maps each state  $q$  into a positive integer  $n(q)$
- Define numbering functions also for symbols in the tape alphabet and directions  $L$  and  $R$
- Mappings may clash, as in  $n(q_0) = 1$ ,  $n(0) = 1$ , and  $n(L) = 1$ .

## From $M$ to $R(M)$




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- Mappings may clash, as in  $n(q_0) = 1$ ,  $n(0) = 1$ , and  $n(L) = 1$ .
- Let  $1^k = \underbrace{11 \cdots 1}_{k \text{ times}}$ . A transition  $\delta(q, X) = [r, Y, d]$ :

$$001^{n(q)}01^{n(X)}01^{n(r)}01^{n(Y)}01^{n(d)}$$

- Given  $M$ , its representation  $R(M)$  corresponds to a sequence of encoded transitions, followed by '000'.
- Given an input alphabet of bits,  $R(M)w$  corresponds to the regular expression

$$(0(01^+)^5)^* 000 (0|1)^*$$


# From $M$ to $R(M)$ : Example




- Encoding states, tape alphabet, directions:

$$n(q_0) = 1 \quad n(0) = 1, \quad n(1) = 2, \quad n(B) = 3 \quad n(L) = 1, \quad n(R) = 2$$

- $R(M)$ :



# A Universal TM



Turing's **Halting language**:

$$L_H = \{ R(M)w \mid R(M) \text{ represents a TM } M \text{ and } M \text{ halts with input } w \}$$

Theorem

$L_H$  is recursively enumerable.

Proof (Sketch).

It is possible to give a deterministic, three-tape machine  $U$  that accepts  $L_H$ , simulating the transitions of  $M$ —see next. □



A deterministic, 3-tape TM simulating TMs with a binary alphabet:

1. Check the format of the input; enter into an infinite loop if invalid.
2. Move input to tape 2
3. Write 1 on tape 3 — state 1 should always be the start state
4. Simulate the machine by repeating the following:
  - i. Find a transition based on
    - the state (tape 3) and
    - the current symbol (tape 2)
  - ii. If no transition is found, terminate
  - iii. Otherwise, if a transition is found: change the state (tape 3), change the symbol (tape 2), and move the head (tape 2).

The reader explains how to handle a non-binary alphabet; this requires a fourth tape.



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# Decidable $\neq$ Semi-decidable



Recall:

- **Theorem.** If  $L$  is recursive (decidable) then  $L$  is recursively enumerable (semi-decidable).
- **Theorem.** If  $L$  is recursive, then  $\overline{L}$  is also recursive.

As already seen, the UTM terminates for input  $u$  iff  $u \in L_H$ , where  $L_H$  is Turing's halting language (which the UTM accepts precisely).

- **Theorem.** Language  $L_H$  is recursively enumerable.
- **Theorem.** Language  $\overline{L_H}$  is not recursively enumerable.  
Similar to the proof of undecidability of the halting problem.
- **Theorem.** Language  $L_H$  is not recursive.  
If  $L_H$  were recursive,  $\overline{L_H}$  would be recursive too (closure properties), and therefore recursively enumerable: contradiction.

# Outline



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# Problem Reducibility



Obtaining new undecidability results from known results

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- The halting problem (call it “HALT”) is not decidable
- Suppose we have a problem at hand, called “NEW”.



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- Reducing HALT to NEW means giving a computable (decidable) function so we can use a solution to NEW to solve HALT
- With the reduction, we could decide HALT if NEW was decidable
- But HALT is not decidable, so NEW must also be undecidable



Obtaining new undecidability results from known results

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- Suppose we have a problem at hand, called “NEW”.
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- With the reduction, we could decide HALT if NEW was decidable
- But HALT is not decidable, so NEW must also be undecidable

More formally: given problems  $A$  and  $B$ , we can define a relation  $A \leq_{red} B$  (“ $A$  effectively reducible to  $B$ ”):

- If  $A \leq_{red} B$  and  $B$  is decidable then  $A$  is also decidable
- If  $A \leq_{red} B$  and  $A$  is undecidable then  $B$  is also undecidable

The previous strategy: establish undecidability of NEW by formalizing  $HALT \leq_{red} NEW$  (“HALT is effectively reducible to NEW”)

## Acceptance of the empty string (1/2)



The **blank tape problem**: deciding whether a TM halts when a computation is initiated with a blank tape (an empty string  $\epsilon$ )


Theorem

*The blank tape problem is undecidable.*

**Idea for a proof by contradiction:**

We show that HALT is reducible to the blank tape problem.

1. Assume there's a TM  $B$  that solves the blank tape problem:



## Acceptance of the empty string (2/2)



2. To reduce HALT to the blank tape problem, we add a preprocessor  $N$  to  $B$ . The preprocessor  $N$  inputs a TM  $M$  followed by input  $w$  and produces  $R(M')$ , where  $M'$  is a machine that:

- i) Writes  $w$  on a blank tape
- ii) Transfers control to the initial state of  $M$
- iii) Runs  $M$

$M'$  halts when run with a blank tape iff  $M$  halts with input  $w$ .



## Acceptance of the empty string (2/2)




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$M'$  halts when run with a blank tape iff  $M$  halts with input  $w$ .

3. Construct the composite machine



This machine solves HALT, which is undecidable.

It then follows that the blank tape problem is undecidable.



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- Let's say we are interested in deciding some **non trivial** property of programs:
  - true of some programs but not of others
  - insensitive to the program's syntax and to its underlying algorithm
- A non trivial property talks about what a program does, rather than how it does it
- Rice's theorem says that no such properties can be decided. Hence, undecidability is the rule, rather than the exception

# Rice's Theorem



## Theorem

*Every non trivial property of the recursively enumerable sets is undecidable.*

- A property  $P$  is a map from r.e. sets to  $\top$  (true) or  $\perp$  (false)  
Example: the property of emptiness is the map

$$P(A) = \begin{cases} \top & \text{if } A = \emptyset \\ \perp & \text{if } A \neq \emptyset \end{cases}$$

- We represent r.e. sets by TMs that accept them  
Still, we are interested in properties of r.e. sets, not of TMs
- **Non trivial** properties: there's at least one r.e. set that satisfies the property, and at least one that doesn't. Examples:
  - $L(M)$  is finite / regular / CFL
  - $M$  accepts 1010101 (i.e.,  $1010101 \in L(M)$ )
- Non example:  $M$  has at least 42 states

# Rice's Theorem: Proof Sketch



- Let  $P$  be a non trivial property with  $P(\emptyset) = \perp$ .  
There must exist an r.e. set  $A$  such that  $P(A) = \top$ .  
Let  $K$  be a TM accepting  $A$ .
- We reduce the halting problem to the set  $\{M \mid P(L(M)) = \top\}$ .  
Given  $R(M)w$ , construct a machine  $M'$  that on input  $y$ :
  1. Keeps  $y$  on a separate track somewhere
  2. Writes  $w$  on its tape ( $w$  is “hardwired” in the control of  $M'$ )
  3. Runs  $M$  with input  $w$  ( $M$  is also “hardwired” in the control of  $M'$ )
  4. If  $M$  halts on  $w$ ,  $M'$  runs  $K$  on  $y$ , and accepts if  $K$  accepts
- The simulation in (3) may halt or not. We then have:

$$M \text{ doesn't halt on } w \Rightarrow L(M') = \emptyset \Rightarrow P(L(M')) = P(\emptyset) = \perp$$

$$M \text{ halts on } w \Rightarrow L(M') = A \Rightarrow P(L(M')) = P(A) = \top$$

- This reduces the halting problem to set  $\{M \mid P(L(M)) = \top\}$ .  
Hence, it is undecidable whether  $L(M)$  satisfies  $P$ .



## Theorem

*Let  $P$  be a class of languages over  $\mathbb{B}$ .*

*Let  $L_1$  and  $L_2$  be semi-decidable languages over  $\mathbb{B}$  with  $L_1 \in P$  and  $L_2 \notin P$  and  $L_1 \subseteq L_2$ .*

*Then the language  $L_P$  is not semi-decidable.*

## Rice's Theorem - In the Reader (2/3)



- From 'not decidable' to 'not semi-decidable' properties  
 $L_1 \in P$  and  $L_2 \notin P$  mean 'non trivial property';  
together with  $L_1 \subseteq L_2$ , they mean 'non monotone property'
- Properties not as mappings but as classes of languages, i.e.,  
sets of TMs  $M$  such that  $P(L(M)) = \top$
- Proof contradicts the following theorem: The complement of  $L_H$   
(semi-decidable) is not semi-decidable (Theorem 6.4)
- Assumption: there's a TM  $M_P$  that accepts  $L_P$ .  
Use  $M_P$  to construct a TM  $K$  such that  $L(K) = \overline{L_H}$ .
  - Given input  $u = R(M)w$ ,  $K$  executes  $M_P$  with input  $R(M')$   
 $K$  accepts  $u$  iff  $M_P$  accepts  $R(M')$
  - What is  $M'$ ?  $M'$  runs machines  $M_1$  and  $M_2$  (accepters for  $L_1$   
and  $L_2$ ):  $v \in L(M')$  iff  $v \in L(M_1)$  OR ( $v \in L(M_2)$  followed by  
 $w \in L(M)$ )
  - We have: (i)  $w \in L(M) \Rightarrow L_2 \notin P$  and (ii)  $w \notin L(M) \Rightarrow L_1 \in P$   
and therefore that  $w \notin L(M)$  iff  $L(M') \in P$   
Assumption  $L_1 \subseteq L_2$  is used here.

## Rice's Theorem - In the Reader (3/3)



### Theorem

*Let  $P$  be a class of languages over  $\mathbb{B}$ . Let  $L_1$  and  $L_2$  be semi-decidable languages over  $\mathbb{B}$  with  $L_1 \in P$  and  $L_2 \notin P$  and  $L_1 \subseteq L_2$ . Then the language  $L_P$  is not semi-decidable.*

### Proof (Sketch).

Recall  $L_P = \{R(M_i) \mid M_i \in TM0 : L(M_i) \in P\}$ . Based on the previous constructions ( $K$  and  $M/M'$ ), we have the following:

$$\begin{aligned} R(M)w \in L(K) &\equiv R(M') \in L(M_P) && [K \text{ executes } M_P \text{ on } R(M')] \\ &\equiv R(M') \in L_P && [\text{assumption on } M_P] \\ &\equiv L(M') \in P && [\text{definition of } L_P] \\ &\equiv w \notin L(M') && [w \notin L(M) \text{ iff } L(M') \in P] \end{aligned}$$

Therefore,  $L(K) = \overline{L_H}$ , and so  $\overline{L_H}$  is semi-decidable.

This contradicts Thm 6.4: hence,  $L_P$  is not semi-decidable.







## Theorem

*Let  $L$  be the language:  $\{R(M) \mid L(M) \text{ is not regular}\}$ .  
Then  $L$  is not semi-decidable (i.e., recursively enumerable).*

You may reuse the previous theorem:

## Theorem

*Let  $P$  be a class of languages over  $\mathbb{B}$ . Let  $L_1$  and  $L_2$  be semi-decidable languages over  $\mathbb{B}$  with  $L_1 \in P$  and  $L_2 \notin P$  and  $L_1 \subseteq L_2$ . Then the language  $L_P$  is not semi-decidable.*



## Theorem

*Let  $L$  be the language:  $\{R(M) \mid L(M) \text{ is not regular}\}$ .*

*Then  $L$  is not semi-decidable (i.e., recursively enumerable).*

## Hints:

- The property  $P$  in this case concerns “non regularity”
- We can use the previous theorem by finding  $L_1$  and  $L_2$  such that:
  - $L_1 \in P$  (i.e., a language that is not regular);
  - $L_2 \notin P$  (i.e., a language that is regular);
  - $L_1 \subseteq L_2$ .

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**Gödel's Incompleteness Theorem**



- A proof system is **sound** if all theorems are true, i.e., it is not possible to prove a false sentence
- A proof system is **complete** if all true sentences are theorems of the system

**Gödel's Result:** No reasonable formal system for number theory is complete—can prove all true sentences

In the following:

- The language of number theory
- Peano arithmetic (a proof system for number theory)
- Sketch of Gödel's proof

# The language of number theory



A language for expressing properties of the naturals  $\mathbb{N} = \{0, 1, \dots\}$ .

- variables  $x, y, z, \dots$  ranging over  $\mathbb{N}$
- operator symbols  $+$  and  $\cdot$ , and
- constant symbols  $0$  and  $1$  (identities for  $+$  and  $\cdot$ )
- relation symbol  $=$  (symbols such as  $<$ ,  $\leq$ ,  $>$ ,  $\geq$  are definable)
- quantifiers  $\forall$ ,  $\exists$ , and propositional operators  $\vee$ ,  $\wedge$ ,  $\neg$ ,  $\Rightarrow$ , etc.
- parentheses

The language can define concepts such as “ $y$  divides  $x$ ”, “ $x$  is odd”, and bit-manipulation formulas (cf. TM encodings)

A formula without free (unquantified) variables is called a **sentence**. Sentences have a well-defined truth value.

$\text{Th}(\mathbb{N})$ : the set of all true sentences. The **decision problem** for number theory is to decide whether a sentence is in  $\text{Th}(\mathbb{N})$ .

# Peano Arithmetic (PA)



A proof system for number theory.

Consists of axioms (basic assumptions) + rules of inference (applied mechanically to derive theorems from the axioms)

Write  $\varphi(x)$  to denote a formula with free variable  $x$

- Axioms from first-order logic (propositional formulas, quantifiers, equality) but also from number theory (successor, identities, induction axiom)
- Inference rules:

$$\frac{\varphi \quad \varphi \Rightarrow \psi}{\psi} \qquad \frac{\varphi}{\forall x \varphi}$$

A **proof** of  $\varphi_n$  is a sequence  $\varphi_0, \dots, \varphi_n$  of formulas s.t. each  $\varphi_i$  either is an axiom or follows from earlier formulas by an inference rule. A sentence is a **theorem** if it has a proof.

PA is sound: the set of theorems of PA is a subset of  $\text{Th}(\mathbb{N})$ .

Gödel's remarkable result is that PA is not complete.



Gödel proved incompleteness by constructing a sentence of number theory  $\varphi$  that asserts its own unprovability:

$$\varphi \text{ is true} \iff \varphi \text{ is not provable}$$

The construction of  $\varphi$  is interesting, as it captures self-reference as present in TMs and programming languages.



A proof approach due to Turing: In a proof system such as PA one can show that

1. The set of theorems (provable sentences) is r.e., but
2. The set of true sentences  $\text{Th}(\mathbb{N})$  is not r.e.

Therefore, the two sets cannot be equal, and the proof system cannot be complete.

It is relatively easy to show (1), but proving (2) is much harder.



# Th( $\mathbb{N}$ ) is not r.e - Proof Sketch



A reduction from  $\overline{L_H}$  to Th( $\mathbb{N}$ ).

- Given  $R(M)w$ , we produce a sentence  $\gamma$  in the language of number theory such that  $R(M)w \in \overline{L_H} \iff \gamma \in \text{Th}(\mathbb{N})$ .  
Thus,  $M$  doesn't halt on  $w \iff \gamma$  is true.
- Intuitively,  $\gamma$  uses number theory to say “ $M$  doesn't halt on  $w$ ”.
- Construct a formula  $\text{VALCOMP}_{M,w}(y)$  that says that  $y$  represents a valid computation history of  $M$  on input  $w$ .
- Hence,  $\text{VALCOMP}_{M,w}(y)$  says that  $y$  represents a sequence of configurations of  $M$ , written  $\alpha_0, \dots, \alpha_N$ , such that  $\alpha_0$  is the start configuration (with  $w$ ) and  $\alpha_N$  is a halt configuration.
- The desired formula is then  $\gamma = \neg \exists y \text{ VALCOMP}_{M,w}(y)$ .



This lecture:

- A Universal Turing machine
- Undecidability results
- Acceptance of the empty string (the blank tape problem)
- Rice's Theorem
- Incompleteness of arithmetic

## Next Lecture

- Unrestricted and Context-Sensitive Grammars/Languages
- Course Evaluation