Arithmetic Overflow

In mathematics: a+b>a and a-b<a for b>0

Such obvious facts are no longer true for binary represented integers

```
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
int main(int argc, char* argv[]) {
                                           4,294,967,295
    unsigned int u1 = UINT MAX;
    u1 ++;
    printf("u1 = %u \ n", u1);
    unsigned int u2 = 0;
    u2 --;
    printf("u2 = %u\n", u2);
                                           4,294,967,295
                                            2,147,483,647
    signed int s1 = INT MAX;
    s1 ++;
                                          -2,147,483,648
    printf("s1 = %d\n", s1);
                                          -2,147,483,648
    signed int s2 = INT_MIN;
    s2 --;
                                           2,147,483,647
    printf("s2 = %d\n", s2);
```

Example 1: Bypass Length Checking

Incorrect length checking could lead to integer overflows, and then buffer overflow.

```
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <limits.h>
char buf[128];
void combine(char *s1, unsigned int len1, char *s2, unsigned int len2) {
  if (len1 + len2 + 1 <= sizeof(buf)) {</pre>
   strncpy(buf, s1, len1);
   strncat(buf, s2, len2);
                      Buffer Overflow!
                                            len1 + len2 + 1 = 10 < 128
int main(int argc, char* argv[]) {
                                            strncpy and strncat will be executed.
    unsigned int len1 = 10;
    unsigned int len2 = UINT MAX;
    char *s1 = (char *)malloc(len1 * sizeof(char));
    char *s2 = (char *)malloc(len2 * sizeof(char));
    combine(s1, len1, s2, len2);
```

Widthness Overflow

A bad type conversion can cause widthness overflows

```
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
int main(int argc, char* argv[]) {
    unsigned int l = 0xdeabeef;
    printf("l = 0x%u\n", l);
    unsigned short s = l;
    printf("s = 0x%u\n", s);
    unsigned char c = l;
    printf("c = 0x%u\n", c);
}
Oxdeadbeef
```

Example 2: Truncation Errors

Incorrect type conversion could lead to integer overflows, and then buffer overflow.

```
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <limits.h>
int func(char *name, unsigned long cbBuf) {
   unsigned int bufSize = cbBuf;
                                             bufSize = 0xffff
   char *buf = (char *)malloc(bufSize);
    if (buf) {
       memcpy(buf, name, cbBuf)
        free(but);
                                            Buffer Overflow!
        return 0;
int main(int argc, char* argv[])
   unsigned long len = 0x10000fffff;
    char *name = (char *)malloc(len * sizeof(char));
    func(name, len);
```

How to Fix Integer Overflow Vulnerability

Be more careful about all the possible consequences of vulnerable operations.

Better length checking

Safe type conversion:

Widening conversion: convert from a type of smaller size to that of larger size.

Outline

- **▶** Format String Vulnerabilities
- Integer Overflow Vulnerabilities
- Scripting Vulnerabilities

Scripting Vulnerabilities

Scripting languages

- Construct commands (scripts) from predefined code fragments and user input at runtime
- Script is then passed to another software component where it is executed.
- It is viewed as a domain-specific language for a particular environment.
- It is referred to as very high-level programming languages
- Example:
 - ▶ Bash, PowerShell, Perl, PHP, Python, Tcl, Safe-Tcl, JavaScript

Vulnerabilities

- An attacker can hide additional commands in the user input.
- The system will execute the malicious command without any awareness

Example 1: Command Injection

Consider a server running the following command

> system: takes a string as input, spawns shell, and executes the string as command in the shell.

```
void display_file(char* filename) {
  char cmd[512];
  snprintf(cmd, sizeof(cmd), "cat %s", filename);
  system(cmd);
}
```

Normal case:

A client sets filename=hello.txt

cat hello.txt

Compromised Input:

- ▶ The attacker sets filename = hello.txt; rm -rf /
- The command becomes:

```
cat hello.txt; rm -rf /
```

After displaying file, all files the script has permission to delete are deleted!