

# Outline

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- ▶ **Protection Strategies**

- ▶ Confinement
- ▶ Reference Monitor

- ▶ **Hardware-assisted Protection**

- ▶ Basic Functionalities
- ▶ Trusted Platform Module
- ▶ Trusted Execution Environment

# Using Hardware to Protect Software

## Software is not always trusted

- ▶ Privileged software (OS, hypervisor) usually has very large code base, which inevitably contains lots of vulnerabilities.
- ▶ Once it is compromised, the attacker can do anything to any apps running on it.

| SW                | Line of codes |
|-------------------|---------------|
| Linux Kernel 5.12 | 28.8M         |
| Windows 10        | 50M           |
| VMWare            | 6M            |
| Xen               | 0.9M          |

*Commercial software typically has 20 to 30 bugs for every 1k lines of code*

## Hardware is more reliable

- ▶ After the chip is fabricated, it is hard for the attacker to modify it. The **integrity** of hardware is guaranteed.
- ▶ It is also very hard for the attacker to peek into the chip and steal the secret (e.g., encryption key). The **confidentiality** of hardware is guaranteed.
- ▶ It is more reliable to introduce security-aware hardware to protect the operating system and applications

# Basic Functionality: Encryption

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## Encryption performed using dedicated hardware

- ▶ Trusted Platform Module (TPM)
- ▶ Hardware Security Modules (HSM)
- ▶ Advanced Encryption Standard New Instructions (AES-NI)

## Benefits

- ▶ Performance efficiency: faster execution with optimized hardware
- ▶ Energy efficiency: lower power consumption compared to software solutions
- ▶ Security: resistant to software-level attacks and malware
- ▶ Ease of use: transparent encryption with minimal user interaction.


## Applications

- ▶ Data protection in storage
- ▶ Secure boot
- ▶ Cloud security

# Basic Functionality: Remote Attestation

A mechanism that allows a user to know whether her app executes securely on a trusted platform.

- ▶ A remote platform provides unforgeable evidence about the security of its software to a client.
- ▶ A common strategy to prove the software running on the platform are intact and trustworthy.



## Major components for remote attestation

- ▶ Integrity measurement architecture: provide reliable and trustworthy security report
- ▶ Remote attestation protocol: ensuring the attestation report is transmitted to the client without being modified by attackers in OS, apps or network

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

# Trusted Platform Module (TPM)

## A chip integrated into the platform

- ▶ A separated co-processor
- ▶ Its state cannot be compromised by malicious host system software

## Inside the chip

- ▶ Random number and key generators
- ▶ Crypto execution engine
- ▶ Different types of crypto keys.



# Development and Implementation

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## Designed by Trusted Computing Group (TCG)

- ▶ First version: TPM 1.1b, released in 2003.
- ▶ An improved version: TPM 1.2, developed around 2005-2009
  - Equipped in PCs in 2006 and in servers in 2008
  - Standardized by ISO and IEC in 2009
- ▶ An upgraded version: TPM 2.0, released on 9 April 2014.

## Application of TPM

- ▶ Intel Trusted Execution Technology (TXT)
- ▶ Microsoft Next-Generation Secure Computing Base (NGSCB)
- ▶ Windows 11 requires TPM 2.0 as a minimal system requirement
- ▶ Linux kernel starts to support TPM 2.0 since version 3.20
- ▶ Google includes TPMs in Chromebooks as part of their security model
- ▶ VMware, Xen, KVM all support virtualized TPM.