### More Similar Vulnerable Functions

Functions	Descriptions		
printf	prints to the 'stdout' stream		
fprintf	prints to a FILE stream		
sprintf	prints into a string		
snprintf	prints into a string with length checking		
vprintf	prints to 'stdout' from a va_arg structure		
vfprintf	print to a FILE stream from a va_arg structure		
vsprintf	prints to a string from a va_arg structure		
vsnprintf	prints to a string with length checking from a va_arg structure		
syslog	output to the syslog facility		
err	output error information		
warn	output warning information		
verr	output error information with a va_arg structure		
vwarn	output warning information with a va_arg structure		

# History of Format String Vulnerability

#### Originally noted as a software bug (1989)

By the fuzz testing work at the University of Wisconsin

#### Such bugs can be exploited as an attack vector (September 1999)

snprintf can accept user-generated data without a format string, making privilege escalation was possible

Security community became aware of its danger (June 2000)

Since then, a lot of format string vulnerabilities have been discovered in different applications.

Application	Found by	Impact	years
wu-ftpd 2.*	security.is	remote root	> 6
Linux rpc.statd	security.is	remote root	> 4
IRIX telnetd	LSD	remote root	> 8
Qualcomm Popper 2.53	security.is	remote user	> 3
Apache + PHP3	security.is	remote user	> 2
NLS / locale	CORE SDI	local root	?
screen	Jouko Pynnōnen	local root	> 5
BSD chpass	TESO	local root	?
OpenBSD fstat	ktwo	local root	?

## How to Fix Format String Vulnerability

### Limit the ability of attackers to control the format string

- Hard-coded format strings.
- Do not use %n
- Compiler support to match printf arguments with format string

```
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>

int main(int argc, char* argv[]) {
   char user_input[100];
   scanf("%s", user_input);
   printf(user_input);
}
printf("%s\n", user_input);
}
```

### Outline

- **▶** Format String Vulnerabilities
- Integer Overflow Vulnerabilities
- Scripting Vulnerabilities

## Integer Representation

In mathematics integers form an infinite set.

### In a computer system, integers are represented in binary.

- The representation of an integer is a binary string of fixed length (precision), so there is only a finite number of "integers".
- Signed integers can be represented as two's complement: the Most Significant Bit (MSB) indicates the sign of the integer:
  - MSB is 0: positive integer
  - MSB is 1: negative integer.

## Integer Overflow

An operation cases its integer operand to increase beyond its maximal value, or decrease below its minimal value. The results are no longer correct.

- Unsigned overflow: the binary cannot represent an integer value.
- Signed overflow: a value is carried over to the sign bit

#### Possible operations that lead to integer overflow.

- Arithmetic operation
- Type conversion.

Integer overflow is difficult to spot, and can lead to other types of bugs, frequently buffer overflow.

### Arithmetic Overflow

#### In mathematics: a+b>a and a-b<a for b>0

Such obvious facts are no longer true for binary represented integers

```
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
int main(int argc, char* argv[]) {
                                           4,294,967,295
    unsigned int u1 = UINT MAX;
    u1 ++;
    printf("u1 = %u \ n", u1);
    unsigned int u2 = 0;
    u2 --;
    printf("u2 = %u\n", u2);
                                           4,294,967,295
                                            2,147,483,647
    signed int s1 = INT MAX;
    s1 ++;
                                          -2,147,483,648
    printf("s1 = %d\n", s1);
                                          -2,147,483,648
    signed int s2 = INT_MIN;
    s2 --;
                                           2,147,483,647
    printf("s2 = %d\n", s2);
```

## Example 1: Bypass Length Checking

Incorrect length checking could lead to integer overflows, and then buffer overflow.

```
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <limits.h>
char buf[128];
void combine(char *s1, unsigned int len1, char *s2, unsigned int len2) {
  if (len1 + len2 + 1 <= sizeof(buf)) {</pre>
   strncpy(buf, s1, len1);
   strncat(buf, s2, len2);
                      Buffer Overflow!
                                            len1 + len2 + 1 = 10 < 128
int main(int argc, char* argv[]) {
                                            strncpy and strncat will be executed.
    unsigned int len1 = 10;
    unsigned int len2 = UINT MAX;
    char *s1 = (char *)malloc(len1 * sizeof(char));
    char *s2 = (char *)malloc(len2 * sizeof(char));
    combine(s1, len1, s2, len2);
```