Internet Security

Public-Key Encryption and PKI

Public-Key Cryptography: History and Concept



Inventors of Public-Key Encryption



Whitfield Diffie Martin Hellman

2015 Turing Award Winner

Clifford Cocks

Leonard Adleman Ron Rivest Adi Shamir

2002 Turing Award Winner

RSA Algorithm

public key (e, n)

private key (d, n)

3 $\quad 65537 = 2^{16}+1$

Encryption: $M^e \bmod n \Rightarrow C$

Decryption: $C^d \bmod n = M$

$$(M^e)^d \bmod n = M^{e \cdot d} \bmod n = M$$

Euler theorem

For any $M < p$ and q (p, q are prime #s)

$$M^{(p-1)(q-1)+1} \bmod p \cdot q = 1 \cdot M$$

find p, q $\quad n = p \cdot q$, $\quad e = 65537$

$$e \cdot d = 1 + (p-1)(q-1)$$

$$e \cdot d = k(p-1)(q-1) + 1$$

$$e \cdot d \bmod (p-1)(q-1) = 1$$

$$M^{e \cdot d} \bmod n$$

$$= M^{k(p-1)(q-1)} \cdot M \bmod n$$

$$= \left(M^{(p-1)(q-1)}\right)^k \cdot M \bmod n$$

$$= \left(M^{(p-1)(q-1)} \bmod n\right)^k \cdot M \bmod n$$

$$= 1^k \cdot M \bmod n$$

$$= M$$

find p, q, $\quad n = p \cdot q$,

find e

find d, s.t. $\quad e \cdot d \bmod (p-1)(q-1) = 1$ $\Rightarrow$ Extended Euclidian Algorithm

$a \cdot x \bmod n = 1$

$x = a^{-1} \bmod n$

$n = 33$

$e = 17$

$M = 31$

Exercise Related to RSA

Let n = 33 and e = 17.

1. Find the private key d.
2. Encrypt the message M = 31.

Assume RSA is used.

For 2, you don't need to get the final numeric results; showing the expression is sufficient. ~~You do need to find the numeric value of the private key, though~~.

$n = 33 = 3 \times 11$

$e \cdot d \mod (3-1)(11-1) = 1$

$e \cdot d \mod 20 = 1$

p. 9

$$\begin{cases} M^{17} \mod 33 = C \\ C^{13} \mod 33 = M \end{cases}$$

$17 \cdot d \mod 20 = 1$

$d = 13$

$17 \cdot 13 = 221 \mod 20 = 1$

Computing Using Big Numbers



Digital Signature



Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange



Turn DH to Public-Key Encryption



PUBLIC-KEY INFRASTRUCTURE (PKI)

Man-in-the-Middle Attack (MITM)



Defeating the Man-in-the-Middle Attack Using Digital Signature

❖ Digital Signatures



Review


public key
public key
CA
prove you know the private key (owner of the key)
prove owner of the identity
domain
www.example.com/file
DNS
email
sign
Root
Int.
Int.
CA
CA
CA
Customer

X.509 Certificate (paypal)

```
$ openssl x509 -in certificate.crt -text -noout
```

```
Certificate:
    Data:
        Version: 3 (0x2)
        Serial Number:
            2c:d1:95:10:54:37:d0:de:4a:39:20:05:6a:f6:c2:7f
    Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
        Issuer: C=US, O=Symantec Corporation, OU=Symantec Trust Network,
                CN=Symantec Class 3 EV SSL CA - G3
        Validity
            Not Before: Feb  2 00:00:00 2016 GMT
            Not After : Oct 30 23:59:59 2017 GMT
        Subject: 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.60.2.1.3=US/
                 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.60.2.1.2=Delaware/
                 businessCategory=Private Organization/
                 serialNumber=3014267, C=US/
                 postalCode=95131-2021, ST=California, L=San Jose/
                 street=2211 N 1st St, O=PayPal, Inc., OU=CDN Support,
                 CN=www.paypal.com
        Subject Public Key Info:
            Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption
                Public-Key: (2048 bit)
                Modulus:
                    00:da:43:c8:b3:a6:33:5d:83:c0:63:14:47:fd:6b:
                    22:bd:bf:4e:a7:43:11:55:eb:20:8b:e4:61:13:ee:
                    ......
                    00:c5:01:69:b5:10:16:a5:85:f8:fd:07:84:9a:c9:
                    14:91
                Exponent: 65537 (0x10001)
    Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
         4b:a9:64:20:cc:77:0b:30:ab:69:50:d3:7f:de:dc:7c:e2:fb:
         93:84:fd:78:a7:06:e8:14:03:99:c0:e4:4a:ef:c3:5d:15:2a:
         ...
         7d:6a:de:cb:9f:ff:ef:8c:65:35:e4:22:b5:88:b2:48:32:1e:
         a4:71:a7:9e
```

```
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
MIIHWTCCBkGgAwIBAgIQLNGVEFQ30N5KOSAFavbCfzANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADB3
MQswCQYDVQQGEwJVUzEdMBsGA1UEChMUU3ltYW50ZWMgQ29ycG9yYXRpb24xHzAd
BgNVBAsTFlN5bWFudGVjIFRydXN0IE5ldHdvcmsxKDAmBgNVBAMTH1N5bWFudGVj
IENsYXNzIDMgRVYgU1NMIENBIC0gRzMwHhcNMTYwMjAyMDAwMDAwWhcNMTcxMDMw
MjM1OTU5WjCCAQkxEzARBgsrBgEEAYI3PAIBAxMCVVMxGTAXBgsrBgEEAYI3PAIB
......
w3NlCcoN9KcCVKesPx7OKwIgEyKaNe98YBdY9b4nw+KcJRzjZZIFJVIu7R53cfO1
wv4AdQBo9pj4H2SCvjqM7rkoHUz8cVFdZ5PURNEKZ6y7T0/7xAAAAVKkVnlXAAAE
AwBGMEQCIHQpjXQ06MfOV9DjzEnQm2CLPnui8P/lLyZrM6sEZvCNAiAziNOuyunX
wsaILVE7FMjg96sY02A0dsW/mGVPps7lJDANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOCAQEAS6lk
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ZdZuwaOv/PAR29XusH8fY//HNR2I2wTXGg8Ztpad6KT9gIqFfHvfSZ8VDSU9IdjN
fDlUABWAm1B+nDxoZWlyvHHmmOgw6m4wm5ANFul1hjAWeaR/TlWd20lj7iXUt+dW
GN/QMQ3a55rjwNQnA3s2WWuHGPaE/jMG17iiL2O/hUdIvLE9+wA+fWrey5//74xl
NeQitYiySDIepHGnng==
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
```



CA's X.509 Certificate

```
Certificate:
    Data:
        Version: 3 (0x2)
        Serial Number:
            7e:e1:4a:6f:6f:ef:f2:d3:7f:3f:ad:65:4d:3a:da:b4
    Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
        Issuer: C=US, O=VeriSign, Inc., OU=VeriSign Trust Network,
                OU=(c) 2006 VeriSign, Inc. - For authorized use only,
                CN=VeriSign Class 3 Public Primary Certification Authority - G5
        Validity
            Not Before: Oct 31 00:00:00 2013 GMT
            Not After : Oct 30 23:59:59 2023 GMT
        Subject: C=US, O=Symantec Corporation, OU=Symantec Trust Network,
                 CN=Symantec Class 3 EV SSL CA - G3
        Subject Public Key Info:
            Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption
                Public-Key: (2048 bit)
                Modulus:
                    00:d8:a1:65:74:23:e8:2b:64:e2:32:d7:33:37:3d:
                    ...
                    66:80:af:b3:2f:29:1d:23:b8:8a:e1:a1:70:07:0c:
                    34:0f
                Exponent: 65537 (0x10001)
    Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
         42:01:55:7b:d0:16:1a:5d:58:e8:bb:9b:a8:4d:d7:f3:d7:eb:
         ...
         86:4b:29:4c:e1:dc:b5:e1:e0:33:9d:b3:cb:36:91:4b:fe:a1:
         b4:ee:f0:f9
```

CA

Int. CA

Root CA's X.509 Certificate

```
Certificate:
    Data:
        Version: 3 (0x2)
        Serial Number:
            18:da:d1:9e:26:7d:e8:bb:4a:21:58:cd:cc:6b:3b:4a
    Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption
        Issuer: C=US, O=VeriSign, Inc., OU=VeriSign Trust Network,
                OU=(c) 2006 VeriSign, Inc. - For authorized use only,
                CN=VeriSign Class 3 Public Primary Certification Authority - G5
        Validity
            Not Before: Nov  8 00:00:00 2006 GMT
            Not After : Jul 16 23:59:59 2036 GMT
        Subject: C=US, O=VeriSign, Inc., OU=VeriSign Trust Network,
                OU=(c) 2006 VeriSign, Inc. - For authorized use only,
                CN=VeriSign Class 3 Public Primary Certification Authority - G5
        Subject Public Key Info:
            Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption
                Public-Key: (2048 bit)
                Modulus:
                    00:af:24:08:08:29:7a:35:9e:60:0c:aa:e7:4b:3b:
                    ...
                    9f:73:b8:33:0a:cf:5d:3f:34:87:96:8a:ee:53:e8:
                    25:15
                Exponent: 65537 (0x10001)
    Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption
         93:24:4a:30:5f:62:cf:d8:1a:98:2f:3d:ea:dc:99:2d:bd:77:
         ...
         3f:68:5c:f2:42:4a:85:38:54:83:5f:d1:e8:2c:f2:ac:11:d6:
         a8:ed:63:6a
```

self-signed

root - CA

Root Certificate Authority (CA)

Survey result on April 2016:

- Comodo Group: 40.6%
- Symantec: 26.0% market share
- GoDaddy: 11.8%
- GlobalSign: 9.7%

Getting X.509 Certificate from CA



Set up HTTPS Web Server using X.509 Certificate

❖ Apache configuration file

```
<VirtualHost *:443>
    ServerName example.com
    DocumentRoot /var/www/Example
    DirectoryIndex index.html

    SSLEngine On
    SSLCertificateFile      /etc/apache2/ssl/bank_cert.pem  ①
    SSLCertificateKeyFile   /etc/apache2/ssl/bank_key.pem   ②
</VirtualHost>
```



How PKI Defeats MITM Attacks







Question: DNS

For the DNS cache-poisoning attack (i.e., provide a fake IP address for a banking site), if the banking site uses HTTPS, can the attack still work?



MITM Proxy (HTTPS Proxy)



HTTP proxy

Attacks on PKI ❶❷❸❹



Attack on CA ❶

DigiNotar Case Study

DigiNotar B.V. [3] was a Certificate Authority that provided digital certificate services. The digital certificates were used to secure Internet traffic, to issue (qualified) electronic signatures and to provide data encryption. DigiNotar also issued government accredited PKIoverheid certificates. During the months of June and July of 2011, the security of DigiNotar was breached and rogue certificates were issued. One of these certificates, a rogue Google certificate, was abused on a large scale in August of 2011 targeting primarily Iranian Internet users. At the end of August the intrusion became public knowledge and set into motion a chain of events that eventually led to the removal of all the Certificate Authorities that were hosted by DigiNotar from trust lists and ultimately the bankruptcy of the company.

"Using this [Gmail authentication] cookie, the hacker is able to log in directly to the Gmail mailbox of the victim and also read the stored emails," said Fox-IT. The hackers could also use the same credentials to log onto other Google services, including Google Docs and Google Latitude -- in the latter case, to identify the exact location of the victim -- and hijack Facebook and Twitter accounts.

Fox-IT said that approximately 300,000 IP addresses, each representing at least one computer and so at least one user, had accessed sites displaying a fake certificate for *google.com* between July 27 and Aug. 29. Nearly all -- Fox-IT said 99% -- of those IP addresses originated in Iran.

Investigators assumed that the *google.com* certificate was used primarily to spy on Iranians' Gmail accounts.

CNNIC Case Study

Google to drop China's CNNIC Root Certificate Authority after trust breach

OWEN WILLIAMS
12 days ago
Follow

Last month, a Chinese certificate authority issued valid security certificates for a number of domains, including Google's, without their permission, which resulted in a major trust breach in the crypto chain.

CNNIC had delegated its authority to Egyptian intermediary MCS Holdings to issue the certificates in question and the company installed it in a man-in-the-middle proxy internally.

Protecting CA

Comodo Case Study (March 2011)

Countermeasure: Certificate Pinning

Attack on Algorithm ❷

The Imporance of Collision Resistance

```
Certificate:
    Data:
        Version: 3 (0x2)
        Serial Number:
            2c:d1:95:10:54:37:d0:de:4a:39:20:05:6a:f6:c2:7f
    Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
        Issuer: C=US, O=Symantec Corporation, OU=Symantec Trust Network,
                CN=Symantec Class 3 EV SSL CA - G3
        Validity
            Not Before: Feb  2 00:00:00 2016 GMT
            Not After : Oct 30 23:59:59 2017 GMT
        Subject: 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.60.2.1.3=US/
                 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.60.2.1.2=Delaware/
                 businessCategory=Private Organization/
                 serialNumber=3014267, C=US/
                 postalCode=95131-2021, ST=California, L=San Jose/
                 street=2211 N 1st St, O=PayPal, Inc., OU=CDN Support,
                 CN=www.paypal.com
        Subject Public Key Info:
            Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption
                Public-Key: (2048 bit)
                Modulus:
                    00:da:43:c8:b3:a6:33:5d:83:c0:63:14:47:fd:6b:
                    22:bd:bf:4e:a7:43:11:55:eb:20:8b:e4:61:13:ee:
                    ......
                    00:c5:01:69:b5:10:16:a5:85:f8:fd:07:84:9a:c9:
                    14:91
                Exponent: 65537 (0x10001)
    Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
         4b:a9:64:20:cc:77:0b:30:ab:69:50:d3:7f:de:dc:7c:e2:fb:
         93:84:fd:78:a7:06:e8:14:03:99:c0:e4:4a:ef:c3:5d:15:2a:
         ...
         7d:6a:de:cb:9f:ff:ef:8c:65:35:e4:22:b5:88:b2:48:32:1e:
         a4:71:a7:9e
```

Question: Root CA's certificate and SHA1

Question: I notice that VeriSign's G5 certificate (self-signed) uses sha1, which is proven not to be collision resistant in February 2017, should VeriSign immediately revoke this certificate? Why or Why not?

```
Certificate:
    Data:
        Version: 3 (0x2)
        Serial Number:
            18:da:d1:9e:26:7d:e8:bb:4a:21:58:cd:cc:6b:3b:4a
    Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption
        Issuer: C=US, O=VeriSign, Inc., OU=VeriSign Trust Network,
                OU=(c) 2006 VeriSign, Inc. - For authorized use only,
                CN=VeriSign Class 3 Public Primary Certification Authority - G5
        Validity
            Not Before: Nov  8 00:00:00 2006 GMT
            Not After : Jul 16 23:59:59 2036 GMT
        Subject: C=US, O=VeriSign, Inc., OU=VeriSign Trust Network,
                OU=(c) 2006 VeriSign, Inc. - For authorized use only,
                CN=VeriSign Class 3 Public Primary Certification Authority - G5
        Subject Public Key Info:
            Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption
                Public-Key: (2048 bit)
                Modulus:
                    00:af:24:08:08:29:7a:35:9e:60:0c:aa:e7:4b:3b:
                    ...
                    9f:73:b8:33:0a:cf:5d:3f:34:87:96:8a:ee:53:e8:
                    25:15
                Exponent: 65537 (0x10001)
    Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption
         93:24:4a:30:5f:62:cf:d8:1a:98:2f:3d:ea:dc:99:2d:bd:77:
         ...
         3f:68:5c:f2:42:4a:85:38:54:83:5f:d1:e8:2c:f2:ac:11:d6:
         a8:ed:63:6a
```

Attack on Trusted Certificates ❸

Attack on User Confirmation ❹



IDN Homograph Attack

❖ What you see (from Firefox)





❖ The actual name (from Chrome)



Types of X.509 Certificate

- DV: Domain Validated
- OV: Organization Validated
- EV: Extended Validated

Issued To

Common Name (CN)	www.chase.com
Organization (O)	JPMorgan Chase and Co.
Organizational Unit (OU)	GTI GNS
Serial Number	62:5A:65:43:01:7A:7E:D1:2E:E4:46:20:39:0E:02:7C

Issued By

Common Name (CN)	Symantec Class 3 EV SSL CA - G3
Organization (O)	Symantec Corporation
Organizational Unit (OU)	Symantec Trust Network

Issued To

Common Name (CN)	www.amazon.com
Organization (O)	Amazon.com, Inc.
Organizational Unit (OU)	<Not Part Of Certificate>
Serial Number	1D:4A:BD:AA:78:D0:9A:FE:79:9D:41:BC:EB:7A:76:62

Issued By

Common Name (CN)	Symantec Class 3 Secure Server CA - G4
Organization (O)	Symantec Corporation
Organizational Unit (OU)	Symantec Trust Network

Types of X.509 Certificates



Certificate Revocation List (CRL)

Summary

- Public key encryption concept
- Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol
- RSA algorithm
- Man-in-the-middle attack
- Digital signature, X.509 certificate, and CA
- How PKI defeats MITM
- Attacks on PKI