LECTURE 2.1 SINGLE PERIOD GAMES: SIMULTANEOUS MOVES

In simultaneous move, one-shot games, you make decisions without knowing the action of your rival. This can be interpreted as:

- Players make decisions at the same time
- Players make decisions before knowing the decisions of their rivals.

Usually write out in what is called "strategic" or "normal" form:

- Payoffs are represented in a matrix
- Payoffs include all the benefits to a player (monetary, non-monetary)

Consider the following pricing game for Boeing and Airbus. Numbers represent profits.

The number left number in each cell is the payoff to the left player (Boeing).

Airbus

	Low price	High price
Low price	\$500, \$500	\$1000, \$0
High price	\$0, \$1000	\$750, \$750

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This Airbus-Boeing game is a rebadged Prisoners dilemma in which the (strictly) dominant strategy is to expand.

Notice how this does not maximise surplus from the view of the players. How can firms such as these get to a better outcome?

In this game we assume that players make their decisions simultaneously. Consider what happens when players make decisions sequentially. We'll come to that in another section.

COMPONENTS OF A GAME

- Players: *i* = 1,...,n
- Actions: (e.g. prices or quantities or advertising)
- Strategies: complete contingent plan of action
- Information available to players: we will assume perfect information
- Rules of the game
- Payoffs: a complete summary of the value to each player

DOMINANT STRATEGIES

A strategy is (strictly) **dominant** if it gives a (strictly) higher payoff than every other strategy, for every strategy that your rivals play.

- If you have a strictly dominant strategy, you should play it for sure.
- In a dominant strategy equilibrium, all players choose a dominant strategy.

DOMINANT STRATEGIES

Reconsider the pricing game between Boeing and Airbus. Does either player have a dominant strategy?

Airbus

	Low price	High price
Low price	\$500 \$500	\$1000, \$0
High price	\$0,\$1000	\$750, \$750

DOMINANT STRATEGIES

Consider a revised pricing game for Boeing & Airbus where the US Government guarantees Boeing's survival. Can you see any dominant strategies?

Airbus

	Low price	High price
Low price	\$500, \$500	\$1000, \$0
High price	\$600, \$1000	\$750, \$750

Consider the problem faced by the major tobacco companies in the 1970s.

- The firms could advertise or not.
- If you don't advertise but your rivals do, their profits increase and yours fall.

BAT

	•
Im	perial

	Don't Ad	Advertise
Don't advertise	\$50, \$50	\$20, \$60
Advertise	\$60, \$20	\$27, \$27

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The US government imposed an advertising ban on TV (amongst other health related measures). Big 4 tobacco companies spent \$315m on advertising in 1970, and \$252m in 1971. Profits rose by \$91m. The dominant strategy equilibrium was removed, benefitting the tobacco firms

	_	BAT	
		Don't Ad	Advertise
les e sui al	Don't advertise	\$50,\$50	\$20, \$60
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C. D. et al. D. Letter Market CO 2020			

DOMINATED STRATEGIES

A strategy is (strictly) dominated if the player has another strategy that gives a (strictly) higher payoff no matter what her rivals do.

Consider the following game. Does either player have a dominated strategy?

Toyota

Honda

	Large	Small	Don't build
Large	0,0	12,8	18,9
Small	8,12	1616	2015
Don't build	9, 8	1520	18,18

DOMINATED STRATEGIES

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Consider the following game. Does either player have a dominated strategy?

			Toyota		
		Lar	ge	Small	Don't build
Honda	Large	0,		12,8	18,9
	Small	8,	2	1616	2015
	Don't build	9,	8	15(20)	18,18

BEST RESPONSES

Best response function (reaction function): best choice of strategy for any choice of rival.

A best response is determined by asking:

- "Suppose I know Bob will play 'Left'. What is my best choice?"
- "Suppose I know Bob will play Right. What is my best response?"

With more players, to determine a best response, you would need to know what every other player would play.

- I'm a member of OPEC. Suppose I know that Kuwait plans to export 20m barrels of oil. Saudi Arabia plans to export 30m barrels, and Nigeria plans to export... How much should I produce?
- Now suppose I know Kuwait plans to export 25m, Saudi Arabia plans to export 32m, and Nigeria plans... How much should I produce now?

A set of strategies is a Nash equilibrium if every player is playing a best response to their rivals' strategies. No one has an incentive to change strategy

- A Nash equilibrium is self-enforcing or stable
- Nash equilibrium is a weaker concept than dominant strategy equilibrium

Nash equilibrium is a self-fulfilling agreement. If we agree to play a certain way, we'll both go through with it. Unilateral deviations are not worthwhile.

A Nash equilibrium could also be an outcome that we've settled on after repeating a situation many many times, or an outcome we expect given repeated observation of similar situations

What I choose to do depends on what I expect the other player to do – it's an inherently strategic concept.

A procedure for finding Nash Equilibrium in two person games in five steps.

- If both players have a dominant strategy these constitute their Nash equilibrium strategies.
- If one player has a dominant strategy this is their Nash equilibrium strategy, then find the other players best response to identify NE.
- If neither player has a dominant strategy, eliminate dominated strategies.
- Identify best responses for each player.
- Look for an equilibrium in mixed strategies see later.

Recall this example from earlier. Both players have a dominant strategy, which gives the Nash equilibrium.

Airbus

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RO	ei	ng

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Low price	\$500 \$500	\$1000, \$0
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- If one player has a dominant strategy, this is their Nash equilibrium strategy. Then find the other players best response to identify Nash equilibrium.
- If neither player has a dominant strategy, eliminate dominated strategies.
- Identify best responses for each player.
- Look for an equilibrium in mixed strategies see later.

Recall this revised pricing example from earlier. Airbus has a dominant strategy. We can then determine the best response of Boeing to locate the Nash equilibrium.

Airbus

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Bo	ei	na

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Recall this game from before. We effectively used these steps: eliminated the dominated strategies to identify the Nash equilibrium of Small/Small.

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		Lar	ge	Small	Don't build
_	Large	0,	0	12,8)	18,9
Honda	Small	8,	2	16/16	2015
	Don't build	9,	8	15(20)	18,18

COORDINATION GAMES

In a competitive setting coordination can often be very profitable. Consider this game between Boeing & Airbus making a decision about using a common communications technology

Airbus

	Alpha	Beta
Alpha	\$100, \$100	\$50, \$50
Beta	\$50, \$50	\$100, \$100

COORDINATION GAMES

There are two Nash equilibria, and no focal point to help coordinate.

Airbus

	Alpha	Beta
Alpha	\$100 \$100	\$50, \$50
Beta	\$50, \$50	\$100,\$100

COORDINATION GAMES

Consider this revised technology game. Again there are two Nash equilibria.

How could Boeing get its preferred Nash equilibria? Could Boeing pre-commit to one option? If so, pre-commitment must be credible (e.g. public sign agreement with parts supplier).

Airbus

	Alpha	Beta
Alpha	\$100,\$50	\$40, \$40
Beta	\$25, \$25	\$50,\$100