


Social preferences

Notes on Behavioural Economics

Jason Collins



Social preferences

- Distribution: the division of resources
- Reputation: what other people think
- Reciprocity: the intentions and actions of others

The ultimatum game




TABLE 1—THE ULTIMATUM GAME IN SMALL-SCALE SOCIETIES

| Group | Country | Mean offer ^a | Modes ^b | Rejection rate ^c | Low-offer rejection rate ^d |
|-----------------------|----------|-------------------------|----------------------|-----------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| Machiguenga | Peru | 0.26 | 0.15/0.25 (72) | 0.048 (1/21) | 0.10 (1/10) |
| Hadza (big camp) | Tanzania | 0.40 | 0.50 (28) | 0.19 (5/26) | 0.80 (4/5) |
| Hadza (small camp) | Tanzania | 0.27 (38) | 0.20 (8/29) | 0.28 (5/16) | 0.31 |
| Tsimané | Bolivia | 0.37 | 0.5/0.3/0.25 (65) | 0.00 (0/70) | 0.00 (0/5) |
| Quichua | Ecuador | 0.27 | 0.25 (47) | 0.15 (2/13) | 0.50 (1/2) |
| Torguud | Mongolia | 0.35 | 0.25 (30) | 0.05 (1/20) | 0.00 (0/1) |
| Khazax | Mongolia | 0.36 | 0.25 | | |
| Mapuche | Chile | 0.34 | 0.50/0.33 (46) | 0.067 (2/30) | 0.2 (2/10) |
| Au | PNG | 0.43 | 0.3 (33) | 0.27 (8/30) | 1.00 (1/1) |
| Gnau | PNG | 0.38 | 0.4 (32) | 0.4 (10/25) | 0.50 (3/6) |
| Sangu farmers | Tanzania | 0.41 | 0.50 (35) | 0.25 (5/20) | 1.00 (1/1) |

| Group | Country | Mean offer ^a | Modes ^b | Rejection rate ^c | Low-offer rejection rate ^d |
|-----------------------|-----------|-------------------------|--------------------|-----------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| Unresettled villagers | Zimbabwe | 0.41 | 0.50 (56) | 0.1 (3/31) | 0.33 (2/5) |
| Resettled villagers | Zimbabwe | 0.45 | 0.50 (70) | 0.07 (12/86) | 0.57 (4/7) |
| Achuar | Ecuador | 0.42 | 0.50 (36) | 0.00 (0/16) | 0.00 (0/1) |
| Orma | Kenya | 0.44 | 0.50 (54) | 0.04 (2/56) | 0.00 (0/0) |
| Aché | Paraguay | 0.51 | 0.50/0.40 (75) | 0.00 (0/51) | 0.00 (0/8) |
| Lamelara ^e | Indonesia | 0.58 | 0.50 (63) | 0.00 (3/8) | 0.00 (4/20) |

Note: PNG = Papua New Guinea.

^a This column shows the mean offer (as a proportion) in the ultimatum game for each society.

^b This column shows the modal offer(s), with the percentage of subjects who make modal offers (in parentheses).

^c The rejection rate (as a proportion), with the actual numbers given in parentheses.

^d The rejection rate for offers of 20 percent or less, with the actual numbers given in parentheses.

^e Includes experimenter-generated low offers.

The dictator game






Fig. 1 Distribution of mean giving per treatment




Fig. 2 Distribution of individual give rates