


Sophisticated present bias examples

Notes on Behavioural Economics

Jason Collins



Naïve and sophisticated present-biased agent

$$\beta = 0.95$$

$$\delta = 0.95$$

$$u(x_n) = x_n$$

\$100 next week or \$110 in two weeks?

The naïve agent

At $t = 0$, \$100 next week or \$110 in two weeks?

The naïve agent

At $t = 0$, \$100 next week or \$110 in two weeks?

$$\begin{aligned}U_0(1, \$100) &= \beta \delta u(x_1) \\&= \beta \delta u(\$100) \\&= 0.95 \times 0.95 \times 100 \\&= 90.25\end{aligned}$$

The naïve agent

At $t = 0$, \$100 next week or \$110 in two weeks?

$$\begin{aligned}U_0(2, \$110) &= \beta \delta^2 u(x_2) \\&= \beta \delta^2 u(\$110) \\&= 0.95 \times 0.95^2 \times 110 \\&= 94.31\end{aligned}$$

The naïve agent

At $t = 0$, \$100 next week or \$110 in two weeks?

$$U_0(1, \$100) = 90.25 < 94.31 = U_0(2, \$110)$$

The naïve agent

At $t = 1$, \$100 today or \$110 next week?

$$\begin{aligned} U_1(1, \$100) &= u(x_1) \\ &= u(\$100) \\ &= 100 \end{aligned}$$

The naïve agent

At $t = 1$, \$100 today or \$110 next week?

$$\begin{aligned}U_1(2, \$110) &= \beta \delta u(x_2) \\&= \beta \delta u(\$110) \\&= 0.95 \times 0.95 \times 110 \\&= 99.275\end{aligned}$$

The naïve agent

At $t = 1$, \$100 today or \$110 next week?

$$U_1(1, \$100) = 100 > 99.275 = U_1(2, \$110)$$

The sophisticated agent

At $t = 1$, \$100 today or \$110 next week?

The sophisticated agent

At $t = 1$, \$100 today or \$110 next week?

$$\begin{aligned}U_1(1, \$100) &= u(x_1) \\&= u(\$100) \\&= 100\end{aligned}$$

The sophisticated agent

At $t = 1$, \$100 today or \$110 next week?

$$\begin{aligned}U_1(2, \$110) &= \beta \delta u(x_2) \\&= \beta \delta u(\$110) \\&= 0.95 \times 0.95 \times 110 \\&= 99.275\end{aligned}$$

The sophisticated agent

At $t = 1$, \$100 today or \$110 next week?

$$U_1(1, \$100) = 100 > 99.275 = U_1(2, \$110)$$

The sophisticated agent

At $t = 0$, \$100 next week?

	Naive agent	Sophisticated agent
$t = 0$	\$110 at $t = 2$	\$100 at $t = 1$
$t = 1$	\$100 at $t = 1$	\$100 at $t = 1$

Naïve and sophisticated present-biased agent

$$\beta = 0.5$$

$$\delta = 1$$

OK movie: 6

Good movie: 10

Great movie: 16

The naïve agent

$$\begin{aligned}U_0(0, 0K) &= u(0K) \\ &= 6\end{aligned}$$

The naïve agent

$$\begin{aligned}U_0(1, \text{good}) &= \beta \delta u(\text{good}) \\&= 0.5 \times 1 \times 10 \\&= 5\end{aligned}$$

The naïve agent

$$\begin{aligned}U_0(2, \text{great}) &= \beta \delta^2 u(\text{great}) \\&= 0.5 \times 1^2 \times 16 \\&= 8\end{aligned}$$

The naïve agent

$$U_0(2, \text{great}) > U_0(0, \text{OK}) > U_0(1, \text{good})$$

The naïve agent

$$\begin{aligned}U_1(1, \text{good}) &= u(\text{good}) \\ &= 10\end{aligned}$$

The naïve agent

$$\begin{aligned}U_1(2, \text{great}) &= \beta \delta u(\text{great}) \\&= 0.5 \times 1 \times 16 \\&= 8\end{aligned}$$

The naïve agent

$$U_1(1, \text{good}) = 10 > 8 = U_1(2, \text{great})$$

The sophisticated agent

The sophisticated agent

$$\begin{aligned}U_1(1, \text{good}) &= u(\text{good}) \\ &= 10\end{aligned}$$

The sophisticated agent

$$\begin{aligned}U_1(2, \text{great}) &= \beta \delta u(\text{great}) \\&= 0.5 \times 1 \times 16 \\&= 8\end{aligned}$$

The sophisticated agent

$$U_1(1, \text{good}) = 10 > 8 = U_1(2, \text{great})$$

The sophisticated agent

$$U_0(0, 0K) = u(0K)$$

$$= 6$$

The sophisticated agent

$$U_0(1, \text{good}) = \beta \delta u(\text{good})$$

$$= 0.5 \times 1 \times 10$$

$$= 5$$

The sophisticated agent

$$U_0(0, \text{OK}) = 6 > 5 = U_0(1, \text{good})$$

$(0, -\$10)$

$(1, -\$15)$

$(2, -\$25)$



The naïve agent

$$\beta = 0.5$$

$$\delta = 1$$

$$u(x_n) = x_n$$

The naïve agent

$$\begin{aligned}U_0(0, -\$10) &= u(-\$10) \\ &= -10\end{aligned}$$

The naïve agent

$$\begin{aligned}U_0(1, -\$15) &= \beta \delta u(-\$15) \\&= 0.5 \times 1 \times (-15) \\&= -7.5\end{aligned}$$

The naïve agent

$$\begin{aligned}U_0(2, -\$25) &= \beta \delta^2 u(-\$25) \\&= 0.5 \times 1^2 \times (-25) \\&= -12.5\end{aligned}$$

The naïve agent

$$U_0(1, -\$15) > U_0(0, -\$10) > U_0(2, -\$25)$$

The naïve agent

$$\begin{aligned}U_1(1, -\$15) &= u(-\$15) \\ &= -15\end{aligned}$$

The naïve agent

$$\begin{aligned}U_1(2, -\$25) &= \beta \delta u(-\$25) \\&= 0.5 \times 1 \times (-25) \\&= -12.5\end{aligned}$$

The naïve agent

$$U_1(2, -\$25) = -12.5 > 15 = U_1(1, -\$15)$$

$(0, -\$10)$

$(1, -\$15)$

$(2, -\$25)$



The sophisticated agent

$$\beta = 0.5$$

$$\delta = 1$$

$$u(x_n) = x_n$$

The sophisticated agent

$$\begin{aligned}U_1(1, -\$15) &= u(-\$15) \\ &= -15\end{aligned}$$

The sophisticated agent

$$U_1(2, -\$25) = \beta \delta u(-\$25)$$

$$= 0.5 \times 1 \times (-25)$$

$$= -12.5$$

The sophisticated agent

$$U_1(2, -\$25) = -12.5 > 15 = U_1(1, -\$15)$$

The sophisticated agent

$$\begin{aligned} U_0(0, -\$10) &= u(-\$10) \\ &= -10 \end{aligned}$$

The sophisticated agent

$$\begin{aligned}U_0(2, -\$25) &= \beta \delta^2 u(-\$25) \\&= 0.5 \times 1^2 \times (-25) \\&= -12.5\end{aligned}$$

The sophisticated agent

$$U_0(0, -\$10) = -10 > 12.5 = U_0(2, -\$25)$$



Naïve

Sophisticated

