Density-dependent selection and the limits of relative

fitness

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# Density-dependent selection and the limits of relative fitness

#### 3 Abstract

Selection is commonly described in terms of relative fitness. Yet when selection is strong, the ecological view of selection in density-regulated populations seems to be incompatible with widely-used, constant-density relative fitness models such as the Wright-Fisher. Here we analyze the population ecological limits of relative fitness using a novel generalization of the Wright-Fisher model in which population density depends dynamically on the demographic rates of the types present. Our model contains a "reproductive excess, and clearly distinguishes between density-dependent selection and selection-dependent density. These 10 two effects are confounded in standard models of density-regulated population growth. Both 11 effects are necessary, in combination with strong selection, for relative fitness to break down in populations close to demographic equilibrium. Remarkably, both effects are not sufficient: 13 we give an example of strong selection on a density-regulating trait subject to density-14 dependent selection that conforms to the relative fitness description almost exactly. We 15 reiterate the importance of reproductive excesses in many species, which allows even strong 16 selection to have no effect on density. Our model also offers a possible alternative to relative fitness when the latter is untenable, as is likely the case far from demographic equilibrium. (191 words)

#### 20 Introduction

There are a variety of different measures of fitness. Some widely used examples in evo-21 lutionary ecology are expected lifetime reproductive ratio  $R_0$ , intrinsic population growth rate r, saturation population density (often labeled "K") (Benton and Grant, 2000), and invasion fitness (Metz et al., 1992). In addition, "relative fitness" is the standard in much of evolutionary biology, particularly evolutionary genetics, where attention is generally re-25 stricted to relative genotypic proportions (Barton et al., 2007, pp. 468). The variety of fitness measures is not problematic in itself, because different measures may be more useful in different circumstances. But it should be clear how the measure being used is connected to the processes of birth and death which govern population biology (Metcalf and Pavard, 2007; Doebeli et al., 2017). While such a connection is fairly clear for absolute fitness measures like r, relative fitness seems largely divorced from population biology. It has even been pro-31 posed that relative fitness be justified from measure theory, abandoning population biology altogether (Wagner, 2010). Given the ubiquitous use of relative fitness, it is important that 33 we understand its population ecological basis, both to clarify its domain of applicability, and 34 as part of the broader challenge of synthesizing ecology and evolution. 35 Constant relative fitness values can be justified as a linear approximation (Ewens, 2004, 36 277) (Charlesworth, 1994, Chap. 4) which is close to exact provided that selection 37 is sufficiently weak and stable over time. Yet strong, temporally-variable selection occurs 38 widely in nature and the lab, including in wild *Drosophila*, where population density varies by orders of magnitude each seasonal cycle (Messer et al., 2016; Bergland et al., 2014). The question is whether relative fitness can be used when selection is not vanishingly weak.

In general, age-structured populations that reproduce by outcrossing do not permit strong

selection to be represented in terms of type-specific relative-fitness constants (Charlesworth,

age structure, where it is easier to evaluate how the success or failure of the relative fitness
 description is tied to the underlying population ecological assumptions.

The basis of relative fitness is straightforward in the absence of crowding: it simply 47 represents differences in intrinsic population growth rate. In discrete time, the change in 48 frequency of type i is  $\Delta p_i = \left(\frac{W_i}{W} - 1\right) p_i$ , where  $W_i$  is the intrinsic absolute growth factor 49 of type i, and  $\overline{W} = \sum_{i} W_{i} p_{i}$  is the population mean W. Here we can rescale W however 50 we please and replace it with "relative fitness" w without affecting the ratio  $\frac{W_i}{\overline{W}} = \frac{w_i}{\overline{w}}$ . In 51 continuous time, the canonical selection equation is  $\frac{dp_i}{dt} = (r_i - \overline{r})p_i$ , where W is replaced by 52 the intrinsic exponential growth rate r (Crow et al., 1970, pp. 26). If there are two types 53 present, a wildtype and a mutant for instance, then the continuous time canonical selection equation can be written as

$$\frac{dp_i}{dt} = sp_i(1 - p_i),\tag{1}$$

where the constant selection coefficient s is the difference in r between types. The corresponding adaptive sweeps follow a logistic curve.

The difficulty with Eq. (1) arises in crowded populations. Since crowded and uncrowded 58 conditions are so different, we expect that s will often depend on density (Travis et al., 59 2013). Eq. (1) is then no longer a complete description of selection — we would also need 60 to specify a model for how density is changing. Note that frequency-dependent selection does not raise similar problems; Eq. (1) is still a complete description of selection even if 62 its behavior is more complicated due to s depending on frequency. Population genetics 63 traditionally evades the issue of density-dependent selection by simply assuming that total 64 population density N has reached its equilibrium value, which is assumed to be a fixed 65 constant. The selection coefficient s now abstractly parameterizes the rate at which selection changes relative frequencies, and no longer corresponds to differences in intrinsic growth rates 67 r. 68

However, MacArthur famously argued that when population growth is density-regulated, 69 selection in crowded populations is intimately connected to the ability to keep growing at 70 higher densities than other types can tolerate (MacArthur and Wilson, 1967). The classic 71 example is the logistic model, where the type with the greatest saturation population den-72 sity "K" excludes the others (Fig. 1a). Similarly, the " $R^*$  rule", a central tenet of resource 73 competition theory, states that when growth is limited by a single homogeneous consumable 74 resource, the type able to deplete the resource to the lowest equilibrium density  $R^*$  excludes 75 the others (Grover, 1997). Differences in  $R^*$  will often entail differences in saturation den-76 sity. The Lotka-Volterra competition model also couples selection in crowded populations to density except in special cases (Smouse, 1976; Mallet, 2012). In these examples, both Nand s change during, and as a result of, adaptive sweeps. It would therefore seem that the 79 ubiquitous constant-N, relative fitness description of selection is incompatible with a huge class of population ecological processes driving selection (Fig. 1b), even in the absence of age-structure and mating.

In light of this difficulty, the relative fitness description has been justified in broadly two different ways for crowded populations (we do not discuss Wagner's [2010] measuretheoretical justification, which is independent of population biology). The first is to simply assume that selection is density-independent but relax the assumption of constant N by allowing density to change as a result of selective sweeps (Barton et al., 2007, pp. 468)
(Prout, 1980). Obviously this does not address the problem that s can, in reality, depend on density. Type-specific responses to density are at the center of MacArthur's argument and the density-dependent selection literature that grew out of it (e.g. (Roughgarden, 1979)).

The second justification, which primarily grew out of a controversy over Haldane's "cost of selection", is to appeal to the existence of a "reproductive excess" of juveniles that are more fragile than their adult counterparts (Turner and Williamson, 1968; Kimura and Crow, 1969; Nei, 1971). Selection can then be concentrated at the juvenile phase, uncoupling selection




Figure 1: Selection in crowded environments shown as a phase diagram for the densities of two types  $n_1$  and  $n_2$ . (a) The logistic model  $\frac{dn_1}{dt} = r_1(1 - \frac{n_1 + n_2}{K_1})n_1$  and  $\frac{dn_2}{dt} = r_2(1 - \frac{n_1 + n_2}{K_2})n_1$  with  $r_1 = r_2$  and  $K_1 > K_2$ . (b) The constant-N, relative fitness description of selection.

from population density at the adult phase unless it is so strong that the reproductive excess is depleted. This justifies Eq. (1) because, for a population in demographic equilibrium, 96 selective sweeps do not affect density, and so the density-dependence of selection does not 97 matter. Unfortunately this reproductive excess literature is also poorly integrated with 98 population ecology. Kimura and Crow (1969) took constant N as a requirement and then 99 derived some variants of the logistic model that satisfy this requirement. Nei (1971) proposed 100 a model with an explicit representation of reproductive excess, but used an unusual model of 101 competition based on pair-wise interactions which was only defined for at most two different 102 types. As a result, the role of reproductive excesses in justifying Eq. (1) is still largely verbal. 103 Here we study the population ecology of relative fitness using a novel model of density-104 dependent population growth based on territorial contests. Rather than attempting to make 105 sense of relative fitness in existing standard models of population growth (e.g. (Kimura and Crow, 1969; Mallet, 2012)), we instead do the reverse, and attempt to make population eco-

logical sense of the widely-used Wright-Fisher relative-fitness model. Our starting point is the classic lottery model of territorial contest (Sale, 1977; Chesson and Warner, 1981). Like 109 the Wright-Fisher model, the classic lottery assumes a saturated population with constant N, 110 and fitness involves a product of fertility and juvenile viability (Crow et al., 1970, pp. 185), 111 but unlike the Wright-Fisher model, generations can overlap. Our first task is to generalize 112 the lottery model to create a variable-density version of the Wright-Fisher model with over-113 lapping generations (sections "Model" and "Analytical approximation of the variable-density 114 lottery"). 115 Equipped with this new model, we turn to the evaluation of Eq. (1). We first discuss 116 selection on the ability to contest territories, which behaves like a pure constant-N, relative 117 fitness trait, and discuss how this fits with MacArthur's analysis of selection in crowded pop-118 ulations (section "K-selection and selection-dependent density"). We then consider selection 119

on density-regulating traits (section "Density-regulating traits and the threat of strong selec-

tion"), and conclude by contrasting the classical density-dependent selection literature with

# $\mathbf{Model}$

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#### Assumptions and definitions

our results ("Discussion").

We assume that reproductively mature individuals ("adults") each require their own territory to survive and reproduce. All territories are identical, and the total number of territories is T.

Time advances in discrete iterations, each representing the time from birth to reproductive maturity. In a given iteration, the number of adults of the i'th type will be denoted by  $n_i$ , the total number of adults by  $N = \sum_i n_i$ , and the number of unoccupied territories by U = T - N. We assume that the  $n_i$  are large enough that stochastic fluctuations in the  $n_i$  ("drift") can be ignored (with T also assumed large to allow for small type densities  $n_i/T$ ).




Figure 2: Each iteration of our model has three elements. First, propagules are produced by adults and dispersed at random (only propagules landing on unoccupied territories are shown). Some territories may receive zero propagules. Lottery competition then occurs in each unoccupied territory that receives a propagule (only illustrated in one territory). Each type has a probability proportional to  $c_i x_i$  of securing a given territory, where  $c_i$  measures competitive ability and  $x_i$  is the number of propagules that disperse there. In the illustrated territory, the black type disperses more propagules but is a poorer competitor. Territories are then made available by deaths among those adults present at the start of the iteration (red crosses).

Each iteration, adults produce new offspring ("propagules"). These disperse at random, 132 regardless of distance from their parents, and independently of each other (e.g. there is 133 no avoidance of territories crowded with propagules). We assume that adults cannot be 134 ousted by juveniles, so that propagules landing on occupied territories are doomed. We 135 assume that each adult from type i produces a constant number  $b_i$  of successfully dispersing 136 propagules; the number of propagules dispersing to unoccupied territories is then given by 137  $m_i = b_i n_i U/T$ . The total number of these propagules will be denoted  $M = \sum_i m_i$ . Note 138 that due to our assumption of uniform dispersal, the parameter  $b_i$  can be thought of as a 139 measure of "colonization ability", which combines fecundity and dispersal ability (Levins 140 and Culver, 1971; Tilman, 1994; Bolker and Pacala, 1999). 141

The number of propagules of the i'th type landing in any particular territory is denoted  $x_i$ . We assume that  $x_i$  follows a Poisson distribution  $p_i(x_i) = l_i^{x_i} e^{-l_i}/x_i!$ , where  $l_i = m_i/U$  is the mean territorial propagule density for type i (the total propagule density will be denoted  $L = \sum_i l_i$ ). This is strictly only an approximation of random dispersal, but it is an excellent approximation given our assumption that the  $n_i$  are large enough that drift can be ignored (Appendix A).

When multiple propagules land on the same territory, the victor is determined by lottery competition: type i wins a territory with probability  $c_i x_i / \sum_j c_j x_j$ , where  $c_i$  is a constant representing relative competitive ability (Fig. 2). We expect that a fraction  $p_1(x_1) \dots p_G(x_G)$  of the U unoccupied territories will have the propagule composition  $x_1, \dots, x_G$ . Type i is expected to win a proportion  $c_i x_i / \sum_j c_j x_j$  of these. Ignoring fluctuations about these two expectations (due to our no-drift, large  $n_i$ , large T approximation), type i's territorial acquisition is given by

$$\Delta_{+} n_{i} = U \sum_{x_{1}, \dots, x_{G}} \frac{c_{i} x_{i}}{\sum_{j} c_{j} x_{j}} p_{1}(x_{1}) \cdots p_{G}(x_{G}), \tag{2}$$

where the sum only includes territories with at least one propagule present.

Finally, we assume that adult mortality only occurs in adults present at the start of the iteration, and at a constant, type-specific per-capita rate  $0 \le d_i \le 1$ . Thus, the overall change in type abundances is

$$\Delta n_i = \Delta_+ n_i - d_i n_i. \tag{3}$$

Fig. 2 illustrates one iteration of the model.

#### 160 Connection to the Wright-Fisher and classic lottery models

In the classic lottery model (Chesson and Warner, 1981), unoccupied territories are assumed 161 to be saturated with propagules from every type  $l_i \gg 1$ . From the law of large numbers, the composition of propagules in each territory will then not deviate appreciably from the mean 163 composition  $l_1, l_2, \ldots, l_G$  (G is the number of types present), and so the probability that type 164 i wins any particular unoccupied territory is approximately  $c_i l_i / \sum_j c_j l_j$ . Then the numbers 165 of territories won by each type  $\Delta_+ n_1, \Delta_+ n_2, \dots, \Delta_+ n_G$  follow a multinomial distribution with 166 U trials and success probabilities  $\frac{c_1 l_1}{\sum_j c_j l_j}, \frac{c_2 l_2}{\sum_j c_j l_j}, \dots, \frac{c_G l_G}{\sum_j c_j l_j}$ , respectively. Type i is expected 167 to win a proportion  $c_i l_i / \sum_j c_j l_j$  of the U available territories, and deviations from this 168 expected outcome are small (since T is large by assumption), giving 169

$$\Delta_{+}n_{i} = \frac{c_{i}l_{i}}{\sum_{j}c_{j}l_{j}}U = \frac{c_{i}l_{i}}{\overline{c}L}U, \tag{4}$$

where  $\bar{c} = \sum_j c_j m_j/M$  is the mean competitive ability for a randomly selected propagule. In section "Analytical approximation of the density-dependent lottery", we derive a generalization of Eq. (4) that accommodates arbitrary propagule densities  $l_i$ .

There is a close connection between the classic lottery model and the Wright-Fisher model of genetic drift (Svardal et al., 2015). In the Wright-Fisher model, type abundances are sampled each generation from a multinomial distribution with success proba-

bilities  $w_i n_i / \sum_j w_j n_j$ , where w is relative fitness and the  $n_i$  are type abundances in the preceding generation. Population size N remains constant. This is equivalent to the classic lottery model with non-overlapping generations ( $d_i = 1$  for all i) and relative fitness given by  $w_i = b_i c_i$  i.e. a product of fertility and viability (Crow et al., 1970, pp. 185). Thus, the classic lottery model is essentially the Wright-Fisher model extended to allow overlapping generations, but ignoring drift. This means that our extension of the classic lottery model to arbitrary densities represents a variable-density generalization of the Wright-Fisher model (we also do not consider drift here).

#### Results

#### $_{\scriptscriptstyle 185}$ Analytical approximation of the variable-density lottery

Eq. (2) involves an expectation over the time-dependent dispersal distributions  $p_i$ , and is thus too complicated to give intuition about the dynamics of density-dependent lottery competition. We now evaluate this expectation.

Similarly to the high- $l_i$  approximation of the classic lottery model, we replace the  $x_i$  with 189 appropriate mean values, although we cannot simply replace  $x_i$  with  $l_i$  as in Eq. (4). The 190 classic lottery model breaks down for types with low propagule density ( $l_i \ll 1$ ) because 191 territorial acquisition is then not correctly represented by a lottery in each territory with the 192 mean propagule density. For a type with low propagule density  $l_i \ll 1$ , we have  $x_i = 1$  in the 193 territories where its propagules land, and so its growth comes entirely from territories which 194 deviate appreciably from  $l_i$ . To account for this, we separate Eq. (2) into  $x_i = 1$  and  $x_i > 1$ 195 parts. Our more general approximation only requires that there are no large discrepancies 196 in competitive ability (i.e. we do not have  $c_i/c_j \gg 1$  for any two types). We obtain (details 197

198 in Appendix B)

$$\Delta_{+} n_{i} \approx \left[ e^{-L} + (R_{i} + A_{i}) \frac{c_{i}}{\overline{c}} \right] l_{i} U, \tag{5}$$

where

$$R_i = \frac{\bar{c}e^{-l_i}(1 - e^{-(L-l_i)})}{c_i + \frac{\bar{c}L - c_i l_i}{L - l_i} \frac{L - 1 + e^{-L}}{1 - (1 + L)e^{-L}}},$$

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$$A_i = \frac{\overline{c}(1 - e^{-l_i})}{\frac{1 - e^{-l_i}}{1 - (1 + l_i)e^{-l_i}} c_i l_i + \frac{\overline{c}L - c_i l_i}{L - l_i} \left( L \frac{1 - e^{-L}}{1 - (1 + L)e^{-L}} - l_i \frac{1 - e^{-l_i}}{1 - (1 + l_i)e^{-l_i}} \right)}.$$

Comparing Eq. (5) to Eq. (4), the classic lottery per-propagate success rate  $c_i/\bar{c}L$ 201 has been replaced by three separate terms. The first,  $e^{-L}$ , accounts for propagules which 202 land alone on unoccupied territories; these territories are won without contest. The second, 203  $R_i c_i/\bar{c}$ , represents competitive victories when the i type is a rare invader in a high density 204 population (i.e. it determines invasion fitness (Metz et al., 1992)). The third term,  $A_i c_i/\bar{c}$ , 205 represents competitive victories when the i type is abundant. The relative importance of 206 these three terms varies with both the overall propagule density L and the relative propagule 207 frequencies  $l_i/L$ . If  $l_i \gg 1$  for all types, we recover the classic lottery model (only the  $A_i c_i/\bar{c}$ 208 term remains, and  $A_i \to 1/L$ ). 209

Fig. 3 shows that Eq. (5) and its components closely approximate simulations of our variable-density lottery model over a wide range of propagule densities. Two types are present, one of which is at low frequency. The growth of the low-frequency type relies crucially on the low-density competition term  $R_i c_i/\bar{c}$ . On the other hand,  $R_i c_i/\bar{c}$  is negligible for the high-frequency type, which depends instead on high density territorial victories. Fig. 3 also shows the breakdown of the classic lottery model at low propagule densities.

Eq. (5) takes a much simpler form if all types are competitively equivalent  $(c_i = c)$ ,

$$\Delta_{+}n_{i} = \frac{l_{i}}{L}(1 - e^{-L})U. \tag{6}$$




Figure 3: Comparison of the analytical approximation Eq. (5) with simulations. Perpropagule success probability  $\Delta_+ n_i/l_i U$  from the classic lottery model, individual-based simulations of random dispersal and lottery competition, and Eq. (5) and its three components. Two types are present, a rare type with  $c_1 = 1.5$ , and a common type with  $c_2 = 1$ . Simulation points are almost invisible in for the common type due to near exact agreement with Eq. (5). Dashed lines in show the breakdown of the classic lottery model. Parameters:  $m_1 = 10^4$  and  $m_2 = 9 \times 10^4$  and U varies between  $5 \times 10^3$  and  $10^6$ .

Here  $1 - e^{-L}$  is the fraction of territories that receive at least one propagule under Poisson dispersal,  $(1 - e^{-L})U$  is the total number of territories gained, and type i receives a fraction  $l_i/L$  of these. Total population density thus grows according to

$$\Delta N = (1 - e^{-L})U - \sum_{i} d_i n_i \tag{7}$$

#### Selection-dependent density and K-selection

Equipped with our variable-density lottery model, we now start evaluating the validity of Eq. (1). In this section we explore whether we should expect population density to vary as a result of selection (Prout, 1980). Since the idea that density does vary with selection is closely connected to the notion of "K-selection", we start by revisiting MacArthur's analysis of selection in crowded environments (MacArthur and Wilson, 1967).

MacArthur considers a population with two types that have densities  $n_1$  and  $n_2$  subject to density-dependent growth described by

$$\frac{dn_1}{dt} = f_1(n_1, n_2) \qquad \frac{dn_2}{dt} = f_2(n_1, n_2). \tag{8}$$

The environment is assumed to remain constant apart from the type densities. The functions  $f_1$  and  $f_2$  must decline to zero if  $n_1$  or  $n_2$  are sufficiently large, because no population has unlimited resources. This defines the nullclines  $f_1(n_1, n_2) = 0$  and  $f_2(n_1, n_2) = 0$  in  $(n_1, n_2)$  space. The outcome of selection is then determined by the relationship between these nullclines. Specifically, a type will be excluded if its nullcline is completely contained in the region bounded by the other type's nullcline. In other words, for a type to have the possibility of persisting, it must be able to keep growing to higher densities than the other type can tolerate in some region of  $(n_1, n_2)$  space (Fig. 1a).

To formalize the relationship between nullclines, MacArthur used the symbol "K" to

label the four intersection points of the nullclines with the  $n_1$  and  $n_2$  axes, specifically  $f_1(K_{11},0) = 0$ ,  $f_1(0,K_{12}) = 0$ ,  $f_2(0,K_{22}) = 0$  and  $f_2(K_{21},0) = 0$ . These K values determine whether a region of higher-density growth exists for each type, provided that the nullclines are close to being straight lines. Note that only  $K_{11}$  and  $K_{22}$  are saturation densities aking to the K parameter in the logistic model; following widespread convention, we will refer to selection on these saturation densities as "K-selection" (Fig. 1a). The other intersection points,  $K_{12}$  and  $K_{21}$ , are related to competition between types. For instance, in the Lotka-Volterra competition model we have

$$f_1(n_1, n_2) = r_1(1 - \alpha_{11}n_1 - \alpha_{12}n_2)n_1$$

$$f_2(n_1, n_2) = r_2(1 - \alpha_{22}n_1 - \alpha_{21}n_2)n_2$$
(9)

where  $\alpha_{11} = 1/K_{11}$  and  $\alpha_{22} = 1/K_{22}$  measure competitive effects within types, while  $\alpha_{12} = 1/K_{12}$  and  $\alpha_{21} = 1/K_{21}$  measure competitive effects between types (Fig. 4a).

Thus, when MacArthur concludes that "fitness is K" in crowded populations (MacArthur 238 and Wilson, 1967, pp. 149), the meaning is that selection either favors the ability to keep 239 growing at ever higher densities (moving a type's own nullcline outwards), or the ability to 240 suppress the growth of competitors at lower densities (moving the nullcline of competitors 241 inwards) (Gill, 1974). This general idea is much broader than "K-selection" in the sense 242 of selection for greater saturation density, and applies even if the nullclines are nonlinear 243 to such an extent that the "K" values themselves do not give much information about the 244 regions of high-density growth. 245

It is obvious from Eq. (9) that selection can favor a superior competitor in a crowded population even if its saturation density is the same as, or lower than that of the other types present. However, the Lotka-Volterra model still couples selection to population density (Smouse, 1976). Fig. 4a shows Lotka-Volterra selection between two types with the same




Figure 4: Selection between types with identical saturation density but different inter-type competitive ability. (a) Lotka-Volterra competition (Eq. 9) with  $r_1 = r_2 = 1$ ,  $\alpha_{11} = \alpha_{22} = 1$ ,  $\alpha_{12} = 0.9$  and  $\alpha_{21} = 1.2$ . Trajectories do not follow the line  $N = K_{11} = K_{22}$ . (b) Lottery competition (Eq. 5) with  $b_1 = b_2 = 5$ ,  $d_1 = d_2 = 0.1$  and  $c_1/c_2 = 5$ . Trajectories converge on the line  $N = K_{11} = K_{22}$ .

saturation density ( $\alpha_{11} = \alpha_{22}$ ,  $\alpha_{21} > \alpha_{12}$ ). Even though the initial and final densities of a sweep are the same, density is not constant over a sweep. Only a highly restricted subset of r and  $\alpha$  values will keep N constant over a selective sweep (further details in Appendix C). Intuitively, for one type to exclude another with the same saturation density, competitive suppression of growth between types must be stronger than competitive suppression of growth within types, causing a dip in N over the sweep.

By contrast, if one type in our density-dependent lottery model has a c advantage but 256 the types are otherwise identical (so that each type has the same saturation density), the 257 density trajectories converge on the line of constant density equal to the saturation density 258 (Fig. 4b). Selection then occurs purely along this line, similarly to Fig. 1b. This occurs 259 because c does not directly affect N: it only affects the relative likelihood for each type 260 to win a contested territory, not whether a territory is contested in the first place (this 261 can be seen formally in Eq. (7)). In other words, once the population reaches demographic 262 equilibrium, it behaves indistinguishably from a constant-N relative fitness model. While 263 quite different from classical growth models like the Lotka-Volterra, this is all perfectly 264 consistent with MacArthur's general argument. 265

The constant-N behavior of c-selection arises from the role of c as a trait determining relative competitive success in territorial contests. As such, this behavior is a result of a reproductive excesses. By contrast, previous models of selection-independent density either used unusual models of competition (Kimura and Crow, 1969; Nei, 1971), or made restrictive parameter choices in the Lotka-Volterra model (Appendix C; Smouse 1976; Mallet 2012).

#### Density-regulating traits and the threat of strong selection

In the previous section we showed that c-selection and the regulation of population density are independent even though population growth is density-regulated in our variable-density lottery. Nevertheless, selection and density regulation are intimately connected in widely

used models of population growth, as well as for the lottery b and d traits.

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To see why this connection potentially poses a threat to relative fitness, consider the simple birth-death model (Kostitzin, 1939, pp. 20) (Travis et al., 2013)

$$\frac{dn_i}{dt} = (b_i - \delta_i N)n_i \tag{10}$$

where  $\delta_i$  is the per-capita increase in mortality rate due to crowding (for simplicity, there are no deaths when uncrowded), playing a similar role as K in the logistic model.

Starting from a monomorphic population, the frequency of a  $\delta_i \to \delta_i(1-\epsilon)$  variant obeys

$$\frac{dp_i}{dt} = \epsilon \delta_i N p_i (1 - p_i). \tag{11}$$

The selection coefficient  $s = \epsilon \delta_i N$  thus depends on density (compare with Model III in Kimura and Crow (1969)). On the other hand, the frequency of a  $b_i \to b_i (1 + \epsilon)$  variant will exactly obey Eq. (1) with  $s = \epsilon b_i$ , independent of density.

In practice the density dependence in Eq. (11) only matters if N changes substantially 284 during a sweep. This can easily occur if a population is far from demographic equilibrium 285 (we return to this scenario in the Discussion). However, even if N has reached equilibrium, 286 it will change substantially over a  $\delta$ -sweep if selection on  $\delta$  is sufficiently strong. To quantify 287 this effect, we need to account for how much N changes as a result of a  $\delta$ -sweep beginning 288 and ending in equilibrium (Kimura and Crow, 1969); from Eq. (10) we have an increase 289 from  $N_{\text{initial}} = b_i/\delta_i$  to  $N_{\text{final}} = b_i/\delta_i(1-\epsilon) = N_{\text{initial}}/(1-\epsilon)$ . The corresponding selection 290 coefficient increases from  $s_{\text{initial}} = \epsilon b_i$  to  $s_{\text{final}} = s_{\text{initial}}/(1-\epsilon)$ . Consequently, noticeable 291 deviations from Eq. (1) occur with proportional changes to  $\delta$  of order  $\epsilon = 0.2$  and upwards 292 i.e. selection must be quite strong (Fig. 5). 293

Let us now turn to selection on b and d in our lottery model. Recall that  $m_i = b_i n_i U/T$ ,




Figure 5: (a) Proportional change in the selection coefficient over a "K-like" sweep for a type that experiences proportionally  $1-\epsilon$  fewer deaths induced by crowding. The population is in demographic equilibrium at the start and end of the sweep. (b) Example equilibrium-to-equilibrium  $\delta$ -sweep (Eq. 11) for  $\epsilon=0.2$  showing a noticeable deviation from the canonical selection equation.

and so  $L = M/U = \bar{b}N/T$  where  $\bar{b}$  is the population mean b. Thus, from Eq. (6) we have

$$\Delta n_i = \left(\frac{b_i}{\overline{b}} \frac{1 - e^{-\overline{b}N/T}}{N} (T - N) - d_i\right) n_i. \tag{12}$$

It can be seen that the mortality d is akin to the birth rate in Eq. (10), and so, while d does affect density, selection on d is density independent. Thus, d sweeps follow the canonical relative fitness model exactly (Fig. 6).

At first glance, b in Eq. (12) appears to be analogous to the  $\delta$  in Eq. (10) because it regulates density and is multiplied by the density-dependent term  $f(\bar{b}, N) = \frac{1 - e^{-\bar{b}N/T}}{N}(T - N)$ .

This term declines from  $\bar{b}$  at low density to zero at high density and as a result, selection on b is density-dependent. The source of this density-dependence is that the selective advantage from having greater b depends on the number of territories being contested; if almost all are occupied, then there is little advantage to having a greater b.

Nevertheless, the behavior of equilibrium-to-equilibrium b-sweeps are qualitatively differ-305 ent from the  $\delta$  sweeps above. The reason is that b regulates density by controlling how many 306 unoccupied territories receive propagules. Thus, greater b means more propagules contesting 307 territories, but also more territories being contested. The net effect on  $f(\bar{b}, N)$  is precisely 308 zero in equilibrium: in a single-type equilibrium we have  $b_i/\bar{b}=1$  and so  $f(\bar{b},N)=d_i$  exactly 309 at the beginning and end of a pure b sweep, even though the density N increases. Strictly 310 speaking there is some deviation in f(N) from  $d_i$  during the sweep, but this deviation is an 311 order of magnitude smaller than for a  $\delta$  sweep (the deviation due to a sweep with propor-312 tional effect  $b_i \to b_i(1+\epsilon)$  is only of order  $\epsilon^2$ , whereas the analogous effect in Fig. 5 is of order 313  $\epsilon$ ; see Appendix D for details). Since selection must already be quite strong for a  $\delta$  sweep to 314 threaten Eq. (1), we conclude that b sweeps also obey the canonical selection equation (to a 315 close approximation).




Figure 6: The density-dependence of selection in our variable-density lottery plotted as the selection coefficient  $(\Delta n_j - \Delta n_i)/n_j$  experienced by an adaptive variant j present at the same frequency as a wildtype i. Here  $b_i = 1$ ,  $d_i = 0.5$  and  $c_i = 1$ . For b-selection we set  $b_j = b_i(1 + \epsilon)$ , and similarly for c and d, with  $\epsilon = 0.1$ . d-selection is density-independent, b-selection gets weaker with lower territorial availability, while c-selection initially increases with density as territorial contests become more important, but eventually also declines as available territories become scarce. The equilibrium density for the i type is  $\approx 0.4$ .

#### Discussion

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Summarizing the three traits in the variable-density lottery model: (i) c-selection is density-318 dependent, but c does not regulate density; (ii) d regulates density, but d-selection is density-319 independent; (iii) b regulates density and b-selection is density-dependent. Despite these 320 differences, pure b, c and d sweeps starting and ending at equilibrium all obey the canonical 321 selection equation. This rich variety of behaviors in relation to density is quite different 322 from that found in the classical density-dependent selection literature (Roughgarden, 1979; 323 Christiansen, 2004). 324 To briefly review: based on a diploid, bi-allelic variant of the logistic model, the r/K325 scheme proposed a dichotomy between r-selection (uncrowded) and K-selection (crowded) 326 (MacArthur, 1962), with the latter taken to mean selection for greater saturation density 327 (Gill, 1974). A more general Lotka-Volterra model introduces the inter-type  $\alpha_{ij}$  competition 328 coefficients, with selection on these termed " $\alpha$ -selection" (Gill, 1974; Joshi et al., 2001). 329 Setting aside r which confers no selective advantage at equilibrium, we are left with K and 330  $\alpha$ , which both behave like  $\delta$  in that they are density-dependent and cause density to change 331 over a sweep (although N only dips temporarily during an  $\alpha$ -sweep). Thus, strong selection 332 is sufficient for relative fitness to break down in the classical view of density-dependent 333 selection. Indeed, in the defense of Eq. (1) given by Kimura and Crow (1969), it was 334 assumed that s will be a few percent at most. While this may be reasonable for adaptive 335 mutations, there is no reason to expect selection on standing variation to be so weak, wild 336 Drosophila being an obvious counter-example (Bergland et al., 2014). 337 Our variable-density lottery model shows that it is not simply a lack of ecological re-338 alism that underlies the contrast between relative fitness and the classical view of density-339 dependent selection. Rather, in many population growth models, only one life-history stage

is represented, and the competitive effects resulting from crowding appear as a reduction in

absolute fitness that only depends on the type densities at this life-history stage (e.g. the  $n_i^2$  and  $n_i n_j$  terms in the Lotka Volterra equation). As noted in the introduction, this precludes selection concentrated at a fragile juvenile stage as a result of a reproductive excess (Chesson, 1983; Turner and Williamson, 1968; Kimura and Crow, 1969; Nei, 1971).

Reproductive excesses appear in the variable-density lottery model when the number 346 of propagules is greater than the number of available territories. Then only  $\approx 1/L$  of the 347 juveniles contesting available territories survive to adulthood. Unlike the role of adult density 348  $n_i$  in single-life-stage models, it is the propagule densities  $l_i$  that represent the crowding 349 that drives competition (a "critical age-group"; Charlesworth 1994, pp. 54). In general, 350 reproductive excesses will tend to produce strictly-relative lottery-type contests in which 351 fitter types grow at the expense of others by preferentially filling the available adult "slots". 352 The number of slots can remain fixed or change independently of selection at the juvenile 353 stage. By ignoring reproductive excesses, single life-stage models are biased to have total 354 population density be sensitive to ongoing selection. In this respect, the Wright-Fisher model 355 and similar viability selection heuristics actually capture an important ecological process. 356

We now turn to the breakdown of Eq. (1). We first discuss the problem shown in Fig. 5, 357 which occurs when strong selection changes population density and is also density-dependent. In the variable-density lottery, this occurs if and only if types differ in more than one trait. 359 The c and d traits represent the two distinct directions in which density and selection inter-360 act: selection may depend on density, and density may depend on selection (Prout, 1980). 361 The combination is necessary to pose a threat to Eq. (1). However, the b trait remark-362 ably demonstrates that the combination is not sufficient, since the density-dependence of 363 b-selection disappears over equilibrium-to-equilibrium b-sweeps. Thus, the simple linear mod-364 els that have become standard in discussions of density-dependent selection (Roughgarden, 365 1979; Christiansen, 2004; Mallet, 2012; Travis et al., 2013) actually represent a complicated 366 form of the interaction between density and selection, and their parameters confound the underlying issues.

While this is a conceptual reason to be wary of the classical density-dependent selection 369 models, it is not clear how we should expect the trait variation in nature to align. For 370 instance, should we expect mutations to generally affect b, c and d independently of each 371 other, or pleiotropically such that  $\delta$ -like selection is prevalent? In the case of well-mixed 372 indirect exploitation competition for consumable resources, the  $R^*$  rule suggests that  $\delta$ -like 373 selection will be prevalent. However, for many populations consumable resources are not 374 well-mixed. Spatial localization of consumable resources (e.g. due to restricted movement of 375 nutrients through soils) will tend to create a territorial situation similar to the lottery model, 376 where resource competition only occurs locally and both it any interference competition are 377 subsumed into the competitive ability c, which does not affect N. 378

Relative fitness models truly break down when N is far from equilibrium and selection is density-dependent (as seems likely; Travis et al. 2013). For example, wild Drosophila experience large seasonal boom-bust cycles in population density coupled to strong selection that drives large swings in allele frequency (Bergland et al., 2014). In this case there is no choice but to abandon relative fitness, and our model provides one potentially suitable option. Whether or not our density-dependent lottery model is a good description of Drosophila ecology, the close connection between our model and Wright-Fisher is useful, because drift in our model should behave broadly similarly. Thus, our model it should provide a useful starting point for analyzing evolution in this and other far-from-equilibrium situations.

Another issue with the constant-N relative fitness description of selection is that it precludes consideration of longer-term aspects of the interplay between evolution and ecology such as population extinction. A variety of approaches have been developed for dealing with these issues in quantitative genetics (Burger and Lynch, 1995; Engen et al., 2013), population genetics (Bertram et al., 2017) and adaptive dynamics (Ferriere and Legendre, 2013; Dieckmann and Ferrière, 2004). Although density-dependent selection is pertinent to these

- longer-term issues (Travis et al., 2013), our focus here has been the description of the time-
- dependent process by which selection changes allele frequencies. This is particularly critical
- for making sense of evolution at the genetic level, for which we now have abundant data.

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# 482 Appendix A: Poisson dispersal

For simplicity of presentation, we assume a Poisson distribution for the  $x_i$  as our model of 483 dispersal. Strictly speaking, the total number of i propagules  $\sum x_i$  (summed over unoccupied 484 territories) is then no longer a constant  $m_i$ , but fluctuates between generations for a given 485 mean  $m_i$ . Nevertheless, since we do not consider the random fluctuations in type abundances 486 here, and for ease of comparison with the classic lottery model, we ignore the fluctuations 487 in  $m_i$ . Instead we focus on Poisson fluctuations in propagule composition in each territory. 488 In the exact model of random dispersal, the counts of a type's propagules across un-489 nocupied territories follows a multinomial distribution with dimension U, total number of 490 trials equal to  $m_i$ , and equal probabilities 1/U for a propagate to land in a given territory. 491 Thus, the  $x_i$  in different territories are not independent random variables. However, for suf-492 ficiently large U and  $m_i$ , this multinomial distribution for the  $x_i$  across territories is closely 493 approximated by a product of independent Poisson distributions for each territory, each with 494 rate parameter  $l_i$  (Arenbaev, 1977, Theorem 1). Since we are ignoring finite population size 495 effects, we effectively have  $T \to \infty$ , in which case U can only be small enough to violate 496 the Poisson approximation if there is vanishing population turnover, and then the dispersal 497 distribution is irrelevant anyway. Likewise, in ignoring stochastic finite population size for the  $n_i$ , we have effectively already assumed that  $m_i$  is large enough to justify the Poisson 499 approximation (the error scales as  $1/\sqrt{m_i}$ ; Arenbaev 1977).

## 501 Appendix B: Growth equation derivation

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In this appendix we derive Eq. (5). Following the notation in the main text, the Poisson distributions for the  $x_i$  (or some subset of the  $x_i$ ) will be denoted p, and we use P as a general shorthand for the probability of particular outcomes.

We start by separating the right hand side of Eq. (2) into three components

$$\Delta_{+}n_{i} = \Delta_{u}n_{i} + \Delta_{r}n_{i} + \Delta_{a}n_{i}, \tag{13}$$

which vary in relative magnitude depending on the propagule densities  $l_i$ . The first component,  $\Delta_u n_i$ , accounts for territories where only one focal propagule is present ( $x_i = 1$  and  $x_j = 0$  for  $j \neq i$ ; u stands for "uncontested"). The proportion of territories where this occurs is  $l_i e^{-L}$ , and so

$$\Delta_u n_i = U l_i e^{-L} = m_i e^{-L}. \tag{14}$$

The second component,  $\Delta_r n_i$ , accounts for territories where a single focal propagule is present along with at least one non-focal propagule  $(x_i = 1 \text{ and } X_i \ge 1 \text{ where } X_i = \sum_{j \ne i} x_j$ is the number of nonfocal propagules; r stands for "rare"). The number of territories where this occurs is  $Up_i(1)P(X_i \ge 1) = m_i e^{-l_i}(1 - e^{-(L-l_i)})$ . Thus

$$\Delta_r n_i = m_i e^{-l_i} (1 - e^{-(L-l_i)}) \left\langle \frac{c_i}{c_i + \sum_{j \neq i} c_j x_j} \right\rangle_{\tilde{p}}, \tag{15}$$

where  $\langle \rangle_{\tilde{p}}$  denotes the expectation with respect to the probability distribution  $\tilde{p}$  of nonfocal propagule abundances  $x_j$ , in those territories where exactly one focal propagule, and at least one non-focal propagule, landed.

The final contribution,  $\Delta_a n_i$ , accounts for territories where two or more focal propagules

are present  $(x_i \ge 2; a \text{ stands for "abundant"})$ . Similar to Eq. (15), we have

$$\Delta_a n_i = U(1 - (1 + l_i)e^{-l_i}) \left\langle \frac{c_i x_i}{\sum_j c_j x_j} \right\rangle_{\hat{p}}$$
(16)

where  $\hat{p}$  is the probability distribution of both focal and nonfocal propagule abundances in those territories where at least two focal propagules landed.

To derive Eq. (5) we approximate the expectations in Eq. (15) and Eq. (16) by replacing  $x_i$  and the  $x_j$  with "effective" mean values as follows

$$\left\langle \frac{c_i}{c_i + \sum_{j \neq i} c_j x_j} \right\rangle_{\tilde{p}} \approx \frac{c_i}{c_i + \sum_{j \neq i} c_j \langle x_j \rangle_{\tilde{q}}}.$$
 (17)

$$\left\langle \frac{c_i x_i}{\sum_j c_j x_j} \right\rangle_{\hat{p}} \approx \frac{c_i \langle x_i \rangle_{\hat{q}}}{\sum_j c_j \langle x_j \rangle_{\hat{q}}}.$$
 (18)

Here the effective means  $\langle \rangle_{\tilde{q}}$  and  $\langle \rangle_{\hat{q}}$  are taken with respect to new distributions  $\tilde{q}$  and  $\hat{q}$ , respectively. In the following subsection we define  $\tilde{q}$  and  $\hat{q}$  and explain our reasoning for using these distributions to take the effective means.

#### The effective distributions $ilde{q}$ and $\hat{q}$

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The approximations (17) and (18) must be consistent between rare and common types. To illustrate, suppose that two identical types (same b, c and d) are present, with low  $l_1 \ll 1$  and high density  $l_2 \approx L \gg 1$  respectively. Since L is large, uncontested territories make up a negligible fraction of the total. The rare type grows almost entirely due to  $\Delta_r n_1$ , while the common type grows almost entirely due to  $\Delta_a n_2$ . To ensure consistency, the approximate per-capita growth rates implied by the approximations (17) and (18) must be equal  $\Delta_r n_1/m_1 = \Delta_a n_2/m_2$ . Even small violations of this consistency condition would mean exponential growth of one type relative to the other. This behavior is clearly pathological,

because any single-type population can be arbitrarily partitioned into identical rare and common subtypes. Thus, predicted growth or decline would depend on an arbitrary assignment of rarity.

For example, suppose that we use  $\tilde{p}$  and  $\hat{p}$  to calculate the effective means. The right hand side of Eq. (17) is then approximately 1/(L+1), and since  $l_1 \ll 1$  and  $L \gg 1$  we have  $\Delta_r n_1 \approx 1/(L+1)$  in Eq. (15). Similarly, for the common type,  $\sum_j \langle x_j \rangle_{\hat{p}} = L$  in Eq. (18), and so  $\Delta_a n_2 \approx 1/L$ . Thus, the identical rare type is pathologically predicted to decline in frequency.

The effective distributions  $\tilde{q}$  and  $\hat{q}$  are devised to avoid this pathology. The idea is to make the approximation that the distribution for the total number of propagules per territory is the same in all territories. This is only an approximation because conditioning on focal propagules being present does change the distribution of X in the corresponding subset of territories (in the above example, the mean propagule density across all territories is L, but in the territories responsible for the growth of the rare type we have  $\langle X \rangle_{\tilde{p}} = L + 1$ ).

More formally, let  $\mathbf{x}$  denote the vector of propagule abundances  $(x_1, \ldots, x_G)$  in a given territory, and  $\mathbf{x}_i = (x_1, \ldots, x_{i-1}, x_{i+1} \ldots, x_G)$  similarly denote the vector of non-focal abundances, so that  $p(\mathbf{x}_i) = p_1(x_1) \cdots p_{i-1}(x_{i-1}) p_{i+1}(x_{i+1}) \cdots p_G(x_G)$ . The corresponding total propagule numbers are denoted  $X = \sum_j x_j$  and  $X_i = X - x_i$ . Then, in territories where one focal propagule and at least one non-focal propagule are present, the effective distribution is defined by

$$\tilde{q}(\mathbf{x}_i) = \sum_{X=2}^{\infty} P(X|X \ge 2)p(\mathbf{x}_i|X_i = X - 1),\tag{19}$$

where the total number of propagules X follows a Poisson distribution with mean L, and  $P(X|X \ge 2) = P(X)/P(X \ge 2) = P(X)/(1 - (1 + L)e^{-L})$ . Similarly, in territories where

more than one focal propagule is present, the effective distribution is defined by

$$\hat{q}(\mathbf{x}) = \sum_{X=2}^{\infty} P(X|X \ge 2) p(\mathbf{x}|x_i \ge 2, X).$$
(20)

#### 559 Calculating the effective means

Here we calculate the effective means, starting with the  $\Delta_r n_i$  component. We have

$$\langle x_j \rangle_{\tilde{q}} = \sum_{\mathbf{x}_i} \tilde{q}(\mathbf{x}_i) x_j$$

$$= \frac{1}{1 - (1 + L)e^{-L}} \sum_{X=2}^{\infty} P(X) \sum_{\mathbf{x}_i} p(\mathbf{x}_i | X_i = X - 1) x_j. \tag{21}$$

The inner sum over  $\mathbf{x}_i$  is the mean number of propagules of a given nonfocal type j that will be found in a territory which received X-1 nonfocal propagules in total, which is equal to  $\frac{l_j}{L-l_i}(X-1)$ . Thus,

$$\langle x_j \rangle_{\tilde{q}} = \frac{l_j}{1 - (1 + L)e^{-L}} \frac{1}{L - l_i} \sum_{X=2}^{\infty} P(X)(X - 1)$$

$$= \frac{l_j}{1 - (1 + L)e^{-L}} \frac{L - 1 + e^{-L}}{L - l_i},$$
(22)

where the last line follows from  $\sum_{X=2}^{\infty} P(X)(X-1) = \sum_{X=1}^{\infty} P(X)(X-1) = \sum_{X=1}^{\infty} P(X)X - \sum_{X=1}^{\infty} P(X)$ . Substituting Eqs. (17) and (22) into Eq. (15), we obtain

$$\Delta_r n_i \approx m_i R_i \frac{c_i}{\bar{c}},\tag{23}$$

where  $R_i$  is defined in Eq. (6).

Turning now to the  $\Delta_a n_i$  component, the mean focal abundance is

$$\langle x_i \rangle_{\hat{q}} = \sum_{\mathbf{x}} \hat{q}(\mathbf{x}) x_i$$

$$= \sum_{x_i} p(x_i | x_i \ge 2) x_i$$

$$= \frac{1}{1 - (1 + l_i)e^{-l_i}} \sum_{x_i \ge 2} p(x_i) x_i$$

$$= l_i \frac{1 - e^{-l_i}}{1 - (1 + l_i)e^{-l_i}}.$$
(24)

For nonfocal types  $j \neq i$ , we have

$$\langle x_{j} \rangle_{\hat{q}} = \sum_{X=2}^{\infty} P(X|X \ge 2) \sum_{\mathbf{x}} p(\mathbf{x}|x_{i} \ge 2, X) x_{j}$$

$$= \sum_{X=2}^{\infty} P(X|X \ge 2) \sum_{x_{i}} p(x_{i}|x_{i} \ge 2, X) \sum_{\mathbf{x}_{i}} p(\mathbf{x}_{i}|X_{i} = X - x_{i}) x_{j}$$

$$= \sum_{X=2}^{\infty} P(X|X \ge 2) \sum_{x_{i}} p(x_{i}|x_{i} \ge 2, X) \frac{l_{j}(X - x_{i})}{L - l_{i}}$$

$$= \frac{l_{j}}{L - l_{i}} \left[ \sum_{X=2}^{\infty} P(X|X \ge 2) X - \sum_{x_{i}} p(x_{i}|x_{i} \ge 2) x_{i} \right]$$

$$= \frac{l_{j}}{L - l_{i}} \left( L \frac{1 - e^{-L}}{1 - (1 + L)e^{-L}} - l_{i} \frac{1 - e^{-l_{i}}}{1 - (1 + l_{i})e^{-l_{i}}} \right). \tag{25}$$

In going from line 2 to 3, we used the same logic used to evaluate the inner sum in Eq. (21), and in going from 3 to 4 we have separately evaluated the contributions from the X and  $x_i$ terms in the numerator. Combining these results with Eqs. (16) and (18), we obtain

$$\Delta_a n_i = m_i A_i \frac{c_i}{\overline{c}},\tag{26}$$

where  $A_i$  is defined in Eq. (6).

#### 567 Approximation limits

Eq. (17) and (18) must not only be consistent with each other, they must also be individually good approximations. Here we evaluate these approximations.

The fundamental requirement for making the replacement in Eqs. (17) and (18) is that we can ignore the fluctuations in the  $x_i$  and hence replace them with a constant effective mean value. Mathematically, we require that the standard deviations  $\sigma_{\tilde{q}}(\sum_{j\neq i}c_jx_j)$  and  $\sigma_{\tilde{q}}(\sum_{j}c_jx_j)$  must be sufficiently small compared to the corresponding means  $\langle \sum_{j\neq i}c_jx_j\rangle_{\tilde{q}}$  and  $\langle \sum_{j}c_jx_j\rangle_{\tilde{q}}$  in Eqs. (17) and (18) respectively.

To evaluate these standard deviations, we will work with  $\tilde{p}$  and  $\hat{p}$  distributions instead of  $\tilde{q}$  and  $\hat{q}$ . This is mathematically much simpler because the  $x_i$  are independent under  $\tilde{p}$  and  $\hat{p}$ , and is justified by the fact that  $\tilde{p}$  and  $\hat{p}$  are closely related to  $\tilde{q}$  and  $\hat{q}$  respectively, and so we expect the relevant means and standard deviations will be similar.

Starting with Eq. (17), we have  $\langle x_j \rangle_{\tilde{p}} = l_j/C$ , where  $C = 1 - e^{-(L-l_i)}$ , and the corresponding variances and covariances are given by

$$\sigma_{\tilde{p}}^{2}(x_{j}) = \langle x_{j}^{2} \rangle_{\tilde{p}} - \langle x_{j} \rangle_{\tilde{p}}^{2}$$

$$= \frac{l_{j}^{2} + l_{j}}{C} - \frac{l_{j}^{2}}{C^{2}}$$

$$= \left(1 - \frac{1}{C}\right) \frac{l_{j}^{2}}{C} + \frac{l_{j}}{C}, \tag{27}$$

and

$$\sigma_{\tilde{p}}(x_{j}, x_{k}) = \langle x_{j} x_{k} \rangle_{\tilde{p}} - \langle x_{j} \rangle_{\tilde{p}} \langle x_{k} \rangle_{\tilde{p}}$$

$$= \frac{1}{C} \langle x_{j} x_{k} \rangle_{p} - \frac{l_{j} l_{k}}{C^{2}}$$

$$= \left(1 - \frac{1}{C}\right) \frac{l_{j} l_{k}}{C} \qquad j \neq k. \tag{28}$$

Note that 1-1/C is negative because C<1. Decomposing the variance in  $\sum_{j\neq i}c_jx_j$ ,

$$\sigma_{\tilde{p}}^2(\sum_{j\neq i} c_j x_j) = \sum_{j\neq i} \left[ c_j^2 \sigma_{\tilde{p}}^2(x_j) + 2 \sum_{k>j, k\neq i} c_j c_k \sigma_{\tilde{p}}(x_j, x_k) \right], \tag{29}$$

we obtain

$$\frac{\sigma(\sum_{j\neq i} c_j x_j)}{\langle \sum_{j\neq i} c_j x_j \rangle} = C^{1/2} \frac{\left(\sum_{j\neq i} c_j^2 l_j + (1 - \frac{1}{C}) \left(\sum_{j\neq i} c_j l_j\right)^2\right)^{1/2}}{\sum_{j\neq i} c_j l_j}.$$
 (30)

Eq. (30) reveals two key points. First, when the  $c_j$  have similar magnitudes (their ratios 581 are of order one), Eq. (17) is an excellent approximation. In this case, the right hand side of 582 Eq. (30) is approximately equal to  $C^{1/2} \left( \frac{1}{L-l_i} + 1 - \frac{1}{C} \right)^{1/2}$ , which is small for both low and 583 high nonfocal densities. The worst case scenario occurs when  $L - l_i$  is of order one, and it 584 can be directly verified that Eq. (17) is then still a good approximation (see Fig. 7). Second, 585 if some of the  $c_j$  are much larger than the others, the relative fluctuations in  $\sum_{j\neq i} c_j x_j$  can 586 be large. Specifically, in the presence of a rare, strong competitor  $(c_j l_j \gg c_{j'} l_{j'})$  for all other 587 nonfocal types j', and  $l_j \ll 1$ ), then the right hand side of Eq. (30) can be large and we cannot make the replacement Eq. (17). Fig. 7 shows the breakdown of the effective mean approximation when the are large differences in c.

Turning now to Eq. (18), all covariances between nonfocal types are now zero, so that  $\sigma_{\hat{p}}^2(\sum c_j x_j) = \sum c_j^2 \sigma_{\hat{p}}^2(x_j), \text{ where } \sigma_{\hat{p}}^2(x_j) = l_j \text{ for } j \neq i. \text{ Here}$ 

$$\sigma_{\hat{p}}^{2}(x_{i}) = \frac{l_{i}}{D} \left( l_{i} + 1 - e^{-l_{i}} - \frac{l_{i}}{D} \left( 1 - e^{-l_{i}} \right)^{2} \right), \tag{31}$$

where  $D = 1 - (1 + l_i)e^{-l_i}$ , and

$$\frac{\sigma_{\hat{p}}(\sum c_j x_j)}{\langle \sum c_j x_j \rangle} = \frac{\left(\sum_{j \neq i} c_j^2 l_j + c_i^2 \sigma_{\hat{p}}^2(x_i)\right)^{1/2}}{\sum_{j \neq i} c_j l_j + c_i l_i (1 - e^{-l_i})/D}.$$
(32)




Figure 7: Comparison of our approximation with simulations and the naive  $\tilde{p},\hat{p}$  approximation as a function of the relative c-advantage between two types. Our approximation breaks down in the presence of large relative c-advantages. The inset shows the pathology of the  $\tilde{p},\hat{p}$  approximation — in the neutral case of c=1 one type grows faster than the other.

Similarly to Eq. (30), the right hand side of Eq. (32) is small for both low and high nonfocal densities. Again, the worst case scenario occurs when  $l_i$  and  $L - l_i$  are of order 1, but Eq. (18) is still a good approximation this case. Again, the approximation breaks down in the presence of a rare, strong competitor (Fig. 7).

# Appendix C: Total density in the Lotka-Volterra competition model

Here we show that under the Lotka-Volterra model of competition, total density N does not in general remain constant over a selective sweep in a crowded population even if the types have the same saturation density (for a related discussion on the density- and frequencydependence of selection in the Lotka-Volterra model, see (Smouse, 1976; Mallet, 2012)).

We assume equal effects of crowding within types  $\alpha_{11} = \alpha_{22} = \alpha_{\text{intra}}$  and  $N = 1/\alpha_{\text{intra}}$  and check whether it is then possible for  $\frac{dN}{dt}$  to be zero in the sweep  $(n_1, n_2 \neq 0)$ . Substituting these conditions into Eq. (9), we obtain

$$\frac{dn_1}{dt} = r_1(\alpha_{11} - \alpha_{12})n_1n_2 
\frac{dn_2}{dt} = r_2(\alpha_{22} - \alpha_{21})n_1n_2$$
(33)

Adding these together,  $\frac{dN}{dt}$  can only be zero if

$$r_1(\alpha_{\text{intra}} - \alpha_{12}) + r_2(\alpha_{\text{intra}} - \alpha_{21}) = 0.$$
(34)

To get some intuition for Eq. (34), suppose that a mutant arises with improved competitive ability but identical intrinsic growth rate and saturation density  $(r_1 = r_2 \text{ and } \alpha_{11} = \alpha_{22})$ . This could represent a mutation to an interference competition trait, for example (Gill,  $^{608}$  1974). Then, according the above condition, for N to remain constant over the sweep, the  $^{609}$  mutant must find the wildtype more tolerable than itself by exactly the same amount that  $^{610}$  the wildtype finds the mutant less tolerable than itself.

Even if we persuaded ourselves that this balance of inter-type interactions is plausible in some circumstances, when multiple types are present the requirement for constant N becomes

$$\sum_{ij} r_i (\alpha_{\text{intra}} - \alpha_{ij}) p_i p_j = 0, \tag{35}$$

which depends on frequency and thus cannot be satisfied in general for constant inter-type coefficients  $\alpha_{ij}$ . We conclude that selection in the Lotka-Volterra competition model will generally involve non-constant N.

## Appendix D: Density-dependence of b-selection

In section "Density-regulating traits and the threat of strong selection" we argued that the density-dependent factor  $f(\bar{b}, N)$  is unchanged at the beginning and end points of an equilibrium-to-equilibrium b. Here we estimate the magnitude of the deviation in  $f(\bar{b}, N)$ during the sweep.

For simplicity, we introduce the notation D = N/T and assume that D is small. We can thus make the approximation  $1 - e^{-\bar{b}D} \approx \bar{b}D$  and  $f(\bar{b}, N) \approx \bar{b}(1 - D)$ . We expect this to be a conservative approximate based on the worst case scenario, because N is most sensitive to an increase in b in this low-density linear regime. We first calculate the value of  $f(\bar{b}, N)$  at the halfway point in a sweep, where the halfway point is estimated with simple linear averages for b and b. The sweep is driven by a b variant with  $b_j = b_i(1 + \epsilon)$ , and we denote the corresponding initial and final densities by b and b respectively, where we

have  $d_i = b_i(1 - D_i) = b_j(1 - D_j)$ . We obtain

$$f_{\text{half}} = f(\frac{b_i + b_j}{2}, \frac{N_i + N_j}{2}) = \frac{b_i + b_j}{2} \left( 1 - \frac{D_i + D_j}{2} \right)$$

$$= \frac{1}{4} (b_i + b_j) (2 - D_i - D_j)$$

$$= \frac{1}{4} (2d_i + b_i (1 - D_j) + b_j (1 - N_i)). \tag{36}$$

Dividing by  $d_i$ , the proportional deviation in f(N) at the midpoint of the sweep is

$$\frac{f_{\text{half}}}{d_i} = \frac{1}{4} \left( 2 + \frac{b_i}{b_j} + \frac{b_j}{b_i} \right) 
= \frac{1}{4} \left( 2 + \frac{1}{1+\epsilon} + 1 + \epsilon \right) 
= 1 + \frac{1}{4} (\epsilon^2 - \epsilon^3 + \dots),$$
(37)

where we have used the Taylor expansion  $\frac{1}{1+\epsilon} = 1 - \epsilon + \epsilon^2 - \epsilon^3 + \dots$ 

By contrast, for a  $\delta$  sweep in Eq. (10), the density-dependent term N increases by a factor of  $\frac{1}{1-\epsilon} = 1 + \epsilon + \epsilon^2 + \ldots$  Thus, the deviations in f(N) are an order of magnitude smaller than those shown in Fig. (5), and even proportional changes of order  $\epsilon = 0.1$  will cause a negligible deviation from the canonical selection equation.