Jason D. Hartline

Computer Science
Northwestern University
2233 Tech Drive
Evanston, IL 60208.

Research Interests

Economics. Mechanism design, auction theory, microeconomics, economic theory, econometrics.

Computer Science. Algorithmic mechanism design, algorithmic game theory, machine learning theory, algorithms, data science.

Education

Ph.D. in Computer Science. University of Washington, Seattle, WA. Summer 2003 Thesis: Optimization in the Private Value Model: Competitive Analysis Applied to Auction Design Advisor: Anna Karlin.

M.S. in Computer Science. University of Washington, Seattle, WA. Spring 2000

B.S. in Computer Science. Cornell University, Ithaca, NY.

Spring 1997

B.S. in Electrical Engineering. Cornell University, Ithaca, NY.

Spring 1997

Current Appointment

Associate Professor. Northwestern U., Evanston, IL. Fall 2012 – present Electrical Engineering and Computer Science Department, McCormick School of Engineering; Managerial Economics and Decision Sciences Department, Kellogg School of Management (courtesy); and Department of Economics, Wienberg School of Arts and Sciences (courtesy).

Previous Appointments

Visiting Researcher. Microsoft Research, Cambridge, MA.

Spring 2015

Visiting Professor. Harvard U., Cambridge, MA.

2014

Computer Science and Economics departments.

Assistant Professor. Northwestern U., Evanston, IL.

2008 - 2012

Electrical Engineering and Computer Science Department, McCormick School of Engineering and Managerial Economics and Decision Sciences Department, Kellogg School of Management (courtesy).

Previous Appointments (cont.)

Researcher. Microsoft Research, Mountain View, CA.

Research Area: Algorithmic Mechanism Design, Auction Theory, Pricing Algorithms, Auctions for Sponsored Search.

Post-doctoral Research Fellow. ALADDIN, Carnegie Mellon U., Pittsburgh, PA. Fall 2003 Research Area: Mechanism Design.

Supervisor: Avrim Blum.

Mentoring

Ph.D. Advisees.

Yiding Feng, Aleck Johnsen, and Michalis Mamakos.

Former Students. since 2009
Bach Ha (Microsoft), Nima Haghpanah (Penn State, Asst. Prof.), Darrell Hoy (Tremmor Technolo-

gies), and Samuel Taggart (Oberlin, Asst. Prof.)

Post-doctoral Fellows. since 2006

Liad BLumrosen (Hebrew U.) and Azarakhsh Malekian (Toronto, Asst. Prof.)

Former Summer Students.

since 2004

Gagan Aggarwal, Abraham Flaxman, Ning Chen, Mukund Sundararajan, Benjamin Prosnitz, Matthew Burgess, Saeed Alaei, Hu Fu, and Shweta Jain.

Service

Program Committee. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce. 2005, 2006, 2008-present

Coorganizer. Special Quarter on Online Markets and Data Science. Spring 2018 with Jacob Abernethy, Constantinos Daskalakis, and Denis Nekipelov.

Special Initiatives Chair. ACM Special Interest Group on E-commerce. 2014–2015 on the Academic Job Market.

Guest Editor. Games and Economic Behavior. 2011–2014 special issues for papers from STOC, FOCS, and SODA conferences.

Advisory Editor. Games and Economic Behavior. 2012–2017

Associate Editor. Operations Research Letters. 2012–2017

Co-organizer. New York Computer science and Economics (NYCE) Day. 2013

Co-organizer. FOCS Workshop on Bayesian Mechanism Design. 2012

Program Committee. Symposium on Theory of Computation. 2012

Program Committee. ACM Symposium on Theory of Computating. 2012

Co-organizer. Workshop on Bayesian Mechanism Design. 2011

Service (cont.)

Co-organizer. Greece Economic and Algorithmic Theory Week.	2011	
Co-organizer. Bertinoro Workshop on Algorithmic Game Theory.	2006, 2010	
Tutorials Chair. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce.	2010	
Local Arrangements. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce.	2008	
Organizer. Midwest Theory Day.	2008	
Program Committee. ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms.	2007	
Co-organizer. Bay Algorithmic Game Theory Symposium (biannual).	2006-2007	
Co-organizer. Workshop on Sponsored Search Auctions.	2006	
Co-organizer. Alternative Solution Concepts in Mechanism Design.	2006	
Co-organizer. ALADDIN Workshop on Auction Theory & Practice.	2003	
Awards, Fellowships, and Grants		
NSF Collaborative Research. Peer Grading with Douglas Downey and Eleanor O'Rourke.	2017	
NSF Award. Non-revelation Mechanism Design	2016	
Teacher of the Year. EECS Dept., Northwestern U.	2010-2011	
NSF Collaborative Research. Towards Realistic Mechanisms: statistics, inference, and approximation in simple Bayes-Nash implementation 2011 with Shuchi Chawla and Denis Nekipelov.		
NSF CAREER Award. Mechanism Design.	2009	
NSF Collaborative Research. Approximation in Mechanism Design. with Shuchi Chawla.	2008	
ALADDIN Post-doctoral Research Fellowship. Carnegie Mellon University.	2003	
Math Sciences Post-doctoral Research Fellowship. National Science Foundation Declined.	n. 2003	
Microsoft Endowed Fellowship. Microsoft Corp.	2001	
Bob Bandes Teaching Award, Honorable Mention. CS Dept., U. of Washington	n. 1998	
Small Business Innovative Research Grant. Department of Education.	1997	

Patents

Online Pricing and Buyback. U.S. Patent #8260724

2012

with Moshe Babaioff and Robert Kleinberg.

Systems and Methods for Pricing and Selling Digital Goods. U.S. Patent #6985885 2006 with Andrew Goldberg and Andrew Wright.

Book Chapters

Profit Maximizing Mechanism Design.

Algorithmic Game Theory 2007

with Anna Karlin; eds. Noam Nisan, Tim Roughgarden, Eva Tardos, and Vijay Vazirani.

Popular Press

Badminton and the Science of Rule Making.

Huffington Post 2012

with Robert Kleinberg.

Working Papers

Mechanism Redesign.

2017

with Shuchi Chawla and Denis Nekipelov.

Multi-dimensional Virtual Values and Second-degree Price Discrimination. 2014-2016 with Nima Haghpanah.

Non-revelation Mechanism Design.

2016

with Samuel Taggart.

Journal Papers

Optimal auctions vs. Anonymous Pricing.

 GEB^{1} 2018

with Saeed Alaei, Rad Niazadeh, Manolis Pountourakis, and Yang Yuan.

Efficient Computation of Optimal Auctions via Reduced Forms.

 MOR^{2} 2018

with Saeed Alaei, Hu Fu, Nima Haghpanah, and Azarakhsh Malekian.

Non-optimal Mechanism Design.

 AER^3 2015

with Brendan Lucier.

Bayesian Incentive Compatibility and Matchings.

GEB 2015

with Robert Kleinberg and Azarakhsh Malekian. Special Issue.

¹Games and Economic Behavior.

²Mathematics of Operations Research.

³American Economic Review.

Journal Papers (cont.)

Optimal Crowdsourcing Contests.

GEB 2015

with Shuchi Chawla and Balu Sivan. Special Issue.

Envy freedom and prior-free mechanism design. Journal of Economic Theory 2015 with Nikhil Devanur and Qiqi Yan. Special issue.

Mechanism Design via Consensus Estimates, Cross Checking, and Profit Extraction. with Bach Ha. Special issue.

Transactions on Economics and Computation 2013

Bayesian Mechanism Design.

 $FTTCS^{4}$ 2012

Approximation in Mechanism Design.

AER 2012

Derandomization of Auctions.

GEB 2010

with Gagan Aggarwal, Amos Fiat, Andrew Goldberg, Nicole Immorlica, and Madhu Sudan.

Algorithms for Data Migration. with Eric Anderson, Joseph Hall, M. Hobbes, Anna Karlin, Jared Saia, Ram Swaminathan, and John Wilkes.

Algorithmica 2010

Reducing Mechanism Design to Algorithm Design via Machine Learning. JCSS⁵ 2008 with Maria-Florina Balcan, Avrim Blum, and Yishay Mansour.

Competitive Auctions.

GEB 2006

with Andrew Goldberg, Anna Karlin, Mike Saks, and Andrew Wright. Special issue.

Characterizing History Independent Data Structures.

Algorithmica 2005

with Edwin Hong, Alexander Mohr, William Pentney, and Emily Rocke. Special issue.

Refereed Conference Papers

An End-to-end Argument in Mechanism Design (Prior-independent Auctions for Budgeted Agents). with Yiding Feng.

FOCS⁶ 2018

Fast Core Pricing for Rich Advertising Auctions.

 $EC^7 \ 2018$

with Nicole Immorlica, Mohammad Reza Khani, Brendan Lucier, and Rad Niazadeh.

Bernoulli Factories and Black-box Reductions in Mechanism Design.

 $STOC^{8}$ 2017

with Shaddin Dughmi, Robert Kleinberg, and Rad Niazadeh.

Bayeesian Budget Feasibility with Posted Pricing.

WWW 2016

with Eric Balkanski.

A/B Testing of Auctions.

EC 2016

with Shuchi Chawla and Denis Nekipelov.

⁴Foundations and Trends in Theoretical Computer Science.

⁵Journal of Computer and System Sciences.

⁶IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science.

⁷ACM Conference on Economics and Computation.

⁸ACM Symposium on Theory of Computating.

Refereed Conference Papers (cont.)

No-regret Learning in Bayesian Games. with Vasilis Syrgkanis and Eva Tardos.	NIPS ⁹ 2015	
Reverse Mechanism Design. with Nima Haghpanah.	EC 2015	
Optimal auctions vs. Anonymous Pricing. with Saeed Alaei, Rad Niazadeh, Manolis Pountourakis, and Yang Yuan.	FOCS 2015	
Mechanism Design for Data Science. with Shuchi Chawla and Denis Nekipelov.	EC 2014	
Price of Anarchy for Auction Revenue. with Darrell Hoy and Samuel Taggart.	EC 2014	
Optimal Auctions for Correlated Buyers with Sampling. with Hu Fu, Nima Haghpanah, and Robert Kleinberg.	EC 2014	
The Simple Economics of Approximately Optimal Auctions. with Saeed Alaei, Hu Fu, and Nima Haghpanah.	FOCS 2013	
Auctions with Unique Equilibria. with Shuchi Chawla.	EC 2013	
Prior-independent Auctions for Risk-averse Agents. with Hu Fu and Darrell Hoy.	EC 2013	
Prior-free Auctions for Budgeted Agents. with Nikhil Devanur and Bach Ha.	EC 2013	
Prior-independent Mechanisms for Scheduling. with Shuchi Chawla, David Malec, and Balu Sivan.	STOC 2013	
Mechanism Design via Multi- to Single-agent Reduction. with Saeed Alaei, Hu Fu, Nima Haghpanah, and Azarakhsh Malekian.	EC 2012	
Optimal Crowdsourcing Contests. with Shuchi Chawla and Balu Sivan. Invited to GEB special issue.	$SODA^{10}$ 2012	
Mechanism Design via Consensus Estimates, and Cross Checking, and Profit Extraction. with Bach Ha. Invited to TEAC special issue. SODA 2012		
Truth, Envy, and Profit. with Qiqi Yan. Invited to JET special issue.	EC 2011	
Bayesian Incentive Compatibility and Matchings.	SODA 2011	

⁹Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems. ¹⁰ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms.

with Robert Kleinberg and Azarakhsh Malekian. Invited to GEB special issue.

Refereed Conference Papers (cont.)

Bayesian Algorithmic Mechanism Design.

STOC 2010

with Brendan Lucier.

Sequential Posted Pricing and Multi-parameter Mechanism Design.

STOC 2010

with Shuchi Chawla, David Malec, and Balasubramanian Sivan.

Simple versus Optimal Mechanisms.

EC 2009

with Tim Roughgarden.

Limited and Online Supply and the Bayesian Foundations of Prior-free Mechanism Design. with Nikhil Devanur.

EC 2009

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Selling Ad Campaigns: Online Algorithms with Cancellations.

 $EC \ 2009$

with Moshe Babaioff and Robert Kleinberg.

Mechanism Design and Money Burning.

STOC 2008

with Tim Roughgarden.

Optimal Marketing Strategies over Social Networks.

WWW 2008

with Vahab Mirrokni and Mukund Sundararajan.

Auctions for Structured Procurement.

SODA 2008

with Matthew Cary, Abraham Flaxman, and Anna Karlin.

Algorithmic Pricing via Virtual Valuations.

EC 2007

with Shuchi Chawla and Robert Kleinberg.

Knapsack Auctions.

SODA 2006

with Gagan Aggarwal.

Bayesian Optimal No-deficit Mechanism Design.

 $WINE^{11}$ 2006

with Shuchi Chawla, R. Ravi, and Uday Rajan.

Mechanism Design via Machine Learning.

FOCS 2005

with Maria-Florina Balcan, Avrim Blum, and Yishay Mansour.

Derandomization of Auctions.

STOC 2005

with Gagan Aggarwal, Amos Fiat, Andrew Goldberg, Nicole Immorlica, and Madhu Sudan.

On Profit-Maximizing Envy-Free Pricing.

SODA 2005

with Venkat Guruswami, Anna Karlin, David Kempe, Claire Kenyon, and Frank McSherry.

Collusion-Resistant Mechanisms for Single Parameter Agents.

SODA 2005

with Andrew Goldberg.

Near-Optimal Online Auctions.

SODA 2005

with Avrim Blum.

 $^{^{11} \}mathrm{International}$ Workshop on Internet and Network Economics.

Refereed Conference Papers (cont.)

From Optimal Limited to Unlimited Supply Auctions. with Robert McGrew.	EC 2005	
On the Competitive Ratio of the Random Sampling Auction. with Uriel Feige, Abraham Flaxman, and Robert Kleinberg.	WINE 2005	
Near-Optimal Pricing in Near-Linear Time. with Vladlen Koltun.	$WADS^{12}$ 2005	
A Lower Bound on the Competitive Ratio of Truthful Auctions. with Andrew Goldberg, Anna Karlin, and Mike Saks.	$STACS^{13}$ 2004	
Competitiveness via Consensus. with Andrew Goldberg.	SODA 2003	
Envy-Free Auctions for Digital Goods. with Andrew Goldberg.	EC 2003	
Truthful and Competitive Double Auctions. with Kaustubh Deshmukh, Andrew Goldberg, and Anna Karlin.	ESA^{14} 2002	
Competitive Generalized Auctions. with Amos Fiat, Andrew Goldberg, and Anna Karlin.	STOC 2002	
Characterizing History Independent Data Structures. with Edwin Hong, Alexander Mohr, William Pentney, and Emily Rocke.	$ISAAC^{15}$ 2002	
Competitive Auctions and Digital Goods. with Andrew Goldberg and Andrew Wright.	SODA 2001	
Competitive Auctions for Multiple Digital Goods. with Andrew Goldberg.	ESA 2001	
On Algorithms for Efficient Data Migration. with Joe Hall, Anna Karlin, Jared Saia, and John Wilkes.	SODA 2001	
An Experimental Study of Data Migration Algorithms. WAE^{16} 2001 with E. Anderson, J. Hall, M. Hobbes, A. Karlin, J. Saia, R. Swaminathan, and J. Wilkes.		

¹²Workshop on Algorithms and Data Structures. ¹³Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science. ¹⁴European Symposium on Algorithms.

¹⁵International Symposium on Algorithms and Computation. ¹⁶Workshop on Algorithm Engineering.