



Data Security: Key Learning

Dr. Dan Massey



Returning to Our Motivating Problems:

Confidentiality: how could we encrypt a message? (email, web/http, sms, etc)

Encrypt Message with receiver's public key

Integrity: how could we authenticate a message?

Sign message with sender's private key

(availability – not primary motivation now,
provided the approach is feasible)

Establishing a Symmetric Key

- Alice and Bob want to establish a symmetric key
 - AES (symmetric) is faster and more efficient than RSA (asymmetric)
- Previously relied on a trusted third party Cathy
 - See previous slides on learning symmetric keys and replay attacks!
- New approach is to leverage asymmetric keys
 - Alice has a public/private key pair.
 - Bob has a public/private key pair.
- Can we use the public/private keys to establish a symmetric key?

Recall: Needham-Schroeder

Alice || Bob || r_1

Alice

Cathy

Alice ← $\{ \text{Alice} || \text{Bob} || r_1 || k_s || \{ \text{Alice} || k_s \} k_B \} k_A$ Cathy

Alice → $\{ \text{Alice} || k_s \} k_B$ Bob

Alice ← $\{ r_2 \} k_s$ Bob

Alice → $\{ r_2 - 1 \} k_s$ Bob

Worked entirely with symmetric keys....

K_a , K_b , and K_s are all symmetric keys (e.g. AES keys)

Key Exchange Using Public Keys


- Public Key Definitions and Assumptions
 - e_A, e_B Alice and Bob's public keys known to all
 - d_A, d_B Alice and Bob's private keys known only to owner
- Simple protocol
 - Alice generates a new symmetric session key
 - k_s is desired session key

Alice $\xrightarrow{\{k_s\} e_B}$ Bob


Limitation and Solution

- Vulnerable to forgery
 - Because e_B known to anyone, Bob has no assurance that Alice sent message
- Simple fix uses Alice's private key
 - k_s is desired session key

Alice $\xrightarrow{\{\{k_s\} d_A\} e_B}$ Bob



(a) Creation of a digital envelope



(b) Opening a digital envelope

Figure 2.9 Digital Envelopes


Learning Public Keys

- How Does Alice Learn Bob's Public Key?
 - Previous slide only works if Alice knows the correct e_B
- Much Easier Than Agreeing on a Secret Key
 - For the secret key, adversary must not observe the key
 - For the public key, everyone can observe the key.
- Naïve First Attempt
 - Alice asks trusted third party Cathy for Bob's public key
 - No need to encrypt the message
 - Everyone can (and should) learn Bob's public key

Man In The Middle Attack



Eve intercepts request



Certificate Authorities

- How Does Alice Learn Bob's Public Key?
 - Assume already learned public key for trusted third party Cathy.
- Bob Asks Cathy to Sign His Public Key
 - Bob securely provides his public key to Cathy
 - Cathy signs Bob's public key with Cathy's private key
- Alice Uses Cathy to Verify Bob's Public Key
 - Alice has securely learned Cathy's public key
 - Bob's sends Alice his public key and the signature from Cathy
 - Using Cathy's public key, Alice can verify Bob's public key
- Cathy is a Certificate Authority!

Learning the Public Key Using a CA



Processing Actions at Alice:

Alice knows e_{Cathy} (Cathy's public key) via external means

Using e_{Cathy} (Cathy's public key), Alice can verify e_b (Bob's public key) because it is signed by d_{Cathy} (Cathy's private key)

This assumes

**Alice has learned the correct public key for Cathy
and Cathy signed the correct public key for Bob**




Figure 2.8 Public-Key Certificate Use

Heilmeier Questions

- What are you trying to do? Articulate your objectives using absolutely no jargon.
- How is it done today, and what are the limits of current practice?
- What is new in your approach and why do you think it will be successful?
- Who cares? If you succeed, what difference will it make?
- What are the risks?
- How much will it cost?
- How long will it take?
- What are the mid-term and final “exams” to check for success?