Firm Heterogeneity in Production-Based Asset Pricing: The Role of Habit Sensitivity and Lumpy Investment


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Evidence 1: Risky and Risk-Free Assets


Figure 1: Risky and Risk-Free Asset



- $ightharpoonup r^e r^f$ is High and Volatile
- r is Low and Smooth
- ▶ 1st Challenge: Market Excess Return is High & Volatile but Risk-Free Rate is Low & Smooth

Evidence 2: Asset Prices & Real Economy


Figure 2: Macro-Asset Pricing Dynamics



- Market Excess Return is High but Consumption is Smooth ⇒ 2nd Challenge
- \blacktriangleright Market Excess Return is High and Investment Dynamics are Volatile \Rightarrow 3rd Challenge

Evidence 3: Size Premiums

Figure 3: Size Premiums



- ▶ Small Firms earn Higher Expected Return than Big Firms ⇒ Size Premiums
- Size Premiums are no Small (0.66% Quarterly or 2.5%-7% Annually) and Volatile (8.69% Quarterly or 17-20%Annually) ⇒ 4th Challenge

Motivation: Two Aspects of Asset Pricing Puzzles

Challenges: The G.E. Model Has Difficulty in.....

- Matching Equity Risk Premiums and Risk-Free Rate jointly
 - Inter-temporal Effects on Risk-Free Rate Dominates...
- Matching Macro Quantities and Equity Risk Premiums jointly
 - ▶ Consumption Smoothing ⇒ Stochastic Discount Factor Less Volatile ⇒ Underestimate 1st/2nd-Order Moments of Risk Premiums
 - ▶ Adjustment Costs \Rightarrow Risk Premiums \uparrow and Investment Volatility \downarrow
- Replicating the Time-Series and Cross-Sectional Stock Return jointly
 - ► Lumpy Investment Model + Decreasing Return to Scale
 - ⇒ High Prod. Firms have High Market-to-Book Ratio but More Risky
 - ⇒ Value Premiums might be Negative (Favilukis & Lin 2010WP)

Inconsistency:

- Most Production-Based Models Rely on Convex Costs ⇒ Empirically Rejected ⇒ Micro-Level Investment is Lumpy
- Calibration with Unreasonable Parameters.

What I Did: Resolve Four Challenges in Both Aspects

Build a G.E. Heterogeneous Firm Macro Model with Following Ingredients:

- Campbell & Cochrane (1999JPE)'s Habit + GHH Structure
- Khan & Thomas (2008Ecta)'s Fixed Capital Adjustment Costs
- New Habit Sensitivity Function: $\lambda^S = \frac{1}{\overline{S}} 1$ vs. $\lambda^S = \frac{1}{\log S} 1$

Results: The Model Replicates

Table 1: Compare to Previous Literature

Facts	Equity +Premium + Volatility	Business Cycle	Micro Lumpy Investment	Cross-Sectional Stock Return
Cooper et al. (2006JF)	√	×		
Herskovic (2020WP)	$\sqrt{}$	×	×	\checkmark
Favilukis&Lin (2015RFS)	$\sqrt{}$	\checkmark	×	×
Chen (2017RFS,2018RAPS)	$\sqrt{}$	$\sqrt{}$	×	×
Favilukis&Lin (2013JME)	×	$\sqrt{}$	\checkmark	×
Winberry(2020AER)	×	$\sqrt{}$	$\sqrt{}$	×
This Paper	\checkmark	, V	$\sqrt{}$	\checkmark

Micro Foundation:

Fixed Capital Adjustment Costs + Reasonable Calibrated Values



Literature Review

Asset Pricing with Habits:

Boldrin et al. (1999AER), Jermann (1998JME); Campbell & Cochrane (1999JPE); Chen (2017RFS, RAPS), Luo (2019WP)

Macro Implications of Non-Convex Costs:

Khan & Thomas (2008Ecta), House (2014JME), Clementi et al. (2017WP), Mongey Williams (2017WP), Winberry (2020AER), Koby & Wolf (2020WP)

Asset Pricing with Non-Convex Costs:

Kogan (2004JFE), Carlson et al. (2004JF), Zhang (2005JF); Cooper(2006JF), Herskovic et al. (2020WP); Favilukis & Lin (2010WP)

► G.E. Model with Heterogeneous Firms:

Luo (2019WP); Ai et al. (2013RFS), Favilukis & Lin (2010WP, 2015RFS), Chen (2018RAPS); Gomes et al. (2003JPE), Garleanu et al. (2012JF)

Outline

- Model Set Up
 - Physical Environment, Firm, and Households Problem
 - ► Equilibrium Conditions and Numerical Algorithm
- Solution to Challenges
- Benchmark Calibration: Target Moments
- Model Evaluation
 - ► Time-Series Implications
 - Cross-Sectional Implications
- Conclusion
- Appendix

Model Set Up

Environment: Discrete Time and Infinite Horizons

Household:

- Consumes Consumption Good C_t
- Supplies Labor N_t at Competitive Wage W_t
- Receives Aggregate Dividends Π_t from Firms

Firms: Continuum of Firms, Each with Idiosyncratic State $\mu_{i,t} = \mu(k_{i,t}, z_{i,t}, \xi_{i,t})$

- ▶ Hire Labour $n_{i,t}$ at Competitive Wage W_t ,
- Produce Goods with Labour n_{i,t} and Capital Stock k_{i,t}
 - Production Function with Decreasing Returns to Scale $y_{i,t} = e^{z_{i,t}} e^{x_t} k_{i,t}^{\theta} n_{i,t}^{\nu}$
- Choose whether to Adjust Capital or not
 - ▶ if Adjust \Rightarrow Pay $\xi_{i,t}$ and Choose next Period's Capital Stock $k_{i,t+1}$
- Pay Out Firm-Level Dividends π_t

Shock:

- Aggregate Shock: $x_{t+1} = \log X_{t+1} = \rho^X \log X_t + \varepsilon^X_{i,t+1}, \varepsilon^X_{i,t+1} \backsim N(0,\sigma_X)$
- Firm-Level Shock: $z_{i,t+1} = \log Z_{i,t+1} = \rho^Z \log Z_{i,t} + \varepsilon_{i,t+1}^z, \varepsilon_{i,t+1}^z \backsim N(0,\sigma_z)$

Khan & Thomas (2008Ecta) Economy

- ► Fixed Capital Adjustment Costs ⇒ Capture Microeconomic Lumpy Investment Behaviour.
- Each Firm Faces a Binary Choice: Invest or Not.
- ► Ivestment Project Brings Extra Value to Firm ⇒ Firm Chooses to Invest.
- $\qquad \qquad V^{a}(k_{i,t},z_{i,t};\Omega_{t}) \lambda^{c}(\Omega_{t})\xi_{i,t}w(\Omega_{t}) > V^{n}(k_{i,t},z_{i,t};\Omega_{t})$
- ▶ Inaction Firms \Rightarrow Small Market Equities + Issue Dividends \Rightarrow Cash Flow Risks $\uparrow \Rightarrow$ Size Premiums \uparrow
- ▶ Adjustment Probability $\downarrow \Rightarrow$ Expected Return $\uparrow \Rightarrow$ Equity Premiums \uparrow

Household Problem

► Habit Formation:

$$U = E_0 \left\{ \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \frac{\left(C_t - H_t - \psi \frac{N_t^{1+\alpha}}{1+\alpha} \right)^{1-\sigma}}{1-\sigma} \right\}$$
 (1)

• Surplus Consumption Ratio: $S_t \equiv \frac{C_t - H_t}{C_t}$

$$s_{t+1} = \log S_{t+1} = \left(1 - \rho^{S}\right) \log \bar{S} + \rho^{S} \log S_{t} + \lambda^{S} \log \left(\frac{C_{t+1}}{C_{t}}\right)$$
 (2)

- ► Habit Sensitivity Function: $\lambda^S = \frac{1}{\log S} 1$

Equilibrium Conditions

An Equilibrium of This Model Consists of

- Firms' Value Function: $V(k_{i,t}, z_{i,t}, \xi_{i,t}; \Omega_t)$
- Firms' Policy Functions: $k(k_{i,t}, z_{i,t}; \Omega_t)$, $n(k_{i,t}, z_{i,t}; \Omega_t)$, and $\hat{\xi}$
- ▶ Households' Policies $C(\Omega_t)$, $N(\Omega_t)$, and Stochastic Discount Factor $M(\Omega_{t+1}|\Omega_t)$
- ightharpoonup a Wage $W(\Omega_t)$
- ▶ a Law of Motion for the Distribution of Firm $g(k_{i,t}, z_{i,t}; \Omega_t)$

such that

- the Firms' Policies are Optimal
- the Households' Policies are Optimal
- the Labour Market Clears

$$\left(\frac{w(\Omega_t)}{\chi}\right)^{\frac{1}{\alpha}} = \int \left(n(k_{i,t}, z_{i,t}; \Omega_t) + \frac{\hat{\xi}(k_{i,t}, z_{i,t}; \Omega_t)^2}{2\bar{\xi}}\right) g(k, z) dz dk$$
(3)

the Law of Motion of the Distribution is Consistent with the Firm's Policies

Algorithm: Reiter (2009JEDC) & Winberry (2018QE)

Numerical Method: Projection+Perturbation Method

- ► A G.E. Production-Based Asset Pricing Model:
 - ▶ The Cross-Section Distribution of Firms is a State Variable
- Step One: Projection in Stationary Distribution
 - ▶ Approximate the Cross-Sectional Distribution with Finite Dimension Parametric Family ⇒ Reduce Dimension
 - Capture the Law of Motion of Distribution
 - ► Compute the Stationary Equilibrium with Projection Method
- ► Step Two: Perturbation in Aggregate Dynamics—Second-Order Perturbation

Solution to Challenges

1. Equity Premium & Risk-Free Rate Puzzle

- Challenge: High & Volatile Equity Premium and Low & Smooth Risk-Free Rate
- Reason: the Intertemporal Substitution Effects on Risk-Free Rate
- Solution: Precautionary Saving Motivations Offset the Intertemporal Effects
- ▶ Intuition: Same Story in Chen (2017RFS, 2018RAPS)
 - ▶ SDF Decomposition $\frac{C_{t+1}S_{t+1}}{C_tS_t}$ Plays a Key Role
 - ► Take Logarithm and Extend the $\frac{C_{t+1}S_{t+1}}{C_tS_t}$


$$\left\{ \left(-\sigma\right) \left[\left(\rho^{S}-1\right) \left(\log \bar{S} - \log S_{t}\right) + \frac{1}{\log \bar{S}} \mu(g_{c}) \right] + \frac{\left(-\sigma\right)^{2}}{2(\log \bar{S})^{2}} \sigma(g_{c}) \right\}$$


► The Sign of $-\frac{\sigma}{\log \bar{S}}$ and $\frac{(-\sigma)^2}{2(\log \bar{S})^2}$ are Opposite \Rightarrow Low & Smooth Risk-Free Rate

2. Equity Premium & Volatility Puzzle

- Challenge: High & Volatile Equity Premium under Consumption Smoothing
- ▶ Reason: Household Endogenously Smoothes Consumption in a G.E. Model
- ▶ Solution: Novel Habit Sensitivity Produces Volatile SDF
- Intuition: Habit Destruction and Negative Habit

Figure 4: λ^S and SDF: the Way to Replicate Equity Volatility





Mathematically

- $\lambda^S = \frac{1}{\log \bar{S}} 1 \text{ vs } \lambda^S = \frac{1}{\bar{S}} 1.$
- $ightharpoonup \log \bar{S} < \bar{S}$

$$\Rightarrow \frac{1}{\log \bar{S}} - 1 > \frac{1}{\bar{S}} - 1$$

$$\Rightarrow Var\left\{\bar{S}^{1-\rho_s}S_t^{\rho_s}\left(\frac{C_{t+1}}{C_t}\right)^{\left(\frac{1}{\log \bar{S}} - 1\right)}\right\} > Var\left\{\bar{S}^{1-\rho_s}S_t^{\rho_s}\left(\frac{C_{t+1}}{C_t}\right)^{\left(\frac{1}{\bar{S}} - 1\right)}\right\}$$

given that $\frac{1}{\log \overline{S}} - 1 > 0$ and $S_{t+1} > 1$.

- The Agent Destroys Her Habit Periodically (Dunlap 1928; Ljungqvist & Uhlig 2009, 2015)
- Consumption is Smooth but Marginal Utility is Volatile
 - \Rightarrow SDF is Volatile
 - \Rightarrow Risk Premiums are High: $E_t[R_{t+1}^e R_{t+1}^f] = -Cov_t(R_{t+1}^e R_{t+1}^f, \lambda_{t+1})$
 - \Rightarrow Risk Premiums are Volatile: $R_{t+1}^e = \frac{V_{t+1} + D_{t+1}}{V_t}$
 - ⇒ A Solution for the 2nd Challenge



3. High Risk Premiums with Volatile Aggregate Investment

Equity Premium Puzzle in the Production-Based Asset Pricing Literature

- ▶ Challenge: High Risk Premiums with Volatile Aggregate Investment
- Reason: Asset Prices rather than Investment Absorb the Productivity Shock
- ▶ Intuition: Idiosyncratic Risks Offset the Fixed Adjustment Costs
- Solution: A Story in Khan & Thomas (2008Ecta)


Micro Frictions: Adjustment Probabilities $\downarrow \Rightarrow$ Risk Premiums \uparrow

- ► Have Similar Implications on Risk Premiums
 - ▶ Upper Bound of Fixed Costs ↑ ⇒ Adjustment Probabilities ↓
 - ▶ Idiosyncratic Risks $\uparrow \Rightarrow$ Adjustment Probabilities \downarrow
- ► Have Opposite Implications on Aggregate Investment
 - Upper Bound of Fixed Costs ↑ ⇒ Investment Volatility ↓
 - Idiosyncratic Risks ↑ ⇒ Investment Volatility ↑

4. High Cross-Sectional Stock Return

- I Specify on the Lumpy Investment Model
- Challenge: Cross-Sectional Stock Return—Size and Value
- ▶ Reason: Operational Leverage ⇒ Negative Value Premiums
- Solution: Change the Direction to Size Premium
- ► Intuition: Small Firms Absorb More Productivity Shock

Figure 5: The Impulse Response Function of TFP to Return on Big/Small Firm



Benchmark Calibration

Table 2: Benchmark Identification: Target Moments

Parameter	Value	Target Moments	Model	Data
ρ^X	0.95	$\sigma(y_t)$	1.56%	1.51%
σ^X	0.007	$\sigma(i_t)/\sigma(y_t)$	2.92	2.89
$ar{\xi}$	0.25	$\rho(i_t, y_t)$	0.82	0.88
log $ar{\mathcal{S}}$	0.1	$E(r^e-r^f)$	1.79%	1.54%
$ ho^{S}$	0.975	$\sigma(r^e-r^f)$	7.72%	7.74%
λ^{s}	$rac{1}{\log ar{S}} - 1$	$\frac{E(r^e - r^f)}{\sigma(r^e - r^f)}$	0.23	0.20

Strategy & Targets

- Asset Pricing: Moments of Risky Assets
- ▶ Macroeconomics: Moments of Investment Cyclicity and Volatility
- ▶ Just-Identified: 6 Parameters vs. 6 Moments

Model Evaluation

Using Non-target Moments to Evaluate Performances


- Time-Series Implications
 - Asset Prices Dynamics
 - Asset Prices Moments
 - ▶ IRF of TFP to Asset Prices
 - The Predictability of Market Excess Return
 - Macroeconomic Implications
 - Business Cycle Moments
 - ► IRF of TFP to Macro Variables
- Cross-Sectional Implications
 - ▶ The Cross-Sectional Distribution of Investment Rate
 - Size Premiums

Table 3: Benchmark Model: Time-Series Asset Pricing Moments

Equity	Benchmark	Data
$E(r^e-r^f)$	1.79%	1.54%
$\sigma(r^e-r^f)$	7.72%	7.74%
$E(r^e-r^f)/\sigma(r^e-r^f)$	0.23	0.20
T-Bills		
$E(r^f)$	0.88%	0.40%
$\sigma(r^f)$	0.57%	0.99%

What to Take Home: Successfully Avoids Risk-Free Rate Puzzle

Figure 6: Impulse Response Function of TFP Shock to Asset Return



- Marginal Utility is Counter-Cyclical
- Ex-Post Return is Pro-Cyclical⇒Expected Return is Positive

$$E_t[R_{t+1}^e - R_{t+1}^f] = -Cov_t(R_{t+1}^e - R_{t+1}^f, \lambda_{t+1})$$

- First-Order and Second-Order Perturbation
 - ▶ Second-Order Perturbation is Non-Smooth
 ⇔ Captures Infra-Marginal Properties of Value Function & Investment

Table 4: Benchmark Model: Return Prediction of Dividend-Price Ratio

-	Benchmark		Full Sample 1952-2018	
Horizons	Coefficients	R^2	Coefficients	R^2
1 Quarter	0.0462	0.0034	0.0178	0.0087
1 Year	0.2295	0.0255	0.0811	0.0377
2 Year	0.5739	0.0405	0.1401	0.0577
3 Year	1.0473	0.0610	0.1652	0.0640
4 Year	1.5592	0.0777	0.1745	0.0582
5 Year	1.9942	0.0832	0.2142	0.0683

$$E_t[r_{t+k}] - r_{t+k}^f = a + \beta_{dp} \times \frac{d_t}{\rho_t} + \epsilon_{t+k}$$
(4)

What to Take Home: Predicts the Correct Sign and Trend

- Regressive Fitness Rises with the Increases in Investment Horizons
- Dividend Yields Positively Associate with Risk Premiums
- Magnitudes of Simulated Results are Comparable to Empirical Evidence

Table 5: Benchmark Model: Macroeconomic Implications

		Benchmark		
Variables	$\sigma(x_t)$	$\sigma(x_t)/\sigma(y_t)$	$\rho(x_t, y_t)$	$\rho(x_t, x_{t-1})$
y _t	1.56%	1	1	0.71
c_t	1.28%	0.82	0.93	0.70
i_t	4.54%	2.92	0.82	0.76
n_t	1.04%	0.67	1.00	0.71
		Data		
y _t	1.51%	1	1	0.85
c_t	1.20%	0.80	0.85	0.81
i_t	4.35%	2.89	0.88	0.80
n _t	1.84%	1.21	0.87	0.90

What to Take Home: Similar to a Single Shock RBC Model

- Matches Volatilities of Consumption, Investment, and Output
- Underestimates Co-movements and Overestimates Persistence

Table 6: Benchmark Model: Microeconomic Moments

Distribution	Benchmark	Data
Mean	9.93%	10.4%
Standard Deviation	12.03%	16.0%
Skewness	3.08	3.60
Excess Kurtosis	12.36	17.6
Investment Patterns		
Spike (> 20%)	15%	14.4%
Positive(0% – 20%)	85%	85.6%

What to Take Home: Assumes Non-negative Investment Rate ⇒Spike

- Uses Depreciation Rate to Match Average Investment Rate
- ▶ Replicates Key Moments of Distribution and Patterns of Micro Investment

Table 7: Benchmark Model: Cross-Sectional Asset Pricing Moments

	Model		Data		
Moments	Half-Sort	Half-Sort	3 Portfolios	5 Portfolios	10 Portfolios
$E(r^s)$	3.02%	3.47%	3.39%	3.34%	3.33%
$E(r^b)$	1.91%	3.01%	2.76%	2.73%	2.68%
$E(r^s-r^b)$	1.11%	0.46%	0.63%	0.61%	0.66%
$std(r^s)$	6.74%	10.78%	11.51%	11.88%	12.27%
$std(r^b)$	7.13%	7.85%	7.76%	7.67%	7.61%
$std(r^s-r^b)$	4.48%	5.09%	6.76%	7.66%	8.69%
$\rho(r^s, r^b)$	0.79	0.89	0.82	0.78	0.71

What to Take Home:

- Matches Risk Premiums of Small Firms and Most Second-Order Moments
- ▶ Underestimates Risk Premiums of Large Firms⇒Overestimates Size Premiums

What to Take Home

Challenges: Lumpy Investment in G.E. Resolves Challenges Below

Table 8: Compare to Previous Literature

Facts	Equity +Premium + Volatility	Business Cycle	Micro Lumpy Investment	Cross-Sectional Stock Return
Cooper et al. (2006JF)		×	√	√
Herskovic (2020WP)	$\sqrt{}$	×	×	$\sqrt{}$
Favilukis&Lin (2015RFS)	$\sqrt{}$	\checkmark	×	×
Chen (2017RFS,2018RAPS)	\checkmark	$\sqrt{}$	×	×
Favilukis&Lin (2013JME)	×		\checkmark	×
Winberry(2020AER)	×	$\sqrt{}$	\checkmark	×
This Paper	√	√	<i></i> √	√

- Novel Habit Sensitivity
 - $ightharpoonup -\frac{\sigma}{\log \bar{S}}$ and $\frac{(-\sigma)^2}{2(\log \bar{S})^2}$ are Opposite
 - ► Habit Destruction ⇒ Unconditional Vol. of the SDF ↑ and Robust IRF
- Micro Frictions: Adjustment Probabilities ↓ ⇒ Risk Premiums ↑
 - Have Similar (Opposite) Implications on Risk Premiums (Aggregate Investment)
 - ▶ Small Firms \Rightarrow Un-adjust \Rightarrow Higher Cash Flow Risks \Rightarrow Size Premiums

Appendix

Firm Problem

Firm Problem: Khan & Thomas (2008Ecta) Economy

- ▶ The Firm's Aggregate State is $(k_{i,t}, z_{i,t}, \xi_{i,t}; \Omega_t)$
- Let $V(k_{i,t}, z_{i,t}, \xi_{i,t}; \Omega_t)$ be the Discounted Present Value of the Firm.
- Firm Chooses to Adjust or Not

$$V(k_{i,t}, z_{i,t}, \xi_{i,t}; \Omega_{t}) = \lambda^{c}(\Omega_{t}) \max_{n} \left\{ e^{z_{i,t}} e^{x_{t}} k_{i,t}^{\theta} n_{i,t}^{\nu} - w(\Omega_{t}) n_{t} \right\}$$

$$+ \max_{i} \{ V^{a}(k_{i,t}, z_{i,t}; \Omega_{t}) - \lambda^{c}(\Omega_{t}) \xi_{i,t} w(\Omega_{t}), V^{n}(k_{i,t}, z_{i,t}; \Omega_{t}) \}$$
(5)

 $\qquad \qquad \textbf{Decision Threshold: } \tilde{\xi} = \frac{V^a(k_{i,t},z_{i,t};\Omega_t) - V^n(k_{i,t},z_{i,t};\Omega_t)}{\lambda^c w(\Omega_t)}$

Firm Problem: Khan & Thomas (2008Ecta) Economy

- Range of The Threshold: $\hat{\xi}(k_{i,t},z_{i,t};\Omega_t) = \arg\min\left\{\max\left\{0,\tilde{\xi}(k_{i,t},z_{i,t};\Omega_t)\right\},\bar{\xi}\right\}$
- ▶ Adjustment Probability: $\frac{\hat{\xi}(k_{i,t},z_{i,t};\Omega_t)}{\xi} \in [0,1]$
- ▶ Firm Value

$$\begin{split} \hat{V}(k_{i,t}, z_{i,t}; \Omega_t) &= \lambda^c(\Omega_t) \max_n \left\{ e^{z_{i,t}} e^{x_t} k_{i,t}^{\theta} n_{i,t}^{\nu} - w(\Omega_t) n_t \right\} \\ &+ \frac{\hat{\xi}(k_{i,t}, z_{i,t}; \Omega_t)}{\bar{\xi}} \left\{ V^a(k_{i,t}, z_{i,t}; \Omega_t) - \lambda^c(\Omega_t) w(\Omega_t) \frac{\hat{\xi}(k_{i,t}, z_{i,t}; \Omega_t)}{2} \right\} \\ &+ \left(1 - \frac{\hat{\xi}(k_{i,t}, z_{i,t}; \Omega_t)}{\bar{\xi}} \right) V^n(k_{i,t}, z_{i,t}; \Omega_t) \end{split}$$

$$(6)$$

Benchmark Calibration

Table 9: Parameters Selection: Microeconomic Structure

Parameter	Description	Value
λ^e	Debt-to-Equity Ratio	0.54
β	Discount Factor	0.99
σ	Curvature	1
α	Inverse Frisch Elasticity	1/2
Ν	Stationary Work Hour	1/3
ψ	Labour Disutility	1
heta	Capital Share	0.21
u	Labour Share	0.64
δ	Depreciation	0.025
[-b, b]	Bound of Region	0.011
$ ho^Z$	Persistence of Idio. Shock	0.859
σ^Z	s.d. of Idio. Shock	0.015

Table 10: Investment Dynamics and Risk Premiums: Different Sensitivity Functions


Parameters	Moments	Benchmark	$\log \bar{S} = 0.65$	$\bar{\xi} = 0.44$	Data
			$ ho^{S} = 0.95$	$\rho^z = 0.90$	
$\frac{1}{5} - 1$	$\sigma(y_t)$	1.61%	1.61%	1.61%	1.51%
3	$\rho(i_t, y_t)$	-0.65	-0.40	0.09	0.88
	$\sigma(i_t)/\sigma(y_t)$	0.51	0.37	0.35	2.89
	$E(r^e-r^f)$	1.56%	1.59%	1.73%	1.54%
	$std(r^e-r^f)$	1.43%	1.72%	1.43%	7.74%
	$E(r^e-r^f)/\sigma(r^e-r^f)$	1.09	0.92	1.21	0.20
$\frac{1}{\log S} - 1$	$\sigma(y_t)$	1.56%	1.59%	1.56%	1.51%
	$\rho(i_t, y_t)$	0.82	0.98	0.89	0.88
	$\sigma(i_t)/\sigma(y_t)$	2.92	0.52	3.09	2.89
	$E(r^e-r^f)$	1.79%	1.93%	173.07%	1.54%
	$std(r^e-r^f)$	7.73%	1.30%	245.33%	7.74%
	$E(r^e - r^f)/\sigma(r^e - r^f)$	0.23	1.49	0.71	0.20

Traditional Habit Sensitivity

- ► Has Potential to Generate (Smooth) and Counter-Cyclical Investment Dynamics
- ► Fails to Generate Volatile Risk Premiums



Figure 7: Impulse Response Function of TFP Shock to Business Cycle



GHH Utility

- Amplifies Aggregate Consumption, Investment, and Output
- Has Marginal Effects on Wages and Hours Worked

Inspecting the Mechanism


Challenge 1: Mathematical Proof

► SDF Decomposition

$$\log M_{t+1} = \log \beta + (-\sigma) \left\{ \log \left(\frac{C_{t+1}S_{t+1}}{C_{t}S_{t}} \right) + \log \left(\frac{C_{t+1}S_{t+1} - \frac{\psi}{1+\alpha} \times N_{t+1}^{1+\alpha}}{C_{t}S_{t} - \frac{\psi}{1+\alpha} \times \frac{C_{t+1}S_{t+1}}{C_{t}S_{t}} \times N_{t}^{1+\alpha}} \right) \right\}
= \log \beta + \left\{ (-\sigma) \left[\left(\rho^{S} - 1 \right) \left(\log \overline{S} - \log S_{t} \right) + \frac{1}{\log \overline{S}} \mu(g_{c}) \right] + \frac{(-\sigma)^{2}}{2(\log \overline{S})^{2}} \sigma(g_{c}) \right\}
+ (-\sigma) \log \left(\frac{C_{t+1}S_{t+1} - \frac{\psi}{1+\alpha} \times N_{t+1}^{1+\alpha}}{C_{t}S_{t}} \times N_{t}^{1+\alpha}} \right)$$
(7)


- $\qquad \qquad \frac{C_{t+1}S_{t+1}}{C_tS_t} \text{ shares the same sign of } \log \left(\frac{C_{t+1}S_{t+1} \frac{\psi}{1+\alpha} \times N_{t+1}^{1+\alpha}}{C_{t+1}S_{t+1} \frac{\psi}{1+\alpha} \times \frac{C_{t+1}S_{t+1}}{C_tS_t} \times N_t^{1+\alpha}} \right)$
- $ightharpoonup -\frac{\sigma}{\log S}$ and $\frac{(-\sigma)^2}{2(\log S)^2}$ are Opposite

Figure 8: Asset Pricing Moments: Conditional on log \$\bar{S}\$



- ▶ $\log \bar{S} \uparrow \Rightarrow$ U-Shaped Risk Premium and Volatility \Leftrightarrow When $\log \bar{S} > 0.25$, $E(r^e r^f) > std(r^e r^f)$
- ▶ $\log \bar{S} \uparrow \Rightarrow E(r^f) \uparrow \text{ and } std(r^f) \downarrow$





- The Weight between Precautionary Saving Motivations and EIS Plays a Key Role
- Consumption Volatility Plays another Key Role

Challenge 2: Compare to Chen (2017RFS)'s Work

- ▶ Traditional Habit Sensitivity $\lambda^S = \frac{1}{5} 1$
 - ▶ Large \bar{S} to Make the Agent Destroys Her Habit Periodically $\Rightarrow \lambda^S \downarrow$ Assign a Small Weight to $\frac{(-\sigma)^2}{2(\log \bar{S})^2}$
 - $\Rightarrow \mathsf{Equity}\ \mathsf{Volatility}\ \downarrow$
 - ▶ A Small \bar{S} Cannot Produce a Volatile SDF under Lumpy Economics \Rightarrow Equity Volatility \downarrow

This Paper: Take the Advantages of Both Mechanisms with $\lambda^{S} = \frac{1}{\log \bar{S}} - 1$

- ▶ Picking Small $\log \bar{S} \iff$ Picking Large \bar{S} to Make the Habit Destruction \Rightarrow but λ^S still \uparrow
- Why Traditional Model Fails to....?
 - ▶ Numerical Method: Reiter (2009JEDC) and Winberry (2018QE)
 - ▶ Misspecified: Oh (2011WP) with Krusell & Smith (1998JPE)

Challenge 3: Mathematical Proof

Value Function

$$\hat{V} = \lambda^{c} \max_{n} \left\{ e^{z} e^{x} k^{\theta} n^{\nu} - wn \right\} + \frac{\hat{\xi}}{\bar{\xi}} \left\{ V^{a} - \lambda^{c} w \frac{\hat{\xi}}{2} \right\} + \left(1 - \frac{\hat{\xi}}{\bar{\xi}} \right) V^{n}$$


where

$$\begin{split} \tilde{\xi} &= \frac{V^a - V^n}{\lambda^c w} \\ \hat{\xi} &= \arg\min\left\{\max\left\{0, \tilde{\xi}\right\}, \bar{\xi}\right\} = \arg\min\left\{\max\left\{0, \frac{V^a - V^n}{\lambda^c w}\right\}, \bar{\xi}\right\} \end{split}$$

- If $\bar{\xi}<\tilde{\xi}$ then $\hat{\xi}=\bar{\xi}$, only Adjusted Firms are Considered and the Adjustment Probability is One
- If $\hat{\xi} = \tilde{\xi} = \frac{v^3 v^n}{\lambda^c w} < \bar{\xi} \Rightarrow$ the Relative Weights Assigned to Adjusted and Constraint Firms are $\frac{\hat{\xi}}{\hat{\xi}}$ and $1 \frac{\hat{\xi}}{\hat{\xi}} \Rightarrow \frac{\hat{\xi}}{\hat{\xi}}$ is Adjustment Probability
- $\bar{\xi} \uparrow \Rightarrow$ Adjustment Probability $\frac{\hat{\xi}}{\bar{\xi}} \uparrow \Rightarrow$ Assign Higher Weights on Constraint Firms \Rightarrow Future Dividends \uparrow Risk Premiums \uparrow





Figure 10: Asset Pricing Moments: Conditional on $\bar{\xi}$



- $lackbr{\xi}\uparrow\Rightarrow E(r^e-r^f)$, $std(r^e-r^f)$, and Sharp Ratio \uparrow
- $\bar{\xi} \uparrow \Rightarrow E(r^f) \downarrow$ and Investment Smooth
- \blacktriangleright Small $\bar\xi\Rightarrow$ All Firms Adjust \Rightarrow Equity is Less Risky than T-Bill \Rightarrow Negative Premiums

Figure 11: The Mechanism of $\bar{\xi}$






$$ar{\xi} \uparrow \Rightarrow \mathsf{Adjustment} \; \mathsf{Probability} \xi(\epsilon,k) = rac{\hat{\xi}}{\hat{\xi}} \downarrow$$


 \Rightarrow Firms Choose Inaction \Rightarrow Future Dividend $\uparrow \Rightarrow$ Risk Premiums \uparrow


Figure 12: Macro-Asset Pricing Moments: Conditional on σ_z



- $\sigma_z \uparrow \Rightarrow E(r^e r^f)$, $std(r^e r^f)$, Sharp Ratio, and $\sigma(i_t) \uparrow$
- ightharpoonup $\bar{\xi} \uparrow \Rightarrow E(r^f) \downarrow$

Figure 13: The Mechanism of σ_z





Idiosyncratic Risks $\sigma_z \uparrow \Rightarrow$ Adjustment Probability $\xi(\epsilon, k) = \frac{\hat{\xi}}{\xi} \downarrow \Rightarrow$ Cash Flow Risks \Rightarrow Risk Premiums \uparrow

Challenge 4: Mathematical Proof

Recall the value function:

$$\begin{split} \hat{V}(k_{i,t}, z_{i,t}; \Omega_t) &= \lambda^c(\Omega_t) \underset{n}{\text{max}} \left\{ e^{z_{i,t}} e^{x_t} k_{i,t}^{\theta} n_{i,t}^{\nu} - w(\Omega_t) n_t \right\} \\ &+ \frac{\hat{\xi}(k_{i,t}, z_{i,t}; \Omega_t)}{\bar{\xi}} \left\{ V^a(k_{i,t}, z_{i,t}; \Omega_t) - \lambda^c(\Omega_t) w(\Omega_t) \frac{\hat{\xi}(k_{i,t}, z_{i,t}; \Omega_t)}{2} \right\} \\ &+ \left(1 - \frac{\hat{\xi}(k_{i,t}, z_{i,t}; \Omega_t)}{\bar{\xi}} \right) V^n(k_{i,t}, z_{i,t}; \Omega_t) \end{split}$$

The return on unconstrained (big) firm and constrained (small) firm is given by:

$$R^{a}(\Omega_{t+1}|\Omega_{t}) = \frac{\frac{\hat{\xi}}{\hat{\xi}} \int V^{a}(k_{i,t+1}, z_{i,t+1}; \Omega_{t+1}) di + \frac{\hat{\xi}}{\hat{\xi}} D(\Omega_{t+1})}{\frac{\hat{\xi}}{\hat{\xi}} \int V^{a}(k_{i,t}, z_{i,t}; \Omega_{t}) di}$$

$$= \frac{\int V^{a}(k_{i,t+1}, z_{i,t+1}; \Omega_{t+1}) di + D(\Omega_{t+1})}{\int V^{a}(k_{i,t}, z_{i,t}; \Omega_{t+1}) di}$$

$$R^{n}(\Omega_{t+1}|\Omega_{t}) = \frac{\left(1 - \frac{\hat{\xi}}{\hat{\xi}}\right) \int V^{n}(k_{i,t+1}, z_{i,t+1}; \Omega_{t+1}) di + \left(1 - \frac{\hat{\xi}}{\hat{\xi}}\right) D(\Omega_{t+1})}{\left(1 - \frac{\hat{\xi}}{\hat{\xi}}\right) \int V^{n}(k_{i,t}, z_{i,t}; \Omega_{t}) di}$$

$$= \frac{\int V^{n}(k_{i,t+1}, z_{i,t+1}; \Omega_{t+1}) di + D(\Omega_{t+1})}{\int V^{n}(k_{i,t}, z_{i,t}; \Omega_{t}) di}$$

$$(8)$$

Challenge 4: Mathematical Proof


The return spread between small and big firm is:

$$\begin{split} &R^{n}(\Omega_{t+1}|\Omega_{t}) - R^{a}(\Omega_{t+1}|\Omega_{t}) \\ &= \frac{\int V^{n}(k_{i,t+1}, z_{i,t+1}; \Omega_{t+1}) di + D(\Omega_{t+1})}{\int V^{n}(k_{i,t}, z_{i,t}; \Omega_{t}) di} - \frac{\int V^{a}(k_{i,t+1}, z_{i,t+1}; \Omega_{t+1}) di + D(\Omega_{t+1})}{\int V^{a}(k_{i,t}, z_{i,t}; \Omega_{t+1}) di} \\ &= \frac{\left[\int V^{n}(k_{i,t+1}, z_{i,t+1}; \Omega_{t+1}) di + D(\Omega_{t+1})\right] \int V^{a}(k_{i,t}, z_{i,t}; \Omega_{t+1}) di}{\int V^{a}(k_{i,t}, z_{i,t}; \Omega_{t+1}) di \int V^{n}(k_{i,t}, z_{i,t}; \Omega_{t+1}) di} \\ &- \frac{\left[\int V^{a}(k_{i,t+1}, z_{i,t+1}; \Omega_{t+1}) di + D(\Omega_{t+1})\right] \int V^{n}(k_{i,t}, z_{i,t}; \Omega_{t}) di}{\int V^{a}(k_{i,t}, z_{i,t}; \Omega_{t+1}) di \int V^{n}(k_{i,t}, z_{i,t}; \Omega_{t}) di} \\ &= \frac{\int V^{a}(k_{i,t}, z_{i,t}; \Omega_{t+1}) di D(\Omega_{t+1}) - \int V^{n}(k_{i,t}, z_{i,t}; \Omega_{t}) di}{\int V^{a}(k_{i,t}, z_{i,t}; \Omega_{t+1}) di \int V^{n}(k_{i,t}, z_{i,t}; \Omega_{t}) di} \\ &= \frac{\int \left[V^{a}(k_{i,t}, z_{i,t}; \Omega_{t+1}) - V^{n}(k_{i,t}, z_{i,t}; \Omega_{t})\right] di D(\Omega_{t+1})}{\int V^{a}(k_{i,t}, z_{i,t}; \Omega_{t+1}) di \int V^{n}(k_{i,t}, z_{i,t}; \Omega_{t}) di}} > 0 \end{aligned}$$

Challenge 5: Debate on Irrelevance


- Debate: Micro Frictions Has (Marginal) Effects on Aggregate Investment
- ▶ Reason: Procyclical Risk-Free Rate Offset the Aggregate Investment Demand ⇒ Irrelevance
- ► Solution: Novel Habit Sensitivity Produces Robust IRF of TFP
- Intuition: The Similar Story in Winberry (2020AER)
 - ▶ IRF of TFP to Risk-Free Rate is Negative
 - ⇒ Counter-Cyclical Risk-Free Rate
 - \Rightarrow Investment Demand \uparrow
 - ▶ IRF of TFP to Aggregate Investment is Robustly Positive
 - ⇒ Procyclical Investment
 - \Rightarrow Investment Volatility \uparrow

Figure 14: IRF of TFP to Risk-Free Rate



Counter-Cyclical Risk-Free Rate ⇒ Investment Demand ↑

Figure 15: Investment IRFs: (log) Steady-State Surplus-Consumption Ratio



► U-Shaped IRF ⇒ Counter-Cyclical & Smooth Investment Dynamics

Comparative Statistics

Alternative Preferences: Keeping Up with the Joneses

Recall the Utility Function:

$$U = E_0 \left\{ \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \frac{\left(C_t - H_t - \psi \frac{N_t^{1+\alpha}}{1+\alpha} \right)^{1-\sigma}}{1-\sigma} \right\}$$

► Habit with Actual Consumption

$$H_t = \tau C_{t-1}$$

$$\lambda_t^c = \left(C_t - \tau C_{t-1} - \psi \frac{N_t^{1+\alpha}}{1+\alpha} \right)^{-\sigma}$$

Habit with Net Consumption

$$H_t = \tau \left(C_{t-1} - \psi \frac{N_{t-1}^{1+\alpha}}{1+\alpha} \right)$$

$$\lambda_t^c = \left(C_t - \psi \frac{N_t^{1+\alpha}}{1+\alpha} - \tau \left(C_{t-1} - \psi \frac{N_{t-1}^{1+\alpha}}{1+\alpha} \right) \right)^{-\sigma}$$

Table 11: Habit Formation: Moment Comparisons

Models	CC		KJ		No Habits	Data
	$rac{1}{\log ar{S}} - 1$	$\frac{1}{\overline{5}}-1$	C_t	$C_t - \psi rac{N_t^{1+lpha}}{1+lpha}$		
$\sigma(y_t)$	1.56%	1.61%	1.78%	1.59%	1.58%	1.51 %
$\sigma(c_t)/\sigma(y_t)$	0.82	1.23	1.16	0.60	0.77	0.80
$\sigma(i_t)/\sigma(y_t)$	2.92	0.73	4.40	3.39	2.38	2.88
$\sigma(n_t)/\sigma(y_t)$	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.67	1.21
$\rho(c_t, y_t)$	0.93	0.99	0.80	0.99	0.99	0.85
$\rho(i_t, y_t)$	0.82	-0.47	0.33	0.99	0.99	0.88
$\rho(n_t, y_t)$	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.87
$\rho(c_{t-1}, c_t)$	0.70	0.73	0.94	0.77	0.72	0.81
$\rho(i_{t-1},i_t)$	0.76	0.84	0.76	0.68	0.71	0.80
$\rho(n_{t-1},n_t)$	0.71	0.72	0.67	0.72	0.72	0.90
$\rho(y_{t-1}, y_t)$	0.71	0.72	0.76	0.72	0.72	0.85
$E(r^e-r^f)$	1.79%	1.59%	1.78%	6.05%	1.77%	1.54%
$std(r^e - r^f)$	7.72%	1.43%	1.58%	11.31%	1.18%	7.74%
$E(r^f)$	0.88%	1.01%	1.02%	0.90%	0.98%	0.40%
$std(r^f)$	0.57%	0.09%	0.15%	0.26%	0.12%	0.99%
$\frac{E(r^e-r^f)}{\sigma(r^e-r^f)}$	0.23	1.12	1.13	0.53	1.51	0.20

Additional Micro Frictions

Investment-Specific Shock

$$k_{i,t+1} = (1 - \delta)k_{i,t} + e^{q_t}i_{i,t}$$

$$q_{t+1} = \rho^q q_t + \sigma^q \varepsilon_{t,t+1}^q + \sigma^{qx} \varepsilon_{t,t+1}^{qz}$$
(10)

Uncertainty Shock

$$z_{i,t+1} = \rho^{Z} z_{i} + \varepsilon_{i,t+1}^{Z}, \varepsilon_{i,t+1}^{Z} \backsim N(0, X_{t}^{U} \bar{\sigma})$$

$$X_{t+1}^{U} = \rho^{U} \log X_{t}^{U} + \varepsilon_{t+1}^{U}, \varepsilon_{t+1}^{U} \backsim N(0, \sigma^{U})$$
(11)

Convex Costs

$$\Phi(I_{i,t}/k_{i,t}) = \frac{\lambda_x}{2} \left(\frac{I_{i,t}}{k_{i,t}}\right)^2 k_{i,t}$$
 (12)

and its Value Function

$$\hat{V} = \lambda^{c} \max_{n} \left\{ e^{z} e^{x} k^{\theta} n^{\nu} - wn \right\} + \frac{\hat{\xi}}{\bar{\xi}} \left\{ V^{a} - \lambda^{c} w \frac{\hat{\xi}}{2} \right\} + \left(1 - \frac{\hat{\xi}}{\bar{\xi}} \right) V^{n} \\
- \lambda^{c} \frac{\hat{\xi}}{\bar{\xi}} \times \frac{\lambda_{x}}{2} \left(\frac{k^{a}}{k} - (1 - \delta) \right)^{2} - \lambda^{c} \left(1 - \frac{\hat{\xi}}{\bar{\xi}} \right) \times \frac{\lambda_{x}}{2} \left(\frac{k^{n}}{k} - (1 - \delta) \right)^{2}$$
(13)

Table 12: The Microeconomic Frictions: Comparisons

-					
Models	Benchmark	IST	Uncertainty Shock	Convex Costs	Data
$\sigma(y_t)$	1.56%	1.58%	1.58 %	1.58 %	1.51 %
$\sigma(c_t)/\sigma(y_t)$	0.82	0.80	0.80	0.73	0.80
$\sigma(i_t)/\sigma(y_t)$	2.92	2.79	2.67	2.97	2.88
$\sigma(n_t)/\sigma(y_t)$	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.67	1.21
$\rho(c_t, y_t)$	0.93	0.95	0.96	0.94	0.85
$\rho(i_t, y_t)$	0.82	0.88	0.88	0.85	0.88
$\rho(n_t, y_t)$	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.87
$\rho(c_{t-1},c_t)$	0.70	0.70	0.70	0.71	0.81
$\rho(i_{t-1},i_t)$	0.76	0.76	0.76	0.74	0.80
$\rho(n_{t-1},n_t)$	0.71	0.71	0.71	0.71	0.90
$\rho(y_{t-1}, y_t)$	0.71	0.71	0.71	0.71	0.85
$E(r^e-r^f)$	1.79%	1.57%	1.39%	2.66%	1.54%
$std(r^e - r^f)$	7.72%	5.70%	4.95%	7.76%	7.74%
$E(r^f)$	0.88%	0.96%	0.97%	0.88%	0.40%
$std(r^{f})$	0.59%	0.48%	0.45%	0.49%	0.99%
$\frac{E(r^{e}-r^{f})}{\sigma(r^{e}-r^{f})}$	0.23	0.27	0.28	0.34	0.20

Additional Micro Frictions have merely Marginal Contribution