

Safe Protocol Language (SPL)


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Problem - Network Protocol Arms Race

- ▶ Network communication protocols
 - ▶ Constantly being design, updated, and implemented
- ▶ New areas of protocol growth
 - ▶ Long Termin Evolution (LTE)
 - ▶ IP Television (IPTV)
 - ▶ Virtual Networks in Cloud Enviornments
- ▶ Requires continuous new development

Problem - LTE Protocol Proliferation



Problem - Classic Software Engineering & Verification

- ▶ Protocol design may be faulty
 - ▶ lacks safety and/or liveness
 - ▶ does not conform to specification
 - ▶ inefficient
- ▶ Protocol implementation may be deficient
 - ▶ does not conform to design
 - ▶ overly permissive
 - ▶ inefficient

Problem - High Cost & Low Reliability

- ▶ System Cost
 - ▶ Per protocol cost is measured in man years
 - ▶ Interesting problems involve systems of protocols
 - ▶ Exploration is prohibitive for all but institutional efforts
- ▶ System Reliability
 - ▶ Availability and security dependent on underlying protocols
 - ▶ Simple, mature protocols by large companies suffer
 - ▶ <http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls> : Apple, Cisco, etc.

Problem - Existing Solutions

- ▶ System Programming Languages

- ▶ Leverage libraries for common protocol idioms
- ▶ Protocol concepts built on-top of system language (C/C++)
- ▶ Unit and System testing required to catch faults
- ▶ Ad-hoc and usually reactive approach
- ▶ Increases cost of solution

- ▶ Formal Verification

- ▶ Heavy duty model checking languages (Spin/Promela)
- ▶ Required understanding: protocol and verification
- ▶ High barrier to entry for non-verification communities
- ▶ Increases cost of solution



Prior Work

- ▶ Esterel - model checking language with code extraction [Bous91]
- ▶ HIPPCO - optimizing compiler for Esterel [Cast97]
- ▶ Prolac - functional language with sub-typing [Khol99]
- ▶ Click - configuration language for router components [Khol00]
- ▶ PacketTypes - declarative message format language [McCan00]
- ▶ Austin Protocol Compiler - certified compilation [McGui04]
- ▶ binpac - similar to PacketTypes but with ASCII formats [Pang06]
- ▶ protege - ad-hoc protocols for sensor nets [Wang11]


Language Research Objectives

- ▶ Simplify and unify design and implementation
 - ▶ Lower protocol knowledge/idioms into language
 - ▶ Shift verification reasoning from user to the compiler
 - ▶ Reduce the amount of code to define a protocol
- ▶ Leverage language theory and verification research
 - ▶ Validate message and logic handling with type systems
 - ▶ Validate state machine behavior with model checking

Intra-Protocol Anatomy



Inter-Protocol Anatomy



First Focus - Message Format

- ▶ Material portion of implementation effort
 - ▶ Messages are nested self-describing structures
 - ▶ Decode/encode functions are non-trivial
- ▶ Source of 2 classes of vulnerabilities
 - ▶ Value constraints
 - ▶ Structural constraints
 - ▶ Inhabited by numerous entries in Cert

First Focus - Message Format

- ▶ Support declarative format definitions
 - ▶ Type check definitions for structural inconsistency
 - ▶ Eliminate need to write decode and encode functions
 - ▶ Reduces development time and ability to inject errors
- ▶ Capture value and structural constraints
 - ▶ Use constraints during state machine type check
 - ▶ Find unsafe usages during compile
 - ▶ Automatically resolve unsafe usage during compile

Structure & Constraint Capture

- Capture constraints with macros and/or comments

```
struct iphdr {  
#if defined(__LITTLE_ENDIAN_BITFIELD)  
    __u8  ihl:4,  
    version:4;  
#elif defined (__BIG_ENDIAN_BITFIELD)  
    __u8  version:4,  
    ihl:4;  
#else  
#error    "Please fix <asm/byteorder.h>"  
#endif  
    __u8  tos;  
    __be16 tot_len;  
    __be16 id;  
    __be16 frag_off;  
    __u8  ttl;  
    __u8  protocol;  
    __sum16 check;  
    __be32 saddr;  
    __be32 daddr;  
    /*The options start here. */  
};
```

Explicit Constraint Checking

```
if (iph->ihl < 5 || iph->version != 4)
goto inhdr_error;

if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, iph->ihl*4))
goto inhdr_error;

iph = ip_hdr(skb);

if (unlikely(ip_fast_csum((u8 *)iph, iph->ihl)))
goto inhdr_error;

len = ntohs(iph->tot_len);
if (skb->len < len) {
    IP_INC_STATS_BH(dev_net(dev), IPSTATS_MIB_INTRUNCATEDPKTS);
    goto drop;
} else if (len < (iph->ihl*4))
goto inhdr_error;
```

Format Declaration Types

- ▶ `uint t_1 t_2` - new type
 - ▶ t_1 = expression defining the number size of this uint in bits
 - ▶ t_2 = expression defining the initial/default value of this type
- ▶ `pad t` - new type
 - ▶ t = expression defining the number of bits to skip
- ▶ `array t_1 t_2` - new type
 - ▶ t_1 = expression defining the type contained in the array
 - ▶ t_2 = expression defining the initial/default value of the array

Format Declaration Types

- ▶ pdu $id \{ l_i = t_i \}$ - new type
 - ▶ id = identifier for the pdu record
 - ▶ l_i = label for this particular attribute
 - ▶ t_i = term to assign to label of this attribute
- ▶ enum $id \{ p_i : t_i \}$
 - ▶ id = identifier for the enum variant
 - ▶ p_i = predicate used to identify the variant type
 - ▶ t_i = term used under this predicate

Format Example

```
pdu LLC ...  
pdu IPv4 ...  
pdu ARP ...
```

```
enum L2_type  
    <= 0x0600 : LLC  
    == 0x0800 : IPv4  
    == 0x0806 : ARP
```

```
pdu EtherII  
    uint 48 dst  
    uint 48 src  
    uint 16 type_len  
    [uint 8] * payload  
    uint 32 crc
```

Format - Structural Dependencies

```
pdu Test
  uint 1 flag
  pad 7
  if flag == 1 then
    uint 16 extra
  [uint 8] * payload
```

- Potential unsafe usage of extra

```
rcv :: Test -> Unit
rcv pkt =
  examine pkt.extra
```

Aside - Lambda Calculus

- ▶ Formalized by Alonzo Church
- ▶ Developed to study the foundations of mathematics
- ▶ Foundation of programming language theory

Aside - Lambda Calculus

- ▶ Inductively defined language of terms
 - ▶ $t ::= x \mid \lambda x.t \mid t t$
- ▶ variable - x
- ▶ abstraction - $\lambda x.t$
- ▶ application - $t t$

Aside - Lambda Calculus

► Evaluation Rules / Dynamics

$$\frac{t_1 \rightarrow t'_1}{t_1 \ t_2 \rightarrow t'_1 \ t_2} \textit{App}$$

$$\frac{t_2 \rightarrow t'_2}{v_1 \ t_2 \rightarrow v_1 \ t'_2} \textit{App}$$

$$\frac{}{(\lambda x. t) \ v \rightarrow [x \mapsto v] \ t} \textit{App}$$

Aside - Lambda Calculus

- ▶ The λ calculus is turing complete
- ▶ $\text{tru} = \lambda t. \lambda f. t;$
- ▶ $\text{fls} = \lambda t. \lambda f. f;$
- ▶ $\text{if_then_else} = \lambda l. \lambda m. \lambda n. l\ m\ n;$
- ▶ $\text{if_then_else}\ \text{tru}\ x\ w$

Aside - Lambda Calculus

- ▶ Enrich system with types, an environment, and more terms
- ▶ $t ::= x \mid \lambda x.t \mid t \ t \mid \text{if } t \text{ then } t \text{ else } t$
- ▶ $t ::= \text{pred } t \mid \text{succ } t \mid \text{iszero } t$
- ▶ $t ::= \text{true} \mid \text{false} \mid 0$
- ▶ $T ::= \text{Bool} \mid \text{Nat} \mid T \rightarrow T$
- ▶ $\Gamma ::= \emptyset \mid \Gamma, x : T$

Aside - Lambda Calculus

- Statics / Type Relations : $\Gamma \vdash t : T$

$$\frac{}{\Gamma \vdash \text{true} : \text{Bool}} T_{\text{true}}$$

$$\frac{}{\Gamma \vdash \text{false} : \text{Bool}} T_{\text{false}}$$

$$\frac{}{\Gamma \vdash 0 : \text{Nat}} T_{\text{zero}}$$

$$\frac{x:T \in \Gamma}{\Gamma \vdash x : T} T_{\text{store}}$$

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash t : \text{Nat}}{\Gamma \vdash \text{succ } t : \text{Nat}} T_S$$

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash t : \text{Nat}}{\Gamma \vdash \text{pred } t : \text{Nat}} T_P$$

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash t : \text{Nat}}{\Gamma \vdash \text{iszero } t : \text{Bool}} T_Z$$

Aside - Lambda Calculus

- Statics / Type Relations : $\Gamma \vdash t : T$

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash t_1 : \text{Bool} \quad \Gamma \vdash t_2 : T \quad \Gamma \vdash t_3 : T}{\Gamma \vdash \text{if } t_1 \text{ then } t_2 \text{ else } t_3 : T} T_{ifelse}$$

$$\frac{\Gamma, x : T_1 \vdash t_2 : T_2}{\Gamma \vdash \lambda x : T_1. t_2 : T_1 \rightarrow T_2} T_{abs}$$

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash t_1 : T_1 \rightarrow T_2 \quad \Gamma \vdash t_2 : T_1}{\Gamma \vdash t_1 t_2 : T_2} T_{app}$$

Aside - Lambda Calculus

- Dynamics / Evaluation : $t \rightarrow t'$

$$\frac{}{P\ 0 \rightarrow 0} E_{P0}$$

$$\frac{}{Z\ 0 \rightarrow \text{true}} E_{Z0}$$

$$\frac{}{Z\ (S\ \text{nv}) \rightarrow \text{false}} E_{ZS}$$

$$\frac{}{P\ (S\ \text{nv}) \rightarrow \text{nv}} E_{PS}$$

$$\frac{}{\text{if true then } t_2 \text{ else } t_3 \rightarrow t_2} E_{\text{ifelse-true}}$$

$$\frac{}{\text{if false then } t_2 \text{ else } t_3 \rightarrow t_3} E_{\text{ifelse-false}}$$

Aside - Lambda Calculus

- Dynamics / Evaluation : $t \rightarrow t'$

$$\frac{}{(\lambda x : T_1.t_2) v_3 \rightarrow [x \mapsto v_3] t_2} E_{app}$$

$$\frac{t \rightarrow t'}{\text{pred } t \rightarrow \text{pred } t'} E_P$$

$$\frac{t \rightarrow t'}{\text{succ } t \rightarrow \text{succ } t'} E_S$$

$$\frac{t \rightarrow t'}{\text{iszero } t \rightarrow \text{iszero } t'} E_Z$$

Aside - Lambda Calculus

- Dynamics / Evaluation : $t \rightarrow t'$

$$\frac{t_1 \rightarrow t'_1}{\text{if } t_1 \text{ then } t_2 \text{ else } t_3 \rightarrow \text{if } t'_1 \text{ then } t_2 \text{ else } t_3} E_{\text{ifelse}}$$

$$\frac{t_1 \rightarrow t'_1}{t_1 \ t_2 \rightarrow t'_1 \ t_2} E_{\text{app}}$$

$$\frac{t_2 \rightarrow t'_2}{v_1 \ t_2 \rightarrow v_1 \ t'_2} E_{\text{app}}$$

Aside - Lambda Calculus

- ▶ Safety of the simply typed λ calculus
- ▶ Progress - if $\Gamma \vdash t : T$ then $t \rightarrow t'$ or $t \approx v$
- ▶ Preservation - if $\Gamma \vdash t : T$ and $t \rightarrow t'$ then $\Gamma \vdash t' : T$
- ▶ Well typed programs do not 'go wrong'

Terms

Basic term structure found in λ_{\rightarrow}

$t_{base} ::= t \ t \mid \lambda x. t \mid \text{if } t \text{ then } t \text{ else } t \mid t \text{ as } T \mid \text{let } x = t \text{ in } t \mid$
 $\{x_i = t_i^{i \in 1..n}\} \mid t.x \mid \text{nil} \mid \text{cons } t \ t$

Augmenting terms allowing for structural types

$t_{ext} ::= \text{array } t \ t \mid \text{uint } t \ t \mid \text{pad } t \mid \text{pdu } t \mid \text{enum } t$

Built-in Types

$\tau_{constant} ::= \text{Nat} \mid \text{Nat}^{\infty} \mid \text{Char} \mid \text{Bool} \mid \text{Unit}$

$\tau_{composite} ::= \tau^{\top} \mid \tau \rightarrow \tau \mid [\tau] \mid \tau?t$

$\sigma ::= \tau \mid \alpha \mid \forall\alpha.\sigma$

$\tau^{\top} = \tau \cup \{\top\}$, where \top indicates the undefined value

$\text{Nat}^{\infty} = \text{Nat} \cup \{\infty\}$

$\tau?t$ = type τ 's presence depends on a predicate t being true

Type Constructors

$\pi ::= \text{array} \mid \text{uint} \mid \text{pad} \mid \text{pdu} \mid \text{enum}$

$\text{array} :: \forall \alpha. \alpha \rightarrow \text{Nat}^\infty \rightarrow *$

$\text{uint} :: \text{Nat} \Rightarrow \text{Nat}^\top \Rightarrow *$

$\text{pdu} :: \{\pi\}^+ \Rightarrow *$

$\text{enum} :: \{\forall \alpha. \alpha \rightarrow \text{Bool}, \tau\}^+ \Rightarrow *$

$\text{pad} :: \text{Nat} \Rightarrow *$

PDU Example

Surface Syntax

```
pdu EtherII
  uint 48 dst
  uint 48 src
  uint 16 type_len
  [uint 8] * payload
  uint 32 crc
```

Resulting Term

```
let EtherII = pdu { dst=uint 48 ⊥, src=uint 48 ⊥, type_len=uint
16 ⊥, payload=[uint 8] ∞ ⊥, crc = uint 32 ⊥ } in ...
```

PDU Type Checking

The sequence of inner types incrementally contribute to the environment.

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash t_1 : T_1 \quad \forall i \in 2..N \quad \Gamma, \{t_1 : T_1, \dots, t_{i-1} : T_{i-1}\} \vdash t_i : T_i}{\Gamma \vdash \{t_1, \dots, t_N\} : \{T_1, \dots, T_N\}}$$

Dependency Environment

Maybe we need an environment to carry dependencies around

```
pdu Test
  uint 1 flag
  pad 7
  IF flag == 1
    uint 16 extra
  END
```

δ = special dependency term

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash t : Bool \quad \Gamma \vdash \delta : T}{\Gamma \vdash IF\ t : Unit, \delta : T?t}$$

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash \delta : T}{\Gamma \vdash End : Unit, \delta : Unit}$$

Reserved Attributes

$\text{attr}_{pdu} ::= x.\text{bits} \mid x.\text{bytes}$
 $\text{attr}_{enum} ::= x.\text{type} \mid x.\text{enum}$

```
enum EnumTest
  == 74 : uint 32
  > 100 : [char] 128
```

```
pdu PduTest
  uint 8 kind
  EnumTest type payload
```

```
rcv :: PduTest -> Unit
rcv pkt =
  f pkt.bits pkt.bytes pkt.payload.type pkt.payload.enum
```

Enum Example

```
pdu LLC ...
```

```
pdu IPv4 ...
```

```
pdu ARP ...
```

```
enum L2_type
```

```
    <= 0x0600 : LLC
```

```
    == 0x0800 : IPv4
```

```
    == 0x0806 : ARP
```

```
pdu EtherII
```

```
    uint 48 dst
```

```
    uint 48 src
```

```
    uint 16 type_len
```

```
    L2_type type_len payload
```

```
    uint 32 crc
```

Simple Exmample

```
rcv :: ARP -> Unit
rcv pkt as ARP =
    if pkt.type == Request
        then send pkt.mac ( arp_who_has pkt.ip )
        else arp_update pkt.mac pkt.ip

rcv :: IPv4 -> Unit
rcv pkt as IPv4 =
    if pkt.ttl == 0
        then send pkt.src ( make_dst_unreach pkt )
        else fwd ( dec_ttl pkt )

rcv :: EtherII -> Unit
rcv pkt as EtherII =
    rcv pkt.payload
```

Checking Example

```
pdu Foo
  uint 1 flag
  pad 7
  if flag == 1
    then uint 32 seq

rcv :: Foo -> Unit
rcv pkt =
  do_something pkt.seq
```

Potential error accessing parameter that is conditionally runtime dependent

Conditional Types

Let the type of `seq` depend on its conditional structural

$$\frac{\dots}{\Gamma \vdash \text{seq} : \text{uint } 32 \text{ ? flag == 1}}$$

Only type check dependent terms if they exist in a branch of control flow that covers the dependency.

```
rcv :: Foo -> Unit
rcv pkt =
  if pkt.flag == 1 or pkt.flag != 0 or ...
    then do_something pkt.seq
```


Predicate Introduction

- ▶ Δ - set of known facts
- ▶ conditional terms introduce predicates
- ▶ evaluate sub-terms using new fact established by predicate

$$\frac{\Delta|\Gamma \vdash t_1 : Bool \quad \Delta, \{t_1\}|\Gamma \vdash t_2 : \tau \quad \Delta, \{\neg t_1\}|\Gamma \vdash t_3 : \tau}{\Delta|\Gamma \vdash \text{if } t_1 \text{ then } t_2 \text{ else } t_3 : \tau} \mathbf{T}_{if}$$

Dependency Elimination

- ▶ deduce dependency from known facts
- ▶ eliminate dependency in resulting type

$$\frac{\Delta|\Gamma \vdash t : \tau? \delta \quad \Delta \models \delta}{\Delta|\Gamma \vdash t : \tau} \mathbf{T}_{DepElim_1}$$

Dependency Deferral

- ▶ use of type without proof of dependency
- ▶ rewrite term using conditional
- ▶ eliminate dependency of type

$$\frac{\Delta|\Gamma \vdash t : \tau?\delta \quad \Delta \not\vdash \delta}{\Delta|\Gamma \vdash t : \tau?\delta \rightsquigarrow \text{if } \delta \text{ then } t \text{ else } \textit{error} : \tau} \mathbf{T}_{DepElim_2}$$

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