

ra-
tio-
nal
au-
tonomously
his-
tory
 $\pi(o_{1:t}) =$
 a_t
re-
flex
pol-
icy
 $\pi(o_t) =$
 a_t
markov
prop-
erty
his-
tory
 $p(s_{t+1} | s_{a:t}, a_{1:t}) =$
 $p(s_{t+1} | s_t, a_t)$
ob-
serv-
able
world
com-
plete
in-
for-
ma-
tion
 $o_t =$
 s_t
par-
tially
ob-
serv-
able
 $o_t \sim$
 $p(o_t | s_t)$
From:
01-
Introduction
slide
24
best
response
op-
er-
a-
tor
 B_i
 l_i
 a_i
 l_i
 a_{-i}
Nash
equi-
lib-
ria
 $\sum_i (u) =$
0
looser
mixed
Nash
equi-
lib-
rium
 $u_1 >$
 $u_3 >$
 $u_4 >$
 $u_2 >$
 $u_3 >$
 $u_1 >$
 $u_2 >$
 u_4
stag-
hunt
game

Chicken

Player 2

a_1

a_2

a_1

0

1

0

-1

a_2

-1

-10

1

-10

Player 1