

Marriage and Misallocation: Evidence from 70 Years of US History

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Motivation

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- ▶ Does this shift enhance productivity?
 - ▶ Specialization à la Becker (1981)
- ▶ Or does it lead to misallocation?
 - ▶ Traditional gender roles make labor allocation deviate from productivity-maximizing choice

Research question

**By how much do traditional gender norms in marriage
constrain aggregate output?**

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“Wives have to stay home and take care of the household”

This paper

- ▶ Empirical facts motivating focus on gender norms *in marriage*

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- ▶ **Build & calibrate structural model**
 - ▶ Measure gender norms in marriage
 - ▶ Perform counterfactuals

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- ▶ **Empirical facts motivating focus on gender norms *in marriage***
- ▶ **Build & calibrate structural model**
 - ▶ Measure gender norms in marriage
 - ▶ Perform counterfactuals
- ▶ **Reduced form analysis to validate model & explore dynamics**

Contributions

1. Aggregate implications of misallocation

- ▶ Restuccia and Rogerson (2008), Hsieh and Klenow (2009), Hsieh et al (2019), Erosa et al (2017)

→ Misallocation due to gender norms associated with marriage

2. Rising Female LFP due to cultural change

- ▶ Fernandez and Wong (2014), Fernandez, Fogli, Olivetti (2004), Fernandez (2013), Fogli and Veldkamp (2011)

→ Quantify the effect of weakening gender roles on female LFP

3. Gender identity & Economics of the family

- ▶ Akerlof and Kranton (2000), Bertrand, Kamenica and Pan (2015)
- ▶ Chiappori, Salanie and Weiss (2017), Chiappori, Iyigun, and Weiss (2009)

→ Embed gender identity into model of household decision-making

4. How gender roles change

- ▶ Kuziemko, Pan, Shen, Washington (2017), Fernandez (2013), Fogli and Veldkamp (2011)


→ Use natural experiment to explore how norms change

Roadmap

1. Motivating facts
2. Model
3. Parameter identification
4. Counterfactuals
5. Reduced form analysis
6. Conclusions

Motivating facts

1. Less traditional attitudes on gender roles over time




Do you approve of a married woman earning money in business or industry if she has a husband capable of supporting her? Yes 0, No 1

General Social Survey

[Other questions](#)

[World](#)

1. Less traditional attitudes on gender roles over time



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Gallup Polls



General Social Survey

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
[World](#)

2. "Unexplained" LFP rose for married women

Residuals from:

$$LFP_{it} = X_{it}\beta + \varepsilon_{it}$$

X_{it} : dummies for age, education, race, # of children



Source: US Census


→ LFP trend for married and single women different. Maybe culture?

3. Once married, time use skewed towards traditional roles

Individual i of age a in year y at event time t :

$$\text{housework}_{iayt} = \sum_{j \neq -1} \alpha_j \cdot \mathbb{1}(j = t) + \beta_a + \gamma_y + v_{ist}$$

Housework's share of
own housework and market hours




Source: Panel Survey of Income Dynamics, 1968-2015

Absolute diff-men


Absolute diff-women

4. Temporary shock to female LFP weakens gender norms



→ Norms evolve endogenously and dynamically

The need for a model




Model

Key features of the model

- ▶ Individuals choose to work in market vs. home
(Roy, 1951; Eaton and Kortum, 2004; Hsieh et al., 2019)
- ▶ Norms wedges lower the value of nontraditional behavior among married couples
(Akerlof and Kranton, 2000; Bertrand et al, 2015)
- ▶ Jointly model education, marriage, labor supply
(Chiappori et al, 2017; Chiappori, et al, 2018)
- ▶ Recursive structure simplifies parameter identification

Three-period model with three choices




Forward-looking; returns to edu in marriage & labor market

Three-period model with three choices




Gains: public goods, risk sharing, marital bliss
Costs: subject to gender roles

Three-period model with three choices




**Married couples get disutility (a.k.a. "norms wedge", τ)
from wives working in the market & husbands working at home**

Three-period model with three choices




Three-period model with three choices



→ **Recursive** structure simplifies parameter identification
(300 or 420 groups of households each year)

Three-period model with three choices



Solve model backwards.

[$t = 3$] Economic utilities (Adaptation of Chiappori et al, 2017)

Marrieds

- ▶ Husband m and wife f . $i \in \{m, f\}$ gets

$$u_i(Q, C_i, L_f, L_m) = \ln(Q) + \ln(C_i - \tau_{Fi} w_f L_f)$$

Singles

- ▶ Not subject to gender roles. i gets

$$\hat{u}_i(\hat{Q}_i, \hat{C}_i) = \ln(\hat{Q}_i) + \ln(\hat{C}_i)$$

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\uparrow \uparrow \uparrow
public private
goods goods

disutility from
wife's market work

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- ▶ Pareto efficiency \Rightarrow couple maximizes **joint** output together UMP

\rightarrow Indirect utilities denoted v_i

Singles

- ▶ Not subject to gender roles. i gets

$$\hat{u}_i(\hat{Q}_i, \hat{C}_i) = \ln(\hat{Q}_i) + \ln(\hat{C}_i)$$

\rightarrow Indirect utilities denoted \hat{v}_i

$[t = 3]$ Optimal labor supply choice: market vs. home

- **Singles** (person i)

$$\hat{L}_i^* = \mathbb{1}(w_i \geq h_i)$$

- **Marrieds** (husband m , wife f)

$$L_f^* = \mathbb{1}[(1 - \tau) \cdot w_f \geq h_f]$$

$$L_m^* = \mathbb{1}[w_m \geq h_m]$$

- Wages and home productivities

1. group (G) component: (gender \times schooling pair \times family composition)
2. idiosyncratic abilities: $\varepsilon_i^w, \varepsilon_i^h \stackrel{i.i.d.}{\sim} \text{Fréchet}(\theta)$

$$w_i = \bar{w}_G \cdot \varepsilon_i^w, \quad h_i = \bar{h}_G \cdot \varepsilon_i^h$$

Firms in the labor market

- ▶ A representative firm in this economy produces the aggregate market output Y^{mkt} from male and female labor:

$$Y^{mkt} = AL = A(L_M + L_F)$$

- ▶ L_g : total efficiency units of labor of gender g

$[t = 2]$ Marriage market choice (Building on Choo and Siow, 2006)

- ▶ S types of men and women, defined by their edu level
- ▶ Idiosyncratic preference for each spousal type $\overset{i.i.d.}{\sim}$ type I extreme-value
- ▶ In equilibrium (Supply = Demand),

$$\frac{n^{qr}}{\sqrt{n^{q0}n^{0r}}} = \frac{\mathbb{E}(v_m^{qr}) + \mathbb{E}(v_f^{qr}) - [\mathbb{E}(\hat{v}_m^q) + \mathbb{E}(\hat{v}_f^r)]}{2} + \psi^{qr}$$

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$$\frac{n^{qr}}{\sqrt{n^{q0}n^{0r}}} = \frac{\overbrace{\mathbb{E}(v_m^{qr}) + \mathbb{E}(v_f^{qr})}^{\text{expected economic utility in match}} - \overbrace{[\mathbb{E}(\hat{v}_m^q) + \mathbb{E}(\hat{v}_f^r)]}^{\text{expected economic utility as singles}}}{2} + \underbrace{\psi^{qr}}_{\substack{\uparrow \\ \text{marital bliss} \\ \text{of match}}}$$

$[t = 1]$ Educational choice

- ▶ Idiosyncratic preference for each edu level $\overset{i.i.d.}{\sim}$ type I extreme-value
- ▶ Women's educational choice:

$$\mathbb{P}(\text{edu } r) = \frac{\exp\{U_F^r\}}{\sum_{s=1}^S \exp\{U_F^s\}}$$

where

$$U_F^r = \sum_{q=0}^S \left[\frac{n^{qr}}{F^r} \mathbb{E}(v_F^{qr}) \right] - \textcolor{red}{c}_F^r$$

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$$U_F^r = \overbrace{\sum_{q=0}^S \left[\frac{n^{qr}}{F^r} \mathbb{E}(v_F^{qr}) \right]}^{\text{expected utility from edu level } r} - \underset{\substack{\uparrow \\ \text{cost of attaining} \\ \text{edu level } r}}}{c_F^r}$$

$[t = 1, 2]$ Education and marriage choice

- ▶ Marriage: compare expected utility, in match vs. as single
- ▶ Education: compare expected utility vs. cost for every education level

Parameter identification

Taking the model to the data

- ▶ Model is fitted to
 - ▶ US decennial census, 1940-2010
 - ▶ Men & women aged 25-54, household heads or spouses of heads
- Economically active age

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 - ▶ **Parameters to be inferred:**
dispersion of market and home abilities (θ), market productivity (\bar{w}),
home productivity (\bar{h}), norms wedges (τ_F, τ_M), marital bliss in each
marriage match (ψ), cost of schooling (c)
 - ▶ **Variables needed:** market wage, LFP, marital status, education, children

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- ▶ Cross-validation
 - ▶ Various attitudinal surveys (1938-2017) in Roper Polls database

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
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→ Higher the closer the spousal education levels are
4. c_g^s : frac of men & women with each edu level
→ The cost of attaining the highest edu level was larger for women 1940-1990, and overturned in 2000


Optimal labor supply decision: market vs home

- ▶ **Single** (woman i): $\hat{L}_i^* = \mathbb{1}(\bar{w}_{single} \varepsilon_i^w \geq \bar{h} \varepsilon_i^h)$
- ▶ **Average wage:** $\text{avrwage}_{single} = \bar{w}_{single} \left(\frac{1}{\text{LFP}_{single}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\theta}} \Gamma \left(1 - \frac{1}{\theta} \right)$




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- ▶ **Married** (wife f): $L_f^* = \mathbb{1}[(1 - \tau) \cdot \bar{w}_{\text{married}} \varepsilon_f^w \geq \bar{h} \varepsilon_f^h]$
- ▶ **Average wage:** $\text{avrwage}_{\text{married}} = \bar{w}_{\text{married}} \left(\frac{1}{\text{LFP}_{\text{married}}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\theta}} \Gamma \left(1 - \frac{1}{\theta} \right)$




Optimal labor supply decision: market vs home

- ▶ **Married** (wife f): $L_f^* = \mathbb{1}[(1 - \tau) \cdot \bar{w}_{\text{married}} \varepsilon_f^w \geq \bar{h} \varepsilon_f^h]$
- ▶ **Average wage:** $\text{avrwage}_{\text{married}} = \bar{w}_{\text{married}} \left(\frac{1}{\text{LFP}_{\text{married}}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\theta}} \Gamma \left(1 - \frac{1}{\theta} \right)$



Optimal labor supply decision: market vs home



$$\tau = 1 - \frac{\text{avrwage}_{single}}{\text{avrwage}_{married}} \left(\frac{1 - \text{LFP}_{single}}{1 - \text{LFP}_{married}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\theta}}$$

What τ captures

τ : by how much LFP choice of marrieds differ from similar singles, not explained by wage differentials

Includes

- ▶ Preference to conform with traditional identity as wife/husband
- ▶ Differential preference for home prod for marrieds relative to singles
- ▶ Differential non-wage treatment by firms
- ▶ Preference for more home-productive women as wife
- ▶ Interdependence between husband & wife's LFP spousal dependence

What τ captures


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
- ▶ Preference to conform with traditional identity as wife
- ▶ Differential preference for home prod for married women relative to single women
- ▶ Differential non-wage treatment by firms
- ▶ Preference for more home-productive women as wife
- ▶ Interdependence between husband & wife's LFP spousal dependence

→ Arguably "gender roles"

τ : gender norms wedges (by group)



τ : gender norms wedges



Matches the answers to various attitudinal survey questions on gender roles in marriage becoming less traditional over time

Attitude trend

Cross-check: τ correlated with attitudes (state-level)

	Dependent variable τ	
	average	median
Regressed on:		
Fraction disapproving of married women working	0.249** (2.21)	0.282** (2.21)
Regressed on:		
Composite attitudinal index	0.450*** (2.94)	0.439** (2.50)
N	51	51

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

t statistics in parentheses; robust standard errors

Counterfactual simulations

Quantifying the importance of norms

selection into marr

**What would have happened in 2000
with norms wedge (τ) at 1940 level (% change)?**

	Adjustment margins	
	Labor supply	Labor supply, marriage, and education
Education		
Women's years of schooling	-	-1.4
Men's years of schooling	-	-0.8
Selection into marriage		
Marriage rate	-	-32.2
Married women's edu/single women's edu	-	-4.1
Married men's edu/single men's edu	-	-1.2


Quantifying the importance of norms

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**What would have happened in 2000
with female norms wedge (τ_F) at 1940 level (% change)?**

	Adjustment margins	
	Labor supply	Labor supply, marriage, and education
Labor Force Participation		
Married women's LFP	-14.3	-17.5
Married men's LFP	-	-0.03
Single women's LFP	-	0.6
Single men's LFP	-	0.1
Output per head		
Married women's market output	-7.0	-13.0
Married women's total output	-2.1	-6.5
Married men's market output	-	-0.8
Married men's total output	-	-0.8
Aggregate market output	-2.0	-4.8
Aggregate market & home output	-0.6	-3.5
Within-household gender earnings gap		
Wife's share of household market income	-11.5	-14.9

Output effects of different counterfactuals \bar{w}, \bar{h}



Reduced form exercise

Reduced form exercise to validate model

- ▶ Want to verify model predictions when norms change
- ▶ BUT, difficult to find *direct* exogenous shock to norms
- ▶ Alternative approach: explore effects of a shock that *indirectly* affects norms & check that other variables change in the expected direction
→ Model validation


WW2 casualties as an indirect shock to gender norms

- ▶ WW2 induced change in gender norms via temporarily higher FLFP (Fernandez, Fogli, and Olivetti, 2004)
- ▶ High draftee casualties have two direct effects:
 - ▶ labor market: male labor supply ↓
 - ▶ marriage market: widows ↑
- Through these effects, induce one-off increase in FLFP.
- ▶ Gender norms evolve as more women work (Fernandez, Fogli, and Olivetti, 2004; Fogli and Veldkamp, 2011; Fernandez, 2013; Bisin and Verdier, 2000 & 2011)
- ▶ One-off shock may propagate over the long-term via cultural change

Reduced form empirical specification

- ▶ County-level casualty measure:


$$casualty_c = \frac{\text{drafted and killed}}{\text{drafted}}$$



- ▶ Difference-in-differences framework

$$Y_{ict} = \alpha_c + \lambda_t + \sum_{t \neq 1940} \beta_t \times casualty_c + X_{ict}\gamma + \varepsilon_{ict}$$

Female LFP gradually increases



Source: US Decennial Census, 1900-2010

Story of one-off shock to FLFP → long-term cultural change

▶ Attitudes

alternative channels

- ▶ Attitude index less traditional

▶ Women's work

- ▶ Gradual ↑ in married women's market work
- ▶ Within household, gradual ↑ in wife's share of hours & income
- ▶ Temporary ↑ in single women's market work

Only married women affected in the long term

▶ Men's work

- ▶ Men's employment barely affected

▶ Marriage

- ▶ Marriage rate ↑
- ▶ Gradual ↑ in average edu of married women

Gender norm as cost to marriage, stronger for higher ability women

▶ Wages

- ▶ Female wage ↓

As more women work, working women less positively selected

Back to model - adding dynamics, using WW2 results

- ▶ **Economywide** dynamics: τ responds to past female LFP


$$\underline{\Delta}\tau_t = f(\underline{\Delta}FLFP_{t-1}, FLFP_{t-1}) + v_t$$

- ▶ Assumptions:
 - ▶ Casualties changed FLFP in 1950 and nothing else
 - ▶ Effect only propagates via changes in norms
- ▶ Estimation strategy:
 - ▶ minimize

$$\sum_t (\text{DiD coeff, } FLFP_t - \text{change in } FLFP_t \text{ in model due to } \underline{\Delta}\tau_t)^2$$

Dynamic counterfactuals


What would happen in 2010 if women were paid male wages, one-off?



Conclusions

Relevance of changing norms around the world

Fraction agreeing that when jobs are scarce, men have more right to a job than women



Source: IPUMS International

Conclusion

- ▶ We do not learn about development *only* from developing countries
- ▶ Rather, we can also learn from a developed country that has undergone large historical changes
 - ▶ Gender norms wedges declined significantly in US, 1940-2000
 - ▶ Gender norms matter for aggregate output
 - ▶ One-off policy inducing a large rise in female LFP may bring economy to a new equilibrium with higher female LFP
- ▶ 1 in 10 countries of the world have female LFP lower than 1940 US


APPENDIX

“Unexplained” female LFP, married vs. single return

Residuals from:


$$LFP_{it} = X_{it}\beta + \varepsilon_{it}$$

X_{it} : dummies for age, education, race, # of children




Source: US Census

Division of labor by gender upon marriage



Source: PSID [Return](#)

Division of labor by gender upon marriage



Source: PSID [Return](#)

2. Corr: traditional attitudes & low married women's LFP


	Dependent variable	
	Married women's LFP	Single women's LFP
	(1)	(2)
Fraction agreeing that when jobs are scarce, men have more right to a job than women	-0.436*** (-3.49)	-0.959* (-1.75)
Wave in sample	5 (2005-2009)	All (1989-2014)
Wave dummies	-	✓
Country dummies	-	✓
N	41	149

t statistics in parentheses; * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Robust SE for column (1), and SE clustered by country for column (2)

Return


3. Over time: less traditional attitudes on gender roles



Source: Gallup Polls, Virginia Slims Survey, PEW Values Survey, General Social Survey

3. Over time: less traditional attitudes on gender roles

Fraction agreeing that when jobs are scarce, men have more right to a job than women



Source: World Values Survey

[Return](#)

Variation in attitudes by individual characteristics

Do you approve of a married woman working in industry/business if she has a husband capable of supporting her?

	Average	F-statistic	Shapley decomp (%)		Average	F-statistic	Shapley decomp (%)
Year				Education			
1930-1939	0.77			Middle school or lower	0.41		
1940-1949	0.71			High school drop-out	0.29		
1970-1979	0.26	6.5	20.1	High school	0.20	88.1	64.6
1980-1989	0.16			College drop-out	0.14		
1990-1999	0.14			College or higher	0.09		
Marital status				Number of children			
Married	0.19			0	0.14		
Widowed	0.28			1	0.17		
Divorced	0.18	4.5	3.2	2	0.18	4.0	13.6
Separated	0.19			3	0.21		
Never married	0.15			4 or more	0.27		
Sex				Age			
Male	0.20			20-29	0.23		
Female	0.18	7.4	0.8	30-39	0.26	1.0	6.7
Race				40-49	0.29		
White	0.28			50-59	0.33		
Black	0.25	13.5	5.5				
Other	0.21						

Return

Marrieds

- ▶ Husband m and wife f . $i \in \{m, f\}$ gets

$$u_i(Q, C_i, L_f, L_m) = \ln(Q) + \ln(C_i - \tau_F w_f L_f - \tau_M h_m (1 - L_m))$$

- Q : public consumption
- C_i : i 's private consumption
- L_i : i 's LFP indicator
- w_i : i 's market wage
- h_i : i 's home productivity
- τ_{Fi} : i 's disutility from $L_f = 1$
- τ_{Mi} : i 's disutility from $L_m = 0$

Singles

- ▶ Not subject to gender roles. i gets

$$\hat{u}_i(\hat{Q}_i, \hat{C}_i) = \ln(\hat{Q}_i) + \ln(\hat{C}_i)$$

The general form of the utility function

return

$$u_i = H\left(f(Q)C_i - r(Q)\left[\tau_F w_f L_f + \tau_M h_m(1 - L_m)\right] + g_i(Q)\right)$$

where the following conditions hold:

Conditions

- C1) H is strictly increasing and strictly concave
- C2) $(H')^{-1}$ is homogeneous or logarithmically homogeneous
- C3) $2p(f')^2 - p \cdot f \cdot f'' + [(1 - \tau_F)w_f L_f + (1 - \tau_M)h_m(1 - L_m)](r''f' - r'f'') - f'g'' + g'f'' > 0$, where $g(Q) \equiv g_m(Q) + g_f(Q)$

Married couple's utility maximization problem

return

$$\begin{aligned} \max_{Q, C_f, C_m} \quad & Q(C_f + C_m - \tau_F w_f L_f - \tau_M h_m(1 - L_m)) \\ \text{s.t.} \quad & pQ + C_f + C_m = w_m L_m + w_f L_f + h_m(1 - L_m) + h_f(1 - L_f) \end{aligned}$$

Optimal public and private consumption

$$\begin{aligned}Q &= \frac{w_m L_m + (w_f - \tilde{k}) L_f + (b_m - \tilde{h})(1 - L_m) + b_f(1 - L_f)}{2p} \\&= \frac{w_m L_m + k w_f L_f + h b_m(1 - L_m) + b_f(1 - L_f)}{2p} \\C &= pQ + \tilde{k} L_f + \tilde{h}(1 - L_m)\end{aligned}$$

return

Marrieds

- ▶ For Pareto efficiency, couple acts as single decision unit maximizing joint marital output budget constraint

$$\begin{aligned} \max_{Q,C} & Q(C - [k_f + k_m]L_f - [h_f + h_m](1 - L_m)) \\ \text{s.t. } & pQ + C = w_m L_m + w_f L_f + b_m(1 - L_m) + b_f(1 - L_f) \end{aligned}$$

- ▶ w_i : i 's market wage, b_i : i 's home productivity
- ▶ Efficient risk sharing \Rightarrow ratio of MU of private consumption equals endogenously determined Pareto weight μ

$$\frac{\partial u_m}{\partial C_m} = \mu \frac{\partial u_f}{\partial C_f}$$

- ▶ Indirect utilities

$$v_m = 2 \ln Q + \ln p + \ln \frac{1}{1 + \mu}, \quad v_f = 2 \ln Q + \ln p + \ln \frac{\mu}{1 + \mu}$$

Singles

Separate budget constraints for market & home-produced goods

The maximization problem is equivalent to solving

$$\max_{Q,C,Y,B} (Q + Y)(C + B - \tilde{k}L_f - \tilde{h}(1 - L_m))$$

s.t.

$$pQ + C = w_m L_m + w_f L_f$$

$$pY + B = b_m(1 - L_m) + b_f(1 - L_f)$$

- ▶ Y : the non-rival, public component of home production (e.g. cleaning of communal area, or food preparation for children)
- ▶ $B \equiv B_m + B_f$: the total consumption of the private component of home production (e.g. cleaning of private space, laundry of clothes)

return

Selection issues in comparing marrieds to singles


- ▶ I use singles' labor supply behavior as a benchmark to compare marrieds' labor supply behavior

→ Selection problem: marrieds and singles are different

1. Market wages → incorporated into the model
2. Home productivity → fall in τ_F, τ_M over time is underestimated, so my counterfactual computation is a lower bound
3. Gender role attitudes → fine as long as calibrating the norms wedge applying to marrieds

return


Composite index of attitudes [All questions](#)



Source: Gallup Polls, Virginia Slims Survey, PEW Values Survey, General Social Survey


[return](#)

WW2 casualties gradually change attitudes




[return](#)

Economically active age range



θ : measure of dispersion of market & home abilities [return](#)

- MLE based on the distribution of real hourly wages, adjusting for selection into labor market




$\hat{\theta}$	1.837*** (18.31)
N	3570573

t statistics based on standard errors
clustered by sex in parentheses


* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Similar to Hsieh et al (2018)'s estimate of 1.52 for the dispersion of abilities across occupations, and their choice to use 2 for conducting counterfactuals

ψ : Noneconomics gains to marriage match [return](#)



Matches the well-documented assortative matching by education



Strong corr between attitude index & time allocation

	1(Wife works) (1)	Wife's weekly market hours (2)	Husband's share of housework (3)
Attitude	-0.217*** (-2.92)	-18.44**** (-5.08)	-0.144*** (-2.97)
N	4158	4108	1573

t statistics in parentheses; *** $p < 0.01$, **** $p < 0.001$


Attitude $\in [0, 1]$, with higher value indicating more traditional gender role attitudes

Includes individual FE, state FE, year FE. SE clustered at the individual level

Results robust to controlling for age, age², youngest child's age,
number of children, household size

Data: Work and Family Life Study, 1980-2000 [return](#)

Relative marriage rate of educated women increasing




Source: Bar et al (2018)

[return](#)

Cross-elasticity between spouses' LFPs likely stable over time

- ▶ Elasticity of L_f w.r.t. husband's earnings quite stable over time



Residualized for own and spousal years of schooling, number of children under 18, number of children under 5, family size, age, race, US county dummies

[return](#)

Alternative channels of long-term effects of WW2 casualties

return

- ▶ Gender ratio fell, increasing husbands' bargaining power
 - ▶ But men have more traditional views
- ▶ Increased the stigma of remaining single
 - ▶ But this would predict a decrease in married women's labor force participation, because it affects the marginal *man's* marriage choice more
- ▶ Female wage increased
 - ▶ But female wage did not increase. Could it be that observed female wage did not increase because higher female wage induced lower ability women to start working? It is unlikely that indirect effect dominates the direct effect.
- ▶ Increased marketization of home production, which induces higher ability women to get married more (Bar et al, 2018)
 - ▶ But the number of children fell
- ▶ Birth control pill enabled family planning
 - ▶ But availability of birth control pill should not be correlated with casualties