Finding Bugs Without Running Or Even Looking At Code

Impossible!

Jay Parlar

#formalmethods

Finding Bugs

Finding Bugs

• Reviewing pull requests

Finding Bugs

- Reviewing pull requests
- Testing

Finding Bugs

- Reviewing pull requests
- Testing
- Static analyzers

Talking to an expert and writing stuff down!

"Writing is nature's way of letting you know how sloppy your thinking is"

- Dick Guindon


What you're probably thinking

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 How should we write down our thoughts/ designs/plans?

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- How should we write down our thoughts/ designs/plans?
- Did I really come to a talk about bug discovery, where the solution is "go talk to people and write stuff down"?



Our Example

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• Accounts, Resources, Users

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- Resources and Users belong to Accounts

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Our Example

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- Resources and Users belong to Accounts
- Users can have direct access to Resources
- Resources can have a parent Resource
- If a User can access a parent Resource, then they get access to any child Resources

Let's see some Alloy!

What'd we do?

What'd we do?

Design validation

What'd we do?

- Design validation
- Design exploration

Real Life Example

Systems

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• Multiple customer portals

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- Sessions

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- Identity provider

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- Identity provider
- Auth tokens ("old style" and "new style")
- SAML requests/responses
- And more...

Modelled Operations

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• User navigating to different portals

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- · Portals initiating SAML flows

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check PortalTokenAlwaysPresentInIdentityProvider {
    // If at any time any of our customer portals has an
    // identity token for a user, then our Identity Provider
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        some portal: CustomerPortal |
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- There should be NO POSSIBLE TIME t in which
 - there is some customer portal
 - for which
 - that portal has a token for the user
 - and Identity does not know about the token


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
Counterexample found. Assertion is invalid. 6627ms.


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
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











































































I never looked at a single line of code!


Real Life "Design Flaw"


Model for understanding































Takeaways

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• Write things down

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- Write things down
- Model existing systems

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- Model existing systems
- Model new systems

Resources

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• alloytools.org/book.html

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- alloytools.org/book.html
- www.aosabook.org/en/500L/the-same-origin-policy.html

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- <u>lamport.azurewebsites.net/tla/learning.html</u> (TLA+)

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- <u>lamport.azurewebsites.net/tla/learning.html</u> (TLA+)
- <u>learntla.com</u> (TLA+)
- Multiple formal methods friends at Strange Loop!

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