

# CSF 434/534: Advanced Network and System Security

## Week 04 - Review

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Sources: Professor Messer's CompTIA SY0-501 Security+ Course Notes

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# Bluejacking and Bluesnarfing



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## Bluejacking and Bluesnarfing

### Bluejacking

- ✓ Sending of unsolicited messages to another device via Bluetooth
  - ✓ No mobile carrier required!
- ✓ Typical functional distance is about 10 meters
  - ✓ More or less, depending on antenna and interference
- ✓ Bluejack with an address book object
  - ✓ Instead of contact name, write a message
    - "You are Bluejacked!"
  - ✓ "You are Bluejacked! Add to contacts?"
- ✓ Third-party software may also be used
  - ✓ Bloover, Bluesniff

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## Bluejacking and Bluesnarfing

### Bluesnarfing

- ✓ Access a Bluetooth-enabled device and transfer data
  - ✓ Contact list, calendar, email, pictures, video, etc.
- ✓ First major security weakness in Bluetooth
  - ✓ Marcel Holtmann in September 2003 and Adam Laurie in November 2003
  - ✓ This weakness was patched
- ✓ Serious security issue
  - ✓ If you know the file, you can download it without authentication

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# RFID and NFC Attacks




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## RFID and NFC Attacks

### RFID (Radio-frequency identification)

- ☑ It's everywhere
  - ☑ Credit / debit cards
  - ☑ Access badges
  - ☑ Inventory/Assembly line tracking
  - ☑ Pet/Animal identification
  - ☑ Anything that needs to be tracked
- ☑ Radar technology
  - ☑ Radio energy transmitted to the tag
  - ☑ RF powers the tag, ID is transmitted back
  - ☑ Bidirectional communication
  - ☑ Some tag formats can be active/powered



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## RFID and NFC Attacks

### RFID Attacks

- ☑ Data capture
  - ☑ View communication
  - ☑ Replay attack
- ☑ Spoof the reader
  - ☑ Write your own data to the tag
- ☑ Denial of service
  - ☑ Signal jamming
- ☑ Decrypt communication
  - ☑ Many default keys are on The Google

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## RFID and NFC Attacks

### Near field communication (NFC)

- ☑ Two-way wireless communication
  - ☑ Builds on RFID, which was one-way
- ☑ Payment systems
  - ☑ Google wallet and MasterCard partnership
- ☑ Bootstrap for other wireless
  - ☑ NFC helps with Bluetooth pairing
- ☑ Access token, identity "card"
  - ☑ Short range with encryption support



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## RFID and NFC Attacks

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### NFC Security Concern

- ☑ Remote capture
  - ☑ It's a wireless network
  - ☑ 10 meters for active devices
- ☑ Frequency jamming
  - ☑ Denial of service
- ☑ Relay / Replay attack
  - ☑ Man in the middle
- ☑ Loss of NFC device control
  - ☑ Stolen/lost phone

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## Wireless Disassociation Attacks

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## Wireless Disassociation Attacks

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### It started as a normal day

- ☑ Surfing along on your wireless network
  - ☑ And then you're not
- ☑ And then it happens again
  - ☑ And again
- ☑ You may not be able to stop it
  - ☑ There's (almost) nothing you can do
  - ☑ Time to get a long patch cable
- ☑ Wireless disassociation
  - ☑ A significant wireless denial of service (DoS) attack

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## Wireless Disassociation Attacks

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### 802.11 management frames

- ☑ 802.11 wireless includes a number of management features
  - ☑ Frames that make everything work
  - ☑ You never see them
- ☑ Important for the operation of 802.11 wireless
  - ☑ How to find access points, manage QoS, associate/ disassociate with an access point, etc.
- ☑ Original wireless standards did not add protection for management frames
  - ☑ Sent in the clear
  - ☑ No authentication or validation

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## Wireless Disassociation Attacks

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### Protecting against disassociation

- ☑ IEEE has already addressed the problem
  - ☑ 802.11w - July 2014
- ☑ Some of the important management frames are encrypted
  - ☑ Disassociate, deauthenticate, channel switch announcements, etc.
- ☑ Not everything is encrypted
  - ☑ Beacons, probes, authentication, association
  - ☑ Cart before the horse
- ☑ 802.11w is required for 802.11ac compliance
  - ☑ This will roll out going forward

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## Cryptographic Attacks

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## Cryptographic Attacks

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### Cryptographic attacks

- ☑ You've encrypted data and sent it to another person
  - ☑ Is it really secure?
  - ☑ How do you know?
- ☑ The bad guy doesn't have the combination (the key)
  - ☑ So they break the safe (the cryptography)
- ☑ Finding ways to undo the security
  - ☑ There are many potential cryptographic shortcomings

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## Cryptographic Attacks

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### Known plaintext attack (KPA)

- ☑ Attacker has both the plaintext and the encrypted data
  - ☑ If you know the original plaintext, you may be able to find a "wedge" that is revealed in the ciphertext
  - ☑ The known plaintext is the crib
- ☑ WWII Enigma cipher
  - ☑ Easier to break if you knew some plaintext
  - ☑ Daily weather report (wetter)
  - ☑ Numbers were common (eins)
  - ☑ Royal Air Force would "seed" the North Sea with mines
  - ☑ Future messages would reference the harbor name

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## Cryptographic Attacks

### The password file


- ✓ Different across operating systems
- ✓ Different hash methods
- ✓ Linux Account Hashes
  - ✓ Jumper Bay:1001::42e2f19c31c9ff73cb97eb1b26c10f54::Carter:1007::cf4eb977a6859c76efd21f5094ecf77d::Jackson:1008::e1f757d9cdc06690509e04b5446317d2::O'Neill:1009::78a8c423faedd2f002c6aef69a0ac1af::Teal'c:1010::bf84666c81974686e50d300bc36aea01::

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## Cryptographic Attacks

### Rainbow tables

- ✓ An optimized, pre-built set of hashes
  - ✓ Doesn't need to contain every hash
  - ✓ The calculations have already been done
- ✓ Remarkable speed increase
  - ✓ Especially with longer password lengths
- ✓ Need different tables for different hashing methods (MD5 / SHA1)
  - ✓ Windows is different than MySQL
- ✓ Rainbow tables won't work with salted hashes
  - ✓ Additional random value added to the original hash
  - ✓ e.g (password + random bit/byte sequence)



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## Cryptographic Attacks

### Dictionary attacks

- ✓ People use common words as passwords
  - ✓ You can find them in the dictionary
- ✓ If you're using brute force, you should start with the easy ones
  - ✓ password, ninja, football
- ✓ Many common wordlists available on the 'net
  - ✓ Some are customized by language or line of work
- ✓ This will catch the low-hanging fruit
  - ✓ You'll need some smarter attacks for the smarter people

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## Cryptographic Attacks

### Brute force

- ✓ The password is the key
  - ✓ Secret phrase
  - ✓ Stored hash
- ✓ Brute force attacks - Online
  - ✓ Keep trying the login process
  - ✓ Very slow
  - ✓ Most accounts will lockout after a number of failed attempts
- ✓ Brute force the hash - Offline
  - ✓ Obtain the list of users and hashes
  - ✓ Calculate a password hash, compare it to a stored hash
  - ✓ Large computational resource requirement

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## Cryptographic Attacks

### Birthday attack

- ✓ In a classroom of 23 students, what is the chance of two students sharing a birthday?
  - ✓ 23 students - about 50%
  - ✓ For a class of 30, the chance is about 70%
- ✓ In the digital world, this is a hash collision
  - ✓ A hash collision is the same hash value for two different plaintexts
  - ✓ Find a collision through brute force
- ✓ The attacker will generate multiple versions of plaintext to match the hashes
  - ✓ Protect yourself with a large hash output size

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## Cryptographic Attacks

### Collisions

- ✓ Hash digests are supposed to be unique
  - ✓ Different input data should never create the same hash
- ✓ MD5 hash
  - ✓ Message Digest Algorithm 5
  - ✓ First published in April 1992
  - ✓ Collisions identified in 1996
- ✓ December 2008: Researchers created CA certificate that appeared legitimate when MD5 is checked
  - ✓ Built other certificates that appeared to be legit and issued by RapidSSL

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## Cryptographic Attacks

### Downgrade attack

- ✓ Instead of using perfectly good encryption, use something that's not so great
  - ✓ Force the systems to downgrade their security
- ✓ 1995 - SSL/TLS vulnerability - FREAK - Factoring RSA Export Keys
  - ✓ Public key pairs can be limited to 512 bits or less
    - 1990 U.S. cryptography export regulations
- ✓ Weak keys could be forced during the SSL handshake
- ✓ Modern systems can easily brute force the small keys
- ✓ Vulnerability was patched

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## Cryptographic Attacks

### Weak implementations

- ✓ Weak encryption
  - ✓ One weak link breaks the entire chain
- ✓ 802.11 WEP
  - ✓ The RC4 key can be recovered by gathering enough packets
  - ✓ The algorithm didn't sufficiently protect the key
- ✓ DES - Data Encryption Standard
  - ✓ Relatively small 56-bit keys
  - ✓ Modern systems can brute force this pretty quickly

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
## Cryptographic Attacks

### Replay attacks

- ✓ Some cryptographic algorithms are more susceptible than others to a replay attack
- ✓ A hash with no salt, no session ID tracking, no encryption
- ✓ Replay countermeasure may be part of the cryptography
- ✓ Kerberos and Kerberos derivatives include time stamps
- ✓ Anything after the time to live (TTL) is discarded

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## Threat Actors




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## Threat Actors

### Threat actors and attributes

- ✓ The entity responsible for an event that has an impact on the safety of another entity
  - ✓ Also called a malicious actor
- ✓ Broad scope of actors
  - ✓ And motivations vary widely
- ✓ Intelligence can come from everywhere
  - ✓ Open source intelligence is a massive starting point




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## Threat Actors

### Script kiddies

- ✓ Runs premade scripts without any knowledge of what's really happening
  - ✓ Not necessarily a youngster
- ✓ Can be internal or external
  - ✓ But usually external
- ✓ Not very sophisticated
- ✓ No formal funding
  - ✓ Looking for low hanging fruit
- ✓ Motivated by the hunt
  - ✓ Working the ego, trying to make a name




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## Threat Actors

### Hacktivist

- ✓ A hacker with a purpose
  - ✓ Social change or a political agenda
  - ✓ Often an external entity
- ✓ Can be remarkably sophisticated
  - ✓ Very specific hacks
  - ✓ DoS, web site defacing, release of private documents, etc.
- ✓ Funding is limited
  - ✓ Some organizations have fundraising options



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## Threat Actors

### Organized crime

- ✓ Professional criminals
  - ✓ Motivated by money
  - ✓ Almost always an external entity
- ✓ Very sophisticated
  - ✓ Best hacking money can buy
- ✓ Crime that's organized
  - ✓ One person hacks, one person manages the exploits, another person sells the data, another handles customer support
- ✓ Lots of capital to fund hacking efforts

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## Threat Actors

### Nation states / APT (Advanced persistent threat)

- ✓ Governments
  - ✓ National security, job security
  - ✓ Always an external entity
- ✓ Highest sophistication
  - ✓ Military control, utilities, financial control
  - ✓ United States and Israel destroyed 1,000 nuclear centrifuges with the Stuxnet worm
- ✓ Constant attacks
  - ✓ Advanced Persistent Threat (APT)
- ✓ Massive resources available

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## Threat Actors

### Insiders

- ✓ More than just passwords on sticky notes
  - ✓ Some insiders are out for no good
- ✓ Sophistication may not be advanced, but the insider has institutional knowledge
  - ✓ Attacks can be directed at vulnerable systems
  - ✓ The bad guy knows what to hit
- ✓ Extensive resources
  - ✓ Eating away from the inside

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## Threat Actors

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### Competitors

- ☑ Many different motivations
  - ☑ DoS, espionage, harm reputation
- ☑ High level of sophistication
  - ☑ The competitive upside is huge (and very unethical)
- ☑ Many different intents
  - ☑ Shut down your competitor during an event
  - ☑ Steal customer lists
  - ☑ Corrupt manufacturing databases
  - ☑ Take financial information

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## Penetration Testing

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## Penetration Testing

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### Penetration Testing

- ☑ Pentest
  - ☑ Simulate an attack
- ☑ Similar to vulnerability scanning
  - ☑ Except we actually try to exploit the vulnerabilities
- ☑ Often a compliance mandate
  - ☑ Regular penetration testing by a 3rd-party
- ☑ Technical Guide to Information Security Testing and Assessment
  - ☑ <http://www.professormesser.link/800115>

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## Penetration Testing

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### Verify a threat exists

- ☑ Stay up-to-date
  - ☑ New threats all the time
- ☑ National Institute of Standards and Technology National Vulnerability Database
  - ☑ <http://nvd.nist.gov>
- ☑ Perform regular vulnerability scans
  - ☑ Update your signatures
- ☑ Watch the news - Copycats are prevalent

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## Penetration Testing

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### Passive reconnaissance

- ✓ Learn as much as you can from open sources
  - ✓ There's a lot of information out there
  - ✓ Remarkably difficult to protect or identify
- ✓ Social media
- ✓ Corporate web site, online forums, Reddit
- ✓ Social engineering, dumpster diving
- ✓ Business organizations

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## Penetration Testing

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### Active reconnaissance

- ✓ Trying the doors
  - ✓ Maybe one is unlocked
  - ✓ Don't open it yet
  - ✓ Relatively easy to be seen
- ✓ Ping scans, port scans
- ✓ DNS queries
- ✓ OS scans, OS fingerprinting
- ✓ Service scans, version scans

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## Penetration Testing

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### Exploiting vulnerabilities

- ✓ Try to break into the system
  - ✓ Be careful; this can cause a denial of service or loss of data
  - ✓ Buffer overflows can cause instability
  - ✓ Gain privilege escalation
- ✓ You may need to try many different vulnerability types
  - ✓ Password brute-force
  - ✓ Social engineering
  - ✓ Database injections
  - ✓ Buffer overflows
- ✓ You'll only be sure you're vulnerable if you can bypass security
  - ✓ If you can get through, the bad guys can get through

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## Penetration Testing

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### The process

- ✓ Initial exploitation
  - ✓ Get into the network
  - ✓ A challenging hurdle (most of the time)
- ✓ Persistence
  - ✓ Once you're there, you need to make sure there's a way back in
  - ✓ Set up a backdoor
  - ✓ Build user accounts, change or verify default passwords
- ✓ The pivot
  - ✓ The foothold point
  - ✓ The inside of the network is often relatively open
  - ✓ Jump from here to the rest of the network

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## Penetration Testing

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### Black box, white box, and grey box

- ☑ How much do you know about the test?
  - ☑ Many different approaches
- ☑ Black box
  - ☑ The pentester knows nothing about the systems under attack
  - ☑ “Blind” test
- ☑ White box
  - ☑ Full disclosure
- ☑ Grey box
  - ☑ A mix of black and white
  - ☑ Focus on certain systems or applications

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## Vulnerability Scanning

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## Vulnerability Scanning

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### Vulnerability scanning

- ☑ Usually minimally invasive, unlike a penetration test
- ☑ Port scan - Poke around and see what's open
- ☑ Identify systems and security devices
- ☑ Test from the outside and inside
  - ☑ Don't dismiss insider threats
- ☑ Gather as much information as possible
  - ☑ We'll separate wheat from chaff later

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## Vulnerability Scanning

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### Scan types

- ☑ Scanners are very powerful
  - ☑ Use many different techniques to identify vulnerabilities
- ☑ Non-intrusive scans
  - ☑ Gather information, don't try to exploit a vulnerability
- ☑ Intrusive scans
  - ☑ You'll try out the vulnerability to see if it works
- ☑ Non-credentialed scans
  - ☑ The scanner can't login to the remote device
- ☑ Credentialed scan
  - ☑ You're a normal user, emulates an insider attack

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## Vulnerability Scanning

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### Identify vulnerability

- ☑ The scanner looks for everything
  - ☑ Well, not everything ~
  - ☑ The signatures are the key
- ☑ The vulnerabilities can be cross-referenced online
  - ☑ Almost all scanners give you a place to go
  - ☑ National Vulnerability Database: <http://nvd.nist.gov/>
  - ☑ Microsoft Security Bulletins
- ☑ Some vulnerabilities cannot be definitively identified
  - ☑ You'll have to check manually to see if a system is vulnerable
  - ☑ But the scanner gives you a heads-up

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## Vulnerability Scanning

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### Vulnerability scan results

- ☑ Lack of security controls
  - ☑ No firewall, no anti-virus, no anti-spyware
- ☑ Misconfigurations - Open shares, guest access
- ☑ Real vulnerabilities
  - ☑ Especially newer ones, occasionally the old ones

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## Vulnerability Scanning

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### Dealing with false positives

- ☑ False positives
  - ☑ A vulnerability is identified that doesn't really exist
- ☑ This is different than a low-severity vulnerability
  - ☑ It's real, but it may not be your highest priority
- ☑ False negatives
  - ☑ A vulnerability exists, but you didn't detect it
- ☑ Update to the latest signatures
  - ☑ If you don't know about it, you can't see it
  - ☑ Work with the vulnerability detection manufacturer
  - ☑ They may need to update their signatures for your environment

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## Vulnerability Types

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## Vulnerability Types

### Vulnerability types

- ☑ There are many types of vulnerabilities
  - ☑ Some digital, some physical
- ☑ Cover a broad scope
  - ☑ Programming, network design, process/procedure
- ☑ Any of these can be exploited at any time
  - ☑ Or multiples at the same time
  - ☑ Be on your toes

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## Vulnerability Types

### Race condition

- ☑ A programming conundrum
  - ☑ Sometimes, things happen at the same time
  - ☑ This can be bad if you've not planned for it
- ☑ Two bank accounts with \$100
  - ☑ User 1 and User 2 transfer \$50 from Account A to Account B
  - ☑ Expected outcome: Account A has \$50, Account B has \$150
- ☑ What if you don't perform proper validation?
  - ☑ User 1 and User 2 check the account balances (\$100 in each account)
  - ☑ User 1 transfers \$50 from Account A (now at \$50) to Account B (now at \$150)
  - ☑ At about the same time, user 2 transfers \$50 from Account A (still has \$100, right?, so now at \$50) to Account B (now at \$200)
- ☑ Outcome: Account A has \$50, Account B has \$200

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## Vulnerability Types

### Race conditions can cause big problems

- ☑ January 2004 - Mars rover "Spirit"
  - ☑ Reboot when a problem is identified
  - ☑ Problem is with the file system and prevents rebooting
  - ☑ Reboot because of the file system problem
- ☑ GE Energy - Energy Management System
  - ☑ When multiple power lines failed at the same time, no alert was sent
  - ☑ Caused the Northeast Blackout of 2003
- ☑ Therac-25 radiation therapy machine in the 1980s
  - ☑ Used software interlocks instead of hardware
  - ☑ Race condition caused 100 times the normal dose of radiation
  - ☑ Six patients injured, three deaths

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## Vulnerability Types

### End-of-life vulnerabilities

- ☑ End-of-life
  - ☑ Without vendor support, no security patches
- ☑ March 2017 - Microsoft patches Windows to protect against SMB vulnerability
  - ☑ Windows XP, Windows 8, and Server 2003 were end-of-life and not included
- ☑ May 2017 - WannaCrypt ransomware infects hundreds of thousands of computers
  - ☑ End-of-life systems were wide open
- ☑ Upgrade to maintain security
  - ☑ No other choice

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## Vulnerability Types

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### Lack of vendor support

- ☑ Security requires diligence
  - ☑ The potential for a vulnerability is always there
- ☑ Vendors are the only ones who can fix their products
  - ☑ Assuming they know about the problem
  - ☑ And care about fixing it
- ☑ Trane Comfortlink II thermostats
  - ☑ Control the temperature from your phone
  - ☑ Trane notified of three vulnerabilities in April 2014
  - ☑ Two patched in April 2015, one in January 2016

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## Vulnerability Types

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### Improper input handling

- ☑ Many applications accept user input
  - ☑ We put data in, we get data back
- ☑ All input should be considered malicious
  - ☑ Check everything. Trust nobody.
- ☑ Allowing invalid input can be devastating
  - ☑ SQL injections, buffer overflows, denial of service
- ☑ It takes a lot of work to find input that can be used maliciously
  - ☑ But they will find it

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## Vulnerability Types

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### Improper error handling

- ☑ Errors happen
  - ☑ And you should probably know about it
- ☑ Messages should be just informational enough
  - ☑ Avoid too much detail
  - ☑ Network information, memory dump, stack traces, database dumps
- ☑ This is an easy one to find and fix
  - ☑ A development best-practice

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## Vulnerability Types

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### Misconfiguration/weak configuration

- ☑ Very easy to leave a door open
  - ☑ The hackers will always find it
- ☑ September 2015 - Patreon is compromised
  - ☑ Used a debugger to help troubleshoot site issues
  - ☑ Was left exposed to the Internet
  - ☑ Effectively allowed for remote code executions
  - ☑ Gigabytes of customer data was released online
- ☑ June 2017 - 14 million Verizon records exposed
  - ☑ Third-party left an Amazon S3 data repository open
  - ☑ Researcher found the data before the bad guys

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## Week 04 - Review

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