

# Research Cybersecurity Insights for 2022

**Jim Basney**  
Director, Trusted CI

EDUCAUSE Annual Conference  
October 2022





# Trusted CI: The NSF Cybersecurity Center of Excellence

Our mission: to lead in the development of an NSF Cybersecurity Ecosystem with the workforce, knowledge, processes, and cyberinfrastructure that enables trustworthy science and NSF's vision of a nation that is a global leader in research and innovation.



<https://trustedci.org/>



## Trusted CI Impacts Report

March 2022  
*For Public Distribution*

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Dopheide, Jeannette, Zage, John, & Basney, Jim. (2022). Trusted CI Impacts Report. Zenodo. doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.6374207

# What is Cyberinfrastructure (CI)?

"The comprehensive infrastructure needed to capitalize on dramatic advances in information technology has been termed cyberinfrastructure (CI). Cyberinfrastructure integrates hardware for computing, data and networks, digitally-enabled sensors, observatories and experimental facilities, and an interoperable suite of software and middleware services and tools."

-NSF Cyberinfrastructure Vision for 21st Century Discovery





Image credit: NSF

# NSF BY THE NUMBERS



# NSF Cyberinfrastructure

- Major Facilities / Large Facilities
- Mid-scale Facilities
- ACCESS Resource Providers
- Campus Cyberinfrastructure (CC\*)
- Software & Services (CICI, CSSI, etc.)
- People & Expertise (CyberTraining)

# NSF Major Facilities (examples)

| Facility   | Managing Institution(s)  |
|--|--|
| Arecibo Observatory                                    | University of Central Florida  |
| Academic Research Fleet                                | University of Washington, Oregon State University  |
| IceCube Neutrino Observatory                           | University of Wisconsin  |
| International Ocean Discovery Program                  | Texas A&M, University of California-San Diego<br>(Scripps Institution of Oceanography)       |
| Leadership-Class Computing Facility                    | University of Texas, Austin  |
| Large Hadron Collider                                  | SUNY Stony Brook, Columbia University,<br>University of Nebraska-Lincoln, Cornell University |
| Laser Interferometer Gravitational-wave<br>Observatory | California Institute of Technology   |
| National High Magnetic Field Lab                       | Florida State University   |

# JASON Report on Facilities Cybersecurity

- 7 recommendations on risk assessment, strategy coordination, annual reviews, incident response, resourcing, planning, and national security:  
[https://www.nsf.gov/news/special\\_reports/jasonreportcybersecurity/](https://www.nsf.gov/news/special_reports/jasonreportcybersecurity/)
- Trusted CI support, aligned with the Framework:  
<https://trustedci.org/2022-jason-report>
- New NSF Cybersecurity Advisor for Research Infrastructure  
<https://beta.nsf.gov/careers/openings/od/od/od-2022-87834>

# NSF Science and Compliance

While many cybersecurity compliance programs exist (e.g. HIPAA, FISMA, NIST 800-171), most NSF research (e.g. astronomy, climate, physics, geology) do not fall under a compliance program.



*Gemini South on the summit of Cerro Pachón in Chile (left) and Gemini North on the summit of Maunakea in Hawai'i (right).*

Image credit: Gemini/NSF/AURA

# NSF Cybersecurity Governance

NSF does not prescribe cybersecurity - it is the responsibility of the awardee.



*"NSF's responsibility is for overseeing the Recipient's development and management of the facility as well as assuring the successful performance of the funded activities. **The Recipient is responsible for the day-to-day management of the facility.**"*

NSF Research Infrastructure Guide (NSF 21-107), December 2021. Emphasis from source document.

# The Value of the NSF Approach

NSF's approach allows NSF projects the flexibility to shape their cybersecurity program to best support their science mission.



# Cybersecurity supports organizational mission

Organizational mission translates into different priorities for cybersecurity.

Imagine the program for a bank and hospital – confidentiality, availability, Integrity, resilience, etc. are all prioritized differently.



# The Trusted CI Framework

The Trusted CI Framework establishes  
**best cybersecurity practices** for cybersecurity programs.



- 16 clear and concise requirements.
- Based on best practices and evidence of what works.
- Designed to be universal and timeless.

It focuses on cybersecurity programmatic:

**Mission Alignment, Governance, Resources, and Controls.**

This goes beyond technical controls to address the full spectrum of cybersecurity best practices.

<https://www.trustedci.org/framework>

# Framework Implementation Guide for Research Cyberinfrastructure Operators



The guide gives research organizations a community-tailored head start on choosing among good paths and avoiding treacherous ones.

Includes:

- roadmaps for establishing mature cybersecurity programs
- tailored advice on overcoming common challenges
- pointers to resources, including our publicly available tools and templates

Built by Trusted CI's experienced multi-institutional team, and vetted by a **Framework Advisory Board** representing the diversity of our community.

<https://www.trustedci.org/framework>

# Framework Adopters

## Example Framework Adopters:

- FABRIC
- GAGE
- LIGO
- NOIRLab
- NRAO
- NSO
- OOI
- ResearchSOC



GAGE 

OCEAN  
OBSERVATORIES  
INITIATIVE



<https://www.trustedci.org/framework>

# Growing Ransomware Risk to Science

Ransomware has changed the cybercrime landscape, broadly expanding potential victims to include hospitals, schools, cities, and researchers.

Trusted CI Collaboration with Michigan State University office of the CIO to document impact of ransomware attack on research.

Report available at:  
[hdl.handle.net/2022/26638](https://hdl.handle.net/2022/26638)



Research at Risk:  
Ransomware Attack on Physics and Astronomy Case Study

Aug 1, 2021

*Distribution:* **Public**

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<sup>1</sup> Engagement Lead, Andrew Adams

# Science Gateways Security

September 2013: "Science Gateway Security Recommendations" at the Science Gateway Institute Workshop in Indianapolis

Partnership with Science Gateways Community Institute (SGCI) since 2016


Participation at Gateways conference and SGCI Focus Weeks

Engagements with ChemCOnpute, COIN-OR, COSMIC2, CyberGIS, Data@Risk, EarthCube, Galaxy, GenAPP, GISandbox, Hydroshare, Ike Wai, I-TASSER, SciGaP, SeedMeLab

September 2021: "Recommendations For Improving the Security of a Science Gateway"



Science Gateways  
Community Institute



The image shows the front cover of a research paper titled "Science Gateway Security Recommendations". The cover features two authors' names and their affiliations: Jim Basney from the National Center for Supercomputing Applications at the University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign, and Von Welch from the Center for Applied Cybersecurity Research at Indiana University Bloomington. The paper's abstract discusses the security concerns of science gateways, mentioning standard security concerns like data integrity and availability, and how they differ from general web applications. It also highlights the importance of security recommendations for researchers. The keywords listed are "science gateways" and "security". The paper is identified as being based on work supported by the National Science Foundation under grant numbers 1127210 and 1234408.

Recommendations For Improving the Security of  
a Science Gateway



cybersecurity time and funding  
takeaways to empower science

research, [Trusted CI](#) has partnered with security expertise for high-powered through this partnership we have worked on cybersecurity challenges. The following science gateway community and are by a typical small science gateway team. [Must\(s\)](#) most relevant to the science related to the Musts, science [Implementation Guide for Research](#)

<https://trustedci.org/sciencegateways>

users, exposing SSH to attackers. To ensure best practices: enable two-factor authentication; utilize an automated blocking system; enable multi-factor authentication and disable password algorithms; filter (when possible) known

[CIS Controls #16](#)

service availability through the threat to monitor the system and send issue daily summary emails. [Controls #8](#)

# Science DMZ Security

- Partnered with EPOC, University of Arkansas / DART project on Science DMZ focused engagement
- Created reusable template security documents related to Science DMZs
- Published Security of Science DMZ whitepaper
  - <https://hdl.handle.net/2022/27007>
  - Help senior leadership to understand security of Science DMZs
  - Summarize and expand on security recommendations
  - Provide links to more resources



# Scientific OT



# Scientific Support OT

Also:

Building HVAC



Cranes

Winches

Antenna controllers

Electronic door controls

Environmental monitoring



Two wind profiler radars (orange boxes) on the deck of the R/V Roger Revelle in the central Pacific for the Blue Meridians project: one is a Metek and the other is a SODAR (Metek). There is also a PALS system and several infrared pyranometers (not shown).

# OT Security Study Findings

- Security is a missing element for OT procurement requirements.
- Organizational “siloing” between IT security personnel and OT operators.
- Some host institutions (e.g., universities) can help MFs with IT/OT security but even they may not have OT security expertise appropriate to instruments in MFs.
- Newer OT (acquired in the past five years) — is increasingly “software defined” — contains exactly the same vulnerabilities as traditional IT systems.

## Findings of the 2022 Trusted CI Study on the Security of Operational Technology in NSF Scientific Research

July 13, 2022

Status: Draft Report v1.0

*Distribution: Public*

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Susan Sons, and John Zage

# Staying Connected with Trusted CI

## Trusted CI Webinars

4th Monday of month at 11am ET.

<https://trustedci.org/webinars>

## Follow Us

<https://trustedci.org>

<https://blog.trustedci.org>

@TrustedCI 

## Slack

Email [ask@trustedci.org](mailto:ask@trustedci.org) for an invitation.

## Email Lists

Announce and Discuss

<https://trustedci.org/trustedci-email-lists>

## Ask Us Anything

No question too big or too small.

[info@trustedci.org](mailto:info@trustedci.org)

## Cyberinfrastructure Vulnerabilities

Latest news on security vulnerabilities tailored for cyberinfrastructure community.

<https://trustedci.org/vulnerabilities/>

# Acknowledgments

Trusted CI is supported by the National Science Foundation under Grants 1234408, 1547272, 1920430, and 2241313.

The views expressed do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science Foundation or any other organization.



Trusted CI activities are made possible thanks to the contributions of a multi-institutional team:

<https://trustedci.org/who-we-are/>

