

Final Review

1 Overview

This module has covered a variety of dynamic programming methods and applications. The final review will cover key concepts and techniques from the module, including:

- Formulating dynamic programming problems
- Understanding the components of the dynamic program: state and control variables, transition functions, and payoff/reward functions, salvaging value functions
- Interpreting policy functions and value functions
- Types of dynamic programming problems: finite vs infinite horizon, discrete vs continuous state and control spaces
- Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions for unconstrained optimization in dynamic programming: feasibility, stationarity, complementary slackness
- Envelope conditions and their role in characterizing optimal policies
- Solving Bellman equations using value function iteration (conceptual)

2 Discrete time: Fishery Problem

We study a single-stock fishery with:

- continuous state s (biomass),
- control (harvest) h
- next period's stock is $s' = G(s - h)$.
- Per-period payoff is $\pi(h) = p h - c h$ (constant net price for simplicity).
- Discount factor $\beta \in (0, 1)$.

The planner's problem is to choose a harvest policy $h(s)$ to maximize the present value of profits.

$$\max_h \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \pi(h_t)$$

subject to the stock transition equation $s_{t+1} = G(s_t - h_t)$.

The infinite-horizon Bellman equation (time-stationary) is

$$V(s) = \max_h \{ \pi(h) + \beta V(s') \} = \max_h \{ p h - c h + \beta V(G(s - h)) \}$$

where $s' = G(s - h)$ and $G()$ is some twice differentiable growth function.

2.1 KKT system

- Feasibility: $0 \leq h \leq s$.
- Stationarity (interior): $\pi_h(s, h) - \beta V'(s') G'(s - h) = 0$ with $s' = G(s - h)$.
- Complementary slackness:
 - $h \geq 0, \mu_1 \geq 0, \mu_1 h = 0$ (no negative harvest)
 - $h \leq s, \mu_2 \geq 0, \mu_2 (s - h) = 0$ (cannot harvest more than stock)

With $\pi_h(h) = p - c$, the interior FOC is

$$p - c - \beta V'(s') G'(s - h) = 0$$

2.2 Envelope condition

The envelope condition is not formally a KKT condition, but it has a clear economic interpretation and can help simplify the stationarity condition and solve for a policy function. We derive the envelope condition by differentiating the Bellman wrt to s . Importantly, a marginal change in the state has no direct effect on the optimal control, $\frac{\partial h^*}{\partial s} = 0$. Mathematically, when you differentiate the Bellman wrt to s , you get a cluster of terms that contain the stationarity condition, which is equal to 0 at the optimum. Also, in this case, π does not depend directly on s :

$$V'(s) = 0 + \beta V'(s') G'(s - h^*(s)).$$

Note that the second term of the envelope condition is the same as in the stationary condition above. Combining the two (interior) yields a classic shadow-value condition:

$$p - c = V'(s) \quad (\text{if interior}).$$

Interpretation: harvest up to the point where the marginal net revenue equals the marginal value of stock - the additional future discounted revenue from the growth of the stock (the shadow price or “user cost”). With bounds, policies tilt to no-harvest at very low s (stock rebuilding) and binding-harvest (take most of the stock) when s is very high.

What happens if we increase the price p ? The marginal net revenue increases, so the optimal harvest $h^*(s)$ increases for each stock level s . This leads to lower stock levels in the long run, as higher harvests reduce the biomass available for future periods.

What if we increase the cost c ? The marginal net revenue decreases, leading to lower optimal harvests $h^*(s)$ for each stock level s . This results in higher stock levels in the long run, as reduced harvests allow the biomass to recover and grow over time.

3 Value function iteration

We can solve the Bellman equation numerically using value function iteration:

1. Initialize a guess for the value function $V_0(s)$ over a grid of stock levels s .
2. For each stock level s in the grid, solve the maximization problem to find the optimal harvest $h^*(s)$ and compute the updated value function:

$$V_{n+1}(s) = \max_h \{p h - c h + \beta V_n(G(s - h))\}$$

3. Repeat step 2 until convergence, i.e., until $|V_{n+1}(s) - V_n(s)|$ is below a specified tolerance for all s

4 Problem set 4: Continuous Time Optimal Control

Backstop technology and optimal switching (continuous time)

Consider a planner who must meet a constant flow demand D using either:

- i. extraction from an exhaustible stock $S(t)$ at rate $x(t) \geq 0$ with convex extraction cost, or
- ii. an unlimited “backstop” technology $y(t) \geq 0$ with constant unit cost B .

The planner minimizes the present value of total costs with discount rate $\rho > 0$.

- State: $S(t) \geq 0$ with $S(0) = S_0$.
- Controls: extraction $x(t) \geq 0$ and backstop use $y(t) \geq 0$.

- Flow constraint: $x(t) + y(t) = D$ for all $t \geq 0$.
- Stock dynamics: $\dot{S}(t) = -x(t)$.
- Extraction cost: $C(x) = 1/2cx^2$ with $c > 0$.
- Backstop cost: $By(t)$ with $B > 0$.

Thus the planner's problem is

$$\min_{\{x(t), y(t)\}_{t \geq 0}} \int_0^\infty e^{-\rho t} \left[\frac{1}{2} c x(t)^2 + B y(t) \right] dt \quad \text{s.t.} \quad \dot{S}(t) = -x(t), \quad S(0) = S_0, \quad x(t) + y(t) = D, \quad x(t), y(t) \geq 0.$$

4.1 a)

Eliminate $y(t)$ using the flow constraint and write the problem with one control $x(t) \in [0, D]$. Write the current-value Hamiltonian $H(S, x, \lambda)$. Clearly state the state equation, control bounds, and the transversality condition.

The flow constraint $x(t) + y(t) = D$ allows us to express $y(t)$ in terms of $x(t)$:

$$y(t) = D - x(t).$$

Substituting this into the objective function, we get:

$$\min_{\{x(t)\}_{t \geq 0}} \int_0^\infty e^{-\rho t} \left[\frac{1}{2} c x(t)^2 + B(D - x(t)) \right] dt$$

The current-value Hamiltonian is given by:

$$H(S, x, \lambda) = \frac{1}{2} c x^2 + B(D - x) + \lambda(-x)$$

where $\lambda(t)$ is the co-state variable associated with the state equation $\dot{S}(t) = -x(t)$.

4.2 b)

Derive the first-order necessary conditions (Pontryagin):

- control condition $\partial H / \partial x = 0$ for an interior solution,
- co-state equation $\dot{\lambda} = \rho \lambda - \partial H / \partial S$,
- state equation $\dot{S} = -x$,

Show that (for interior x) the optimal policy satisfies

$$x(t) = \frac{B - \lambda(t)}{c}, \quad \dot{\lambda}(t) = \rho \lambda(t).$$

The first-order necessary conditions are:

1. **Control condition:** For an interior solution, we set the derivative of the Hamiltonian with respect to the control variable x to zero:

$$\frac{\partial H}{\partial x} = c x - B - \lambda = 0 \implies c x = B + \lambda \implies x(t) = \frac{B - \lambda(t)}{c}.$$

2. **Co-state equation:** The co-state equation is given by:

$$\dot{\lambda} = \rho \lambda - \frac{\partial H}{\partial S}.$$

Since H does not explicitly depend on S , we have $\frac{\partial H}{\partial S} = 0$, leading to:

$$\dot{\lambda} = \rho \lambda.$$

3. **State equation:** The state equation is given by:

$$\dot{S} = -x.$$

4.3 c)

Solve the co-state ODE and show that $\lambda(t) = \lambda_0 e^{\rho t}$.

Argue that $0 < x(t) < D$ followed by a switching time T^* at which $x(T^*) = 0$ and the backstop fully supplies demand thereafter ($y(t) = D$ for $t \geq T^*$).

The co-state ODE is:

$$\dot{\lambda} = \rho \lambda.$$

This is a first-order linear ordinary differential equation, so rearranging terms and integrating both sides, we have:

$$\int \frac{1}{\lambda} d\lambda = \int \rho dt.$$

Integrating gives:

$$\ln |\lambda| = \rho t + C,$$

where C is the constant of integration. Exponentiating both sides, we get:

$$\lambda(t) = e^C e^{\rho t} = \lambda_0 e^{\rho t},$$

where $\lambda_0 = e^C$ is the initial value of the co-state variable at time $t = 0$.

- This means the shadow price of the resource grows exponentially over time at the rate ρ .
- $\lambda(t)$ represents the in situ value of the resource stock.
- Because the resource is exhaustible, the scarcity value increases over time.
- The discount rate ρ reflects the planner's time preference, influencing how future costs are valued relative to present costs. Higher ρ leads to a faster increase in $\lambda(t)$, so the costate must rise more quickly to justify delaying extraction. This is the Hotelling rule in resource economics.

4.4 d)

Assuming the interior $0 < x(t) < D$ until the switch, derive closed-form expressions for the switching time T^* defined by $\lambda(T^*) = B$.

From the expression for $\lambda(t)$, we have:

$$\lambda(T^*) = \lambda_0 e^{\rho T^*} = B.$$

Solving for T^* , we get:

$$T^* = \frac{1}{\rho} \ln \left(\frac{B}{\lambda_0} \right).$$

4.5 e)

Comparative statics. For the pre-switch phase ($t < T^*$), characterize how $x(t)$ and T^* change with each parameter c , B , ρ . Provide economic intuition for each sign.

1. Effect of c (extraction cost coefficient):

- As c increases, the optimal extraction rate $x(t) = \frac{B - \lambda(t)}{c}$ decreases for a given $\lambda(t)$. This is because higher extraction costs make it less attractive to extract the resource.
- The switching time T^* increases with c because higher costs delay the point at which it becomes optimal to switch to the backstop technology.

2. Effect of B (backstop cost):

- As B increases, the optimal extraction rate $x(t)$ increases for a given $\lambda(t)$. A higher backstop cost makes extraction more attractive relative to using the backstop technology.
- The switching time T^* decreases with B because a higher backstop cost makes it optimal to switch to the backstop technology sooner since you are depleting the stock faster.

3. Effect of ρ (discount rate):

- As ρ increases, the optimal extraction rate $x(t)$ increases since $\lambda(t) = \lambda_0 e^{\rho t}$. A higher discount rate places more weight on present costs, making extraction more attractive.
- The switching time T^* decreases with ρ because a higher discount rate increases the growth rate of $\lambda(t)$, leading to an earlier switch to the backstop technology.