

ICPSR 36806

2016 Chicago Council Survey of American Public Opinion on U.S. Foreign Policy

Summary Report

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2016 Chicago Council Survey of American Public Opinion on U.S. Foreign Policy

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GLOBAL VIEWS 2016

THE CHICAGO COUNCIL ON GLOBAL AFFAIRS

**U.S. PUBLIC TOPLINE REPORT
General Population**

July 11, 2016

Detailed Findings

Note: Numbers may not add to 100% due to rounding*

Question 2

Question 2: When you follow the news these days, how interested are you in reports about the following: very interested, somewhat interested, or hardly interested at all?

2/2. National news

	(N=2061)					
	Very interested (%)	Somewhat interested (%)	Hardly interested (%)	Don't follow the news (%)	Not sure/Decline (%)	Total (%)
Year						
1974	56	31	10	3	*	100
1978	48	35	12	4	1	100
1982	51	35	9	4	1	100
1986	48	38	10	4	*	100
1990	55	31	8	5	1	100
1994	55	36	8	1	*	100
1998	47	39	11	1	2	100
2002	62	31	7	-	-	100
2015	35	44	10	10	-	100
2016	37	44	10	7	1	100
Change in % points 2015-2016	+2	0	0	-3	-	

* Knowledge Networks calculated numbers to 2 decimal places before final rounding on all questions.

2/4. News about the relations of the United States with other countries

	(N=2061)					
Year	Very interested (%)	Somewhat interested (%)	Hardly interested (%)	Don't follow the news (%)	Not sure/ Decline (%)	Total (%)
1974	50	34	13	3	--	100
1978	44	36	15	4	1	100
1982	45	36	13	4	2	100
1986	49	34	11	5	1	100
1990	53	33	9	5	--	100
1994	50	38	10	1	1	100
1998	45	38	14	1	2	100
2002 (telephone)	62	30	7	0	1	100
2004 (telephone)	53	34	7	7	0	100
2004 (internet)	34	49	10	7	0	100
2006 (internet)	38	46	10	6	0	100
2008 (internet)	31	47	14	8	0	100
2015 (internet)	31	44	15	10	0	100
2016 (internet)	30	47	14	8	0	100
Change in % points 2015-2016	-1	+3	-1	-2	0	

Question 3

Question 3: Do you think it will be best for the future of the country if we take an active part in world affairs or if we stay out of world affairs?

3. U.S. active in World Affairs

	(N=2061)			
	Active part (%)	Stay out (%)	Not sure/Decline (%)	Total (%)
Year				
1947	68	25	7	100
1948	70	24	6	100
1949	68	25	7	100
1950	66	25	9	100
1952	68	23	9	100
1953	71	21	8	100
1954	69	25	6	100
1955	72	21	7	100
1956	71	25	4	100
1973	66	31	3	100
1974	66	24	10	100
1978	59	29	12	100
1982	54	35	11	100
1986	64	27	9	100
1990	62	28	10	100
1994	65	29	6	100
1998	61	28	11	100
2002 (telephone)	71	25	4	100
2004 (internet)	67	30	4	100
2006 (internet)	69	28	3	100
2008 (internet)	63	36	1	100
2010 (internet)	67	31	2	100
2012 (internet)	61	38	1	100
2014 (internet)	58	41	1	100
2015 (internet)	64	35	1	100
2016 (internet)	64	35	1	100
Change in % points 2015-2016	0	0	0	
2012 (internet – main only)	62	38	1	100
2014 (internet – main only)	58	41	1	100
Change in % points 2012-2014 (main only)	-4	+3	0	

Question 5

Question 5: Below is a list of possible threats to the vital interest of the United States in the next 10 years. For each one, please select whether you see this as a critical threat, an important but not critical threat, or not an important threat at all:

5/1. Drug related violence and instability in Mexico

	(N=1734)					
	Top 2 Box (%)	Critical (%)	Important but not critical (%)	Not important (%)	Not sure/ Decline (%)	Total (%)
<u>Year</u>						
2010 (internet)	91	45	46	7	2	100
2014 (internet)	90	40	50	10	1	100
2016 (internet)	90	34	56	10	0	100
Change in % points 2014-2016	0	-6	+6	0	-1	

5/4. Islamic fundamentalism

	(N=1715)					
	Top 2 Box (%)	Critical (%)	Important but not critical (%)	Not important (%)	Not sure/ Decline (%)	Total (%)
<u>Year</u>						
1990	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
1994	69	33	36	14	17	100
1998	71	38	33	16	13	100
2002 (telephone)	85	61	24	8	7	100
2004 (telephone)	72	38	34	17	11	100
2004 (internet)	81	38	43	16	3	100
2006 (internet)	84	43	41	12	3	100
2008 (internet)	85	42	43	13	2	100
2010 (internet)	87	43	44	11	2	100
2012 (internet)	85	39	46	14	1	100
2014 (internet)	84	40	44	14	1	100
2015 (internet)	88	55	33	12	0	100
2016 (internet)	91	59	32	8	1	100
Change in % points 2015-2016	+3	+4	-1	-4	+1	
2012 (internet – main only)	85	39	46	14	1	100
2014 (internet – main only)	85	40	45	14	1	100
Change in % points 2012-2014 (main only)	0	+1	-1	0	0	

5/5. The possibility of unfriendly countries becoming nuclear powers

	(N=1696)					
	Top 2 Box (%)	Critical (%)	Important but not critical (%)	Not important (%)	Not sure/ Decline (%)	Total (%)
<u>Year</u>						
1990	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
1994	93	72	21	3	4	100
1998	93	75	18	3	4	100
2002 (telephone)	97	85	12	2	1	100
2004 (telephone)	92	66	26	5	3	100
2004 (internet)	95	64	31	3	2	100
2006 (internet)	96	69	27	3	1	100
2008 (internet)	97	67	30	3	0	100
2008 (Sept.)	(97)	(60)	(37)	(3)	(1)	100
2010 (internet)	96	69	27	3	1	100
2012 (internet)	95	63	33	4	1	100
2014 (internet)	95	60	35	5	1	100
2015 (internet)	94	59	35	6	0	100
2016 (internet)	95	61	34	5	0	100
Change in % points 2015-2016	+1	+2	-1	-1	0	
2012 (internet – main only)	95	63	33	4	1	100
2014 (internet – main only)	95	60	35	4	1	100
Change in % points 2012-2014 (main only)	0	-3	+2	0	0	

5/6a. Large numbers of immigrants and refugees coming into the U.S.

	(N=1728)					
	Top 2 Box (%)	Critical (%)	Important but not critical (%)	Not important (%)	Not sure/ Decline (%)	Total (%)
<u>Year</u>						
1990	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
1994	95	72	23	3	2	100
1998	90	55	35	7	3	100
2002 (telephone)	91	60	31	8	1	100
2004 (telephone)	84	51	33	15	2	100
2004 (internet)	89	52	37	9	1	100

2006 (internet)	91	51	40	9	1	100
2008 (internet)	86	51	35	13	1	100
2010 (internet)	88	51	37	12	1	100
2012 (internet)	84	40	44	15	1	100
2014 (internet)	81	39	42	18	1	100
2015 (internet)	81	44	36	19	0	100
2016 (internet)	85	43	42	15	0	100
Change in % points 2015-2016	+4	-1	+6	-4	0	
2012 (internet – main only)	85	40	45	15	1	100
2014 (internet – main only)	82	41	41	18	0	100
Change in % points 2012-2014 (main only)	-3	+1	-4	+3	0	

5/8a. Climate Change

	(N=850)					
	Top 2 Box (%)	Critical (%)	Important but not critical (%)	Not important (%)	Not sure/Decline (%)	Total (%)
<u>Year</u>						
2008 (internet)	79	39	40	20	1	100
2010 (internet)	75	34	41	23	2	100
2012 (internet)	77	32	45	22	1	100
2014 (internet)	73	35	38	27	0	100
2015 (internet)	76	40	36	24	0	100
2016 (internet)	77	39	39	22	0	100
Change in % points 2015-2016	+1	-1	+3	-2	0	
2012 (internet – main only)	77	31	46	22	1	100
2014 (internet – main only)	72	34	38	27	0	100
Change in % points 2012-2014 (main only)	-5	+3	-8	+5	-1	

5/8b. Global warming

	(N=844)					
	Top 2 Box (%)	Critical (%)	Important but not critical (%)	Not important (%)	Not sure/Decline (%)	Total (%)
<u>Year</u>						
1990	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
1994	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
1998	81	43	38	12	7	100
2002 (telephone)	79	46	33	17	4	100
2004 (telephone)	79	37	42	17	5	100
2004 (internet)	84	37	47	14	2	100

2006 (internet)	85	46	39	13	2	100
2008 (internet)	81	44	37	18	1	100
2014 (internet)	78	42	35	22	1	100
2016 (internet)	77	44	33	23	0	100
Change in % points 2014-2016	-1	+2	-2	+1	-1	

5/10. International terrorism

	(N=1705)					
	Top 2 Box (%)	Critical (%)	Important but not critical (%)	Not important (%)	Not sure/ Decline (%)	Total (%)
<u>Year</u>						
1990	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
1994	94	69	25	3	3	100
1998	97	84	13	1	2	100
2002 (telephone)	98	91	7	2	--	100
2004 (telephone)	97	81	16	1	2	100
2004 (internet)	97	75	22	1	2	100
2006 (internet)	97	74	23	2	1	100
2008 (internet)	96	70	26	3	1	100
2008 (Sept)	(96)	(64)	(32)	(4)	(1)	100
2010 (internet)	97	73	24	2	1	100
2012 (internet)	96	67	28	3	1	100
2014 (internet)	96	63	33	4	0	100
2015 (internet)	95	69	27	5	0	100
2016 (internet)	98	75	22	2	0	100
Change in % points 2015-2016	+3	+6	-5	-3	0	
2012 (internet – main only)	96	67	29	3	1	100
2014 (internet – main only)	96	63	33	4	0	100
Change in % points 2012-2014 (main only)	0	-4	+4	+1	-1	

5/21. Russia's territorial ambitions

	(N=1722)					
	Top 2 Box (%)	Critical (%)	Important but not critical (%)	Not important (%)	Not sure/Decline (%)	Total (%)
Year						
2014 (internet)	88	38	50	12	0	100
2015 (internet)	85	32	53	14	1	100
2016 (internet)	88	30	57	12	0	100
Change in % points 2015-2016	+3	-2	+4	-2	-1	
2014 (internet – main only)	88	39	48	12	0	100

5/23. The development of China's economic power

	(N=1715)					
	Top 2 Box (%)	Critical (%)	Important but not critical (%)	Not important (%)	Not sure/Decline (%)	Total (%)
Year						
2015 (internet)	85	31	54	15	0	100
2016 (internet)	89	30	59	10	0	100
Change in % points 2015-2016	+4	-1	+5	-5	0	

5/24. The development of China's military power

	(N=1729)					
	Top 2 Box (%)	Critical (%)	Important but not critical (%)	Not important (%)	Not sure/Decline (%)	Total (%)
Year						
2015 (internet)	92	41	51	7	0	100
2016 (internet)	91	38	54	8	1	100
Change in % points 2015-2016	-1	-3	+3	+1	+1	

5/27. A confrontation between North Korea and South Korea

	(N=1727)					
	Top 2 Box (%)	Critical (%)	Important but not critical (%)	Not important (%)	Not sure/Decline (%)	Total (%)
Year						
2015 (internet)	85	29	56	15	1	100
2016 (internet)	87	32	55	13	0	100
Change in % points 2015-2016	+2	+3	-1	-2	-1	

5/28. An international financial crisis

(N=1726)						
Year	Top 2 Box (%)	Critical (%)	Important but not critical (%)	Not important (%)	Not sure/Decline (%)	Total (%)
2015 (internet)	92	49	43	8	0	100
2016 (internet)	94	49	45	6	0	100
Change in % points 2015-2016	+2	0	+2	-2	0	

5/29. North Korea's nuclear program

(N=1719)						
Year	Top 2 Box (%)	Critical (%)	Important but not critical (%)	Not important (%)	Not sure/Decline (%)	Total (%)
2015 (internet)	94	55	39	6	1	100
2016 (internet)	94	60	35	6	0	100
Change in % points 2015-2016	0	+5	-4	0	-1	

Summary of 5: Threats to U.S. Vital Interests - 2016 data only

(N=Base Varies)						
	Top 2 Box (%)	Critical (%)	Important but not critical (%)	Not important (%)	Not sure/Decline (%)	Total (%)
5/10. International terrorism	98	75	22	2	0	100
5/5. The possibility of unfriendly countries becoming nuclear powers	95	61	34	5	0	100
5/29. North Korea's nuclear program	94	60	35	6	0	100
5/28. An international financial crisis	94	49	45	6	0	100
5/4. Islamic fundamentalism	91	59	32	8	1	100
5/24. China's military power	91	38	54	8	1	100
5/1. Drug related violence and instability in Mexico	90	34	56	10	0	100
5/23. China's economic power	89	30	59	10	0	100
5/21. Russia's territorial ambitions	88	30	57	12	0	100
5/27. A confrontation between North Korea and South Korea	87	32	55	13	0	100
5/6a. Large numbers of immigrants and refugees coming into the U.S.	85	43	42	15	0	100
5/8b. Global warming	77	44	33	23	0	100
5/8a. Climate change	77	39	39	22	0	100

Question 7

Question 7: Below is a list of possible foreign policy goals that the United States might have. For each one please select whether you think that it should be a very important foreign policy goal of the United States, a somewhat important foreign policy goal, or not an important goal at all:

7/3. Combating international terrorism

		(N=1587)				
Year	Top 2 Box (%)	Very important (%)	Somewhat important (%)	Not important (%)	Not sure/Decline (%)	Total (%)
1998	96	79	17	2	2	100
2002 (telephone)	98	91	7	1	1	100
2002 (internet)	98	83	15	2	1	100
2004 (internet)	96	71	25	2	2	100
2006 (internet)	97	72	25	2	1	100
2008 (internet)	96	67	29	4	1	100
2008 (Sept.)	(94)	(65)	(29)	(4)	(2)	100
2010 (internet)	96	69	27	3	1	100
2012 (internet)	96	64	32	4	1	100
2014 (internet)	95	61	33	5	1	100
2015 (internet)	95	65	30	5	0	100
2016 (internet)	97	72	25	3	0	100
Change in % points 2015-2016	+2	+7	-5	-2	0	
2012 (internet – main only)	96	64	32	4	0	100
2014 (internet – main only)	94	61	33	5	1	100
Change in % points 2012-2014 (main only)	-2	-3	+1	+1	+1	

7/4a. Maintaining superior military power worldwide

	(N=1589)					
	Top 2 Box (%)	Very important (%)	Somewhat important (%)	Not important (%)	Not sure/ Decline (%)	Total (%)
<u>Year</u>						
1994	89	50	39	9	2	100
1998	90	59	31	6	4	100
2002 (telephone)	94	68	26	4	2	100
2002 (internet)	95	67	28	5	0	100
2004 (internet)	91	50	41	7	2	100
2006 (internet)	91	55	36	7	2	100
2008 (internet)	93	58	35	7	1	100
2010 (internet)	92	56	36	7	1	100
2012 (internet)	91	53	38	8	0	100
2014 (internet)	90	52	38	9	1	100
2015 (internet)	92	55	37	7	1	100
2016 (internet)	92	55	36	8	0	100
Change in % points 2015-2016	0	0	-1	+1	-1	
2012 (internet – main only)	91	54	37	8	0	100
2014 (internet – main only)	91	52	38	9	1	100
Change in % points 2012-2014 (main only)	0	-2	+1	+1	+1	

7/4b. Maintaining superior economic power worldwide

	(N= 1589)					
	Top 2 Box (%)	Very important (%)	Somewhat important (%)	Not important (%)	Not sure/ Decline (%)	Total (%)
<u>Year</u>						
2016	93	48	44	7	1	100

7/5. Protecting the jobs of American workers

		(N=1600)				
	Top 2 Box (%)	Very important (%)	Somewhat important (%)	Not important (%)	Not sure/Decline (%)	Total (%)
<u>Year</u>						
1974	91	74	17	5	4	100
1978	93	78	15	3	4	100
1982	94	77	17	3	3	100
1986	95	77	18	3	2	100
1990	97	84	13	1	2	100
1994	97	83	14	2	1	100
1998	95	80	15	2	3	100
2002 (telephone)	98	85	13	2	--	100
2002 (internet)	98	81	17	2	0	100
2004 (internet)	97	78	19	2	2	100
2006 (internet)	96	76	20	3	2	100
2008 (internet)	97	80	17	3	1	100
2008 (Sept.)	(96)	(78)	(18)	(3)	(2)	100
2010 (internet)	97	79	18	2	1	100
2012 (internet)	98	83	14	2	1	100
2014 (internet)	96	76	20	4	0	100
2015 (internet)	95	73	22	4	0	100
2016 (internet)	97	73	23	3	1	100
Change in % points 2015-2016	+2	0	+1	-1	+1	
2012 (internet – main only)	98	84	14	2	0	100
2014 (internet – main only)	96	76	19	4	0	100
Change in % points 2012-2014 (main only)	-2	-8	+5	+2	0	

7/7b. Attaining U.S. energy independence

		(N= 1616)				
	Top 2 Box (%)	Very important (%)	Somewhat important (%)	Not important (%)	Not sure/Decline (%)	Total (%)
<u>Year</u>						
2016	97	64	32	3	0	100

7/8a. Controlling and reducing illegal immigration

		(N=782)				
	Top 2 Box (%)	Very important (%)	Somewhat important (%)	Not important (%)	Not sure/Decline (%)	Total (%)
<u>Year</u>						
1994	94	72	22	4	2	100
1998	89	55	34	6	5	100
2002 (telephone)	93	70	23	6	1	100
2002 (internet)	97	69	28	3	0	100
2004 (internet)	92	59	33	6	2	100
2006 (internet)	92	58	34	7	1	100
2008 (internet)	92	61	31	8	1	100
2010 (internet)	92	59	33	7	1	100
2012 (internet)	91	53	38	9	1	100
2014 (internet)	89	47	42	10	1	100
2015 (internet)	89	52	37	11	0	100
2016 (internet)	89	45	44	11	1	100
Change in % points 2015-2016	0	-7	+7	0	+1	
2012 (internet – main only)	91	53	38	9	1	100
2014 (internet – main only)	89	48	41	11	1	100
Change in % points 2012-2014 (main only)	-2	-5	+3	+2	0	

7/8b. Controlling and reducing undocumented immigration

		(N= 779)				
	Top 2 Box (%)	Very important (%)	Somewhat important (%)	Not important (%)	Not sure/Decline (%)	Total (%)
<u>Year</u>						
2016	89	51	38	11	0	100

7/9a. Limiting climate change

		(N=771)				
	Top 2 Box (%)	Very important (%)	Somewhat important (%)	Not important (%)	Not sure/Decline (%)	Total (%)
<u>Year</u>						
2008 (internet)	82	42	40	18	1	100
2010 (internet)	77	35	42	22	1	100
2012 (internet)	79	33	46	21	1	100
2014 (internet)	81	41	40	18	1	100
2015 (internet)	76	38	37	24	0	100
2016 (internet)	81	40	41	19	1	100
Change in % points 2015-2016	+5	+2	+4	-5	+1	
2012 (internet – main only)	79	33	46	21	0	100
2014 (internet – main only)	80	41	39	19	1	100
Change in % points 2012-2014 (main only)	+1	+8	-7	-2	+1	

7/9b. Limiting global warming

		(N=806)				
	Top 2 Box (%)	Very important (%)	Somewhat important (%)	Not important (%)	Not sure/Decline (%)	Total (%)
<u>Year</u>						
2014 (internet)	78	42	36	21	1	100
2016 (internet)	82	49	34	18	0	100
Change in % points 2014-2016	+4	+7	-2	-3	-1	

7/10. Preventing the spread of nuclear weapons

		(N=1566)				
	Top 2 Box (%)	Very important (%)	Somewhat important (%)	Not important (%)	Not sure/Decline (%)	Total (%)
<u>Year</u>						
1990	96	84	12	2	2	100
1994	96	82	14	2	2	100
1998	96	82	14	1	3	100
2002 (telephone)	98	90	8	1	1	100
2002 (internet)	98	86	12	2	1	100
2004 (internet)	96	73	23	2	2	100
2006 (internet)	96	74	22	2	2	100
2008 (internet)	98	73	25	2	1	100
2008 (Sept.)	(95)	(66)	(29)	(3)	(3)	100
2010 (internet)	97	73	24	2	1	100
2012 (internet)	97	72	25	2	1	100
2014 (internet)	97	73	24	2	1	100
2015 (internet)	97	72	25	2	1	100
2016 (internet)	96	67	29	3	0	100
Change in % points 2015-2016	-1	-5	+4	+1	-1	
2012 (internet – main only)	97	73	25	2	1	100
2014 (internet – main only)	97	73	24	2	1	100
Change in % points 2012-2014 (main only)	0	0	-1	0	0	

7/11b. Improving the world's environment

		(N= 1593)				
	Top 2 Box (%)	Very important (%)	Somewhat important (%)	Not important (%)	Not sure/Decline (%)	Total (%)
<u>Year</u>						
2016	88	47	42	11	1	100

7/12. Combating world hunger

	(N=1576)					
	Top 2 Box (%)	Very important (%)	Somewhat important (%)	Not important (%)	Not sure/Decline (%)	Total (%)
<u>Year</u>						
1974	92	61	31	5	3	100
1978	90	59	31	5	5	100
1982	91	58	33	5	4	100
1986	94	63	31	4	2	100
1990	92	56	36	6	2	100
1994	94	62	32	4	2	100
1998	92	61	31	5	3	100
2002 (telephone)	96	61	35	4	—	100
2002 (internet)	94	54	40	6	0	100
2004 (internet)	90	43	47	9	2	100
2006 (internet)	91	48	43	8	1	100
2008 (internet)	91	46	45	8	1	100
2010 (internet)	89	42	47	10	1	100
2012 (internet)	91	42	49	8	1	100
2014 (internet)	90	42	48	8	1	100
2015 (internet)	90	42	48	10	0	100
2016 (internet)	89	42	48	10	1	100
Change in % points 2015-2016	-1	0	0	0	+1	
2012 (internet – main only)	91	43	48	9	1	100
2014 (internet – main only)	89	40	49	9	2	100
Change in % points 2012-2014 (main only)	-2	-3	+1	0	+1	

7/19. Defending our allies' security

	(N=1551)					
	Top 2 Box (%)	Very important (%)	Somewhat important (%)	Not important (%)	Not sure/Decline (%)	Total (%)
<u>Year</u>						
1974	83	33	50	9	8	100
1978	85	50	35	7	8	100
1982	89	50	39	5	6	100
1986	91	56	35	5	4	100
1990	88	43	45	7	6	100
1994	90	41	49	7	3	100
1998	88	44	44	7	5	100
2002	94	57	37	5	1	100
2014 (internet)	91	38	54	8	0	100
2015 (internet)	93	38	55	7	0	100
2016 (internet)	92	35	57	7	0	100
Change in % points 2015-2016	-1	-3	+2	0	0	

2014 (internet – main only)	91	38	53	9	0	100
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7/23 . Improving America's standing in the world

	(N=1591)					
	Top 2 Box (%)	Very important (%)	Somewhat important (%)	Not important (%)	Not sure/ Decline (%)	Total (%)
<u>Year</u>						
2008 (internet)	98	83	15	2	1	100
2010 (internet)	92	53	39	8	2	100
2015 (internet)	91	53	38	8	1	100
2016 (internet)	93	53	40	7	0	100
Change in % points 2015-2016	+2	0	+2	-1	-1	

7/30a. Promoting the full participation of women and girls in their societies around the world

	(N= 796)					
	Top 2 Box (%)	Very important (%)	Somewhat important (%)	Not important (%)	Not sure/ Decline (%)	Total (%)
<u>Year</u>						
2016	85	37	48	14	1	100

7/30b. Promoting the rights of women and girls around the world

	(N= 818)					
	Top 2 Box (%)	Very important (%)	Somewhat important (%)	Not important (%)	Not sure/ Decline (%)	Total (%)
<u>Year</u>						
2016	88	42	46	12	0	100

Summary of 7: U.S. Foreign Policy Goals – 2016 data only

Ranking of U.S. Foreign Policy Goals (by Very Important)

Goal	(Base varies)				Total (%)
	Very important (%)	Somewhat important (%)	Not important (%)	Not sure/Decline (%)	
7/5. Protecting the jobs of American workers	73	23	3	1	100
7/3. Combating international terrorism	72	25	3	0	100
7/10. Preventing the spread of nuclear weapons	67	29	3	0	100
7/7b. Attaining U.S. energy independence	64	32	3	0	100
7/4a. Maintaining superior military power worldwide	55	36	8	0	100
7/23. Improving America's standing in the world	53	40	7	0	100
7/8b. Controlling and reducing undocumented immigration	51	38	11	0	100
7/9b. Limiting global warming	49	34	18	0	100
7/4b. Maintaining superior economic power worldwide	48	44	7	1	100
7/11b. Improving the world's environment	47	42	11	1	100
7/8a. Controlling and reducing illegal immigration	45	44	11	1	100
7/12. Combating world hunger	42	48	10	1	100
7/30b. Promoting the rights of women and girls around the world	42	46	12	0	100
7/9a. Limiting climate change	40	41	19	1	100
7/30a. Promoting the full participation of women and girls in their societies around the world	37	48	14	1	100
7/19. Defending our allies' security	35	57	7	0	100

Question 8

Question 8: And how effective do you think each of the following approaches are to achieving the foreign policy goals of the United States – very effective, somewhat effective, not very effective or not effective at all?

8/1. Strengthening the United Nations

Year	(N=2061)							Total (%)
	Top 2 Box (%)	Bottom 2 Box (%)	Very effective (%)	Somewhat effective (%)	Not very effective (%)	Not effective at all (%)	Not sure/Decline (%)	
2012 (internet)	62	37	16	46	25	12	1	100
2014 (internet)	64	35	25	39	23	11	1	100
2015 (internet)	60	38	21	39	24	14	2	100
2016 (internet)	67	31	26	42	21	10	1	100
Change in % points 2015-2016	+7	-7	+5	+3	-3	-4	-1	
2012 (internet – main only)	62	37	16	46	25	12	1	100
2014 (internet – main only)	65	34	25	40	23	12	1	100
Change in % points 2012-2014 (main only)	+3	-3	+9	-6	-2	0	0	

8/2. Maintaining U.S. military superiority

	(N=2061)							
	Top 2 Box (%)	Bottom 2 Box (%)	Very effective (%)	Somewhat effective (%)	Not very effective (%)	Not effective at all (%)	Not sure/Decline (%)	Total (%)
<u>Year</u>								
2012 (internet)	84	15	43	42	12	3	1	100
2014 (internet)	85	14	47	37	12	2	1	100
2015 (internet)	80	19	40	40	13	6	1	100
2016 (internet)	85	14	47	38	11	3	1	100
Change in % points 2015-2016	+5	-5	+7	-2	-2	-3	0	
2012 (internet – main only)	85	14	43	42	11	3	1	100
2014 (internet – main only)	84	15	47	37	12	2	1	100
Change in % points 2012-2014 (main only)	-1	+1	+4	-5	+1	-1	0	

8/3. Placing sanctions on other countries ¹

	(N=2061)							
	Top 2 Box (%)	Bottom 2 Box (%)	Very effective (%)	Somewhat effective (%)	Not very effective (%)	Not effective at all (%)	Not sure/Decline (%)	Total (%)
<u>Year</u>								
2012 (internet)	62	37	16	47	30	7	1	100
2014 (internet)	65	34	22	43	27	7	1	100
2015 (internet)	61	37	13	48	28	9	2	100
2016 (internet)	64	35	16	47	29	5	1	100
Change in % points 2015-2016	+3	-2	+3	-1	+1	-4	-1	
2012 (internet – main only)	63	36	16	47	29	7	1	100
2014 (internet – main only)	65	34	21	44	27	7	1	100
Change in % points 2012-2014 (main only)	+2	-2	+5	-3	-2	0	0	

8/4. Signing free trade agreements with other countries

	(N=2061)							
	Top 2 Box (%)	Bottom 2 Box (%)	Very effective (%)	Somewhat effective (%)	Not very effective (%)	Not effective at all (%)	Not sure/Decline (%)	Total (%)
<u>Year</u>								
2012 (internet)	67	31	13	54	26	5	2	100
2014 (internet)	72	26	18	54	21	5	2	100
2015 (internet)	64	34	13	51	25	9	2	100
2016 (internet)	67	32	13	54	26	6	1	100
Change in % points 2015-2016	+3	-2	0	+3	+1	-3	-1	
2012 (internet – main only)	67	32	13	54	26	5	1	100
2014 (internet – main only)	72	26	18	55	21	5	2	100
Change in % points 2012-2014 (main only)	+5	-6	+5	+1	-5	0	+1	

1. Wording in 2012 and 2014 included “that violate international law.”

8/5. Maintaining existing alliances

	(N=2061)							
	Top 2 Box (%)	Bottom 2 Box (%)	Very effective (%)	Somewhat effective (%)	Not very effective (%)	Not effective at all (%)	Not sure/Decline (%)	Total (%)
Year								
2014 (internet)	87	11	38	49	9	3	1	100
2015 (internet)	84	15	32	52	11	4	1	100
2016 (internet)	89	10	40	50	7	2	1	100
Change in % points 2015-2016	+5	-5	+8	-2	-4	-2	0	
2014 (internet – main only)	87	12	37	50	9	3	1	100

8/6. Building alliances with new countries

	(N=2061)							
	Top 2 Box (%)	Bottom 2 Box (%)	Very effective (%)	Somewhat effective (%)	Not very effective (%)	Not effective at all (%)	Not sure/Decline (%)	Total (%)
Year								
2012 (internet)	76	22	21	56	20	3	1	100
2014 (internet)	80	19	29	51	16	3	1	100
2015 (internet)	76	23	24	51	17	5	2	100
2016 (internet)	83	16	29	54	13	3	1	100
Change in % points 2015-2016	+7	-7	+5	+3	-4	-2	-1	
2012 (internet – main only)	76	22	20	56	20	3	1	100
2014 (internet – main only)	80	19	28	52	16	3	1	100
Change in % points 2012-2014 (main only)	+4	-3	+8	-4	-4	0	0	

8/13. Signing international agreements

	(N= 2061)							
	Top 2 Box (%)	Bottom 2 Box (%)	Very effective (%)	Somewhat effective (%)	Not very effective (%)	Not effective at all (%)	Not sure/Decline (%)	Total (%)
Year								
2016	71	28	17	54	23	5	1	100

8/14. Intervening militarily

	(N= 2061)							
	Top 2 Box (%)	Bottom 2 Box (%)	Very effective (%)	Somewhat effective (%)	Not very effective (%)	Not effective at all (%)	Not sure/Decline (%)	Total (%)
Year								
2016	63	35	13	50	28	7	1	100

Summary of 8: Effectiveness of Approaches to Achieving U.S. Foreign Policy Goals - 2016 data only

Ranked by Top 2 box

	(N=2061)							
	Top 2 Box (%)	Bottom 2 Box (%)	Very effective (%)	Somewhat effective (%)	Not very effective (%)	Not effective at all (%)	Not sure/Decline (%)	Total (%)
8/5. Maintaining existing alliances	89	10	40	50	7	2	1	100
8/2. Maintaining U.S. military superiority	85	14	47	38	11	3	1	100
8/6. Building new alliances with other countries	83	16	29	54	13	3	1	100
8/13. Signing international agreements	71	28	17	54	23	5	1	100
8/4. Signing free trade agreements with other countries	67	32	13	54	26	6	1	100
8/1. Strengthening the United Nations	67	31	26	42	21	10	1	100
8/3. Placing sanctions on other countries	64	35	16	47	29	5	1	100
8/14. Intervening militarily	63	35	13	50	28	7	1	100

Question 11

Question 11: What kind of leadership role should the United States play in the world? Should it be the dominant world leader, or should it play a shared leadership role, or should it not play any leadership role?

	(N=2061)				
	Dominant world leader (%)	Play a shared leadership role (%)	Not play any leadership role (%)	Not sure/ Decline (%)	Total (%)
Year					
2015 (internet)	28	63	8	1	100
2016 (internet)	29	62	8	1	100
Change in % points 2015-2016	+1	-1	0	0	

Question 385

Question 385: Which of the following do you think is more important in determining a country's overall power and influence in the world – a country's economic strength, or its military strength?

385. Determinants of Country's Overall Power

	(N=2061)			
	Economic strength (%)	Military Strength (%)	Not sure/ Decline (%)	Total (%)
Year				
1998	63	28	9	100
2002	66	27	7	100
2010 (internet)	72	23	5	100
2014 (internet)	77	23	1	100
2016 (internet)	71	28	1	100
Change in % points 2014-2016	-6	+5	0	

Question 21

Question 21: Some people say the United States has a unique character that makes it the greatest country in the world. Others say that every country is unique, and the United States is no greater than other nations. Which view is closer to your own?

21. View closest to own about United States

	(N=2061)			
	The greatest country in the world (%)	No greater than other nations (%)	Not sure/ Decline (%)	Total (%)
Year				
2012 (internet)	70	29	1	100
2014 (internet)	65	34	1	100
2016 (internet)	61	38	1	100
Change in % points 2014-2016	-4	+4	0	

Question 40

Question 40: Do you think the United States should or should not have long-term military bases in the following places?

* Answer options were "Favor"/"Oppose" in 2004

40/1. Japan

Year	(N=2061)			Total (%)
	Should have* (%)	Should not have* (%)	Not sure/ Decline (%)	
2002 (telephone)	63	33	4	100
2004 (internet)	52	39	9	100
2006 (internet)	57	34	9	100
2008 (internet)	58	39	3	100
2010 (internet)	50	48	2	100
2012 (internet)	51	46	2	100
2014 (internet)	55	42	3	100
2016 (internet)	60	38	2	100
Change in % points 2014-2016	+5	-4	-1	

40/3. South Korea

Year	(N=2061)			Total (%)
	Should have* (%)	Should not have* (%)	Not sure/ Decline (%)	
2002 (telephone)	67	27	6	100
2004 (internet)	62	30	8	100
2006 (internet)	62	29	9	100
2008 (internet)	63	34	3	100
2010 (internet)	62	36	3	100
2012 (internet)	60	37	3	100
2014 (internet)	64	33	3	100
2016 (internet)	70	28	2	100
Change in % points 2014-2016	+6	-5	-1	

40/6. Germany

<u>Year</u>	(N=2061)			Total (%)
	Should have* (%)	Should not have* (%)	Not sure/ Decline (%)	
2002 (telephone)	69	28	3	100
2004 (internet)	57	35	8	100
2006 (internet)	57	34	9	100
2008 (internet)	59	38	3	100
2010 (internet)	52	46	2	100
2012 (internet)	51	47	2	100
2014 (internet)	57	40	3	100
2016 (internet)	61	37	2	100
Change in % points 2014-2016	+4	-3	-1	

40/8. Australia

<u>Year</u>	(N=2061)			Total (%)
	Should have* (%)	Should not have* (%)	Not sure/ Decline (%)	
2012 (internet)	40	58	3	100
2014 (internet)	42	55	3	100
2016 (internet)	46	52	2	100
Change in % points 2014-2016	+4	-3	-1	

Question 15

Question 15: Thinking about the next generation of Americans who are children today, the way things are going, do you think economically they will be better off, worse off, or about the same as the generation of adults who are working today?

15. Future of next generation of Americans

	(N=2061)				
	Better off (%)	About the same (%)	Worse off (%)	Not sure/ Decline (%)	Total (%)
<u>Year</u>					
2008 (internet)	9	30	60	1	100
2008 (Sept.)	(10)	(27)	(62)	(1)	100
2010 (internet)	8	32	59	1	100
2012 (internet)	8	34	58	1	100
2016 (internet)	11	31	57	0	100
Change in % points 2012-2016	+3	-3	-1	-1	

Question 15B

Question 15b: And thinking now about your parents when they were your age, do you think that economically they were better off, worse off, or about the same as you are today?

15B.

	(N= 2061)				
	Better off (%)	About the same (%)	Worse off (%)	Not sure/ Decline (%)	Total (%)
<u>Year</u>					
2016	39	26	34	1	100

Question 45

Question 45: Please rate your feelings toward some countries and peoples, with one hundred meaning a very warm, favorable feeling, zero meaning a very cold, unfavorable feeling, and fifty meaning not particularly warm or cold. You can use any number from zero to one hundred, the higher the number the more favorable your feelings are toward that country or those people.

45/3. Mexico

(N=1182)									
	Mean	Median	100-76 degrees	75-51 degrees	50 degrees	49-31 degrees	30-0 degrees	Not familiar / Decline	Total
<u>Year</u>									
1978	58°	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
1982	61°	--	16	45	31	3	6	--	--
1986	59°	--	14	39	32	8	7	--	--
1990	56°	--	16	28	35	8	12	--	--
1994	57°	--	17	32	30	7	12	2	100
1998	57°	--	18	32	30	5	14	1	100
2002 (telephone)	60°	60°	25	30	22	7	13	3	100
2002 (internet)	53°	50°							
2004 (internet)	54°	50°	19	24	20	7	19	11	100
2006 (internet)	47°	50°	13	20	20	8	28	12	100
2008 (internet)	50°	50°	16	21	23	9	26	5	100
2010 (internet)	46°	50°	14	16	22	12	29	8	100
2014 (internet)	54°	50°	22	27	20	9	23	--	100
2016 (internet)	51°	50°	15	26	20	11	22	4	100
Change in % points 2014- 2016	-3°	0°	-7	-1	0	+2	-1	--	

45/4. Israel

(N=1185)									
	Mean	Median	100-76 degrees	75-51 degrees	50 degrees	49-31 degrees	30-0 degrees	Not familiar / Decline	Total
<u>Year</u>									
1978	61°	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	100
1982	57°	--	18	31	27	12	13	--	100
1986	59°	--	21	31	30	7	11	--	100
1990	53°	--	16	25	31	10	18	--	100
1994	54°	n/a	17	25	28	9	17	4	100
1998	55°	n/a	18	24	28	9	18	3	100

2002 (telephone)	55°	52°	24	22	21	8	23	2	100
2002 (internet)	49°	50°							
2004 (internet)	53°	50°	21	16	21	6	22	13	100
2006 (internet)	54°	50°	21	20	19	7	21	13	100
2008 (internet)	58°	50°	27	18	24	7	18	6	100
2010 (internet)	57°	50°	25	16	25	8	17	10	100
2014 (internet)	59°	60°	32	21	18	10	19	--	100
2016 (internet)	58°	60°	29	23	17	6	19	5	100
Change in % points 2014-2016	-1°	0°	-3	+2	-1	-4	0	--	

45/6. China¹

(N=1250)									
Year	Mean	Median	100-76 degrees	75-51 degrees	50 degrees	49-31 degrees	30-0 degrees	Not familiar / Decline	Total
1978	44°	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
1982	48°	--	7	25	33	14	22	--	--
1986	53°	--	12	25	37	13	13	--	100
1990	45°	--	8	16	35	12	28	--	--
1994	46°	n/a	6	21	30	14	26	3	100
1998	47°	n/a	6	20	32	14	24	4	100
2002 (telephone)	48°	50°	11	20	30	11	25	3	100
2002 (internet)	40°	45°							
2004 (internet)	44°	50°	8	16	24	12	27	13	100
2006 (internet)	40°	50°	5	14	25	13	31	12	100
2008 (internet)	41°	50°	6	14	27	14	33	5	100
2010 (internet)	45°	50°	8	15	29	12	27	8	100
2014 (internet)	44°	50°	10	20	24	14	32	--	100
2016 (internet)	44°	45°	8	21	22	14	31	5	100
Change in % points 2014-2016	0°	-5°	-2	+1	-2	0	-1	--	

¹ In surveys prior to 1994, this was asked as “People’s Republic of China”

45/11. Japan

(N=1230)									
	Mean	Median	100-76 degrees	75-51 degrees	50 degrees	49-31 degrees	30-0 degrees	Not familiar / Decline	Total
<u>Year</u>									
1978	56°	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	100
1982	53°	--	12	37	27	9	14	--	100
1986	61°	--	23	38	24	8	8	--	100
1990	52°	--	12	30	28	8	20	2	100
1994	52°	--	13	28	30	7	20	2	100
1998	55°	--	17	27	31	8	16	1	100
2002	60°	61°	23	32	24	6	12	3	100
2006 (internet)	58°	60°	23	23	22	6	14	12	100
2008 (internet)	59°	60°	27	23	23	7	15	5	100
2010 (internet)	61°	60°	27	22	27	5	11	8	100
2014 (internet)	62°	60°	34	26	18	5	15	--	100
2016 (internet)	63°	60°	30	30	16	4	13	5	100
Change in % points 2014- 2016	+1°	0°	-4	+4	-2	-1	-2	--	
2014 (internet – main only)	62°	60°	34	26	18	6	15		100

45/12. Russia²

(N=1204)									
	Mean	Median	100-76 degrees	75-51 degrees	50 degrees	49-31 degrees	30-0 degrees	Not familiar/ Decline	Total
<u>Year</u>									
1978	34°	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
1982	25°	--	2	4	14	13	67	--	100
1986	31°	--	3	8	21	13	56	--	--
1990	58°	--	23	31	24	7	15	--	100
1994	54°	--	14	29	30	8	17	--	100
1998	49°	--	9	23	33	12	21	--	100
2002	55°	52°	15	31	28	8	16	2	100
2002	53°								
2008 (internet)	47°	50°	8	21	31	10	24	6	100
2010 (internet)	48°	50°	8	19	32	12	21	8	100
2014 (internet)	36°	40°	6	11	20	15	47	--	100

² In surveys prior to 1990, this was asked as “Soviet Union”

2016 (internet)	40°	40°	5	15	21	15	36	6	100
Change in % points 2014-2016	+4	0	-1	+4	+1	0	-11	--	
2014 (internet – main only)	36°	40°	7	11	20	15	47	--	100

45/14. Iran

(N=1204)									
	Mean	Median	100-76 degrees	75-51 degrees	50 degrees	49-31 degrees	30-0 degrees	Not familiar / Decline	Total
Year									
1978	50°	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
1982	28°	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
1986	23°	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
1990	27°	n/a	3	6	14	10	64	3	100
1994	28°	n/a	3	6	15	10	62	4	100
1998	28°	n/a	4	5	16	10	63	2	100
2002	28°	28°	4	6	14	10	62	4	100
2006 (internet)	21°	20°	2	3	10	8	63	13	100
2008 (internet)	27°	25°	3	5	18	10	60	4	100
2010 (internet)	27°	25°	3	5	18	9	58	7	100
2014 (internet)	27°	20°	4	7	18	6	65	--	100
2016 (internet)	26°	20°	4	5	13	12	60	4	100
Change in % points 2014-2016	-1°	0°	0	-2	-5	+6	-5	--	
2014 (internet – main only)	27°	20°	5	7	17	7	65	--	100

45/15. Cuba

(N=1225)									
	Mean	Median	100-76 degrees	75-51 degrees	50 degrees	49-31 degrees	30-0 degrees	Not familiar / Decline	Total
Year									
1994	38°	--	5	16	20	11	46	2	100
1998	38°	--	6	12	22	11	44	5	100
2008 (internet)	36°	40°	4	9	27	14	41	5	100
2010 (internet)	38°	40°	6	10	27	11	40	7	100

2014 (internet)	41°	40°	8	16	23	13	39	--	100
2016 (internet)	48°	50°	13	24	22	12	26	5	100
Change in % points 2014-2016	+7°	+10°	+5	+8	-1	-1	-13	--	
2014 (internet – main only)	41°	40°	9	16	23	13	40	--	100

45/19. North Korea

(N=1176)									
Year	Mean	Median	100-76 degrees	75-51 degrees	50 degrees	49-31 degrees	30-0 degrees	Not familiar / Decline	Total
1994	34°	n/a	4	5	24	12	50	5	100
1998	36°	n/a	2	9	26	13	46	4	100
2002 (telephone)	34°	30°	5	10	21	10	49	5	100
2002 (internet)	28°	30°							
2004 (internet)	28°	20°	4	5	14	9	52	16	100
2006 (internet)	23°	20°	2	4	14	9	58	15	100
2010 (internet)	27°	25°	3	3	19	9	56	9	100
2014 (internet)	23°	15°	4	5	13	9	69	--	100
2016 (internet)	19°	10°	2	4	11	6	71	5	100
Change in % points 2014-2016	-4°	-5°	-2	-1	-2	-3	+2	--	
2014 (internet – main only)	23°	15°	5	5	13	9	69	--	100

45/20. South Korea

(N=1190)									
Year	Mean	Median	100-76 degrees	75-51 degrees	50 degrees	49-31 degrees	30-0 degrees	Not familiar / Decline	Total
1978	48°	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
1982	44°	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
1986	51°	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
1990	47°	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
1994	48°	n/a	4	26	34	10	22	4	100
1998	50°	n/a	10	18	38	12	15	7	100
2002 (telephone)	46°	50°	--	21	32	7	26	6	100

2004 (internet)	49°	50°	13	18	23	8	22	15	100
2006 (internet)	44°	50°	8	18	24	7	27	15	100
2010 (internet)	52°	50°	17	18	30	7	19	9	100
2014 (internet)	55°	56°	24	28	22	5	21	--	100
2016 (internet)	55°	50°	22	27	21	4	21	5	100
Change in % points 2014- 2016	0°	-6°	-2	-1	-1	-1	0	--	
2014 (internet – main only)	55°	56°	24	27	22	5	22	--	

45/26. Canada

(N=1224)

	Mean	Median	100-76 degrees	75-51 degrees	50 degrees	49-31 degrees	30-0 degrees	Not familiar/ no opinion	Total
<u>Year</u>									
1978	72°	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
1982	74°	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
1986	77°	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
1990	76°	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
1994	73°	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
1998	72°	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
2002	77°	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
2014 (internet)	79°	85°	65	18	8	2	7	--	100
2016 (internet)	81°	85°	67	14	8	1	3	5	100
Change in % points 2014- 2016	+2°	0°	+2	-4	0	-1	-4	--	
2014 (internet – main only)	79°	85°	65	18	8	1	7	--	100

45/27. Australia

(N= 1182)

	Mean	Median	100-76 degrees	75-51 degrees	50 degrees	49-31 degrees	30-0 degrees	Not familiar/ no opinion	Total
<u>Year</u>									
2016	77°	85°	56	18	12	1	4	5	100

45/28. India

(N=1175)									
	Mean	Median	100-76 degrees	75-51 degrees	50 degrees	49-31 degrees	30-0 degrees	Not familiar / Decline	Total
Year									
1978	49°	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
1982	48°	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
1986	48°	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
1990	48°	n/a	6	17	44	9	17	7	100
1994	48°	n/a	5	18	41	8	19	9	100
1998	46°	n/a	3	19	42	10	22	4	100
2002 (telephone)	46°	50°	7	19	32	13	23	6	100
2006 (internet)	46°	50°	9	18	25	11	25	12	100
2008 (internet)	47°	50°	9	22	33	10	21	5	100
2010 (internet)	54°	50°	14	22	34	8	14	8	100
2014 (internet)	53°	50°	15	28	29	8	19	--	100
2016 (internet)	55°	50°	15	31	23	8	15	5	100
Change in % points 2014- 2016	+2°	0°	0	+3	-6	0	-4	--	
2014 (internet – main only)	53°	50°	16	28	28	9	19	--	100

Question 185

Question 185: In your opinion, are relations between the United States with the following countries improving, worsening, or staying about the same? (Select one response for each.)

185/1. China

(N=2061)					
	Improving	Worsening	Staying about the same	Not sure/ Decline	Total
Year	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
2006 (internet)	30	17	47	6	100
2010 (internet)	19	29	47	6	100
2013 (internet)	17	40	39	3	100
2016 (internet)	11	40	46	2	100
Change in % points 2013-2016	-6	0	+7	-1	

185/4. Mexico

(N=2061)					
	Improving	Worsening	Staying about the same	Not sure/ Decline	Total
<u>Year</u>	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
2006 (internet)	17	39	38	5	100
2010 (internet)	10	47	38	6	100
2013 (internet)	13	34	49	3	100
2106 (internet)	10	46	42	2	100
Change in % points 2013-2016	-3	+12	-7	-1	

185/5. South Korea

(N=2061)					
	Improving	Worsening	Staying about the same	Not sure/ Decline	Total
<u>Year</u>	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
2006 (internet)	15	25	53	7	100
2010 (internet)	13	23	57	6	100
2016 (internet)	14	25	58	3	100
Change in % points 2010-2016	+1	+2	+1	-3	

185/8. Russia

(N=2061)					
	Improving	Worsening	Staying about the same	Not sure/ Decline	Total
<u>Year</u>	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
2010 (internet)	17	20	57	6	100
2016 (internet)	6	55	37	2	100
Change in % points 2010-2016	-11	+35	-20	-4	

185/9. Canada

(N=1013)					
	Improving	Worsening	Staying about the same	Not sure/ Decline	Total
<u>Year</u>	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
2013 (internet)	20	7	70	3	100
2016 (internet)	22	7	69	2	100
Change in % points 2013-2016	+2	0	-1	-1	

185/10. Australia

(N= 1048)					
	Improving (%)	Worsening (%)	Staying about the same (%)	Not sure/ Decline (%)	Total (%)
Year					
2016	18	5	75	2	100

185/11. Iran

(N= 2061)					
	Improving (%)	Worsening (%)	Staying about the same (%)	Not sure/ Decline (%)	Total (%)
Year					
2016	13	53	32	2	100

185/12. Israel

(N=2061)					
	Improving (%)	Worsening (%)	Staying about the same (%)	Not sure/ Decline (%)	Total (%)
Year					
2016	10	42	46	2	100

Question 200

Question 200: Do you feel we should increase our commitment to NATO, keep our commitment what it is now, decrease our commitment to NATO, or withdraw from NATO entirely?

200. Commitment to NATO

(N=1046)						
	Increase commitment (%)	Keep commitment same (%)	Decrease commitment (%)	Withdraw entirely (%)	Not sure/ Decline (%)	Total (%)
Year						
1974	4	50	13	7	26	100
1978	9	58	9	4	20	100
1982	9	58	11	4	18	100
1986	8	62	11	5	14	100
1990	4	56	22	5	13	100
1994	5	56	20	6	13	100
1998	9	59	16	5	11	100

2002 (telephone)	11	65	11	6	7	100
2002 (internet)	16	68	8	3	4	100
2004 (internet)	14	58	14	6	8	100
2010 (internet)	10	66	13	8	4	100
2012 (internet)	7	68	15	8	3	100
2014 (internet)	12	66	12	7	4	100
2016 (internet)	12	63	14	7	5	100
Change in % points 2014-2016	0	-3	+2	0	+1	

Question 615

Question 615: Some people say that NATO is still essential to our country's security. Others say it is no longer essential. Which of these views is closer to your own?

615. Attitude toward NATO

(n=1015)				
Year	Still essential (%)	No longer essential (%)	Not sure/ Decline (%)	Total (%)
2002	56	30	14	100
2016 (internet)	65	31	4	100
Change in % points 2002-2016	+9	+1	-10	

Question 50 (1-8)

Question 50 (1-8): I would like to know how much influence you think each of the following countries has in the world. Please answer on a 0 to 10 scale; with 0 meaning they are not at all influential and 10 meaning they are extremely influential.

50/1. The U.S.

(N=2061)															
Year	Mean	Median	0 (%)	1 (%)	2 (%)	3 (%)	4 (%)	5 (%)	6 (%)	7 (%)	8 (%)	9 (%)	10 (%)	Not familiar / Decline (%)	Total (%)
2002 (telephone)	9.1	10	*	*	*	*	*	3	1	5	13	21	55	2	100
2006 (internet)	8.5	9	1	0	0	0	1	6	3	7	17	21	35	9	100
2008 (internet)	9.5	10	1	0	0	0	1	7	3	9	18	19	40	2	100
2010 (internet)	8.6	9	2	1	1	0	1	3	2	7	17	20	41	6	100
2012 (internet)	8.5	9	1	2	1	1	1	4	2	5	16	18	45	4	100
2014 (internet)	8.6	-	1	1	1	1	0	4	2	7	19	19	43	3	100
2016 (internet)	8.5	10	1	1	0	0	1	4	3	8	18	19	38	6	100

Change in % points 2014-2016	-0.1	-	0	0	-1	-1	+1	0	+1	+1	-1	0	-5	+3	
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50/2. Russia

(N=2061)

	Mean	Median	0 (%)	1 (%)	2 (%)	3 (%)	4 (%)	5 (%)	6 (%)	7 (%)	8 (%)	9 (%)	10 (%)	Not familiar / Decline (%)	Total (%)
Year															
2002 (telephone)	6.5	7	3	1	2	3	8	17	11	20	18	9	8	--	100
2006 (internet)	5.6	6	4	1	4	4	10	21	13	14	10	4	4	11	100
2008 (internet)	7.1	7	3	1	2	4	7	22	16	20	11	5	8	2	100
2010 (internet)	6.2	6	5	1	3	4	6	18	12	14	14	8	9	8	100
2012 (internet)	5.8	6	3	2	3	7	8	20	13	14	13	6	6	5	100
2014 (internet)	6.2	7	5	1	3	4	6	16	12	15	17	7	10	4	100
2016 (internet)	6.2	7	4	1	2	5	5	16	13	16	16	7	8	6	100
Change in % points 2014-2016	0	0	-1	0	-1	+1	-1	0	+1	+1	-1	0	-2	+2	
2012 (internet – main only)	5.8	6	3	2	3	7	8	19	13	14	13	6	6	5	100
2014 (internet – main only)	6.2	7	5	1	3	5	6	16	12	15	17	7	10	4	100
Change in % points 2012-2014 (main only)	+0.4	+1	+2	-1	0	-2	-2	-3	-1	+1	+4	+1	+4	-1	

50/5. China

(N=2061)

	Mean	Median	0 (%)	1 (%)	2 (%)	3 (%)	4 (%)	5 (%)	6 (%)	7 (%)	8 (%)	9 (%)	10 (%)	Not familiar / Decline (%)	Total (%)
Year															
2002 (telephone)	6.8	7	2	*	3	3	7	11	13	16	21	13	10	1	100
2006 (internet)	6.4	7	3	1	2	3	5	18	11	15	16	10	9	7	100
2008 (internet)	7.9	8	3	1	1	3	4	15	10	18	18	11	14	2	100
2010 (internet)	7.5	8	3	0	1	3	2	8	6	13	22	13	22	7	100
2012 (internet)	7.4	8	3	2	2	2	3	9	6	12	21	15	21	5	100
2014 (internet)	7.4	8	3	1	1	2	3	10	7	13	23	14	20	4	100
2016 (internet)	7.1	8	3	1	1	1	3	11	9	14	22	14	14	6	100
Change in % points 2014-2016	-0.3	0	0	0	0	-1	0	+1	+2	+1	-1	0	-6	+2	
2012 (internet – main only)	7.4	8	2	2	2	2	3	9	5	12	21	15	22	5	100
2014 (internet – main only)	7.4	8	3	1	1	3	3	10	7	13	23	13	20	4	100

Change in % points 2012-2014 (main only)	-0.1	0	+1	-1	-1	+1	0	+1	+2	+1	+2	-2	-2	-1	
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50/6. India

(N=2061)

	Mean	Median	0 (%)	1 (%)	2 (%)	3 (%)	4 (%)	5 (%)	6 (%)	7 (%)	8 (%)	9 (%)	10 (%)	Not familiar / Decline (%)	Total (%)
Year															
2002 (telephone)	4.7	5	4	2	10	12	18	22	12	9	5	1	3	2	100
2006 (internet)	4.8	5	5	3	7	9	11	23	12	8	6	2	3	11	100
2008 (internet)	6.2	6	6	1	5	8	12	26	17	11	7	4	3	2	100
2010 (internet)	5.0	5	6	2	6	9	11	22	13	11	6	3	4	7	100
2012 (internet)	4.6	5	7	4	8	11	14	18	11	9	7	2	3	5	100
2014 (internet)	4.8	5	7	3	7	9	11	24	12	11	7	2	3	4	100
2016 (internet)	4.8	6	7	2	6	8	11	24	13	11	6	2	3	6	100
Change in % points 2014-2016	0	+1	0	-1	-1	-1	0	0	+1	0	-1	0	0	+2	
2012 (internet – main only)	4.5	5	8	4	8	11	14	18	11	9	7	3	3	5	100
2014 (internet – main only)	4.8	5	7	3	7	9	11	25	12	11	7	2	3	4	100
Change in % points 2012-2014 (main only)	+0.3	0	-1	-1	-1	-2	-3	+7	+1	+2	0	-1	0	-1	

50/7. European Union as a whole³

(N=2061)

	Mean	Median	0 (%)	1 (%)	2 (%)	3 (%)	4 (%)	5 (%)	6 (%)	7 (%)	8 (%)	9 (%)	10 (%)	Not familiar / Decline (%)	Total (%)
Year															
2002 (telephone)	6.7	7	4	1	2	4	4	13	8	15	20	11	10	8	100
2006 (internet)	6.0	6	4	1	2	3	7	20	11	13	14	7	6	12	100
2008 (internet)	7.8	8	4	0	1	3	4	17	10	16	19	11	13	2	100
2010 (internet)	7.2	8	3	0	2	1	1	15	7	15	19	12	17	7	100
2012 (internet)	6.5	7	4	1	3	4	5	13	9	15	19	11	11	5	100
2014 (internet)	7.1	8	4	0	2	2	4	13	7	16	21	12	16	4	100
2016 (internet)	7.0	8	3	1	1	2	3	13	9	15	21	11	13	6	100
Change in % points 2014-2016	-0.1	0	-1	+1	-1	0	-1	0	+2	-1	0	-1	-3	+2	
2012 (internet – main only)	6.5	7	4	1	3	4	5	14	9	16	18	10	11	5	100

³ In 2002 and 2006 the question was asked as “European Union”

2014 (internet – main only)	7.1	8	4	0	2	2	4	13	7	16	21	11	16	4	100
Change in % points 2012-2014 (main only)	+0.5	+1	0	-1	-1	-2	-1	-1	-2	0	+3	+1	+5	-1	

50/8. South Korea

(N=2061)															
Year	Mean	Median	0 (%)	1 (%)	2 (%)	3 (%)	4 (%)	5 (%)	6 (%)	7 (%)	8 (%)	9 (%)	10 (%)	Not familiar / Decline (%)	Total (%)
2010 (internet)	4.7	5	7	3	8	11	12	21	10	10	5	2	4	8	100
2012 (internet)	4.4	5	6	4	10	12	13	21	10	8	6	2	2	5	100
2014 (internet)	4.7	5	7	3	8	10	12	24	12	8	6	2	4	4	100
2016 (internet)	4.6	5	7	3	8	10	11	24	11	9	6	2	3	7	100
Change in % points 2014-2016	-0.1	0	0	0	0	0	-1	0	-1	+1	0	0	-1	+3	
2012 (internet – main only)	4.5	5	6	4	10	12	13	21	10	8	6	2	2	5	100
2014 (internet – main only)	4.6	5	7	3	8	10	12	24	12	8	5	2	4	4	100
Change in % points 2012-2014 (main only)	+0.1	0	+1	-1	-2	-2	-1	+3	+2	0	-1	0	+2	-1	

50/9. Iran

(N=2061)															
Year	Mean	Median	0 (%)	1 (%)	2 (%)	3 (%)	4 (%)	5 (%)	6 (%)	7 (%)	8 (%)	9 (%)	10 (%)	Not familiar / Decline (%)	Total (%)
2014 (internet)	4.3	4	10	5	11	10	12	20	9	9	5	1	3	4	100
2016 (internet)	4.5	5	9	4	9	10	11	21	10	9	5	2	4	6	100
Change in % points 2014-2016	+0.2	+1	-1	-1	-2	0	-1	+1	+1	0	0	+1	+1	+2	
2014 (internet – main only)	4.3	4	10	5	11	10	12	20	9	8	5	2	4	4	100

Question 140

Question 140: Based on what you know, do you think the U.S. should or should not participate in the following treaties and agreements?

140/1. The Paris Agreement that calls for countries to collectively reduce their emissions of greenhouse gases

	(N=2061)			
	Should participate (%)	Should not participate (%)	Not sure/ Decline (%)	Total (%)
<u>Year</u>				
2016	71	25	3	100

140/2. The agreement on the International Criminal Court that can try individuals for war crimes, genocide, or crimes against humanity if their own country won't try them⁴

	(N=2061)			
	Should participate (%)	Should not participate (%)	Not sure/ Decline (%)	Total (%)
<u>Year</u>				
2002 (telephone)	71	22	7	100
2002 (internet)	77	20	4	100
2004 (internet)	76	19	5	100
2006 (internet)	71	25	5	100
2008 (internet)	68	30	2	100
2010 (internet)	70	26	4	100
2012 (internet)	70	28	2	100
2016 (internet)	72	25	3	100
Change in % points 2012-2016	+2	-3	+1	

140/7. The agreement that lifts some international economic sanctions against Iran in exchange for strict limits on its nuclear program for at least the next decade

	(N=2061)			
	Should participate (%)	Should not participate (%)	Not sure/ Decline (%)	Total (%)
<u>Year</u>				
2016	60	36	4	100

⁴ Answer option changed slightly from 2002 to reflect the existence of the ICC. Previous question read, "The agreement to establish an International Criminal Court that would try individuals for war crimes, genocide, or crimes against humanity if their own country won't try them".

Question 10

Question 10: Turning to something else, do you believe that globalization, especially the increasing connections of our economy with others around the world, is mostly good or mostly bad for the United States?

10. Globalization and the U.S.

Year	(N=2061)				
	Mostly good (%)	Mostly bad (%)	Neutral/ equally good and bad (%)	Not sure/ Decline (%)	Total (%)
1998	54	20	15	11	100
2002 (telephone)	56	27	8	9	100
2002 (internet)	61	32	n/a	7	100
2004 (internet)	64	31	n/a	5	100
2006 (internet)	60	35	n/a	5	100
2008 (internet)	58	39	n/a	4	100
2008 (Sept.)	(56)	(42)	n/a	(2)	100
2010 (internet)	56	41	n/a	3	100
2012 (internet)	58	39	n/a	2	100
2014 (internet)	65	34	n/a	1	100
2016 (internet)	65	34	n/a	2	100
Change in % points 2014-2016	0	0	-	+1	

Question 71a

Question 71a: As you may know, the United States is now negotiating a free trade agreement with twelve Pacific nations called the Trans-Pacific Partnership (or TPP). Based on what you know, do you strongly support, somewhat support, somewhat oppose or strongly oppose this free trade agreement?

71A. Opinion on the free trade agreement with twelve Pacific nations

	(N=1006)					
	I strongly support it (%)	I Somewhat support it (%)	I Somewhat oppose it (%)	I strongly oppose it (%)	Not sure/ Decline (%)	Total (%)
Year						
2014 (internet)	11	52	22	9	6	100
2015 (internet)	11	53	18	11	7	100
2016 (internet)	8	52	24	9	7	100
Change in % points 2015-2016	-3	-1	+6	-2	0	

Question 190 (1-7)

Question 190): Overall, do you think international trade is good or bad for:

190/1. The U.S. economy

(N=2061)				
	Good (%)	Bad (%)	Not sure/ Decline (%)	Total (%)
<u>Year</u>				
2004 (internet)	57	39	5	100
2006 (internet)	54	42	4	100
2016 (internet)	59	39	2	100
Change in % points 2006-2016	+5	-3	-2	

190/2. American companies

(N=2061)				
	Good (%)	Bad (%)	Not sure/ Decline (%)	Total (%)
<u>Year</u>				
2004 (internet)	59	37	4	100
2006 (internet)	52	45	3	100
2016 (internet)	57	41	2	100
Change in % points 2006-2016	+5	-4	-1	

190/3. Consumers like you

(N=2061)				
	Good (%)	Bad (%)	Not sure/ Decline (%)	Total (%)
<u>Year</u>				
2004 (internet)	73	22	5	100
2006 (internet)	70	26	4	100
2016 (internet)	70	28	2	100
Change in % points 2006-2016	0	+2	-2	

190/4. Creating jobs in the U.S.**(N=2061)**

	Good (%)	Bad (%)	Not sure/ Decline (%)	Total (%)
<u>Year</u>				
2004 (internet)	38	56	5	100
2006 (internet)	37	60	3	100
2016 (internet)	40	59	2	100
Change in % points 2006-2016	+3	-1	-1	

190/6. Job security for American workers**(N=2061)**

	Good (%)	Bad (%)	Not sure/ Decline (%)	Total (%)
<u>Year</u>				
2004 (internet)	31	64	5	100
2006 (internet)	30	67	3	100
2016 (internet)	35	64	2	100
Change in % points 2006-2016	+5	-3	-1	

190/7. Your own standard of living**(N=2061)**

	Good (%)	Bad (%)	Not sure/ Decline (%)	Total (%)
<u>Year</u>				
2004 (internet)	65	29	6	100
2006 (internet)	64	31	5	100
2016 (internet)	64	34	2	100
Change in % points 2006-2016	0	+3	-3	

Question Q275

Question Q275: Do you think that, as a country, we are more safe, about as safe, or less safe than we were before the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001?

Opinion on country's safety

Year	(N=2061)				Total (%)
	More safe (%)	About as safe (%)	Less safe (%)	Not sure/ Decline (%)	
2014 (internet)	24	48	27	1	100
2015 (internet)	19	46	34	1	100
2016 (internet)	17	41	42	0	100
Change in % points 2015-2016	-2	-5	+8	-1	

Question 281

Question 281: Are you very worried, somewhat worried, not very worried or not worried at all that:

Q281/1. You or someone you know will be the target of gun violence

Year	(N=2061)							Total (%)
	Top 2 Box (%)	Bottom 2 Box (%)	Very worried (%)	Somewhat worried (%)	Not very worried (%)	Not at all worried (%)	Not sure/ Decline (%)	
2016	53	46	15	38	34	12	1	100

Q281/2. You or someone you know will be the target of a terrorist attack

Year	(N=2061)							Total (%)
	Top 2 Box (%)	Bottom 2 Box (%)	Very worried (%)	Somewhat worried (%)	Not very worried (%)	Not at all worried (%)	Not sure/ Decline (%)	
2016	44	55	10	34	40	15	1	100

Question 282

Q282: Do you think the greater threat to the United States from terrorism comes from people outside this country or from people inside this country?

282

Year	(N=1040)			Total (%)
	People outside this country (%)	People inside this country (%)	Not sure/ Decline (%)	
2016	34	65	1	100

Question 266

Q266: Do you feel that the US-led coalition against ISIS and other violent Islamic extremist groups in Iraq and Syria is making the situation:

	(N=2061)						
	A great deal better	Somewhat better	Neither better nor worse	Somewhat worse	A great deal worse	Not sure/Decline	Total
	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
Year							
2016	4	29	42	16	8	2	100

Question 278b

Q278b: In your opinion, would you say that the following actions are always effective, mostly effective, rarely effective or never effective in combatting terrorism?

278b/1. U.S. air strikes against suspected terrorists by manned aircraft

(N=2061)								
	Top 2 Box (%)	Bottom 2 Box (%)	Always effective (%)	Mostly effective (%)	Rarely effective (%)	Never effective (%)	Not sure/ Decline (%)	Total (%)
Year								
2016	73	24	20	53	22	3	3	100

278b/2. U.S. air strikes against suspected terrorists by drones/unmanned aircraft

(N=2061)								
	Top 2 Box (%)	Bottom 2 Box (%)	Always effective (%)	Mostly effective (%)	Rarely effective (%)	Never effective (%)	Not sure/ Decline (%)	Total (%)
Year								
2016	76	21	21	55	18	3	3	100

278b/3. Sending U.S. trainers and special operations forces to countries where terrorists operate

	(N=2061)							
	Top 2 Box (%)	Bottom 2 Box (%)	Always effective (%)	Mostly effective (%)	Rarely effective (%)	Never effective (%)	Not sure/ Decline (%)	Total (%)
Year								
2016	65	33	13	51	29	4	3	100

278b/4. Using torture against suspected terrorists that are captured

	(N=2061)							
	Top 2 Box (%)	Bottom 2 Box (%)	Always effective (%)	Mostly effective (%)	Rarely effective (%)	Never effective (%)	Not sure/ Decline (%)	Total (%)
Year								
2016	45	52	12	32	37	15	3	100

278b/5. Sending U.S. combat troops to fight terrorists abroad

	(N=2061)							
	Top 2 Box (%)	Bottom 2 Box (%)	Always effective (%)	Mostly effective (%)	Rarely effective (%)	Never effective (%)	Not sure/ Decline (%)	Total (%)
Year								
2016	60	37	12	48	32	5	3	100

278b/6. Limiting the flow of migrants and refugees and increasing border controls

	(N=2061)							
	Top 2 Box (%)	Bottom 2 Box (%)	Always effective (%)	Mostly effective (%)	Rarely effective (%)	Never effective (%)	Not sure/ Decline (%)	Total (%)
Year								
2016	57	40	23	34	33	7	3	100

278b/7. Blocking terrorist financing

	(N=2061)							
	Top 2 Box (%)	Bottom 2 Box (%)	Always effective (%)	Mostly effective (%)	Rarely effective (%)	Never effective (%)	Not sure/ Decline (%)	Total (%)
Year								
2016	78	20	36	42	17	3	3	100

Question 280

Q280: How likely is it that occasional acts of terrorism in the U.S. will be part of life in the future?

Q280

	(N=1021)						
	Top 2 Box (%)	Bottom 2 Box (%)	Very likely (%)	Somewhat likely (%)	Not very likely (%)	Not at all likely (%)	Total (%)
Year							
2016	89	10	48	41	9	1	100

Question 325A

Question 325A: In your opinion, is Israel playing a very positive, somewhat positive, somewhat negative or very negative role in resolving the key problems facing the Middle East?

325A. Israel

	(N=2061)						
	Top 2 Box (%)	Bottom 2 Box (%)	Very positive (%)	Somewhat positive (%)	Somewhat negative (%)	Very negative (%)	Total (%)
Year							
2015 (internet)	48	46	12	35	36	10	100
2016 (internet)	51	43	12	39	34	9	100
Change in % points 2015-2016	+3	-3	0	+4	-2	-1	0

Question 230**Question 230: In the Middle East conflict, do you think the United States should:****230. Sides in Middle East Conflict**

	(N=2061)				
	Take Israel's side (%)	Take the Palestinian's side (%)	Not take either side (%)	Not sure/Decline (%)	Total (%)
<u>Year</u>					
2002 (telephone)	25	1	71	3	100
2002 (internet)	24	3	70	4	100
2004 (internet)	17	3	74	6	100
2010 (internet)	28	3	66	4	100
2012 (internet)	30	3	65	2	100
2014 (internet)	30	3	64	3	100
2016 (internet)	33	4	59	3	100
Change in % points 2014-2016	+3	+1	-5	0	

Question 267a**Question 267a: Would you support or oppose the United States taking each of the following actions with respect to Syria?****267a/1. Accepting Syrian refugees into the United States
(N=996)**

	Support (%)	Oppose (%)	Not sure/Decline (%)	Total (%)
<u>Year</u>				
2014 (internet)	42	55	4	100
2016 (internet)	36	60	4	100
Change in % points 2014-2016	-6	+5	0	

267a/3. Sending arms and supplies to anti-government groups in Syria

	(N=996)				
	Support (%)	Oppose (%)	Not sure/Decline (%)	Total (%)	
<u>Year</u>					
2012 (internet)	27	67	6	100	
2014 (internet)	25	70	4	100	
2016 (internet)	26	67	7	100	
Change in % points 2014-2016	+1	-3	+3		

267a/4. Enforcing a no-fly zone over parts of Syria, including bombing Syrian air defenses

(N=996)				
	Support (%)	Oppose (%)	Not sure/ Decline (%)	Total (%)
<u>Year</u>				
2014 ⁵ (internet)	48	47	5	100
2016 (internet)	52	40	8	100
Change in % points 2014-2016	+4	-7	+3	

267a/5. Sending combat troops into Syria to fight violent Islamic extremist groups ⁶

(N=996)				
	Support (%)	Oppose (%)	Not sure/ Decline (%)	Total (%)
<u>Year</u>				
2012 (internet)	14	81	6	100
2014 (internet)	17	78	5	100
2016 (internet)	42	52	6	100
Change in % points 2014-2016	+25	-26	+1	

267a/5b. Sending special operations forces into Syria to fight violent Islamic extremist groups

(N=996)				
	Support (%)	Oppose (%)	Not sure/ Decline (%)	Total (%)
<u>Year</u>				
2016	57	37	6	100

267a/7. Helping to negotiate a peace agreement that allows President Assad of Syria to remain in power

(N=996)				
	Support (%)	Oppose (%)	Not sure/ Decline (%)	Total (%)
<u>Year</u>				
2016	31	62	7	100

⁵ In 2014, was 'a no-fly zone over Syria'.

⁶ In 2014 and prior, was 'sending US troops into Syria'.

**267a/8. Conducting airstrikes against violent Islamic extremist groups
(N=996)**

	Support (%)	Oppose (%)	Not sure/ Decline (%)	Total (%)
<u>Year</u>				
2016	72	22	6	100

Question 251b

Question 251b: Please tell me whether the US and Mexico are working in the same or different direction on each of the following issues:

251b/1 Finding new sources of energy

	(N=1003)			
	Same Direction (%)	Different Direction (%)	Not sure/ Decline (%)	Total (%)
<u>Year</u>				
2013	42	53	5	100
2016 (internet)	40	54	6	100
Change in % points 2013-2016	-2	+1	+1	

251b/2 Combating the trafficking of illegal drugs

	(N=1003)			
	Same Direction (%)	Different Direction (%)	Not sure/ Decline (%)	Total (%)
<u>Year</u>				
2013	43	53	4	100
2016 (internet)	37	59	4	100
Change in % points 2013-2016	-6	+6	0	

251b/3 Securing the US-Mexico border

	(N=1003)			
	Same Direction (%)	Different Direction (%)	Not sure/ Decline (%)	Total (%)
<u>Year</u>				
2013	34	62	5	100
2016 (internet)	27	69	4	100
Change in % points 2013-2016	-7	+7	-1	

251b/4 Trade and economic development

	(N=1003)			
	Same Direction (%)	Different Direction (%)	Not sure/ Decline (%)	Total (%)
<u>Year</u>				
2013	57	39	4	100
2016 (internet)	47	49	5	100
Change in % points 2013-2016	-10	+10	+1	

Question 251a

Question 251a: Please tell me whether the United States and Russia are working in the same or different direction on each of the following issues:

Q251A/1. Ending the conflict in Syria

	(N=1058)			
	Same Direction (%)	Different Direction (%)	Not sure/ Decline (%)	Total (%)
<u>Year</u>				
2016	29	64	6	100

Q251A/2. Limiting Iran's nuclear program

	(N=1058)			
	Same Direction (%)	Different Direction (%)	Not sure/ Decline (%)	Total (%)
<u>Year</u>				
2016	36	58	6	100

Q251A/3. Reducing nuclear weapons worldwide

	(N=1058)			
	Same Direction (%)	Different Direction (%)	Not sure/ Decline (%)	Total (%)
<u>Year</u>				
2016	35	59	6	100

Question 350b**Question 350b: In dealing with Russia, do you think the U.S. should:**

350b

(N=1058)				
	Undertake friendly cooperation and engagement with Russia (%)	Actively work to limit Russia's power (%)	Not sure/ Decline (%)	Total (%)
Year				
2016	56	39	6	100

Question 351b**Question 351b: And do you think that generally Russia is:**

351b

(N=1058)				
	Trying to undertake friendly cooperation and engagement with the United States (%)	Actively working to undermine U.S. international power and influence (%)	Not sure/ Decline (%)	Total (%)
Year				
2016	24	71	5	100

Question 295A**Question 295A: There is a controversy over what the countries of the world, including the U.S., should do about the problem of climate change. Here are three statements. Please tell me which statement comes closest to your own point of view:**

(N=1013)					
	Until we are sure that climate change is really a problem, we should not take any steps that would have economic costs (%)	The problem of climate change should be addressed, but its effects will be gradual, so we can deal with the problem gradually by taking steps that are low in cost (%)	Climate change is a serious and pressing problem. We should begin taking steps now even if this involves significant costs (%)	Not sure/ Decline (%)	Total (%)
Year					
2010 (internet)	26	42	29	3	100
2015 (internet)	24	36	37	2	100
2016 (internet)	19	38	41	2	100
Change in % points 2015-2016	-5	+2	+4	0	

Question 295B

Question 295B: *There is a controversy over what the countries of the world, including the U.S., should do about the problem of global warming. Here are three statements. Please tell me which statement comes closest to your own point of view:*

	(N=1048)				
	Until we are sure that global warming is really a problem, we should not take any steps that would have economic costs (%)	The problem of global warming should be addressed, but its effects will be gradual, so we can deal with the problem gradually by taking steps that are low in cost (%)	Global warming is a serious and pressing problem. We should begin taking steps now even if this involves significant costs (%)	Not sure/Decline (%)	Total (%)
<u>Year</u>					
2006 (internet)	17	37	43	3	100
2016 (internet)	19	36	44	2	100
Change in % points 2006-2016	+2	-1	+1	-1	

Question 376

Question 376: *Now thinking about U.S. foreign policy in Asia, do you think the U.S. should put a higher priority on:*

376. U.S. to emphasize relationships with traditional allies or China

	(N=1055)			
	Building up our strong relations with traditional allies like South Korea and Japan, even if this might diminish our relations with China (%)	Building a new partnership with China, even if this might diminish our relations with our traditional allies (%)	Not sure/Decline (%)	Total (%)
<u>Year</u>				
2010 (internet)	58	31	11	100
2012 (internet)	53	40	7	100
2014 (internet)	59	33	7	100
2016 (internet)	62	28	10	100
Change in % points 2014-2016	+3	-5	+3	

Question 336

Question 336: At the present time, which nation do you feel is stronger in terms of military power, the U.S. or China – or do you think they are about equal militarily?

336. Stronger nation in terms of military power

(N=2061)					
	The U.S. (%)	China (%)	About equal (%)	Not sure/ Decline (%)	Total (%)
<u>Year</u>					
2014 (internet)	54	14	32	1	100
2016 (internet)	50	15	32	3	100
Change in % points 2014-2016	-4	+1	0	+2	

Question 337

Question 337: At the present time, which nation do you feel is stronger in terms of economic power, the U.S. or China – or do you think they are about equal economically?

337. Stronger nation in terms of economic power

(N=2061)					
	The U.S. (%)	China (%)	About equal (%)	Not sure/ Decline (%)	Total (%)
<u>Year</u>					
2014 (internet)	27	45	26	2	100
2016 (internet)	31	38	28	3	100
Change in % points 2014-2016	+4	-7	+2	+1	

Question 350a

Question 350a: In dealing with the rise of China's power, do you think the U.S. should:

350a. U.S. dealing with China's power

(N=1003)				
	Undertake friendly cooperation and engagement with China (%)	Actively work to limit the growth of China's power (%)	Not sure/ Decline (%)	Total (%)
<u>Year</u>				
2006 (internet)	65	29	7	100
2008 (internet)	64	33	3	100
2010 (internet)	68	28	4	100
2012 (internet)	69	28	3	100
2014 (internet)	67	29	3	100
2016 (internet)	63	33	4	100
Change in % points 2014-2016	-4	+4	+1	

Question 351a**Question 351a: And do you think that generally China is:**

351a

Year	(N=1003)			Total (%)
	Trying to undertake friendly cooperation and engagement with the United States (%)	Actively working to undermine U.S. international power and influence (%)	Not sure/ Decline (%)	
2016	27	66	7	100

Question 374**Question 374: Please tell me whether you would support or oppose each of the following kinds of U.S. action to pressure North Korea to stop building its nuclear weapons program:**

* Answer options were "Favor"/"Oppose" in 2015

374/1. Continue diplomatic efforts to get North Korea to suspend its nuclear program

Year	(N=1065)			Total (%)
	Support* (%)	Oppose (%)	Not sure/ Decline (%)	
2015 (internet)	75	20	5	100
2016 (internet)	81	16	4	100
Change in % points 2015-2016	+6	-4	-1	

374/5. Accept that North Korea will produce additional nuclear weapons

Year	(N=1065)			Total (%)
	Support* (%)	Oppose (%)	Not sure/ Decline (%)	
2015 (internet)	16	79	5	100
2016 (internet)	11	85	4	100
Change in % points 2015-2016	-5	+6	-1	

374/6. Impose tighter economic sanctions on North Korea

Year	(N=1065)			Total (%)
	Support* (%)	Oppose (%)	Not sure/ Decline (%)	
2015 (internet)	70	25	6	100
2016 (internet)	80	17	4	100
Change in % points 2015-2016	+10	-8	-2	

374/7. Conduct cyberattacks against North Korean computer systems

	(N=1065)			
	Support* (%)	Oppose (%)	Not sure/ Decline (%)	Total (%)
<u>Year</u>				
2015 (internet)	50	45	6	100
2016 (internet)	53	42	5	100
Change in % points 2015-2016	+3	-3	-1	

374/8. Conduct airstrikes against North Korea's nuclear production facilities

	(N=1065)			
	Support* (%)	Oppose (%)	Not sure/ Decline (%)	Total (%)
<u>Year</u>				
2015 (internet)	36	58	6	100
2016 (internet)	35	60	5	100
Change in % points 2015-2016	-1	+2	-1	

374/9. Send U.S. troops to destroy North Korea's nuclear facilities

	(N=1065)			
	Support* (%)	Oppose (%)	Not sure/ Decline (%)	Total (%)
<u>Year</u>				
2015 (internet)	25	69	6	100
2016 (internet)	25	70	5	100
Change in % points 2015-2016	0	+1	-1	

Summary of 374: - 2016 data only

	(N=1065)			
	Support (%)	Oppose (%)	Not sure/ Decline (%)	Total (%)
<u>Year</u>				
2016				
Continue diplomatic efforts to get North Korea to suspend its nuclear program	81	16	4	100
Impose tighter economic sanctions on North Korea	80	17	4	100
Conduct cyberattacks against North Korean computer systems	53	42	5	100
Conduct airstrikes against North Korea's nuclear production facilities	35	60	5	100

Send U.S. troops to destroy North Korea's nuclear facilities	25	70	5	100
Accept that North Korea will produce additional nuclear weapons	11	85	4	100

Question 390

Question 390: Should legal immigration into the United States be kept at its present level, increased or decreased?

390. Level of legal immigration into the U.S.

(N=2061)					
Year	Kept at present level (%)	Increased (%)	Decreased (%)	Not sure/Decline (%)	Total (%)
2002 (telephone)	27	15	55	3	100
2002 (internet)	30	7	61	1	100
2004 (internet)	31	11	54	4	100
2006 (internet)	39	13	46	2	100
2008 (internet)	39	15	46	1	100
2010 (internet)	40	15	42	3	100
2012 (internet)	42	18	37	2	100
2016 (internet)	41	18	39	1	100
Change in % points 2012-2016	-1	0	+2	-1	

Question 401

Question 401: Do you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable or very unfavorable view of the following people (2013)

401/1 Chinese immigrants in the US

(N=2061)								
Year	Top 2 Box (%)	Bottom 2 Box (%)	Very favorable (%)	Somewhat favorable (%)	Somewhat unfavorable (%)	Very unfavorable (%)	Not sure/Decline (%)	Total (%)
2013	67	31	14	53	25	7	2	100
2016 (internet)	67	30	17	50	22	8	3	100
Change in % points 2013-2016	0	-1	+3	-3	-3	+1	+1	

401/2 Middle Eastern immigrants in the United States

Year	(N=2061)							Total (%)
	Top 2 Box (%)	Bottom 2 Box (%)	Very favorable (%)	Somewhat favorable (%)	Somewhat unfavorable (%)	Very unfavorable (%)	Not sure/Decline (%)	
2016 (internet)	45	52	11	33	32	20	3	100

401/3 Mexican immigrants in the US

Year	(N=2061)							Total (%)
	Top 2 Box (%)	Bottom 2 Box (%)	Very favorable (%)	Somewhat favorable (%)	Somewhat unfavorable (%)	Very unfavorable (%)	Not sure/Decline (%)	
2013	55	44	12	42	30	14	2	100
2016 (internet)	60	36	17	44	25	12	3	100
Change in % points 2013-2016	+5	-8	+5	+2	-5	-2	+1	

401/4 Mexicans living in Mexico

Year	(N=2061)							Total (%)
	Top 2 Box (%)	Bottom 2 Box (%)	Very favorable (%)	Somewhat favorable (%)	Somewhat unfavorable (%)	Very unfavorable (%)	Not sure/Decline (%)	
2013	81	17	31	49	14	4	2	100
2016 (internet)	80	17	36	43	12	4	4	100
Change in % points 2013-2016	-1	0	+5	-6	-2	0	+2	

401/5 Korean immigrants in the United States

Year	(N=2061)							Total (%)
	Top 2 Box (%)	Bottom 2 Box (%)	Very favorable (%)	Somewhat favorable (%)	Somewhat unfavorable (%)	Very unfavorable (%)	Not sure/Decline (%)	
2016 (internet)	67	30	18	49	21	8	3	100

Question 405

Question 405A: When it comes to immigration, which comes closest to your view about “illegal” immigrants who are currently working in the U.S.?

Illegal Immigrants**(N=1029)**

	They should be allowed to stay in their jobs and to apply for U.S. citizenship	They should be allowed to stay in their jobs and to eventually apply for U.S. citizenship only if they pay a penalty and wait a number of years	They should be allowed to stay in their jobs with work permits, but not to apply for U.S. citizenship	They should be required to leave their jobs and leave the U.S.	Not sure/Decline	Total
Year	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
2013 (internet)	25	25	16	31	3	100
2015 (internet)	32	24	13	29	2	100
2016 (internet)	32	25	13	28	1	100
Change in % points 2015-2016	0	+1	0	-1	-1	

Question 405B: When it comes to immigration, which comes closest to your view about “undocumented” immigrants who are currently working in the U.S.?

Undocumented Immigrants**(N=1032)**

	They should be allowed to stay in their jobs and to apply for U.S. citizenship	They should be allowed to stay in their jobs and to eventually apply for U.S. citizenship only if they pay a penalty and wait a number of years	They should be allowed to stay in their jobs with work permits, but not to apply for U.S. citizenship	They should be required to leave their jobs and leave the U.S.	Not sure/Decline	Total
Year	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
2015 (internet)	31	28	11	28	1	100
2016 (internet)	29	26	13	31	2	100
Change in % points 2015-2016	-2	-2	+2	+3	+1	

Question 410a

Question 410a: Do you favor or oppose a wall expanding the 700 miles of border wall and fencing with Mexico to reduce illegal immigration into the United States?

410a

(N=1051)				
	Favor (%)	Oppose (%)	Not sure/ Decline (%)	Total (%)
Year				
2016	48	50	2	100

Question 410b

Question 410b: How effective do you think expanding the 700 miles of border wall and fencing with Mexico would be in reducing illegal immigration?

410b

(N=1010)								
	Top 2 Box (%)	Bottom 2 Box (%)	Very effective (%)	Somewhat effective (%)	Not very effective (%)	Not at all effective (%)	Not sure/ Decline (%)	Total (%)
Year								
2016	45	54	11	34	30	24	1	100

Question 1000

Question 1000: If the presidential election were being held today and the candidates were Hillary Clinton, the Democrat or Donald Trump, the Republican for whom would you vote?

1000

(N=2061)						
	Hillary Clinton (%)	Donald Trump (%)	Neither (%)	Other (%)	Not sure/ Decline (%)	Total (%)
Year						
2016	37	30	26	5	2	100

Question 1000B

Question 1000B: Would you lean toward Hillary Clinton, the Democrat or Donald Trump, the Republican?

1000B

(N=624)				
	Hillary Clinton (%)	Donald Trump (%)	Not sure/ Decline (%)	Total (%)
Year				
2016	43	30	27	100

Question 1001

Question 1001: Regardless of your voting preference in the previous question, who was your top choice for president among the following candidates?

1001

(N=2061)										
	Hillary Clinton (%)	Donald Trump (%)	Bernie Sanders (%)	Ted Cruz (%)	John Kasich (%)	Marco Rubio (%)	Jeb Bush (%)	Other (%)	Not sure/ Decline (%)	Total (%)
Year										
2016	24	16	23	8	9	6	3	8	4	100

DEMOGRAPHICS**Question 1005**

Question 1005: In general, do you think of yourself as:

1005. Ideology

(N=2061)						
	Top 3 Box (%)	Extremely liberal (%)	Liberal (%)	Slightly liberal (%)	Moderate/ Middle of the road (%)	
Year						
2014 (internet)	28	4	14	10	35	
2015 (internet)	26	3	13	10	37	
2016 (internet)	27	4	14	9	35	
2014 (internet – main only)	27	4	13	10	36	
	Bottom 3 Box (%)	Slightly conservative (%)	Conservative (%)	Extremely conservative (%)	Not sure/Decline (%)	Total (%)
Year						
2014 (internet)	36	13	18	5	2	100
2015 (internet)	35	11	19	5	3	100
2016 (internet)	35	11	20	4	3	100
2014 (internet – main only)	36	13	19	5	1	100

Question 1010

Question 1010: Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an independent, or what?

1010. Party ID

(N=2061)						
	Republican (%)	Democrat (%)	Independent (%)	Other (%)	Not sure/Decline (%)	Total (%)
<u>Year</u>						
2014 (internet)	27	36	29	5	2	100
2015 (internet)	27	36	26	8	3	100
2016 (internet)	28	36	26	7	2	100
2014 (internet – main only)	27	36	29	6	2	100

Question 1015**Question 1015: Would you call yourself a strong Republican or a not very strong Republican?**

1015. Type of Republican

<u>Year</u>	(N=635)			Total (%)
	Strong Republican (%)	Not very strong Republican (%)	Not sure/ Decline (%)	
2014 (internet)	42	57	1	100
2015 (internet)	46	53	1	100
2016 (internet)	52	48	1	100
2014 (internet – main only)	42	57	1	100

Question 1020**Question 1020: Would you call yourself a strong Democrat or a not very strong Democrat?**

1020. Type of Democrat

<u>Year</u>	(N=688)			Total (%)
	Strong Democrat (%)	Not very strong Democrat (%)	Not sure/ Decline (%)	
2014 (internet)	45	54	1	100
2015 (internet)	51	49	0	100
2016 (internet)	50	49	1	100
2014 (internet – main only)	45	54	1	100

Question 1025**Question 1025: Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican Party or to the Democratic Party?**

1025. Proximity to Republican or Democratic party

<u>Year</u>	(N=570)				Total
	Republican party (%)	Democratic party (%)	Neither (%)	Not sure/ Decline (%)	
2014 (internet)	27	26	47	1	100
2015 (internet)	26	29	44	1	100
2016 (internet)	29	29	41	1	100
2014 (internet – main only)	27	26	47	1	100

Question 10003**Question 10003: Are you currently registered to vote in the U.S.?**

10003. Registered to vote in the U.S

	(N=2061)					
	Yes, I am registered to vote at my present address (%)	Yes, I am registered to vote at a different address (%)	No, I am not registered to vote (%)	Not sure (%)	Refused (%)	Total (%)
<u>Year</u>						
2016	78	5	13	3	1	100

Question 1648**Question 1648: What is your religion?**

1648. Religion

	(N=2061)						
	Catholic (%)	Evangelical or Protestant Christian (%)	Jehovah's Witness (%)	Mormon (%)	Jewish (%)	Islam/Muslim (%)	Orthodox Church (%)
<u>Year</u>							
2016	25	41	1	2	2	0	0

	Hindu (%)	Buddhist (%)	Unitarian (Universalist) (%)	Other Christian religion (%)	Other non- Christian religion (%)	No religion, not a believer, atheist, agnostic (%)	Total (%)
<u>Year</u>							
2016	1	1	1	8	1	17	100



2016 CHICAGO COUNCIL SURVEY

America in the Age of Uncertainty

American Public Opinion
and US Foreign Policy

By Dina Smeltz, Ivo Daalder,
Karl Friedhoff, and Craig Kafura



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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Over the past year, Donald Trump has been able to channel the anxieties of a significant segment of the American public into a powerful political force, taking him to the doorstep of the White House. These public anxieties stem from growing concerns about the effects of globalization on the American economy and about the changing demographics of the United States.

Although Trump has been able to mobilize many of those who are most concerned about these developments, their motivating concerns are not new. They existed before Donald Trump entered the race, and they are likely to persist even if he loses the election in November 2016. Yet, uniquely among the candidates running for president this cycle, Trump has given voice to this group of Americans, notably through his tough stances on immigration and trade.

At the same time, while this segment of the American public has given Donald Trump traction in the presidential race, his views on important issues garner only minority support from the overall American public. While they are divided on expanding a wall on the US border with Mexico, Americans overall support continued immigration into the United States and favor reform to address the large population of unauthorized immigrants already in the country. Americans overall think globalization is mostly good for the United States, and they see many benefits to free trade. And the American public as a whole—including the core supporters of Donald Trump—still favors the country’s traditional alliances, a shared leadership role for the United States abroad, and the preservation of US military superiority.


CORE TRUMP SUPPORTERS” ARE THOSE IN THE SAMPLE WHO SAID THAT DONALD TRUMP WAS THEIR “TOP CHOICE FOR PRESIDENT” AMONG A LIST INCLUDING THE FOLLOWING CANDIDATES: HILLARY CLINTON, DONALD TRUMP, BERNIE SANDERS, JEB BUSH, TED CRUZ, AND JOHN KASICH.

Trump’s Core Support Is Based on Immigration and Trade

Trump’s rhetoric on immigrants and refugees has most clearly struck a chord with his base. On each and every question concerning immigration, Trump’s core supporters are the least favorable. An overwhelming majority of core Trump supporters agree that immigration is a critical threat to the United States—almost double the percentage among the general public (43%, see Figure A). Six in ten Trump supporters believe that illegal immigrants in the United States should be forced to leave their jobs and the United States (63%). And nine in ten Trump supporters support expanding the wall on the border with Mexico (92%). The public overall is divided on expanding the wall, and 58 percent support a pathway to citizenship for illegal immigrants.

Figure A: **More Trump Supporters See Immigration as a Critical Threat**

Below is a list of possible threats to the vital interest of the United States in the next 10 years. For each one, please select whether you see this as a critical threat, an important but not critical threat, or not an important threat at all. **Large numbers of immigrants and refugees coming into the US (% critical threat)**
n = 1,728




2016 Chicago Council Survey

Core Trump supporters express similar levels of fear about Islamic fundamentalism as Republicans among the general public. However, they are more unfavorable than other Republicans in their views of Middle Eastern immigrants and are less likely to favor admitting refugees from Syria into the United States (Figure B).

Figure B: **A Record Percentage of Republicans See Islamic Fundamentalism as a Critical Threat**

Below is a list of possible threats to the vital interest of the United States in the next 10 years. For each one, please select whether you see this as a critical threat, an important but not critical threat, or not an important threat at all. **Islamic fundamentalism (% critical threat)**
n = 1,715




2016 Chicago Council Survey

Concerns about immigration reinforce economic worries, which are also reflected in the views of core Trump supporters. Trump backers are the least likely to support globalization (Figure C) and to say that free trade has been good for the US economy, for consumers like them, or for their own standard of living. They are also least likely to support the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade deal and the most likely to say the next generation of Americans will be economically worse off than adults today.

Figure C: Trump Supporters Are Less Likely Than Republicans Overall to See Globalization as Good

Do you believe that globalization, especially the increasing connections of our economy with others around the world, is mostly good or mostly bad for the United States? (% mostly good)

n = 2,061



2016 Chicago Council Survey

Negative Feelings toward Immigration and Trade Are Not New and Do Not Reflect the Majority View


While Trump supporters are the most stridently opposed to immigration and are the least likely to support free trade today, these sentiments are not new. Nor are they the majority viewpoint among Americans, who generally support both immigration and trade.

The Chicago Council results reflect partisan differences on these issues over many seasons. Since 1998, a majority of Republicans have consistently said that immigration is a critical threat to the United States, which, at 67 percent, is at a peak today (Figure D). In contrast, beginning in 2002, Democrats' concerns about immigration steadily decreased, with just 27 percent of Democrats saying it poses a critical threat in 2016. Given this wide disparity, as Figure A demonstrates, only a minority of Americans (43%) see immigration as a threat to the United States. And an overall majority of Americans say that illegal immigrants currently working in the United States should be allowed to stay and pursue a path to citizenship (58%).

Figure D: Republicans Are Most Likely to Say Immigration Is a Critical Threat to the United States

Below is a list of possible threats to the vital interest of the United States in the next 10 years. For each one, please select whether you see this as a critical threat, an important but not critical threat, or not an important threat at all: **Large numbers of immigrant and refugees coming into the United States** (% critical threat)

n = 1,728




2016 Chicago Council Survey

Similarly, since 2008, Republicans have consistently expressed more negative views than Democrats on globalization and trade. While the gap between Republicans and Democrats on support for globalization has grown from four percentage points in 2006 to 15 percentage points in 2016, this should not detract from the fact that overall two in three Americans continue to favor globalization (Figure E).

Figure E: Democrat and Republican Views on Globalization Have Diverged

Do you believe that globalization, especially the increasing connections of our economy with others around the world, is mostly good or mostly bad for the United States? (% mostly good)

n = 2,061



2016 Chicago Council Survey


Role of the United States in the World

While Trump's views on immigration and trade clearly resonate with his core supporters, some of his other criticisms of US foreign policy are less popular among his base. For example, core Trump supporters are somewhat more cautious than other Americans of alliances and an active US role in world affairs, but in most cases they continue to favor international engagement. This serves as a reminder that despite divides on issues such as immigration and trade, the American public finds a great deal of common ground on American leadership in the world and how to achieve American goals (Figure F).

Figure F: Republicans and Core Trump Supporters Favor Achieving Foreign Policy Goals by Maintaining US Military Superiority

How effective do you think each of the following approaches is to achieving the foreign policy goals of the United States: very effective, somewhat effective, not very effective, or not effective at all. (% somewhat effective and % very effective, top five responses)

n = 2,061



2016 Chicago Council Survey

Conclusion

Future political candidates may not be able to recreate Trump's success in conveying the public's grievances, but the political winds that have brought Trump to the edge of the presidency will persist. Therefore, it is crucial to understand what these grievances suggest about the United States. Economic recovery has been uneven. The breadth and pace of diversity is increasing, creating discomfort among some segments of American society—especially among those most isolated from these changes.¹ And many Americans find themselves affected by decisions made by people who do not seem to take their views or anxieties seriously.

The changing demographic makeup of America will likely transform the political dynamics, given that younger and non-white Americans are more supportive of globalization, immigration, and increasing ties to the world. But in the near term, the attitudes and opinions that brought Trump to the fore of American politics will remain—and could very well strengthen. ■

INTRODUCTION

The rise of Donald Trump to the Republican Party nomination shocked the political establishment and has dramatically reshaped the contours of the 2016 election. Key to his political success has been his ability to reflect the anxieties of Americans who have felt ignored by politicians and policymakers. The 2016 Chicago Council Survey shows that among this portion of the American public, concerns over changing demographics and economics have built into a potent political force.

While Bernie Sanders also managed to rally a type of “outsider” success in this election cycle, the 2016 Survey found that self-described Democrats share a fairly coherent view on foreign policy regardless of who they supported in the primaries. For this reason, this report focuses on ways that Donald Trump’s campaign seems to have disrupted the traditional Republican party platform by channeling his supporters’ hard-line focus on immigration and—to a lesser extent—opposition to globalization.

Trump’s rise to prominence has occurred as white Americans find themselves on the path to becoming a minority within the overall population for the first time in the nation’s history. Diversity is on the rise, and so too is the foreign-born population—three-quarters of which come from Asia, Mexico, or other Latin American countries.² From 2000 to 2012, America’s foreign-born population increased from 31.1 million to 40.7 million.³ As a percentage of the total population, the foreign-born population has more than doubled, from 5.4 percent in 1960 to 13 percent in 2012. White Americans are now expected to become a minority before 2040.⁴

A Public Religion Research Institute/Brookings survey conducted in 2016 finds that while 78 percent of Americans are comfortable with the prospect of a majority non-white nation, the minority who express concern has grown from 14 percent in 2013 to 21 percent in 2016.⁵ Discomfort with the prospect of increasing diversity is highest among core Trump supporters (34%), an opinion shared by 28 percent of Republicans, 20 percent of Democrats, and 18 percent of Independents. Americans are also closely divided between those who think that immigrants today strengthen the United States because of their hard work and talents (47%) and those who believe immigrants are a burden on the country because they take jobs, housing, and healthcare (43%). Majorities of core Trump supporters (80%) and Republicans (65%) describe immigrants as a burden, while only minorities of Independents (41%) and Democrats (27%) say the same.

However, Trumpism only reaches so far. American support for US engagement in the world remains remarkably stable and cross-partisan. The US public also remains united around combatting a similar set of top threats, including terrorism and nuclear proliferation. Americans of both parties share a similar view of how to deal with Russian and Chinese power, and both support the US military presence in key allied countries such as Japan and South Korea. And cross-partisan majorities favor a continued shared leadership role for the United States internationally.

In the future, other candidates may not be able to recreate Trump’s success in tapping into the anxieties of a discontented minority of the electorate. But his triumph in securing the nomination of a major US political party can be better understood by examining the public opinion context that led to this political moment. ■

Spotlight: Characteristics of Core Trump Supporters

The media has made much of the demographics of Trump supporters—white, older, lesser educated, rust belt residents—in an effort to explain their attraction to Donald Trump’s oratory about a rigged economic system. Conventional wisdom has become that “working class islands of economic discontent”⁶ have borne the brunt of the US and global economic transformation and thus are attracted to an outsider who says he feels their pain.

The Chicago Council Survey finds that the demographics of Trump supporters match some of these features, at least on the surface. Nearly nine in ten identify themselves as white, similar to Republicans overall (82% white). This is notably more white than the US general public overall (65% white) or Democrats (49% white). Core Trump supporters also stand out in educational attainment. While 30 percent of the overall American public and 32 percent of Republicans report having a bachelor’s degree or higher, just two in ten (20%) of core Trump supporters state the same.

Although the racial and age demographics line up with a story of a dispossessed white working class, the income levels of Trump supporters call the working class storyline into question. The Chicago Council Survey finds that core Trump supporters’ income levels are comparable to overall American incomes, though lower than other Republicans.

% of respondents
n = 345

Age		Ethnicity		Party identification	
18-29	16	White, non-Hispanic	88	Republican	59
30-44	27	Black, non-Hispanic	1	Liberal	3
45-59	27	Other, non-Hispanic	6	Moderate	15
60+	30	Hispanic	5	Conservative	40
Gender		Household income		Democrat	8
Male	52	\$0-20K	13	Liberal	1
Female	48	\$20-40K	21	Moderate	7
Education		\$40-75K	25	Conservative	1
High school grad or less	49	\$75-125K	29	Independent	33
Some college/associate's degree	31	\$125K+	13	Liberal	2
College graduates	20			Moderate	19
				Conservative	11

2016 Chicago Council Survey

CHANGING DEMOGRAPHICS, IMMIGRATION, AND SECURITY FEARS


While the candidates disagree over many key points of US foreign policy matters in this election, the most strident divide strikes at the very heart of American identity. In a country populated by immigrants from every corner of the globe, what it means to be American has long been a prominent feature of political debate. Donald Trump has promised to expand the 700-mile wall along the US border with Mexico to prevent illegal immigration and has proposed a temporary ban on Muslim immigrants.⁷ In contrast, Hillary Clinton has said she would accept an even greater number of Syrian refugees than President Obama has pledged and that she will work for comprehensive immigration reform.⁸ With such stark differences among the candidates on an issue that touches on both domestic and foreign policy, the debate on America's openness to immigration—and to the world—is now a core issue in the presidential campaign.⁹

The Great Immigration Divide

An overwhelming majority of core Trump supporters agree that immigration is a critical threat to the United States—almost double the percentage among the general public (Figure 1; Figure 2). And on each and every question concerning immigration, Trump's core supporters are the most unfavorable in their views; for example, eight in ten believe that controlling and reducing illegal immigration is a very important foreign policy goal for the United States—significantly more than Republicans, Democrats, Independents, and the general public.

Figure 1: **More Trump Supporters See Immigration as a Critical Threat**

Below is a list of possible threats to the vital interest of the United States in the next 10 years. For each one, please select whether you see this as a critical threat, an important but not critical threat, or not an important threat at all. **Large numbers of immigrants and refugees coming into the US (% critical threat)**
n = 1,728




2016 Chicago Council Survey

Figure 2: More Trump Supporters Prioritize Controlling and Reducing Illegal Immigration as a Goal

Below is a list of possible foreign policy goals that the United States might have. For each one please select whether you think that it should be a very important foreign policy goal of the United States. **Controlling and reducing illegal immigration** (% very important goal)

n = 782




2016 Chicago Council Survey

Trump's success in rousing support for his anti-immigration policy proposals is best understood in the context of public opinion changes that have taken place over the past two decades. From 1998 to 2002, similarly sized majorities of Democrats, Republicans, and Independents viewed large numbers of immigrants and refugees as a critical threat, and they saw controlling and reducing illegal immigration as a very important goal. But beginning in 2002, Democrats' concerns steadily decreased. By 2016, threat perceptions of immigration among Democrats had dropped by 35 percentage points (Figure 3).

Figure 3: More Republicans See Immigration as a Critical Threat

Below is a list of possible threats to the vital interest of the United States in the next 10 years. For each one, please select whether you see this as a critical threat, an important but not critical threat, or not an important threat at all: **Large numbers of immigrant and refugees coming into the United States** (% critical threat)

n = 1,728




2016 Chicago Council Survey

Republicans, for their part, are now more likely than at any other time to say that immigrants and refugees are a critical threat. Similarly, the percentage of Republicans who say that controlling and reducing immigration is a very important goal has risen to 68 percent, from 61 percent just two years ago (Figure 4). The gaps between Republicans and Democrats on these two indicators now stand at roughly 40 percentage points—both historic highs.

Figure 4: **Republicans and Democrats are Divided on the Importance of Controlling and Reducing Illegal Immigration**

Below is a list of possible foreign policy goals that the United States might have. For each one please select whether you think that it should be a very important foreign policy goal of the United States:
Controlling and reducing illegal immigration (% very important goal)

n = 782



Donald Trump in Step with Republican Public on Immigration

As evidenced by the past two decades of Chicago Council Surveys, the topic of immigration has been a hot-button issue for Republican voters for quite some time. But the same has not been true for Republican opinion leaders. A 2014 Chicago Council Survey of foreign policy opinion leaders found that among Republican opinion leaders, immigration was ranked the lowest among potential threats (16%, see Figure 5). Similarly, as a foreign policy goal, Republican opinion leaders rated controlling and reducing illegal immigration one of the least important goals (20%, very important goal).

Trump has capitalized on these preexisting gaps between Republican leaders and the Republican public and between Democrats and Republicans. His claims about Mexican immigrants being “criminals” and “rapists”¹⁰ and his proposals to build a wall on the border with Mexico are controversial to many. But they channel the concerns of a significant portion of the public. As shown in Figure 1, core supporters of Trump express even greater concern about immigration than the average Republican.


This concern is not limited to illegal immigration. When it comes to legal immigration, Trump’s core supporters also take the least accommodating view. Among this group, 70 percent say that legal immigration should be decreased, compared with 53 percent of Republicans, 41 percent of Independents, and 26 percent of Democrats.

Figure 5: Public Expresses Greater Concern over Immigration than Opinion Leaders

■ Democratic leaders
 ■ Democratic public
 ■ Republican leaders
 ■ Republican public
 ■ Independent leaders
 ■ Independent public


Below is a list of possible foreign policy goals that the United States might have. For each one please select whether you think that it should be a very important foreign policy goal of the United States, a somewhat important foreign policy goal, or not an important goal at all:

n = Public 782, Leaders 642



Below is a list of possible threats to the vital interest of the United States in the next 10 years. For each one, please select whether you see this as a critical threat, an important but not critical threat, or not an important threat at all:

n = Public 1,728, Leaders 635



Note: Republican, Democrat, and Independent leader opinions from the 2014 leader survey. Public opinions from the 2016 Chicago Council Survey.

2016 Chicago Council Survey

Rising Concerns about Islamic Fundamentalism


The increase in the Republican public's concern about immigration since 2014 is likely related to increased media attention to the topic during the primary campaigns, especially since it has become a signature issue for Trump. In addition, Donald Trump has managed to blend fears about terrorism and immigration, saying in an August foreign policy speech, "The common thread linking the major Islamic terrorist attacks that have recently occurred on our soil—9/11, the Ft. Hood shooting, the Boston Bombing, the San Bernardino attack, the Orlando attack—is that they have involved immigrants or the children of immigrants. Clearly new screening procedures are needed."¹¹

Americans express increased concern about the threats posed by both international terrorism (75% in 2016, up from 69% in 2015) and Islamic fundamentalism (59% in 2016, up from 55% in 2015). The public now views these as among the top three threats (along with nuclear proliferation) facing the United States (Figure 6). This makes sense given the context in which the 2016 Chicago Council Survey was fielded—in close proximity to the Orlando shooting and several other high-profile attacks in the United States and Europe which many linked to violent Islamic extremist groups.

Figure 6: **The Top Five Critical Threats According to . . .**

Below is a list of possible threats to the vital interest of the United States in the next 10 years. For each one, please select whether you see this as a critical threat, an important but not critical threat, or not an important threat at all: (% critical threat)

n varies



2016 Chicago Council Survey




WHILE ONLY 23 PERCENT OF AMERICANS OVERALL SAY THAT LIMITING THE FLOW OF MIGRANTS AND REFUGEES IS ALWAYS EFFECTIVE, TWICE AS MANY CORE TRUMP SUPPORTERS SAY THAT SUCH LIMITS ARE ALWAYS EFFECTIVE.

While Republicans and Democrats agree that terrorism is a critical threat, they express differing levels of concern about Islamic fundamentalism. Today, three in four Republicans believe that Islamic fundamentalism poses a critical threat—the highest point since the question was first asked in 1998, even higher than after the September 11 attacks (Figure 7). In contrast, only half of Democrats identify Islamic fundamentalism as a critical threat. Core Trump supporters (76%) are similar to Republicans overall on this question.

Figure 7: A Record Percentage of Republicans See Islamic Fundamentalism as a Critical Threat

Below is a list of possible threats to the vital interest of the United States in the next 10 years. For each one, please select whether you see this as a critical threat, an important but not critical threat, or not an important threat at all. **Islamic fundamentalism (% critical threat)**
n = 1,715



2016 Chicago Council Survey

Partisan Differences Toward Middle Eastern Immigrants

Polls have shown that Americans generally oppose Trump's proposal for a temporary ban on Muslims from other countries entering the United States.¹² The Chicago Council Survey did not ask about a specific ban, but it did ask about the effectiveness of limiting the flow of migrants and refugees as a way to combat terrorism. While only 23 percent of Americans overall say that limiting the flow of migrants and refugees is always effective, twice as many core Trump supporters (47%) say that such limits are always effective. Most other methods of combatting terrorism, including airstrikes, drone strikes, sending US troops, and blocking financing, are deemed effective by majorities across political affiliations.¹³

When asked more specifically about various groups of immigrants, Americans overall are roughly divided on Middle Eastern immigrants, with 45 percent holding a favorable view and 52 percent an unfavorable view. These views help to explain why only 36 percent of the overall US public favors accepting Syrian refugees into the United States (Figure 8).

As with most of the questions about immigrants and immigration, there is a wide partisan divide: about six in ten Democrats feel favorably toward Middle Eastern immigrants (58%) and support taking in Syrian refugees (56%), while among Republicans, only 29 percent are positive toward Middle Eastern immigrants and only 18 percent favor admitting Syrian refugees.¹⁴ Core Trump supporters are the most negative of all: just 15 percent feel favorably toward Middle Eastern immigrants and nine percent support admitting Syrian refugees.

Republicans Want to “Build that Wall”

From the time he formally announced his candidacy, Trump began courting votes from the segment of the US public opposed to immigration. To keep out illegal immigrants, he proposed—and has stuck by—a policy to expand the wall on the border with Mexico.¹⁵

Large majorities of core Trump supporters (92%) and Republicans (79%) favor “expanding the 700 miles of border wall and fencing with Mexico” to reduce illegal immigration into the United States. They also think the wall will be effective at reducing illegal immigration (85% among core Trump supporters and 71% of Republicans).

But Americans overall are evenly divided on building such a wall, with 48 percent in favor and 50 percent opposed. A narrow majority of Americans (54%) say that such an expansion would be ineffective at reducing illegal immigration (compared with 45% effective). Seven in ten Democrats oppose expanding the wall (71%) and think it would be ineffective (69%). And 56 percent of Independents oppose expanding the wall and also think it will be ineffective.

Partisan Divide on Mexican Immigrants—Though Views Have Grown More Positive Since 2013

Americans overall—and across party lines—have grown more positive toward Mexican immigrants since a 2013 Chicago Council survey. In 2013, 55 percent reported favorable views of Mexican immigrants living in the United States—a sentiment that rose to 60 percent in 2016. Looking at partisan views, three-quarters of Democrats (74%, up from 64% in 2013) and nearly half of Republicans (46%, up from 38% in 2013) say they view Mexican immigrants favorably. By contrast, only one-third of core Trump supporters express a favorable view of Mexican immigrants living in the United State (Figure 8).¹⁶


The population of unauthorized immigrants in the United States has been in decline since 2008, and in 2016 it reportedly fell below 11 million for the first time since 2005.¹⁷ This decline has coincided with a shift in Mexican migration: since 2005, net migration into the United States from Mexico has been negative.¹⁸ Many of the unauthorized immigrants still in the United States have lived in the country for many years, and whether they should be offered a legal path to citizenship has been a longstanding issue.

A path to citizenship seems to be a non-starter among a majority of core Trump supporters. Six in ten core Trump supporters (63%) say that illegal immigrants in the United States should be forced to leave their jobs and the United States, while only three in ten (30%) support allowing illegal immigrants to stay in the United States with a path to citizenship.

Figure 8: Core Trump Supporters Are More Negative Toward Immigrant Groups

Do you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable, or very unfavorable view of the following people?: (% net favorable)

n = 2,061



2016 Chicago Council Survey

However, these views are out of step with overall American opinion. Just three in ten among the overall US public (28%) say that illegal immigrants should be forced to leave the United States and leave their jobs—half the percentage of core Trump supporters who feel this way (Figure 9).

Instead, 58 percent of Americans say that illegal immigrants currently working in the United States should be allowed to stay and pursue US citizenship, either immediately (32%) or after a waiting period and paying a fine (26%). An additional 13 percent say they should be allowed to stay in the United States with a work permit but not apply for citizenship. Overall, the number of Americans who prefer there be a pathway to citizenship has increased since 2013, when 50 percent were in favor either immediately (25%) or after a waiting period and paying a fine (25%). This result is in line with the findings of other polls, which have found that a majority of Americans favor a pathway to citizenship and have since at least 2014.¹⁹

As on other immigration questions, there is a sharp partisan divide. Republicans (42%) are more likely than Democrats (14%) to say illegal immigrants should leave the United States. Despite Trump's strong views to the contrary,²⁰ Republicans have become somewhat more favorable toward a path to citizenship (44% in 2016, up from 37% in 2015). For their part, seven in ten Democrats would prefer a path to citizenship, now (44%) or with a conditional fine and waiting period (28%). Only 14 percent of Democrats favor deportation (Figure 9).


Demographic Divisions on Immigration

Americans who are older, white, or have less than a college education are more likely than other Americans to name immigration as a critical threat, prioritize controlling and reducing illegal immigration, and support decreasing legal immigration into the United States (Appendix Figure 1). It is also these demographic groups that are more likely to be core supporters of Trump.

Figure 9: **Americans Overall Favor a Pathway to Citizenship**

When it comes to immigration, which comes closest to your view about illegal immigrants who are currently working in the US? (%)

n = 1,029



2016 Chicago Council Survey

However, it is important to note that other demographic groups—and those groups of Americans that are growing the fastest—hold notably different views. Younger Americans, those with college degrees, and non-whites are generally more likely to favor maintaining legal immigration levels and less likely to view immigration as a critical threat.

Immigration and Economic Insecurity

Clearly, differences of opinion on immigrants and immigration are a major dividing point in this election. The candidates represent vastly different visions for the future of the United States. While those in Trump's camp support expanding the wall with Mexico and are suspicious of immigrant groups, Americans overall favor continued immigration combined with immigration reform to address the large population of unauthorized immigrants already in the country.

Concerns about immigration are also linked to concerns about the economic prospects for the next generation of Americans. Those Americans who feel more threatened by immigration, favor deportation, and feel unfavorably toward immigrants believe that the next generation will be economically worse off than adults today. Unease with immigration and pessimism about the next generation's economic prospects reinforce each other and have proven to be key factors in support for Donald Trump.²¹ ■

THE CONSEQUENCE OF GLOBAL ECONOMICS

One of the most prominent issues in any presidential campaign is the economy, and economic conditions have proven to be a major factor in election outcomes.²² In the 2016 campaign, income inequality is a prominent topic, and in the words of Barney Frank, former Congressman from Massachusetts, “The bumper sticker is now ‘income fairness.’”²³

While the United States has added millions of jobs over several years of sustained growth since the 2009 recession, the top one percent of Americans captured 85 percent of total income growth from 2009 to 2013.²⁴ Additionally, the Great Recession temporarily reduced income inequality, but it has risen again in many states.²⁵ Globalization and international trade have become targets for both candidates. Both Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump have spoken strongly against certain trade deals and criticized some outcomes of globalization. Yet the data show that majorities of Democrats and Republicans continue to think that globalization is good for the United States, and these views have been stable over long periods of time. Core Trump supporters, conversely, are much less likely to positively assess the effects of globalization and international trade.

Republicans Less Supportive of Globalization Than Democrats

While economists and politicians are positive about US economic recovery, the public is less optimistic. The Gallup Economic Confidence Index remains stuck in the negative range,²⁶ and two-thirds of Americans say that the economic system unfairly favors powerful interests.²⁷ Core Trump supporters are even more pessimistic about the economy than other Americans; according to a CNN/ORC survey in June, only 18 percent of Trump supporters say that economic conditions are good, compared with 45 percent of Americans overall.²⁸

In a measure of economic optimism, the Chicago Council asked Americans to compare the prospects of the next generation to their own. As in past years, a solid majority (57%) of Americans say that the next generation will be economically worse off than adults working today. But Trump’s core supporters are the most pessimistic: 70 percent say that the next generation of Americans will be worse off. In a rare instance of substantial opinion difference among Democrats, the core supporters of Bernie Sanders are also more inclined than Hillary Clinton’s supporters to say that future generations would be worse off (57% vs. 41%).

Both Trump and Clinton have sought to place the blame for this pessimism on globalization and international trade. Trump has pledged to impose tariffs on Chinese and Mexican imports and cancel trade agreements in order to revitalize the American economy, saying, “I would tax China on products coming in. I would do a tariff ... [because] they do it to us. The tax should be 45 percent.”²⁹ For her part, Clinton stated that “too many companies lobbied for trade deals so they could sell products abroad but then they instead moved abroad and sold back into the United States.”³⁰

THE GAP BETWEEN REPUBLICANS AND DEMOCRATS ON SUPPORT FOR GLOBALIZATION HAS GROWN FROM FOUR PERCENTAGE POINTS IN 2006 TO 15 PERCENTAGE POINTS IN 2016.


The Republican party's longstanding position has been one that promotes trade as an engine of growth. The party's 2016 platform envisions "a worldwide multilateral agreement among nations committed to the principles of open markets."³¹ Yet recent Chicago Council survey results show that among the public, self-described Republicans are now less positive toward both globalization and international trade than Democrats (Figure 10).

The gap between Republican and Democratic views has grown steadily since 2008. While Republican support for globalization has declined somewhat from its peak in 2006, Democratic support has risen. The result is that the gap between Republicans and Democrats on support for globalization has grown from four percentage points in 2006 to 15 percentage points in 2016.

Figure 10: **Democrat and Republican Views on Globalization Have Diverged**

Do you believe that globalization, especially the increasing connections of our economy with others around the world, is mostly good or mostly bad for the United States? (% mostly good)

n = 2,061




2016 Chicago Council Survey

When asked whether or not globalization is mostly good or mostly bad for the United States, core supporters of Trump are nearly evenly split: 49 percent say it is mostly good, and 51 percent say that it is mostly bad (Figure 11).

Figure 11: Trump Supporters Are Less Likely Than Republicans Overall to See Globalization as Good

Do you believe that globalization, especially the increasing connections of our economy with others around the world, is mostly good or mostly bad for the United States? (% mostly good)

n = 2,061



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But the partisan gap should not detract from the fact that overall support for globalization remains strong: two in three Americans say globalization is mostly good for the United States, one of the highest levels ever reported in the Chicago Council Survey. That support among the public is still cross-partisan, with majorities of Democrats, Independents, and Republicans all in agreement. There has also been an increase in support for globalization among all groups since 2010, just after the Great Recession.

Exploiting Divisions between the Party Elite and the Public

On two core areas—globalization and jobs—Trump has been able to take advantage of an opinion gap between the Republican public and Republican leadership. The 2016 Chicago Council Survey reveals that 85 percent of core Trump supporters and 78 percent of Republicans say protecting American jobs is a very important foreign policy goal. In contrast, the 2014 survey of foreign policy opinion leaders found that only 37 percent of Republican opinion leaders think protecting American jobs is a very important foreign policy goal.³²

Similarly, while the Republican public is somewhat divided on the benefits of globalization, Republican opinion leaders show no such qualms: they overwhelmingly said globalization was mostly good for the United States (98%). And Trump has blamed those leaders for the loss of American manufacturing jobs, telling audiences that “[o]ur politicians have aggressively pursued a policy of globalization—moving our jobs, our wealth and our factories to Mexico and overseas.”³³

Core Trump Supporters and Growing Partisan Divisions on Trade

Core Trump supporters' doubts about globalization carry over into doubts about the specific benefits of international trade, not only for the country but also for their personal lives. A majority of core Trump supporters are positive on the benefits of international trade along just one dimension—"consumers like you." However, on all other dimensions, a majority of core Trump supporters say that international trade is bad (Figure 12).

Americans overall are positive on the benefits of international trade, except in two areas—creating US jobs and the job security of American workers—though larger minorities of Democrats than Republicans say that trade is good for these goals. Democrats are generally more positive than Republicans and Independents about the benefits of international trade. Roughly two in three Democrats and half of Republicans say that trade is good for the US economy and American companies. And a larger majority of Democrats than Republicans also say that trade has been good for US consumers as well as their own standard of living.


This partisan pattern has not always been the case. In 2004 and 2006 Republicans were more likely than Democrats to say that trade was beneficial to the American economy, American consumers, and US standards of living (Figure 12). Republicans and Democrats were equally likely to say that trade is good for jobs and job security in both 2004 and 2006. But today, Democrats are more positive than Republicans across the board.

Candidates and the Public Disagree on the TPP

The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) has been held up to signify the negative aspects of free trade. While both presidential candidates have criticized the TPP, Trump is vehemently opposed to the deal, declaring, "Not only will the TPP undermine our economy, but it will undermine our independence."³⁴

With a negative outlook on international trade, it is somewhat surprising that half of core Trump supporters support the TPP (49% support, 46% oppose). Nonetheless, this puts them at lower levels of support than the overall US public (60%), Republicans (58%), and Democrats (70%) and on par with Independents (52%).

Surprisingly, despite Sanders' vocal opposition to the TPP, 56 percent of his core supporters favor the agreement, as do 74 percent of Clinton's core supporters.




YOUNGER AMERICANS, THE COLLEGE-EDUCATED, THOSE WITH HIGHER INCOME, AND NON-WHITES ARE GENERALLY MORE LIKELY THAN OTHER GROUPS TO SAY THAT FREE TRADE AND GLOBALIZATION ARE GOOD.

Figure 12: Republican and Democrat Opinions on International Trade Have Shifted


Overall, do you think international trade is good or bad for: (% good)
n = 2,061

Democrats Independents Republicans Core Trump supporters


The US economy




American companies




Consumers like you




Creating jobs in the United States



Job security for American workers



Your own standard of living



2016 Chicago Council Survey

Demographic Differences on Trade and Globalization

Partisanship is not the only factor that determines support for free trade. Demographic factors such as age, education, race, income, and gender also play a role. Younger Americans, the college-educated, those with higher income, and non-whites are generally more likely than other groups to say that free trade is good for the US economy, US companies, consumers, and their own standard of living. Moreover, younger Americans and college graduates are more likely than older Americans and the lesser-educated to favor the TPP.

To an extent, these demographic patterns even encompass aspects of trade that most Americans view negatively, such as the impact of international trade on job creation in the United States and job security for American workers. In both cases, non-whites are significantly more likely to view international trade as good than are white, non-Hispanic Americans.

Views of globalization follow suit: younger Americans, non-whites, and college graduates are consistently more likely to say that trade is mostly good for the United States (Appendix Figure 2).

A Changing America and Its Impact on Trade

Core Trump supporters have different views than other Americans on trade and globalization. But some of core Trump supporters' demographic groupings—namely predominately white, less-educated, and older Americans—are shrinking in America.³⁵ As minority populations grow, America becomes less white every year.³⁶ And in 2016, Millennials overtook the Boomers as the largest age cohort.³⁷ Combined with overall growth in the US population, these demographic trends point to a future American public that, all other things being equal, will be even more open to international trade and globalization.

Not only do these growing communities of Americans have different views on trade than core Trump supporters, they are also more positive about the economic future of their children. While 62 percent of whites say that the next generation of children will be worse off, fewer than half of blacks (47%) and Hispanics (49%) say the same. ■

AMERICANS REMAIN COMMITTED TO WORLD ENGAGEMENT

Since using the slogan “America First” in his initial major foreign policy speech, Trump has questioned long-standing tenets of US foreign policy, including US alliance commitments to NATO, Japan, and South Korea. While Trump’s core supporters are generally in step with his policy stances on trade, globalization, and immigration, by and large they do not align with their chosen candidate’s views on broader international engagement.³⁸

Core Trump supporters are somewhat more cautious than other Americans of alliances and an active US role in world affairs, but in most cases they continue to favor international engagement. This serves as a reminder that while Americans may be divided on some issues, when it comes to US leadership in the world and how to achieve foreign policy goals, the public finds common ground.


Making America [Even] Great[er] Again

One of Trump’s common refrains is that the United States is losing internationally. “We lose everywhere. . . . We can’t beat anybody.”³⁹ But Americans—including Trump’s core supporters—do not agree. Across political stripes, Americans continue to see the United States as the most influential country in the world. The public as a whole rates US global influence an average of 8.5 on a 0 to 10 scale—higher than any other individual country or the European Union—and core Trump supporters agree, rating it at 8.3. For comparison, Americans overall ranked China second with a mean influence of 7.1, the EU third at 7.0, and Russia fourth at 6.2 (Figure 13).

Figure 13: **The United States Still Considered Most Influential**

I would like to know how much influence you think each of the following countries has in the world. Please answer on a 0 to 10 scale, with 0 meaning they are not at all influential and 10 meaning they are extremely influential.

n = 2,061




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Since 2010, the perceived influence of the United States has remained steady even as China's perceived influence has marginally waned. Moreover, on this question there has been little partisan divide over time. Americans across political affiliations seem to agree that the United States remains the most influential country in the world, and even though that gap has narrowed since 2002, they do not seem to feel that US influence is being seriously challenged.

Not only do Americans see the United States as the most influential country in the world, but 61 percent say that the United States “has a unique character that makes it the greatest country in the world,” versus 38 percent who say that “every country is unique, and the United States is no greater than other nations.” While Republicans and core Trump supporters are most likely to say that the United States is the greatest country, that should not overshadow the fact that majorities of Democrats and Independents agree (Figure 14).

Figure 14: Across Parties, Majorities Think America is the Greatest

Some people say the United States has a unique character that makes it the greatest country in the world. Others say that every country is unique, and the United States is no greater than other nations. Which view is closer to your own? (% the greatest country in the world)
n = 2,061



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Few Favor US Retreat from World Leadership


While some have characterized Trump's policies as isolationist,⁴⁰ his supporters do not express a desire to withdraw from America's global leadership role. When asked what kind of leadership role the United States should play in the world, only nine percent of core Trump supporters say it should play no leadership role. And while core Trump supporters are more likely than others to favor a dominant leadership position for the United States, 50 percent prefer that the United States take a shared leadership role. This puts Trump's core supporters in line with Republicans more broadly (53% shared leadership) and suggests commonalities with Democrats (70% shared) and Independents (63% shared).

A majority of Americans (64%) also find broad agreement—as they have since 1974—that it would be best for the future of the country to take an active role in world affairs. Support for an active role has long been cross-partisan, and that trend continues in 2016 as majorities of Democrats, Republicans, and Independents all agree on this issue (Figure 15). Core Trump supporters are somewhat divided on the issue, with similar numbers supporting an active role (51%) and staying out of world affairs (48%).

Figure 15: Across Parties, Majorities Favor an Active US Role in World Affairs

Do you think it will be best for the future of the country if we take an active part in world affairs or stay out of world affairs? (% active part)

n = 2,061



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Previous qualitative results show that “staying out of world affairs” means different things to different people, but rarely does it reflect purely isolationist tendencies.⁴¹ For some, “staying out of world affairs” reflects their desire to place greater priority on domestic problems, while others say US international involvement in the past has not been effective nor appreciated. Still others say that the United States should avoid engagement unless there is a direct threat to US security. Trump has referenced each of these ideas in statements, which helps explain why his positions appeal to a certain segment of the population. He has criticized past administrations, stating that “we went from mistakes in Iraq to Egypt to Libya, to President Obama’s line in the sand in Syria.”⁴² He has condemned “rebuilding other countries while weakening our own,” and said that “ending the theft of American jobs will give us resources we need to . . . regain our financial independence and strength.”⁴³


Republicans Say Maintaining US Military Edge Is Important

Trump has promised to build up what he perceives as an underfunded US military and that under his leadership it will be “so big, powerful, and strong that no one will mess with us.”⁴⁴ For the most part, Americans agree on the importance of having a powerful fighting force. A majority of the overall US public says that maintaining US military superiority is a very important foreign policy goal—including half of Democrats (50%) and Independents (49%) and seven in ten Republicans (71%) and core Trump supporters (72%).

To achieve US foreign policy goals, Republicans and core Trump supporters also see maintaining military superiority as the most effective method (Figure 16). Independents rank it second, and Democrats rank it third. Notably, six in ten Republicans (60%) and core Trump supporters (60%) alike say that maintaining US military superiority is very effective, compared to four in ten Democrats (43%) and Independents (42%).

Figure 16: Republicans and Core Trump Supporters Think Maintaining US Military Superiority is Very Effective in Achieving Foreign Policy Goals

How effective do you think each of the following approaches is to achieving the foreign policy goals of the United States: very effective, somewhat effective, not very effective, or not effective at all. (% somewhat effective and % very effective, top five responses)
n = 2,061



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Majorities Think Alliances Are Effective

A significant pillar in the Trump campaign has been to cast existing alliance partners as freeloaders who fail to pay their fair share for their defense. He has continually singled out NATO, Japan, and South Korea as prime examples of this behavior.⁴⁵ But this view finds little resonance among the public or even Trump's base.


Among the overall public, 89 percent say that maintaining existing alliances is very or somewhat effective at achieving US foreign policy goals. That view has bipartisan support: Democrats (94%), Republicans (88%), and Independents (86%) all view maintaining existing alliances as very or somewhat effective, as do 84 percent of core Trump supporters.

Majority Support for Maintaining US NATO Commitment

In one of his critical remarks about the transatlantic alliance, Trump stated in July of 2016 that that “NATO is obsolete” and “many member countries [are] not paying their fair share.”⁴⁶ Core Trump supporters are divided on whether NATO is essential to US security (50% essential, 48% no longer essential), but a majority prefer to increase or maintain the US commitment to NATO (Figure 17). Fewer support a decrease or end to the US commitment to NATO.

Figure 17: Despite Trump's Criticisms, a Majority of His Supporters Favor US Commitment to NATO

Do you feel we should increase our commitment to NATO, keep our commitment what it is now, decrease our commitment to NATO, or withdraw from NATO entirely? (%)
n = 1,046



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The US public as a whole is even more positive about NATO. Clear majorities of Republicans, Democrats, and Independents prefer to increase or maintain the commitment to NATO. Just two in ten Republicans and Independents, and one in ten Democrats, want to decrease the US commitment to NATO, and even fewer support withdrawing from NATO entirely. Additionally, a majority overall (65%) and among Democrats (81%), Republicans (57%), and Independents (58%) say that NATO is still essential to US security.


Majorities Support US Bases Abroad

Regarding US security commitments, Trump has said that “the countries we are defending must pay for the cost of this defense, and if not, the US must be prepared to let these countries defend themselves.”⁴⁷ But Trump’s supporters favor projecting US military power abroad through basing. In fact, core Trump supporters are as or more likely than other Americans to support long-term US military bases in Australia, Germany, Japan, and South Korea (Figure 18).

Figure 18: Trump Supporters Favor Long-Term US Military Bases in Several Key Countries

Do you think the United States should or should not have long-term military bases in the following places? (% should have)

n = 2,061



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This finding fits with Republicans’ overall inclination toward a strong military presence abroad. Whether it is Australia, Germany, Japan, or South Korea, Republicans are consistently more likely than Democrats to support US bases overseas.


A Majority of Americans Support International Agreements

Over decades of Chicago Council surveys, Democrats have consistently been more inclined than Republicans and Independents to favor multilateral cooperation and international agreements, and core Trump supporters are no different than Republicans on these questions. Seven in ten Americans overall and at least eight in ten Democrats say that the United States should participate in “the International Criminal Court that can try individuals for war crimes, genocide, or crimes against humanity if their own country won’t try them” and “the Paris agreement that calls for countries to collectively reduce their emissions of greenhouse gases” (Figure 19). In each case, smaller majorities of Republicans and core Trump supporters agree.

Figure 19: Americans Support US Participation in International Agreements

Based on what you know, do you think the United States should or should not participate in the following international agreements? (% should)


n = 2,061



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Opinion is more divided on the nuclear agreement with Iran. While six in ten Americans overall also support “the agreement that lifts some international economic sanctions against Iran in exchange for strict limits on its nuclear program for at least the next decade,” less than half of each Republicans and core Trump supporters agree.

In a similar vein, while an overall majority of Americans favor cooperating with Russia (56%) and China (63%) over actively working to limiting their influence, Democrats are much more supportive of cooperation than Republicans. Sixty-seven percent of each Democrats and Independents, 55 percent of Republicans, and 49 percent of core Trump supporters think the United States should “undertake friendly cooperation and engagement” with China. When it comes to Russia, 62 percent of Democrats, 55 percent of Independents, 50 percent of Republicans, and 53 percent of core Trump supporters favor cooperation.



ACROSS RACES AND ETHNICITIES, A MAJORITY OF AMERICANS PREFER THAT THE UNITED STATES TAKE AN ACTIVE PART IN WORLD AFFAIRS, INCREASE OR MAINTAIN ITS COMMITMENT TO NATO, AND PARTICIPATE IN SELECT INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS.

Demographic Trends Suggest Stability

Despite the important demographic changes taking place in the United States, there is currently little evidence to suggest that these changes will spark an American withdrawal from the world. Across races and ethnicities, Americans prefer that the United States take an active part in world affairs, as do majorities of all age cohorts (Figure 20). The youngest Americans are also the most likely to see maintaining existing alliances as an effective means of achieving the goals of US foreign policy. And across ethnicities, more than eight in ten people agree on the effectiveness of maintaining alliances. There is broad agreement across ages and ethnicities on the full range of options to achieve US foreign policy goals, with little to distinguish between the various groups.

The same is true of US alliance commitments. At least seven in ten people of all age cohorts say the United States should increase or maintain its commitment to NATO, and the same is true of all ethnicities. Likewise, more than six in ten members of all age groups and ethnicities cite NATO as still essential to US security. Majorities of all ages and ethnicities also support military bases in Germany, Japan, and South Korea.

And when it comes to participating in international agreements, majorities of all ages and ethnicities think the United States should participate in the Paris Agreement to reduce greenhouse gases, the International Criminal Court, and in the agreement to lift sanctions and limit Iran's nuclear program.

Americans Support Continued US Leadership

Taken together, these findings suggest that despite the very different rhetoric out of both campaigns on the role of America in the world, the American public finds much broader agreement than one might otherwise expect. The American public as a whole still thinks that the United States is the greatest and most influential country in the world, and bipartisan support remains strong for the country to take an active part in world affairs. Americans still favor the country's traditional alliances, the maintenance of bases overseas, and the preservation of US military superiority. While core Trump supporters differ from other Americans on immigration and trade, they too support international US engagement, leadership, and the maintenance of the international US military presence. ■

Figure 20: **Few Differences Across Demographic Groups Regarding America's Role in the World**

	Do you think it will be best for the future of the country if we take an active part in world affairs or if we stay out of world affairs? (% active part) n = 2,061	Some people say that NATO is still essential to our country's security. Others say it is no longer essential. Which of these views is closer to your own? (% still essential) n = 2,061	In dealing with the rise of China's power, do you think the United States should: n = 1,003		In dealing with Russia, do you think the United States should: n = 1,058	
			Undertake friendly cooperation and engagement with China (%)	Actively work to limit the growth of China's power (%)	Undertake friendly cooperation and engagement with Russia (%)	Actively work to limit Russia's power (%)
Overall American public	64	65	63	33	56	39
18-29	56	63	70	26	60	32
30-44	56	66	60	37	61	35
45-59	67	66	64	31	49	44
60+	75	65	58	38	54	41
High school or less	58	64	58	36	48	44
Some college/associate's degree	62	61	59	36	59	36
College graduates	73	71	73	26	63	33
White, non-Hispanic	63	64	64	32	55	40
Black, non-Hispanic	57	66	54	37	51	39
Other, non-Hispanic	72	75	73	25	65	31
Hispanic	66	68	59	37	57	36
Male	66	67	67	31	58	39
Female	62	64	60	35	53	38
\$0-20K	57	61	52	39	52	41
\$20-40K	62	66	57	39	51	42
\$40-75K	61	62	70	27	52	42
\$75-125K	66	69	63	34	61	34
\$125K+	73	67	67	30	58	36

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CONCLUSION

Some commentators believe that Trumpism—“a personality-fueled movement that has proven, against the smart money’s predictions, to be in tune with the frustrations of a significant slice of the electorate”⁴⁸—will disappear if Trump loses the election.

The data in this report suggest that this will not be the case. This election cycle has brought certain underlying tensions between Republicans and Democrats to the fore. While the divisions on the issues of immigration and globalization are now more prominent, they were not created in the past year alone. Democrats and Republicans have expressed diverging opinions about immigration since 2002, and the gap between Republican and Democratic views on globalization has grown steadily since 2008. In 2016, Trump supporters are consistently the most negative on these two issues.

Finally, while Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump represent vastly different visions for the future role of the United States in the world, the Chicago Council Survey data suggest that Americans’ preference for international engagement will endure, just as it has over at least the past 40 years. Americans across party affiliation seem to value maintaining traditional alliances, bases overseas, and US military superiority—even supporters of Donald Trump. ■

APPENDIX

Appendix Figure 1: **Demographic Breakdowns and Attitudes toward Immigration**

	Large numbers of immigrants and refugees coming into the United States (% critical threat) n = 1,728	Controlling and reducing illegal immigration (% very important goal) n = 782	Should legal immigration into the United States be kept at its present level, increased, or decreased? n = 2,061			Do you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, or very unfavorable view of the following people: n = 2,061	
			Kept at present level (%)	Increased (%)	Decreased (%)	Mexican immigrants in the United States (% net favorable)	Middle Eastern immigrants in the United States (% net favorable)
Overall American public	43	45	41	18	39	60	45
18-29	30	34	43	26	30	65	53
30-44	37	34	44	21	33	62	46
45-59	51	51	36	16	47	58	41
60+	51	57	40	13	45	58	41
High school or less	45	47	41	15	42	55	38
Some college/associate's degree	46	47	37	18	43	57	43
College graduates	38	39	45	24	31	71	56
White, non-Hispanic	50	51	37	16	45	55	42
Black, non-Hispanic	29	36	48	22	29	67	57
Other, non-Hispanic	36	34	47	28	25	67	48
Hispanic	31	33	47	22	30	71	47
Male	43	45	41	19	39	62	44
Female	43	44	40	18	40	58	46
\$0-20K	44	48	38	18	42	55	41
\$20-40K	49	49	42	13	44	56	38
\$40-75K	42	42	39	18	42	58	45
\$75-125K	40	44	43	19	36	64	49
\$125K+	44	42	40	26	34	66	49

2016 Chicago Council Survey

Appendix Figure 2: Younger Americans, Non-whites, and College Graduates Are Most Likely to See Trade as Beneficial

Overall, do you think international trade is good or bad for: (% good)
n = 2,061

	The US economy	American companies	Consumers like you	Creating jobs in the United States	Job security for American workers	Your own standard of living
18-29	65	62	75	45	37	71
30-44	61	56	74	41	34	65
45-59	53	56	67	36	35	59
60+	56	57	66	38	33	63
High school or less	55	54	64	43	37	60
Some college/associate's degree	55	56	68	35	32	61
College graduates	67	65	82	39	34	73
White, non-Hispanic	54	55	68	33	30	61
Black, non-Hispanic	66	67	64	55	44	63
Other, non-Hispanic	68	61	80	44	40	78
Hispanic	66	60	79	54	47	73
Male	61	62	73	41	35	66
Female	56	53	68	38	35	63
\$0-20K	53	52	63	46	43	56
\$20-40K	52	58	60	39	33	58
\$40-75K	58	58	67	38	34	61
\$75-125K	61	56	76	36	33	68
\$125K+	69	64	82	43	34	75

2016 Chicago Council Survey

METHODOLOGY

This report is based on the results of a survey commissioned by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs. The 2016 edition of the survey is the latest effort in a series of wide-ranging surveys on American attitudes toward US foreign policy. The 2016 Chicago Council Survey was made possible by the generous support of the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, the Robert R. McCormick Foundation, the Korea Foundation, and the personal support of Lester Crown and the Crown Family.

The survey was conducted from June 10 to 27, 2016, among a representative national sample of 2,061 adults. The margin of sampling error for the full sample is ± 2.38 , including a design effect of 1.2149.

Partisan identification is based on respondents' answer to a standard partisan self-identification question: "Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an independent, or what?"

The label of "core Trump supporter" is based on respondents' answer to a presidential preference question: "Regardless of your voting preference in the previous question, who was your top choice for president among the following candidates?" The list of candidates was randomly ordered, with specific candidates including Hillary Clinton, Donald Trump, Bernie Sanders, Ted Cruz, John Kasich, Marco Rubio, and Jeb Bush, as well as the option for respondents to write in additional preferred candidates. Those respondents who said their top choice for president was Donald Trump are referred to as "core Trump supporters."

A full listing of questions asked in the 2016 Chicago Council Survey, including details on which questions were administered to split samples, is available online at www.thechicagocouncil.org.

The survey was conducted by GfK Custom Research, a polling, social science, and market research firm in Palo Alto, California, using a randomly selected sample of GfK's large-scale nationwide research panel, KnowledgePanel® (KP). The survey was fielded to a total of 3,580 panel members yielding a total of 2,244 completed surveys (a completion rate of 63%). The median survey length was 20 minutes. Of the 2,244 total completed surveys, 183 cases were excluded for quality control reasons, leaving a final sample size of 2,061 respondents:

Respondents were excluded if they failed at least one of three key checks:

- Respondents who completed the survey in eight minutes or less.
- Respondents who refused to answer half or more of the items in the survey.
- Respondents who failed two or three of the following checks:
 - Did not accurately input "4," refused or skipped the question that was specifically designed to make sure respondents were paying attention. ("In order to make sure that your browser is working correctly, please select number 4 from the list below.")
 - Refused one or more full lists that included five items or more (of which there were 11 such lists).
 - Respondents who gave exactly the same answer ("straight-lined") to every item on one of the four longest lists in the survey (Q5, Q7, Q50, or Q185).

The GfK Knowledge Panel was originally based exclusively on a national Random Digit Dialing (RDD) sampling methodology. In order to improve the representation of the panel, GfK migrated to using an Address Based Sampling (ABS) methodology for selecting panel members in 2009. For both ABS and RDD recruitment, households (i.e., all eligible adults in the household) that agree to participate in the panel are provided with free Internet hardware and access (if necessary), which uses a telephone line to connect to the Internet and the television as a monitor. Thus, the sample is not limited to those in the population who already have Internet access.

Generally, the specific survey samples represent an equal probability selection method (EPSEM) sample from the panel for general population surveys. The raw distribution of KP mirrors that of the US adults fairly closely, barring occasional disparities that may emerge for certain subgroups due to differential attrition.

To ensure selection of general population samples from KP behave as EPSEM, additional measures are undertaken, starting by weighting the pool of active members to the geodemographic benchmarks secured from the latest March supplement of the Current Population Survey (CPS) along several dimensions. Using the resulting weights as measure of size, in the next step a PPS (probability proportional to size) procedure is used to select study-specific samples. It is the application of this PPS methodology with the imposed size measures that produces fully self-weighting samples from KP, for which each sample member can carry a design weight of unity. Moreover, in instances where a study design requires any form of oversampling of certain subgroups, such departures from an EPSEM design are accounted for by adjusting the design weights in reference to the CPS benchmarks for the population of interest.

The geodemographic benchmarks used to weight the active panel members for computation of size measures include:

- Gender (male, female)
- Age (18–29, 30–44, 45–59, and 60-plus)
- Race/Hispanic ethnicity (white non-Hispanic, black non-Hispanic, other non-Hispanic, two-plus races non-Hispanic, Hispanic)
- Education (less than high school, high school, some college, bachelor and beyond)
- Census region (Northeast, Midwest, South, West)
- Household income (under \$10k, \$10K to <\$25k, \$25K to <\$50k, \$50K to <\$75k, \$75K to <\$100k, \$100K+)
- Home ownership status (own, rent/other)
- Metropolitan area (yes, no)
- Internet access (yes, no)

Once the study sample has been selected and the survey administered, and all the survey data are edited and made final, design weights are adjusted to account for any differential nonresponse that may have resulted during the field period. Depending on the specific target population for a given study, geodemographic distributions for the corresponding population are obtained from the CPS, the American Community Survey (ACS), or in certain instances from the weighted KP profile data. For this purpose an iterative proportional fitting (raking) procedure is used to produce the final weights. In the final step, calculated weights are examined to identify and, if necessary, trim outliers at the extreme upper and lower tails of the weight distribution. The resulting weights are then scaled to aggregate to the total sample size of all eligible respondents.

For this study, the following benchmark distributions of the US adult general population (age 18 or older) from the most recent data (March 2015 Supplement) from the CPS were used for the raking adjustment of weights:

- Gender (male, female) by age (18–29, 30–44, 45–59, 60-plus)
- Race/ethnicity (white non-Hispanic, black non-Hispanic, other non-Hispanic, Hispanic, two-plus races non-Hispanic)
- Census region (Northeast, Midwest, South, West) by metropolitan status (metro, non-metro)
- Education (less than high school, high school, some college, bachelor or higher)
- Household Income (under \$25,000, \$25–\$49,999, \$50,000–\$74,999, \$75,000-plus)
- Household with internet access (yes, no) (Source: July 2013 CPS Supplement Data)

For more information about the sample and survey methodology, please visit the GfK website at <http://www.gfk.com/us/Solutions/consumer-panels/Pages/GfK-KnowledgePanel.aspx>.

For more information about the Chicago Council Survey, please contact Craig Kafura, research associate, at ckafura@thechicagocouncil.org.

ABOUT THE SURVEY SAMPLE

	Democrat	Independent	Republican
% of 2016 sample n = 2,046	36	34	28
Average age	47	47	48
Racial composition (%)			
White, non-Hispanic	49	68	82
Black, non-Hispanic	23	7	2
Hispanic	18	16	10
Other, non-Hispanic	10	8	6
Gender (%)			
Female	55	47	53
Male	45	53	47
Registered to vote	86	75	90
Original vote preference (%)			
Hillary Clinton	51	13	3
Bernie Sanders	34	27	5
Donald Trump	3	15	32
Other Republican	8	30	55
Education (%)			
High school or less	44	42	40
Some college/associate's degree	28	28	28
College graduates	28	30	32

ABOUT THE SURVEY

The Chicago Council Survey, conducted every four years since 1974, biennially since 2002, and now annually, is a trusted and widely cited source of longitudinal data on American public opinion about a broad range of US foreign policy and international issues. With its combination of time series and comprehensive coverage, the Chicago Council Survey is a valuable resource to policymakers, academics, media, and the general public because of its unique ability to capture the sense of particular eras—post-Vietnam, post-Cold War, post-9/11—and to define critical shifts in American public thinking. The Chicago Council Surveys are highly respected and widely used in policy circles and academic research both in the United States and abroad. Several scholarly works have drawn on Chicago Council survey data, including *The Foreign Policy Gap* (Page, Bouton), *Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy* (Holsti), *Faces of Internationalism* (Wittkopf), and *The Rational Public* (Page and Shapiro). All of the Chicago Council Survey data sets are available to the public via the Roper Center, and ICPSR and the 2016 data will be available soon on www.thechicagocouncil.org.

In addition to the annual Chicago Council Survey of American public opinion and US foreign policy, the Chicago Council's polling has often expanded to international polling in Europe, Asia, and Mexico. Recently the Council has reintroduced a leaders' survey as an important component of the 2014 and 2016 Chicago Council Surveys (report forthcoming). Besides these comprehensive reports, the Chicago Council Survey team publishes and disseminates short opinion briefs on topical issues such as negotiations with Iran, climate change, energy, and the pivot to Asia. These short reports can be found on the Council's website and on the Chicago Council Survey blog www.RunningNumbers.org.

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