ScreenView Protocol

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Abstract

ScreenView is a suite of cryptographical and application level networking protocols culminating in a zero configuration end to end encrypted remote screen viewing and controlling software. ScreenView aims to replace TeamViewer, RDP, and VNC for many use cases while being more performant and more secure. ScreenView requires little set up and is just as easy or easier to set up than other solutions. ScreenView defines four different layers of protocols, each encapsulating all the layers below it. Cryptography for communication between peers and the server is based upon TLS 1.3 and Wireguard. End-to-end cryptography used for ALL communication between peers is based upon TLS-SRP. ScreenView end-to-end cryptography prevents man-in-the-middle attacks even if the intermediary server is compromised, unlike TeamViewer. Screen data is sent over UDP to achieve superior performance than TCP based solutions such as VNC. All UDP packets must be authenticated with keys established over TCP before a response is made by the server preventing amplification attacks. A congestion control mechanism is used to handle low bandwidth and poor networking conditions. Finally, ScreenView supports advanced use cases including file transfer, multiple displays, sharing specific windows, shared whiteboards, and clipboard transfer.

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1 Definitions

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119.

1.1 Cryptographical Definitions

Based on Wireguard:

 ϵ represents an empty zero-length bits tring

DH(PRIVATE KEY, PUBLIC KEY) Curve25519 point multiplication of private key and public key, re-turning 32 bytes of output.

DH-GENERATE() Generates a random Curve25519 private key and derives its corresponding public key, returning a pair of 32 bytes values, (private, public). AEAD(KEY, COUNTER, PLAIN TEXT, AUTH TEXT) ChaCha20Poly1305 AEAD, as specified in RFC7539, with its nonce being composed of 32 bits of zeros followed by the 64-bit little-endian value of counter.

HASH(INPUT) BLAKE3(input), returning 32 bytes of output.

HMAC(KEY, INPUT) Hmac-BLAKE3(key, input), the ordinary BLAKE3 hash function used in an HMAC construction, returning 32 bytes of output.

 $\mathrm{KDF}_n(\mathrm{KEY}, \mathrm{INPUT})$ returns an n-tuple of 32 byte values from HKDF with Hash function.

2 Introduction

This section describes the high level overview of ScreenView. Terms used in this section are defined in other sections.

2.1 Application Layers

The table belows is an abstract diagram of the different layers of ScreenView. Each layer encapsulates all the below layers.

Transport Layer
Server Encryption Layer
Server Communication Layer
$ $ E2EE (Peer \leftrightarrow Peer) Encryption Layer
$ Host \leftrightarrow Client Communication Layer$

The Transport Layer is the OSI Transport Layer level protocol for networking (TCP or UDP). The Server Encryption Layer provides security between the Server and a Peer. The Server Communication Layer facilities communication between Peers and the Server. The E2EE (Peer \leftrightarrow Peer) Encryption Layer provides end-to-end encryption between a Peer and another Peer. The Host \leftrightarrow Client Communication Layer facilities communication between a Peer and another Peer.

3 Server Encryption Layer (SEL)

SEL provides security for communication between Peers and the Server. TCP and UDP have different security methods. UDP encryption depends on secrets established in the SVSC protocol and therefore can only be begin after TCP encryption is already established.

3.1 TCP

The TCP SEL is TLS 1.3 as defined in RFC8446. TLS v1.3 MUST be used. Previous versions of TLS MUST NOT be used.

The Client initiates a TLS connection with the Server in accordance with RFC8446. All subsiquent SEL TCP communications occurs over TLS:

$\operatorname{Peer} \leftrightarrow \operatorname{Server}$				
Bytes	Name	Value		
1	type	1		
2	data-length			
data-length	data			

3.2 UDP

UDP encryption and authentication rely on the session-id, peer-id and peer-key values established in a session (described in 4.4). The Server (nor the Peer) MUST NOT process or reply to any messages that don't pass authentication. This prevents an amplification attack.

3.2.1 Transport Data Key Derivation

The Server and Peer derive keys.

$$\begin{split} G &\coloneqq \text{session-id} \\ H &\coloneqq \text{peer-id} \\ J &\coloneqq \text{peer-key} \\ (SU^{send}_{peer} = SU^{recv}_{serv}, SU^{recv}_{peer} = SU^{send}_{serv}) \coloneqq \text{KDF}_2(\text{HASH}(G \mid\mid H \mid\mid J), \epsilon) \\ NU^{send}_{peer} = NU^{recv}_{serv} = NU^{recv}_{peer} = NU^{send}_{serv} \coloneqq 0 \end{split}$$

3.2.2 Transport Data Messages

$Peer \rightarrow Server$				
Bytes	Name	Value		
1	type	2		
16	peer-id			
8	counter			
UDP length -8 bytes	data			

$Server \rightarrow Peer$			
Bytes	Name	Value	
1	type	3	
8	counter		
UDP length - 8 bytes	data		

$$\begin{split} \text{data} &\coloneqq \text{AEAD}(SU_m^{send}, NU_m^{send}, P, \epsilon) \\ \text{counter} &\coloneqq NU_m^{send} \\ NU_m^{send} &\coloneqq NU_m^{send} + 1 \end{split}$$

Where P is the payload to be transported

 NU_m is an 64 bit counter that MUST NOT wrap. After a transport message is sent, if NU_m equals $(2^{64}-1)$ the TCP connection MUST be dropped. Subsequent UDP messages MUST NOT be sent.

4 ScreenView Server Communication (SVSC) Protocol

The SVSC protocol is the Server Communication Layer protocol used for Peers to interact with the relay server, Server. Peers can lease an ID as well as begin a session with another Peer. Once a session is established, Peers can forward messages to another Peer. Unless otherwise noted, all messages MUST occur over TCP.

All SVSC messages' first byte contain a number to indicate the message type.

4.1 Definitions

- Peer denotes a client in classical server/client environment
- Server The intermediary server used for routing and proxying data between two Peers

4.2 Handshake

4.2.1 ProtocolVersion

Handshaking begins with the Server sending the Peer a Protocol Version message. This lets the server know the version supported by the Host. the Protocol Version message consists of 12 bytes interpreted as a string of ASCII characters in the format "SVSC xxx.yyy" where xxx and yyy are the major and minor version numbers, padded with zeros.

$_$ Server \rightarrow Peer					
Bytes	Name	Value			
1	type	0			
11	version	"SVSC 001.000"			

The Peer replies either 0 to indicate the version is not acceptable and that the handshake has failed or 1 if the version is acceptable to the Peer and the handshake as succeeded. If 0 is sent, all communication MUST cease and the TCP connection MUST be terminated.

$\operatorname{Peer} \to \operatorname{Server}$				
Bytes	Name	Value		
1	type	1		
1	ok	0 or 1		

4.3 Leasing

A lease is a temporary assignment of an ID to a Peer. The ID format and generation is discussed in 4.3.5. A maximum of 1 ID can be leased per TCP connection. ID generation MUST be rate limited to prevent ID exhaustion. Rate limiting rules are out of scope for this protocol, however some suggestions are listed in 4.3.6.

4.3.1 LeaseRequest

A LeaseRequest message requests a lease of an ID.

$Peer \rightarrow Server$				
Bytes	Name	\mathbf{Value}		
1	$_{ m type}$	2		
1	has-cookie	0 or 1		
Below only if has-cookie is 1				
24	cookie			

If a Peer would like to request an ID it had previously been issued after expiration, it may include the cookie value it received in the LeaseResponse. There is no guarantee that the Peer will receive the same ID or that the Server will even consider the cookie value.

4.3.2 LeaseResponse

A LeaseResponse message is a response to a LeaseRequest. If has-cookie is 1, a Server MAY consider the cookie value in LeaseRequest or completely ignore it.

$Server \rightarrow Peer$				
Bytes	Name	Value		
1	type	3		
1	accepted	0 or 1		
Below only if accepted is 1				
4	id			
24	cookie			
8	expiration			

expiration is a 64 bit Unix timestamp representing the expiry of lease. Disconnection of a Peer (e.g, the TCP connection is dropped) does not end a lease.

cookie a 128 bit value. The generation of this value is discussed in 4.2 .7.

Consideration of the cookie value MUST have no effect on the the value of accepted. That is, if the request is for a specific ID (implied by the presence of a cookie value and a has-cookie value equal to 1 in the LeaseRequest) and the ID requested is not available, the Server SHOULD respond with a different available ID and an accepted value of 1 (assuming an ID is available). accepted MUST only be 0 if no IDs are left, for rate limiting reasons, or some other reasons unrelated to the cookie value.

4.3.3 LeaseExtensionRequest

A LeaseExtensionRequest message is used to extend a lease. Before a lease has expired, the Peer can request a lease extension. The Server can accept or deny this request. The Peer SHOULD send this message no earlier than as soon as 50 percent of the lease duration has expired.

$\mathrm{Peer} \to \mathrm{Server}$					
Bytes	\mathbf{Name}	Value			
1	$_{ m type}$	4			
24	cookie				

4.3.4 LeaseExtensionResponse

A LeaseExtensionResponse message is a response to a LeaseExtensionRequest.

$Server \rightarrow Peer$					
Bytes	\mathbf{Name}	Value			
1	type	5			
1	$\operatorname{ext}\operatorname{ended}$	0 or 1			
Below only if extended is 1					
8	new-expiration				

new-expiration is a 64 bit Unix timestamp representing the expiry of lease.

4.3.5 ID Generation

An ID is a 26 to 33 bit decimal number. This comes out to about up to 8 to 10 decimal digits, respectively. The Server may scale the keyspace depending on current usage. For optimal user experience while maintaining efficiency, the Server MUST only use keyspaces between 26 bits and 33 bits for ID generation. ID generation must also be uniformly random. All active IDs must be stored on the server. New IDs MUST be unique. ID generation MAY occur using the below algorithm:

Let S represents a set of all active IDs, B be a number of bits between 26 and 33, and generate(x) be a functions that returns a x uniformly random bits.

4.3.6 Rate Limits

To prevent ID exhaustion, rate limits SHOULD be in place. TCP is used for LeaseRequests so IP addresses can not be spoofed. However, using proxy services such as Tor, simple IP based rate limits are likely not entirely sufficient. Servers MAY want to block all known proxy IP addresses.

4.3.7 Cookie Value

A cookie value is a 128 bit value used for authentication in LeaseExtensionRequest and LeaseRequest messages. Specific generation of a cookie is out of scope, however care must be taken to ensure it is not predictable or exploitable. This value MAY be simply a random 24 byte key, HMAC-SHA1(id, key) || id, or something else entirely.

4.4 Sessions

A session is a connection between two Peers. At least one Peer must have an ID. A Peer can have a maximum of one session at any time. Immediately after receiving a EstablishSessionResponse message with a status of 0 or a EstablishSessionNotification message a Peer MUST establish UDP connection by sending a Keepalive message as defined in 4.5. Failure to do so MAY result in dropped SessionData* packets.

4.4.1 EstablishSessionRequest

An EstablishSessionRequest message is a Peer request to establish a session with another Peer.

 $Peer \rightarrow Server$

\mathbf{Bytes}	Name	Value	Description
1	type	6	
4	lease-id		The ID of the Peer to establish this connection with

4.4.2 EstablishSessionResponse

An EstablishSessionResponse message is a response to EstablishSessionRequest.

Server o Peer

Bytes	Bytes Name Value Description		
1	1 type 7		
4	lease-id		the ID of the Peer attempted to connect to
1	1 status 0-5 described below		described below
		Belov	v only if status is 0
16	16 session-id described below		described below
16 peer-id described below		described below	
16	16 peer-key described below		

status can have the following values:

Value	Description		
0	session establishment was successful		
1	ID not found		
2	Peer is offline		
3	Peer is busy		
4	You are busy		
5	Other error		

A Peer may be considered offline if, for example, an unexpired ID has been assigned to them and then the TCP connection is dropped.

session-id is a 128 bit random value used for session identification

peer-id is a 128 bit random value used to authentication a Peer for a given session. A Peer's peer-key MUST never be revealed to anyone but the Peer it belongs to (and the Server that generated it) for security reasons.

4.4.3 EstablishSessionNotification

A EstablishSessionNotification notifies a Peer that a session has been established with them.

	$\operatorname{Server} o \operatorname{Host}$					
Bytes	Name	Value	Description			
1	type	8				
16	16 session-id 16 peer-id		described in 4.4.2			
16			described in 4.4.2			
16	peer-key		described in 4.4.2			

peer-id and peer-key are the id and key of the Peer being notified NOT the id and key of the Peer they are connecting to.

4.4.4 SessionEnd

A SessionEnd message is used to terminate a session. Once a Server receives a SessionEnd message, the Server MUST immediately stop forwarding messages and send a SessionEndNotification to the other Peer. The Peer must ignore any SessionDataPacket message received after this.

$\mathrm{Peer} \to \mathrm{Server}$					
\mathbf{Bytes}	Name	Value	Description		
1	type	9			

4.4.5 SessionEndNotification

A SessionEndNotification notifies a Peer that a session has ended. If a Peer sends a SessionEnd message, the Server MUST send a SessionEndNotification message

to a Peer. The Peer must ignore any Session DataPacket message received after this

$Server \rightarrow Peer$						
Bytes	Name	Value	Description			
1	type	10				

4.4.6 SessionDataSend - TCP/UDP

A SessionDataSend is a message from a Peer intended to be forwarded to the Peer on the other side of the session. If a connection is not available (e.g. UDP was dropped or never established) for SessionDataReceive message to be sent to the other Peer, the SessionDataSend message is silently dropped.

$Peer \rightarrow Server$					
Bytes Name 1 type		Value	${f Description}$		
		11			
3	data-length		length of the content in bytes		
data-length data			data to be forwarded		

4.4.7 SessionDataReceive - TCP/UDP

A SessionDataReceive is a message being forwarded to a Peer from the Peer on the other side of the session. The Server SHOULD forward the message along the same transport as it was received.

Server o Peer					
Bytes Name		Value	Description		
1 type		12			
3	3 data-length		length of the content in bytes		
data-length	data		data to be forwarded		

4.5 Keepalive - TCP/UDP

For each transport (TCP and UDP), if no message has been sent in KeepaliveTimeout a Server sends a keepalive message over the respective transport. The Peer MUST respond with another Keepalive message.

For TCP, if a KeepaliveTimeout response is not received by the Server in double KeepaliveTimeout seconds the TCP connection is considered dropped.

For UDP, if a KeepaliveTimeout response is not received by the Server in half KeepaliveTimeout seconds another Keepalive message is sent. If a response is not received in an additional half KeepaliveTimeout seconds, the UDP connection is considered dropped.

$Server \leftrightarrow Peer$				
Bytes	Name	Value		
1	type	13		

5 Weak Pre Shared Key, Key Authentication (WPSKKA) Protocol

The WPSKKA protocol is the E2EE Encryption layer protocol used to communicate between Peers. All WPSKKA messages' first byte contain a number to indicate the message type.

5.1 Handshake

WPSKKA begins with a handshake to choose an authentication scheme. The goal of authentication is to authenticate the Peers' ephemeral keys. The Host begins with sending all the authentication schemes available as well as their public key which will be authenticated using one of the schemes. WPSKKA defines multiple authentication schemes for different use cases.

5.1.1 AuthScheme

$\mathrm{Host} \to \mathrm{Client}$				
Bytes	Name	Value		
1	type	1		
32	public-key			
1	num-auth-schemes			
num-auth-schemes	$\operatorname{auth-schemes}$			

num-auth-schemes is the number of auth schemes. auth-schemes contians 1 byte per auth-scheme to indidcate which authentication scheme is available. Authentication schemes are defined below.

public-key is the Host's ephemeral public key

Authentication Schemes			
Number	Name		
0	Invalid or Denied		
1	SRP Dynamic		
2	SRP Static		
3	Public key		

5.1.2 TryAuth

The TryAuth messages indicates a Client would to attempt authentication with a particular auth scheme.

Bytes	${f Name}$	Value
1	type	2
32	public-key	
1	auth-scheme-number	

auth-scheme-number is the authentication scheme number the client would like to attempt

public-key is the Client's ephemeral public key

5.1.3 AuthMessage

Messages used in the authentication scheme are encapsulated in this message.

$\mathrm{Host} \leftrightarrow \mathrm{Client}$		
\mathbf{Bytes}	Name	Value
1	type	3
2	length	
length	auth-message	

5.1.4 AuthResult

Messages used in the authentication scheme are encapsulated in this message.

$\mathrm{Host} \to \mathrm{Client}$		
Bytes	Name	Value
1	type	4
1	ok	0 or 1

ok indicates whether the authentication method was successful (1) or not (0). If not, the Client MAY attempt another authentication scheme or try the same one again by sending a TryAuth message. Either party MAP choose to end the connection.

5.2 Transport Data Key Derivation

$$\begin{split} C_{host} &= \mathrm{DH}(E^{pub}_{client},\ E^{priv}_{host}) \\ C_{client} &= \mathrm{DH}(E^{pub}_{host},\ E^{priv}_{client}) \\ (ST^{send}_{peer} &= ST^{recv}_{serv},\ ST^{recv}_{peer} = ST^{send}_{serv}, SU^{send}_{peer} = SU^{recv}_{serv},\ SU^{recv}_{peer} = SU^{send}_{serv}) \coloneqq \mathrm{KDF_4}(C_{host} = C_{client},\ \epsilon) \\ NT^{send}_{host} &= NT^{recv}_{client} = NT^{recv}_{host} = NT^{recv}_{host} = NU^{send}_{host} = NU^{recv}_{client} = NU^{send}_{host} = 0 \end{split}$$

 ${
m ST}$ keys and ${
m NT}$ nonces are used for TCP. ${
m SU}$ keys and ${
m NT}$ nonces are using for UDP.

5.3 Subsequent Messages: Transport Data Messages

Transport Data Messages MUST NOT be sent until authentication is complete.

5.3.1 TCP

$\mathrm{Host} \leftrightarrow \mathrm{Client}$			
Bytes	Name	Value	
1	type	5	
2	data-length		
data- $length$	data		

$$\begin{split} \text{data} &\coloneqq \text{AEAD}(ST_m^{send}, NT_m^{send}, P, \epsilon) \\ \text{counter} &\coloneqq NT_m^{send} \\ NT_m^{send} &\coloneqq NT_m^{send} + 1 \end{split}$$

Where P is the payload to be transported.

 NT_m is an 64 bit counter that MUST NOT wrap. After a transport message is sent, if NT_m equals $(2^{64}-1)$ the UDP and TCP connection MUST be dropped. Subsequent messages MUST NOT be sent.

5.3.2 UDP

$\operatorname{Host} \leftrightarrow \operatorname{Client}$			
Bytes	Name	Value	
1	type	6	
8	counter		
2	data-length		
data- $length$	data		

$$\begin{split} \text{data} &\coloneqq \text{AEAD}(SU_m^{send}, NU_m^{send}, P, \epsilon) \\ \text{counter} &\coloneqq NU_m^{send} \\ NU_m^{send} &\coloneqq NU_m^{send} + 1 \end{split}$$

Where P is the payload to be transported.

 NU_m is an 64 bit counter that MUST NOT wrap. After a transport message is sent, if NU_m equals $(2^{64}-1)$ the UDP and TCP connection MUST be dropped. Subsequent messages MUST NOT be sent.

5.4 SRP Dynamic (1)

SRP Dynamic relies on SRP as defined in RFC5054 to establish a shared key used to authenticate DH keys via a mac. The Host will serve as the SRP server, the Client will serve as the SRP client.

5.4.1 HostHello

$\mathrm{Host} \to \mathrm{Client}$		
Bytes Name		Value
1	$_{ m type}$	1
16	username	
16	salt	
256	srp-B	

$$I := RAND(128)$$

 $s := RAND(128)$
 $B := SRP-B()$
 $username := I$
 $salt := s$
 $srp-B := B$

5.4.2 ClientHello

$Client \rightarrow Host$		
Bytes	\mathbf{Name}	Value
1	$_{ m type}$	2
256	srp-A	
32	$_{ m mac}$	

$$\begin{split} & \text{srp-A} \coloneqq \text{SRP-A()} \\ & L_{client} = L_{host} \coloneqq \text{SRP-PREMASTER()} \\ & \text{mac} \coloneqq \text{HMAC(KDF}_1(L_{client}), \text{public-key)} \end{split}$$

public-key is the Client's public key

The Host validates the mac. If the mac is incorrect a failed AuthResult is sent.

5.4.3 HostVerify

$Host \rightarrow Client$		
Bytes	Name	Value
1	type	3
32	$_{ m mac}$	

 $\operatorname{mac} := \operatorname{HMAC}(\operatorname{KDF}_1(L_{host}), \operatorname{public-key})$

public-key is the Host's public key

After the HostVerify is sent, the Host MUST send a successful AuthResult.

5.5 SRP Static (2)

SRP Static uses the exact same scheme as SRP Dynamic. The only difference is that the SRP password is user defined instead of generated per session. This can be useful in situations where a user wants to be able to connect to a remote computer without physical presence at the other Host's machine.

5.6 Public Key (3)

WIP

6 Remote Visual Display (RVD) Protocol

The RVD protocol is used to communicate messages regarding mouse input, keyboard input, frame data, and clipboard data between the Host and the Client.

All messages MUST occur over the transport listed.

All RVD messages' first byte contain a number to indicate the message type.

A sequence-number is an incrementing 32-bit counter each UDP message sent, separate for Host and Client. All messages sent over UDP MUST begin with a 4 bytes sequence-number. sequence-number is initialized to 0 and increments once for every UDP message sent by the respective Peer. Therefore each RVD UDP message looks like:

Bytes	Name
4	sequence-number
variable	RVD message

6.1 Combining Messages

In some situations, such as when a large screen change occurs or when the screen is first sent to the client, large amounts of FrameData's may need to be sent in quick succession. Often individual FrameData's will be much smaller than the MTU. Similar to TCP's Nagle algorithm, multiple UDP messages can be combined into a single UDP packet as long as the total size is remains less than the MTU. Each message directly follows the previous message with the first message directly following the sequence number. Only one sequence-number is used:

Bytes	Name	
4	sequence-number	
variable	RVD message 1	
variable	RVD message 2	
variable	etc.	

This ONLY applies to UDP messages.

6.2 Definitions

- Host A peer with an ID that wants to share their screen to the Client
- Client A peer that wants to view and maybe control the Host's screen
- Display A rectangular visual region that is shared by a Host to a Client. May or may not be Controllable.
- Controllable A Display that accepts keyboard and mouse input from the Client.

6.3 Handshake

6.3.1 ProtocolVersion - TCP

Handshaking begins by the Host sending the client a ProtocolVersion message. This lets the Client know the version supported by the Host.

The ProtocolVersion message consists of 11 bytes interpreted as a string of ASCII characters in the format "RVD xxx.yyy" where xxx and yyy are the major and minor version numbers, padded with zeros.

$_$ Host \rightarrow Client			
Bytes	Name	\mathbf{Value}	
1	type	0	
11	version	"RVD 001.000"	

The Client replies back either 0 to indicate the version is not acceptable and that the handshake has failed or 1 if the version is acceptable to the Client and the handshake as succeeded. If 0 is sent, all communication MUST cease and an error SHOULD be displayed to user. A SessionEnd message should be sent by the Client.

$Client \rightarrow Host$		
Bytes	Name	Value
1	type	1
1	ok	0 or 1

6.3.2 Initialization

Once the handshake has succeeded the Host responds with a DisplayChange message.

6.4 Control messages

Control messages are messages that instruct the Client about changes regarding the Host.

6.4.1 DisplayChange - TCP

A DisplayChange message informs the Client about the available Displays. RVD supports up to 255 Displays. For each DisplayChange sent, an additional DisplayChange cannot be sent until a DisplayChangeReceived is received by the Host.

 $\begin{array}{c|ccc} & Host \rightarrow Client \\ \hline \textbf{Bytes} & \textbf{Name} & \textbf{Value} \\ \hline 1 & type & 2 \\ \hline 1 & clipboard-readable & 0 or 1 \\ \hline 1 & number-of-displays & 0 - 255 \\ \hline variable & displays-information & DisplayInformation \\ \hline \end{array}$

Each Display has an associated DisplayInformation. displays-information contains number-of-displays DisplayInformations. A DisplayInformation is defined below:

Bytes	Name	Description
1	display-id	
2	width	number of pixels of the width of this display
2	height	number of pixels of the width of this display
2	cell-width	number of pixels of the height of a cell in the grid
2	cell-height	number of pixels of the height of a cell in the grid
1	access	defined below
1	name-length	length of the display-name in bytes
name-length	display-name	the display name (UTF-8)

Restrictions:


- cell-width MUST be less than width. cell-height must be less than height.
- $\bullet\,$ cell-width * cell-height must be less than the MTU headers
- The access byte defines what type of access is available for the display. The bits of the access byte are described below in little endian.

Bit	Name		
0	Flush		
1	$\operatorname{Controllable}$		
2			
3			
4	Reserved for future		
5	use		
6			
7			

If any Controllable bit is 1 and the clipboard-readable byte is set to 1, then the clipboard is writable. The Controllable bit SHOULD be consistent throughout all displays.

The Flush bit indicates whether this display has changed, specifically if this display-id refers to a different Display than the same display-id did in the previous DisplayChange message. In initialization, this MUST always be 1 (as there is no previous DisplayChange). If the display hasn't changed (0) then the frame data MAY be maintained. If Flush is 0, width, height MUST remain the same as the previous DisplayChange specified for the display-id.

Display cell numbering is right to left, up to down, 0 indexed as seen below. If cell-width % width > 0 the right column's width will be width % cell-width. If height % cell-height > 0 the bottom row's height will be height % cell-height.



6.4.2 DisplayChangeReceived - TCP

The DisplayChangeReceived message is sent in reply after receiving a DisplayChange message. It indicates to the Host they may start sending FrameData referencing the new DisplayInformation in the most recent DisplayChange.

$\text{Client} \to \text{Host}$			
Bytes	\mathbf{Name}	Value	
1	$_{ m type}$	3	

6.4.3 MouseLocation - TCP/UDP

The MouseLocation message send information about where the mouse is currently on the screen. The Host sends this information periodically throughout the session. The Host SHOULD send a MouseLocation update when mouse input is received from the Host's system or in reply when it receives a MouseInput.

$$\mathrm{Host}\,\rightarrow\,\mathrm{Client}$$

Bytes	Name	Value	Description
3	type	4	
1	display-id	0-255	
2	x-location		x coordinate of the mouse
2	y-location		y coordinate of the mouse

6.5 Input

Input messages (including *MouseLocation*) may be sent over TCP or UDP. TCP is preferred in most situations. However, in situations where speed is prioritized over the guarantees TCP provides (such as gaming), UDP can be used.

6.5.1 MouseInput - TCP/UDP

$\operatorname{Client} \to \operatorname{Host}$				
Bytes	Name	Value	${f Description}$	
1	type	5		
1	display-id	0-255		
2	x-position		x coordinate of the mouse	
2	y-position		y coordinate of the mouse	
1	button-mask		described below	

Indicates either pointer movement or a pointer button press or release. The pointer is now at (x-position, y-position), and the current state of buttons 1 to 8 are represented by bits 0 to 7 of button-mask respectively, 0 meaning up, 1 meaning down (pressed).

On a conventional mouse, buttons 1, 2 and 3 correspond to the left, middle and right buttons on the mouse. On a wheel mouse, each step of the wheel is represented by a press and release of a certain button. Button 4 means up, button 5 means down, button 6 means left and button 7 means right.

6.5.2 KeyInput - TCP/UDP

The KeyInput event sends key presses or releases.

 $Client \rightarrow Host$

Bytes	Name	Value	Description	
1	type	6		
1	down-flag	0 or 1	indicates whether the key is now pressed or released	
4	key		"keysym"	

Details can be found at the RFB Spec

6.6 Clipboard

6.6.1 ClipboardRequest - TCP

Used to check if a clipboard type exists on the Host.

$\text{Client} \to \text{Host}$			
Bytes	Name	Value	
1	type	7	
1	clipboard-type		
Below only if clipboard-type's first bit is 1			
1	type-name-length		
type-name-length	type-name		

clipboard-type first bit (MSB) indicates whether this request is for a default type (0) or a custom type (1). clipboard-type's second bit (second MSB) indicates whether this request is a exists request (0) or a content request (1). An exists request is for checking whether the type exists but does not return content. A content request returns content if it exists. The remaining bits indicate the default type if the request is for a default type. Otherwise they MUST be 0.

clipboard-type's remaining bits referring to the following default types:

Value	Description	
0	text	
1	text	
2	rtf	
3	${ m html}$	
4 file-pointer		

6.6.2 ClipboardNotification- TCP

Notifies a Peer of a clipboard update. The receiving Peer should update their clipboard.

$+$ Host \leftrightarrow Client				
Bytes	${f Name}$	Value		
1	type	8		
1	clipboard-type			
Below only if clipboard-type's first bit is 1				
1	type-name-length			
type-name-length	type-name			
Below only if clipboard-type's second bit is 1				
3	$\operatorname{content-length}$			
$content ext{-}length$	data	zlib'ed raw data		

clipboard-type, type-name-length, and type-name MUST match a request if the notification is in response. If clipboard-readable is 0 and a Host receives a ClipboardRequest, it MUST be ignored. If no Display is Controllable or clipboard-readable is 0 and a Host receives a ClipboardNotification, it MUST be ignored.

content-length - the length of the content (maximum 2^{24} bytes or 16MB)

6.7 FrameData - UDP

The FrameData message contains an update of a particular cell on a particular Display.

$Host \rightarrow Client$			
Bytes	Name	Value	
1	type	9	
4	frame-number		
1	display-id	0-255	
2	cell-number		
2	size		
size	data		

frame-number is a 32 bit counter, initialized with 0 at the beginning of the protocol, and incremented once from FrameData message sent. data contains raw RGB pixel data of the updated cell.

6.8 Congestion

When sending messages over a network the network may become congested to avoid congesting the network further RVD implements a congestion detection and congestion control mechanism. RVD uses Additive increase/multiplicative decrease or AIMD to control the OutputMaximum which is the maximum messages allowed per CongestionWindow.