

AWS Incident Response via CloudTrail

Description


The purpose of this lab is to gain hands-on experience with conducting incident response on a compromised S3 bucket and IAM user within AWS. The lab involves identifying indicators of compromises on AWS via reading CloudTrail logs and creating Bash scripts for efficient analysis.

Programs and Environments Used

- Hypervisor: VirtualBox
- Environment: Kali Linux

Walkthrough

First, we want to log into the compromised IAM user AWS account to verify the compromised bucket is within the account. The compromised bucket along with the CloudTrail logs stored within the bucket can be seen below:



Once we verify the CloudTrail logs are present, we will then configure an AWS user profile via the Kali Linux command line named “jimmy” with the credentials of the compromised IAM user provided for this lab as seen below:

[illegible]

```

kali@kali: ~/Desktop/dump/AWSLogs/653711331788/CloudTrail/us-east-1/2018/11/28
File Actions Edit View Help

[kali@kali: ~]# cat /usr-east-1/2018/11/28
cat 653711331788 CloudTrail us-east-1 2018/11/28/201811282352_c89ra70H1ryrWvXY.json | jq

{
  "Records": [
    {
      "eventVersion": "1.05",
      "userIdentity": {
        "type": "AWSService",
        "invokedBy": "ecs-tasks.amazonaws.com"
      },
      "eventTime": "2018-11-28T22:31:59Z",
      "eventSource": "sts.amazonaws.com",
      "eventName": "AssumeRole",
      "awsRegion": "us-east-1",
      "sourceIPAddress": "ecs-tasks.amazonaws.com",
      "userAgent": "ecs-tasks.amazonaws.com",
      "requestParameters": {
        "roleSessionName": "d190dd1a-7484-45d6-9113-4ed32d7f2c7",
        "roleArn": "arn:aws:iam:653711331788:role/level3",
        "responseElements": {
          "credentials": {
            "sessionToken": "FQoGZXIvYXZzEFAaDEbnJXlefTt+kjlMKS5BngEU98JlVt+szJah5q2npYc2FIPgrLfmrKj9KotSW7+lo4WxteBTD77aeAcmlTp4GceNBUB86v+Gg5IIdNB2E0LndW6b1Az1jG8Du/Qarx136qjy+kahHxPlR36C4y/9QcP
UZpTPmP3uLsR1KxhvgvB8F510P0Z+Gj1UXN3jFV8EaK0Q/fSPd4LbZ6wI957aJxS2I7N8j1/KTfwPdQ+sxv5Wna0SeinUxD50Zd169CKb6C+qwhR5YtIfyquOVc90o5f1cBN7fYhPrZfS8d+Z+mPYTldAvD/HcdBqQ7U4jqlR2WGuXoBfvyvpt/Kb6
HTPp4g9D0HtLCZ7Sb4u1Y81WbafNmXyJ62j1+BN5QA90YHm9Cu1+9gqt0EgVSk/RdrwtuLTJ3cuFvhlD1gaJHGc0eCoWApr+J9nrzBPTV5008sc8IYVwDl3NRsmP+ZA9AQV/qg2L1cYxScQrQ/pKvOnYwJ4Xu8WBL8RYd01bGf6LWGAtOV+FzVo
XU05FWHlUmpcvctqk8v5Rr50p5paJnxXyGd61szNsvyghmPFJj7fGAXNEK19xthHK3jAdC8H8PrFqYwSGyQdWpde1s2+V4Xp1KlC06xyQg94H0f1fzszBwnnCUB869X2tN8sxbXQ4FqL128mCmuOuwazeG6W5MxU7Fop2mdjaKNu+N8",
            "expiration": "Nov 29, 2018 4:31:59 AM"
          }
        },
        "requestID": "6b7d6c60-f35d-11e8-becc-39e7d43dafef",
        "eventID": "6177ca7e-860e-482c-bde9-50c735af58d6",
        "resources": [
          {
            "ARN": "arn:aws:iam:653711331788:role/level3",
            "accountId": "653711331788",
            "type": "AWS::IAM::Role"
          }
        ],
        "eventType": "AwsApiCall",
        "recipientAccountId": "653711331788",
        "sharedEventID": "id18bf74-8392-4496-9dc4-a45cb799b8b4"
      }
    }
  ]
}

```

With the CloudTrail logs now readable, we can conduct incident response by searching for indicators of compromise within these log files. For instance, we can create a simple Bash script to search for all events filtered by their name and time as seen below:

```
kali@kali: ~/Desktop/dump/AWSLogs/65371131788/CloudTrail/us-east-1/2018/11/28
File Actions Edit View Help
GNU nano 6.2 EventTime.sh
#!/bin/bash
LOGS="*.json" #specifying the variable for logs
for l in $LOGS # starting the for loop
do
    echo "Analyzing $l" # analyzing the log file
    cat "$l" | jq | grep eventTime # displaying the eventTime in JSON format
    cat "$l" | jq | grep eventName # displaying the eventName as well
done
```

```
kali@kali: ~/Desktop/dump/AWSLogs/65371131788/CloudTrail/us-east-1/2018/11/28
File Actions Edit View Help
(kali@kali)~[~/us-east-1/2018/11/28]
$ nano EventTime.sh
(kali@kali)~[~/us-east-1/2018/11/28]
$ chmod 777 EventTime.sh
(kali@kali)~[~/us-east-1/2018/11/28]
$ ./EventTime.sh
Analyzing 65371131788_CloudTrail_us-east-1_20181128T22352_cR9ra7OH1rytWYXY.json
  "eventTime": "2018-11-28T22:31:59Z",
  "eventName": "AssumeRole",
  "eventName": "AssumeRole",
Analyzing 65371131788_CloudTrail_us-east-1_20181128T23052_83VTW2820kieC7Lq.json
  "eventTime": "2018-11-28T23:03:12Z",
  "eventName": "CreateLogStream",
Analyzing 65371131788_CloudTrail_us-east-1_20181128T23052_zKlMhON7EpHala9u.json
  "eventTime": "2018-11-28T23:02:56Z",
  "eventTime": "2018-11-28T23:03:12Z",
  "eventTime": "2018-11-28T23:03:11Z",
  "eventTime": "2018-11-28T23:03:20Z",
  "eventName": "GetObject",
  "eventName": "GetObject",
  "eventName": "Invoke",
Analyzing 65371131788_CloudTrail_us-east-1_20181128T23102_7J9NEIxrJJsrLXsd.json
  "eventTime": "2018-11-28T23:03:50Z",
  "eventTime": "2018-11-28T23:03:12Z",
  "eventTime": "2018-11-28T23:03:20Z",
  "eventTime": "2018-11-28T23:03:13Z",
  "eventTime": "2018-11-28T23:05:53Z",
  "eventTime": "2018-11-28T23:03:35Z",
  "eventName": "CreateLogStream",
  "eventName": "AssumeRole",
  "eventName": "CreateLogStream",
  "eventName": "CreateLogStream",
  "eventName": "ListImages",
  "eventName": "CreateLogStream",
Analyzing 65371131788_CloudTrail_us-east-1_20181128T23102_A1lhv3sW2zRIBFVK.json
  "eventTime": "2018-11-28T23:06:17Z",
  "eventTime": "2018-11-28T23:06:33Z",
  "eventName": "BatchGetImage",
```

As we see in the second image above, there seems to be a bunch of events being logged at that specific date and time. To conduct further analysis, we can then modify our Bash script to search for any IP addresses associated with those event times as seen below:

```
kali@kali: ~/Desktop/dump/AWSLogs/65371131788/CloudTrail/us-east-1/2018/11/28
File Actions Edit View Help
GNU nano 6.2 EventTime.sh
#!/bin/bash
LOGS="*.json" # specifying the variable for logs
for l in $LOGS # starting the for loop
do
echo "Analyzing $l" # analyzing the log file
cat "$l" | jq | grep '2018-11-28T23:03:20[|IP]' # displaying the IP address of events with that specific date/time in JSON Format
done
Help Exit Write Out Read File Where Is Replace Cut Paste Execute Justify Location Go To Line Undo Redo Set Mark Copy To Bracket Previous Next Back Forward
```


```
kali@kali: ~/Desktop/dump/AWSLogs/65371131788/CloudTrail/us-east-1/2018/11/28
File Actions Edit View Help
(kali@kali)~[~/us-east-1/2018/11/28]
$ nano EventTime.sh
(kali@kali)~[~/us-east-1/2018/11/28]
$ ./EventTime.sh
Analyzing 65371131788_CloudTrail_us-east-1_20181128T22352_cr9ra70HlrytWXY.json
"sourceIPAddress": "ecs-tasks.amazonaws.com",
"sessionToken": "FQoG2XIVYXdzEFAaDebnJXleFTT+kjlmKSksBNGEuj8tJVL+szjaH5q2npvc2FIPgrLmfRjK9KqtSW7+lo4WxteBtd77aeAcmlp4GceNBBu86zxGgS1ldNBzEOLnDw6biAz1jg8Du/Qazx136qjy+kahHxPLR36C4y/0Qrc
UZpTFmP3UElRkKhvGvubR518pTOZ-GjLUXN3FV8Ea0K0o/fSP0d4LbZGwI957aJxs2I7N8j1/LKTfWpdq+sxXvSWna0seinuZUD58zd169CKb6C-qwhR5Yt1fyu0vc9Qo5lfcBN2FyhpR2f5Bd+z+mPYTLdbAvD/HcdBQo7U4jqLR2W6uXoBfwvpt/kb6
HtPp4g90Nh1Cc7S84uLjV81MbaNmmXyJ62gi+BN5Qoa90Vhmm9Uj+9gnt0uEgysk/AdrcuLlITnyJcmFvhlD1geJHG4eComApe+9nrbPvTSo08zc81V1Vw013NRsmP+ZA9aQOV/qg2LlcYvScQrC/pKXONWjWjXkub8WLBgPfydo1bG1ELWGA4OV+fzVo
XU05f8H7UmpCvttkQKwsv1Rz18pspmInexY6Ge1szNsvYHqpFj7GAXnEK19xthHK3IaDc6EPrFqWcsYqQW6dpe1sm25+VxppTMBQJ1C06Bxy0g94H8F1ffz56wnnClUpBU0s69X21N8xb4U3FqK128mc0uuaweZeGwq5MwxJ7Fop2dmjakN+u/N8F",
"sourceIPAddress": "ecs-tasks.amazonaws.com",
"sessionToken": "FQoG2XIVYXdzEFAaDahihig4wSqsSS1MJSKSBOW1B0tXzW8SIPTM7RZE1kuZamVqb7hEqtmgS1DeDzp0xpP469USr3cZK74HNErY8W+5cr13Y8Nvr/V07MyzIXnpX1Edo103fNYnA+urhX8+YrTPF6o8uzm40w/lqdq1/DyO
kYUFRtQWf54Jy1t83KVFATuX51KtGekM10dK1cdmHjsZKQsqS4U3MQ4d0UG4ncyEERDv9yckTpg/R4FKEPTf1BN0jycy151R30TPaNaLGMGXHhAKSA5IXosrPBAQ0y02HhSKZCkbskCYG0QCcmVAQK41dEjYkLYtc+PEDasw1G6CQCPEqlwqF3mEPm83
8MjCt1aoJ9NvY9P9hFVKxdvNG65xowfag1351N1kqygEaOnC780aUBRYwELM402/6z7DMj0UegbR3m4uysaph1z1QqNLPwNBW/pqgMYOT11KfzDmc27AytHtL8z25HkYDLWZG19EXa-XeHuPgb0s0DTPs+j8FFZp7f5sR3THhgc5se+ex5oXkxMuh
N8V462J6u1eR8R0fZ8Qf11jyB8J712SHZJOYVH10onbVmqdtv++0d+1idTO+62bXJIKhEmDm2ZDeenF2ZXQGH4PgA4ud1d8XhV1ZVfKEKc1Mw53aAhuhD2LvnXK0pkn1XjwfdX3N0UyenoUR4x/gkY9+MEXMZAY08v2Y1vN2v5cVT3TH0KN+u/N8F",
Analyzing 65371131788_CloudTrail_us-east-1_20181128T23052_83VTWZ62KIEC7Lq.json
"sourceIPAddress": "34.234.236.212",
Analyzing 65371131788_CloudTrail_us-east-1_20181128T23052_zk1MhON7EphLa9u.json
"accountId": "ANONYMOUS_PRINCIPAL",
"sourceIPAddress": "104.102.221.250",
"accountId": "ANONYMOUS_PRINCIPAL",
"sourceIPAddress": "104.102.221.250",
"accountId": "ANONYMOUS_PRINCIPAL",
"sourceIPAddress": "104.102.221.250",
"eventTime": "2018-11-28T23:03:20Z",
"sourceIPAddress": "apigateway.amazonaws.com",
Analyzing 65371131788_CloudTrail_us-east-1_20181128T23102_739NEIxrjJsrLXSD.json
"sourceIPAddress": "34.234.236.212",
"sourceIPAddress": "lambda.amazonaws.com",
"eventTime": "2018-11-28T23:03:20Z",
"sourceIPAddress": "34.234.236.212",
"sourceIPAddress": "34.234.236.212",
"sourceIPAddress": "104.102.221.250",
"sourceIPAddress": "34.234.236.212",
Analyzing 65371131788_CloudTrail_us-east-1_20181128T23102_A1lhv3sWzzRIBFVK.json
"sourceIPAddress": "104.102.221.250",
"sourceIPAddress": "104.102.221.250",
Analyzing 65371131788_CloudTrail_us-east-1_20181128T23102_jw5Hfntz7k0nvcP.json
"accountId": "ANONYMOUS_PRINCIPAL",
"sourceIPAddress": "104.102.221.250",
"accountId": "ANONYMOUS_PRINCIPAL"
```

From the results in the second image above, it looks like there are two different IP addresses associated with the events, one of which is relatively close to each other. Using a domain lookup website, we can see that one of the source IP addresses is not from Amazon, but from Akamai instead, which would be considered as an indicator of compromise given it is not associated with Amazon's AWS as seen below:


34.234.236.212



```
“ ip: "34.234.236.212",  
“ hostname: "ec2-34-234-236-212.compute-  
1.amazonaws.com",  
“ city: "Ashburn",  
“ region: "Virginia",  
“ country: "US",  
“ loc: "39.0437,-77.4875",  
“ org: "AS14618 Amazon.com, Inc.",  
“ postal: "20147",  
“ timezone: "America/New_York"
```



Continuing with conducting incident response, we can create a new Bash script that can search through the logs for any users who invoke the `listBuckets` API call, which can be seen as suspicious and a potential indicator of compromise. The Bash script and the user identified can be seen below:




```
kali@kali: ~/Desktop/dump/AWSLogs/653711331788/CloudTrail/us-east-1/2018/11/28
File Actions Edit View Help
(kali@kali)~[~/us-east-1/2018/11/28]
$ nano greplistBuckets.sh
(kali@kali)~[~/us-east-1/2018/11/28]
$ ./greplistBuckets.sh
zsh: permission denied: ./greplistBuckets.sh
(kali@kali)~[~/us-east-1/2018/11/28]
$ chmod 777 greplistBuckets.sh
(kali@kali)~[~/us-east-1/2018/11/28]
$ ./greplistBuckets.sh
Analyzing 653711331788_CloudTrail_us-east-1_20181128T2235Z_cR9ra70H1pytWXY.json
Analyzing 653711331788_CloudTrail_us-east-1_20181128T2305Z_03VTWZ020k1EC7Lq.json
  "userName": "level1"
Analyzing 653711331788_CloudTrail_us-east-1_20181128T2305Z_zKlMhON7epHala9u.json
Analyzing 653711331788_CloudTrail_us-east-1_20181128T2310Z_7J9NEIxrjJsrLXsd.json
  "userName": "level1"
  "userName": "level1"
  "userName": "level1"
  "userName": "level1"
Analyzing 653711331788_CloudTrail_us-east-1_20181128T2310Z_A1lhv3sWzRi0FVvk.json
  "userName": "level1"
  "userName": "level1"
Analyzing 653711331788_CloudTrail_us-east-1_20181128T2310Z_jJWSHfNtz7kOnvcP.json
  "userName": "level1"
Analyzing 653711331788_CloudTrail_us-east-1_20181128T2310Z_jQajCuioboJ08I4y.json
  "eventName": "ListBuckets",
  "userName": "level3"
Analyzing 653711331788_CloudTrail_us-east-1_20181128T2310Z_rp919zxR2Vcpqfnz.json
(kali@kali)~[~/us-east-1/2018/11/28]
$
```

The user “level3” is the only user that invoked the listBuckets API call as seen in the second image above.

Next Steps

With this lab introducing how to conduct incident response within a cloud environment, I plan on looking around and analyzing more aspects of the CloudTrail logs while learning more about AWS and their services in general. In addition, this lab has introduced the usage of Bash scripts for me, which I will consider learning on improving my scripting skills in Bash for the future.