

From (anti-mainland) Sinophobia and shibboleths to mobilisation on a Taiwanese message board

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This chapter examines the rise in Taiwanese anti-Chinese sentiment, drawing particular connections to language use on the locally-grounded PTT¹ bulletin board system (BBS), specifically its largest board, Gossiping. While the language prevalent on PTT is not limited to this platform, the elite character of the forum and its influence on news coverage – and thus the political process – make it an important window into the crystallising Taiwanese identity.

I start by discussing why Taiwan continues to use a telnet system (a non-hypertext application protocol) as common social media today, when the rest of the world has long since abandoned such systems in favour of the web and mobile apps. I follow with a look into increasing Taiwanese fear of the People's Republic of China (PRC), and discuss the emergence of a new Taiwanese-identifying identity inclusive of the formerly supreme Chinese Civil War-remnant *waishengren*² class. The role of language in this transformation is explained, particularly various forms of outsider-policing language play found in elite-identified alternative media such as PTT. The type of 'insiderness' fostered by such forums in general is explained. In the Taiwanese context, however, this insiderness is particularly politically potent, for reasons of language, culture, and geography, which may have consequences not only for the future of Taiwan, but also for international security.

Taiwan's use of a telnet BBS

BBSs are among the earliest social media – their public availability, beginning in the late 1970s, predates that of the internet by a decade. Initially, use required a point-to-point connection via modem, thus only one user could be accommodated per phone line. The user would leave notes – hence the 'bulletin board' – for others to see. The point-to-point

1 PTT is not a proper acronym. The founder's name is Tu, his nickname, Panda, and he thought it needed another T. See "PTT Name".

2 Those who came to Taiwan with the retreat off the mainland of the Republic of China's army and Nationalist Party or KMT with the loss of the Chinese Civil War and their descendants. While in Taiwan, *waishengren* are now considered one of four 'major ethnic groups', due to relatively recent diversity of origin it is perhaps more helpful to think of the grouping as a class. However, this in turn may be misleading as while the Taiwanese overclass does (and once did to an even greater degree) consist of many *waishengren*, many former KMT soldiers and their descendants live in poverty in situations that may be surprising when one considers only ostensible privilege as in the case of the South African White underclass, for instance.

requirement gave BBSs a local character as long-distance calls were expensive. Today, most BBSs are accessed using telnet, itself antiquated, but allowing for many more users simultaneously – over 150,000 in the case of PTT. On PTT, a system limited to initial text-only posts and 80 character comments, there are consistently over 100,000 users online – with user-friendlier and far flashier web-based offerings available, this is a testament to its environmental necessity. Taiwan's mass media are generally seen to be bowing to the economic imperative of the massive Chinese market (Hsu, 2014), thus the need for an independent, non-monetisable, elite-identified BBS – the National Taiwan University (NTU) club-run PTT.

Justified fears – viable outlets

Taiwanese fear of China is not an easily-condemned xenophobia – it inevitably ties into Taiwan's continued existence as a separate community. While in the past much fretting concerned standard dangerous others – such as female marriage migrants who were seen as uneducated thus undesirable infusions into the body politic – the new fears are based on the potential negation of Taiwanese democracy. The counter-attack is class-based, pointing out that the beneficiaries of cross-strait investment pacts are largely entrepreneurs and big firms investing in mainland production centres. Yet while the government relies on such firms' tax revenue, the welfare of Taiwanese workers as well as national security must also be taken into account. Even without adopting an alter-globalisation mindset, an easy case can be made for strategic hedging and thus siting production in Southeast Asia instead, with costs being similar.³ While there are understandable motives for said pacts, including the need to find a way around the ASEAN-China Free Trade Area, there is a sinking feeling that those pushing them may be purposely “encasing” Taiwan (Wright, 2014), setting up an eventual choice between unification and economic shambles.

These fears are particularly heightened among the young, not only because the slow slide to unification would culminate on their watch, but because of the ever-increasing cost of housing in Taipei due in part to mainland buyers making winners of those with property and losers of the educated young. While such graduates commonly speak English and could thus seek their fortunes elsewhere, a mass exodus to make way for Chinese money at the high end and workers at the low is not a responsible solution. These ‘encasement’ fears are no longer inert, having generated the desperation required to storm and occupy the legislature in the spring of 2014 in opposition to the Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement as part of the

3 See Lynch (2004) and Fell (2016) for efforts at such hedging under past less PRC-friendly governments than that of the former President Ma (2008–2016). For the renewal of such efforts under the Tsai administration, see “Ex-minister touts southbound policy” (2016).

Sunflower Movement – an alliance of class-based concerns with Taiwanese nationalism (Rowen, 2015).

Such alliances are not limited to Taiwan, of course. The ‘one country two systems’ formula under which Hong Kong was transferred to the PRC was intended to apply to Taiwan, thus the ‘one China principle’ enshrined under the 1992 Consensus adhered to by the Kuomintang (KMT) and the PRC.⁴ Hong Kong’s similar path yields less of a framework for peaceful unification and more a cautionary tale. Initially, similarly to Taiwan, Hong Kongers saw themselves as superior to their “illegal immigrant” (Hung, 2014) “country cousins” (Jones, 2014), but since the Asian financial crisis of 1997 such comfort in superiority has been less secure. While dominant discourse once concentrated on mainlanders displaying their peasant ways (for example by defecating in the streets) a sense of helpless dependency has set in, with ‘parallel traders’ and gaudy tourists represented by a menacing locust as in the infamous ad appearing in *Apple Daily* paid for largely by users of popular local forum HK Golden (Hung, 2014). The benefits of mainlander buying power, as in Taiwan, accrue to the entrepreneurial class (Jones, 2014), while adequate housing for the masses remains out of reach. The locust trope can also be understood to indicate a deeper fear – as locusts move on once they eat their fill, so too will Hong Kong be discarded in favour of Shanghai.

While Hong Kongers are exhorted to embrace further economic integration with the mainland by their leaders in a similar manner to former President Ma’s appeals to the Taiwanese, and both polities grumble about such policies on social media, the Taiwanese have a crucial advantage – the ability to fire leaders bent on integration. The Taiwanese mood, and that of their technologically-inclined youthful elites on PTT, has a clear outlet in both electoral politics and protest movements that, unlike in Hong Kong, do not need to fear a People’s Liberation Army garrison equipped with armoured personnel carriers.

Drawing together and pushing away

While, as is common on message boards, Gossiping users attack many broad categories of people – women and gays, for instance, as well as more idiosyncratic targets such as academically inferior ‘humanities people’ (*wenzu*)⁵ – attacks on mainland Chinese and their language use are particularly interesting.

The cleavage between Taiwanese and Chinese culture in Taiwan was ironically abetted by a policy whereby although Mandarin was pushed as the ‘national language’, replacing Japanese following WWII, the orthodoxy represented by Mandarin (Liu, 2012)

4 Though denied by the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), winners of the January 2016 elections.

5 This becomes more understandable considering PTT’s history as a project begun, and continuously maintained by, students in the Department of Computer Science at NTU – see Li, Lin, & Huang (2017) for an in-depth history.

extended to orthodoxy in general, with Taiwan being more ‘Chinese’ than China itself, especially following the destruction of the Cultural Revolution (Damm, 2011b; Zhong, 2016). Thus Taiwan is, if Chinese, a representative of a China that no longer exists. Sinicisation (in the form of Mandarin usage) and Taiwanisation (in the form of forging a coherent national polity clearly different than the mainland) are thus not at odds. Pressures from without merely give a name to this cleavage. The PRC monopolising China-as-concept in the eyes of the world requires a new identifier (Wu, 2004; Zhong, 2016) so one would not be mistaken for the mainland Chinese who are no longer ‘Chinese’.

Waishengren incorporated

Waishengren or “outside-province-people”⁶ quickly managed to alienate the *benshengren* or “this-province-people” when they were sent to rule Taiwan following Japan’s surrender after WWII. On 27 February 1947 a riot broke out over the beating of a grey-market peddler. A bystander was shot by police, igniting general disappointment with the KMT. The governor promised reform as a stalling tactic – when reinforcements arrived, thousands were killed⁷ and thus began the ‘white terror’ – 40 years of martial law.

During the martial law period, the government – in name, as it largely remains today⁸ but also in form – explicitly claimed to represent all of China, thus justifying temporary *waishengren* dominance as representative of the areas to be retaken. By the time the United States changed its diplomatic recognition of Chinese government from the Republic of China to the PRC in 1979, however, retaking the mainland no longer seemed legitimately possible. Thus began a push for ‘indigenization’ (*bentuhua*)⁹ which no longer required a government-in-exile apparatus – making *waishengren* vestigial colonialists.

Though animosity between *waishengren* and the rest of Taiwanese society remains to an extent – as seen in simmering arguments over their historical role revealed in such forms as the Chinese Wikipedia entry talk page¹⁰ (Damm, 2011a) and the outing of a *waishengren* diplomat as a virulently anti-Taiwanese blogger (Turton, 2009) – this has been alleviated somewhat in the younger generation, and even in the older as they are made aware of their ‘Taiwaneseness’. In spite of ethnic affinity, the relaxation of laws on travel to the PRC has made many aware that nostalgia for their ancestral home is misplaced, or at least not tied to a place currently existing (Hillenbrand, 2006; Lin, 2011). Such an effect has been exacerbated in recent years by economic trends. With Taiwanese investment less necessary, a sincere

6 Implying Taiwan is a province of the Republic of China with its claim to all areas once ruled by the Qing dynasty.

7 See “February 28 Incident” for two contemporary accounts in American newsmedia.

8 E.g. “Republic of China”.

9 See Makeham & Hsiao (2005) for a book-length treatment.

10 Where edits to the page are discussed; see “Talk:Waishengren”.

welcome accompanying any sort of investment has been replaced by lists of demands (Lin, 2011) when investment is courted at all (Yu, Yu, & Lin, 2016).

Among the young, such disillusionment fostering a feeling of perhaps being Chinese, but not the “Chinese Chinese” (Lin, 2011), is unnecessary – their inclusion in the Taiwanese polity at large abetted not only by intermarriage but also by the democratisation process whereby professing a local identity became an obvious electoral asset. The former President Ma, certainly not one to abandon mainland ties, upon being elected the mayor of Taipei in 1998 “famously said in Hoklo [Taiwanese]: ‘I eat Taiwanese rice, drink Taiwanese water, I am a New Taiwanese’” (Dupré, 2014). The “post-reform generation” (Le Pesant, 2011) – those born into this new democratic reality – have been found to be relatively uninterested in ethnic categorisation and identify primarily as Taiwanese across ethnic categories. Identity has become territorialised based on common life experience including a “shared feeling of being constantly unfairly treated by the international community and being victims of China’s repeated humiliations and negation of their existence” (Le Pesant, 2011) due to being shut out of most international organisations.

The divisive role of language on two Chinese internets

Language has been another coalescing factor, with Mandarin having become a language of Taiwan – and *the* language among the young and educated – with the majority of the young regarding it as their mother tongue (Liao, 2010). Mandarin usage in Taiwan, however, has taken on what its speakers regard as a “placid” tone, making it a “refined, cultivated, and sophisticated language that categorically differs from the PRC Mandarin” taken as “coarse and aggressive” (Liao, 2010). Structure can also be differentiated, with Taiwanese Mandarin drifting toward features of Southern Chinese dialects, such as commonly placing the verb before the object of a sentence, rather than vice-versa as in the Altaic-influenced Beijing Mandarin (Cheng, 1985). These differences allow for discrimination and the creation of an intra-Taiwanese sphere thereby. Written computer-mediated communication allows for even more rapid shifts, and thus cleavages.

Language use on internet forums will, even assuming intelligibility, tend toward the creation of insider cultures with community standards reinforced textually, sensory cues being absent. Humour and playfulness – in a sea of content – are capital in the attention economy. Funny differs between forums or even subforums, with users invited to leave if they show themselves unable to discern what passes as ‘forum dialect’ use.

On PTT/Gossiping, exclusion is managed similarly. As a Chinese-language forum, excluding those who cannot read Chinese is easy. Shibboleth forging against unwelcome

incursions by mainland Chinese is only somewhat less so, given the divergence in both writing systems and their adaptations for social media use. There is the obvious marker of a different character set, with China using the simplified and Taiwan the traditional. While a mainlander seeking to blend in can simply change his input method allowing him to type traditional characters, this is not foolproof. Some words, for example, the commonly used *zheme* ('such') and *duiyu* ('about'), serve as a shibboleth – the default characters, while technically correct, would not be those chosen by a Taiwanese user.¹¹ This will commonly yield responses telling the mainland Chinese user to leave – in simplified characters, mocking their failure.

Other than character set, the defining characteristic of mainland Chinese internet text is “stylized initials” (Yang, 2007), specifically those using pinyin romanisation initialisms as representative of Chinese expressions, often rude (Chen, 2014) – such as TMD for *tamade* ('his mother's') – or sexual – with YY for *yiyin* ('thinking/fantasizing sexually') being especially common. Such tactics mitigate offensiveness by not using the native characters, which may be too direct an affront, as well as speed up input and circumvent censorship (Chen, 2014). As Taiwan uses *zhuyin fuhao* syllabics as means of inputting characters this is far less prevalent.¹²

Conversely, Gossiping bears markers of the Taiwanese context described above. Mandarin provides the basic language – Taiwanese adds certain expressions. While Taiwanese shares a character set with Mandarin (having both inherited the writing system of literary Chinese), the full range of colloquial expression in Taiwanese is impossible to render using standard Chinese characters. There was no official effort to make the jump from literary Chinese to a standard Taiwanese due to Taiwan having spent the twentieth century ruled by those with designs at integration with those speaking other languages, whether the more recent *Guoyu* Standard Mandarin or Japanese. While Taiwanese has structural influence on Standard Taiwanese Mandarin, there are also more playful manifestations which given the aforementioned nature of internet forums are especially likely to crop up. Taiwanese BBS users “rely on the morphosyllabic nature of the Chinese writing system and search for characters that represent sounds similar to the language or to the accent they intend to imitate” – one that is uniquely Taiwanese. “The effect is what sounds like the mimicry of an intelligible Mandarin sentence heavily influenced by Taiwanese phonology, while the strings of characters present an anomaly in meaning” (Su, 2009). That is, the characters as read aloud

11 For example, *zheme* is rendered 這麼 in the traditional character set and 这么 in the simplified. When attempting to blend in, a mainland user may type 这么, which has resulted in the common pejorative 么么人 (*yaoyaoren*) – 么么 people. I am indebted to my colleague Lin Yi-Ren for this and related insights.

12 The use of *zhuyin fuhao* characters alone, that is, not as input device, but used for their sound or shape serves as another distinction.

make sense when imagining the use of a Taiwanese accent, but are incomprehensible otherwise for those unfamiliar with Taiwanese Mandarin as their meanings are different – this juxtaposition often being amusing, thus privileging its use and propagating the shibboleth.

The reclaiming of such an accent as a marker of what it means to be Taiwanese in the educated community that frequents a forum intimately connected to the most prestigious university on the island serves to further distinguish Taiwanese society from that of the mainland and the Chinese-speaking world in general. While such a heavy accent used in daily life is stigmatised as a marker of the uneducated (Su, 2005), this is reclaimed on the Taiwanese internet as lovable and sincere, marking out mainland Chinese society as lacking these qualities.

Intraforum insidership, Taiwanese insidership

Internet forums have, as explained above, the tendency to create insider cultures when they require particular subcultural understanding. To be a respected member of the tribe, one must continuously acquire and mobilise cultural capital (in line with Bourdieu, 1993). When the forum is anonymous or pseudonymous as in the case of PTT,¹³ the relative lack of Facebook-style reputation management increases the “collective, agglutinative character of social space” (Auerbach, 2012). Though some posters aberrantly connect their posting to a real-life identity (though with little verifiability), most maintain a situation wherein the “only defining characteristics of participants are their memberships in these forums. This instantly provides a point of commonality among all participants by which they can define themselves in opposition to all nonparticipants, or some chosen subset of them” (Auerbach, 2012).

When this tendency of forum culture towards a collective identity is married to the marks of distinction provided by a geographically bounded language community (if ‘imagined’¹⁴) as described above, negating the ‘global village’ concept pushed in the Anglosphere – the internet as place where the world comes together to speak English – the political ramifications both internally and for international relations can be profound, as is seen in Taiwan.

Mobilisation

Students, especially in advanced countries where industrial labour – and thus its strikes – has become less common, are the backbone of social struggle. In Taiwan in particular there is a

13 Though PTT enforces usernames, one may simply reregister with a different name (and thus identity).

14 Following Anderson, 1991, with the national community of largely invisible and thus ‘imagined’ ritual newspaper readers transmuted into ‘real’ BBS posters leaving traces: up or down votes and comments. For further on imagined national communities and consequences of media shifts, see Soffer (2013) and Mihelj (2011).

sense that interfering with or co-opting student struggle would be counterproductive, as students “can get away with action and expression that no other segments of the population could” (Wright, 2014) as their concerns belong to a “pure current of society – the up-and-coming generation, the not-yet soulless and cynical future leaders and elites of the nation whose ideals and hopes remain intact and uncrushed by the contingencies, corruptions, and compromises of the so-called ‘real world’ that the generations above them are running and ruining” (Wright, 2014). During the Sunflower Movement protests, for example, the KMT and allied media attempted to “paint the occupation [of the legislature] as a DPP plot” (Rowen, 2015), though their role was engineered to be supportive yet passive, with party officials being so careful as to “forbid the display of any DPP signs or logos within the occupation zone” (Rowen, 2015). Such a privileging of studenthood is clearly visible in the makeup of Taiwan’s politicians,¹⁵ with all three candidates for president in the 2016 election, for example, holding doctorates from prestigious universities. PTT, embedded in student culture from the time of its creation in a dormitory, and relying on a university network for its continued existence, thus has distinct advantages in its ability to mobilise from that base compared to similar forums in other countries. It is also shielded from interference by lack of economic pressure, being funded by user donations.

Gossiping is particularly suited for real-world mobilisation due to largely being used for *news pasting*, whereby media content (mainstream or otherwise) is copy-pasted to the forum and comments invited. As the media has a habit of obtaining news from Gossiping and covering the user feedback on stories as citizen commentary (Hsieh & Li, 2014), a symbiotic relationship is fostered and the importance of the forum as a deliberative venue is increased (Li et al., 2017). The types of comments generated thereby are commonly quite knowledgeable, with the elite students of NTU and other top universities who formed the core usership during their undergraduate years maintaining the habit after graduation and entry into various professions (Li et al., 2017).

Hong Kong’s HK Golden serves a similar function of “circulating local news faster than any other media” (Hung, 2014). While the forum can be caustic as seen in the aforementioned locust ad, it is heartening that this tendency is tempered in the translation to mass movement – the Umbrella Movement’s firm commitment to non-violent principles was explicitly designed to generate sympathy from an ambivalent public. This is similar to Taiwan post-democratic transition, but strikingly different to tactics both anticipating and precipitating violent confrontation with police present not only in dictatorships such as Egypt

15 See Duh (2016) for an NTU professor complaining of the scholar-politician’s ubiquity.

and flawed democracies such as Ukraine, but also in student protests under consolidated democracies, for example in Quebec in 2012.

PTT has been a crucial support for and generator of social movements at least since 2008's Wild Strawberry Movement, which pushed for amendment to the Assembly and Parade Law requiring outdoor assembly to be approved beforehand by government.¹⁶ The trend began with several hundred students in front of the Executive Yuan after a call for a sit-down demonstration on PTT. This was followed in 2013 after some accrued experience by protests demanding justice for an army conscript who died of organ failure while being punished for minor violations of military discipline. Several hundred thousand protesters were mobilised by leveraging the initial network nurtured on Gossiping into a call for action on the more widely-used Facebook. Finally, the anti-China – or at least anti-opaque integration with China – Sunflower Movement erupted in Spring 2014 from a coalition comprising the Gossiping-generated Citizen 1985 group that drove the conscript protest and other civil society groups (Li et al., 2017). Sunflower then spawned a political party (New Power) picking up five seats in the 2016 election – one of those seats won by the sister of the dead army conscript, who removed an 18-year incumbent.

Conclusions and consequences

While my comments have been tinged by positive assessment of a national community slowly uniting – pushed on by play and language games and rooted in a common way of life – and the interesting role non-commercial social media can play, it is fair to end with a consideration of the consequences. Taiwanese nationalism is seen as dangerous by many analysts and diplomats – particularly those in the United States (Bush, 2016; Wang, 2016) – as, in the extreme case of a declaration of independence with no hedging, a world war may well be triggered. While a survey dating from 2001 notes that “the rapid nativization of ethnic consciousness is only partially reflected in positions on national identity and the independence/unification question, and its influence on concrete policy positions [related to cross-strait economic relations] is even more limited” and that “[p]ut simply, the trend toward Taiwanization in basic ethnic consciousness has not evolved into a political demand for Taiwan independence” (Rigger, 2006; Wu, 2001), three years later the same researcher's outlook is considerably more alarmist (Wu, 2004). Recent studies confirm demands for independence are eschewed by the vast majority when taking into account a likely PRC attack (Kastner, 2016), though accommodating a slow slide toward unification by economic entanglement is a different matter. If President Tsai fails to get the balance right, the social

16 This law was later declared to be in violation of the constitution by the Judicial Yuan. See “Constitutional Court Decision 718” (2014).

media-birtherd New Power Party will be there as a check. Today, with the China-accommodating KMT in disarray, we should look on with hope and admiration at such organising by the aforementioned ‘pure current of society’, but with dread at the likelihood the world’s superpowers may not tolerate the instability precipitated thereby, or worse – use it as bargaining chip.

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