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INFORMATION

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REFERENCES

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PLACEMENT
DIRECTORS

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RESEARCH
INTERESTS

Primary: Labor economics, applied econometrics
Secondary: Public economics

EDUCATION

Ph.D. in Economics, Department of Economics, Uppsala University (2018–present)
Visiting scholar, Center of Labor Economics, UC Berkeley (Aug 2016–June 2017)
Ph.D. studies in Economics, Department of Economics, Stockholm University (2014–2018)

M.Sc. in Economics, Department of Economics, Stockholm University (2012–2014)

B.Sc. in Economics, Department of Economics, Stockholm University (2009–2012)

B.Sc. in Political Science, Department of Political Science, Stockholm University (2009–2012)

AFFILIATIONS

Uppsala Center for Labor Studies, Uppsala University, 2018–

JOB MARKET PAPER

[Saved by Seniority? – Effects of Displacement for Workers at the Margin of Layoff](#)

Abstract: This paper takes a novel approach in estimating the effects of involuntary job loss on future earnings, wages and employment. Whereas thus previous literature has relied on mass layoffs and plant closures for exogenous variation in displacement thus comparing workers across firms I exploit the fact that who is laid off *within* a downsizing establishment is often determined by seniority rules, specifically the last-in-first-out (LIFO) principle. Using matched employer-employee data from Sweden, in combination with a unique individual-level dataset on layoff notifications, I rank workers according to relative seniority and identify establishment/occupation specific discontinuities in the probability of displacement which I exploit in a regression discontinuity framework. I show that displaced workers suffer large initial earnings losses of about 38 percent, but in contrast to previous studies, earnings recover fully within 7 years. I explore heterogeneity across layoffs and find that persistent earnings losses are mainly associated with very large layoff events and that a substantive share of these losses can be attributed to general equilibrium effects.

WORKING PAPERS

[Extended Unemployment Benefits and the Hazard to Employment](#)

Abstract: Previous studies estimating the effect of generosity of unemployment insurance (UI) on unemployment duration has found that as job-seekers approach benefit exhaustion the probability of leaving unemployment increases sharply. Such “spikes” in the hazard rate has generally been interpreted as job-seekers timing their employment to coincide with benefit exhaustion. Card, Chetty and Weber (2007b) argue that such spikes rather reflect flight out of the labor force as benefits run out. This paper revisits this debate by studying a 30 week UI benefit extension in Sweden and its effects on unemployment duration, duration on UI, as well as the timing of employment. As the UI extension is predicated upon a job-seeker having a child below the age of 18 at the time of regular UI exhaustion this provides quasi-experimental variation which I exploit using a regression discontinuity design. I find that although increasing potential UI duration by 30 weeks increases actual take up by about 2.7 weeks, overall duration in unemployment and the probability of employment is largely unaffected. Moreover, I find no evidence of job-seekers manipulating the hazard to employment such that it coincides with UI benefit exhaustion. This result is attributed to generous replacement rates offered in other assistance programs available to job seekers who exhaust their benefits.

[Consequences of Mandatory Advance Layoff Notice for Workers and Firms](#), with Peter Fredriksson, Arash Nekoei, and David Seim

Abstract: Employment protection rules are often criticized for creating inefficiently low labor turnover. However, such rules also provide insurance for displaced workers. This paper addresses the benefits and costs of advance notice of job loss for workers and firms, respectively. Empirically, we use unique administrative data from Sweden on the exact dates of layoff notification as well as contracted notice periods, all at the individual-level. Discontinuities in notification time generated by employment legislation or collective bargaining agreements provide exogenous variation. Our regression-discontinuity estimates indicate that longer notice periods reduce the probability of non-employment and increase annual earnings during the first year after layoff notification. There is some evidence indicating that workers who get longer notification periods experience smaller falls in their reemployment wages. We also show that firms are willing to make – and workers accept – an upfront severance payment in order to avoid the notice period and that firms respond to longer notification periods by laying off fewer workers.

[Caseworkers – do they matter, why, and for whom? Exploring caseworker value-added using random variation](#) (with Martin Söderström and Johan Vikström)

Abstract: This paper studies the importance of caseworkers for job seeker outcomes. We exploit that many local employment offices in Sweden assign job seekers to caseworkers based on their date-of-birth. This random allocation mechanism coupled with unique data on caseworkers allow us to provide new and credible evidence on the performance of caseworkers, as well as mechanisms explaining caseworker value-added. We find that caseworkers matter; a one standard deviation increase in the distribution of caseworker fixed effects increase the 6-months job finding rate by 7 percent and earnings after three years by 4.8 percent. Interestingly, observed caseworker characteristics, such as cognitive and non-cognitive ability, caseworker experience, employment and unemployment history, can not explain caseworker performance. The results suggest that it does not matter much who the caseworkers are, but rather what they do and how they are matched to job seekers. In particular, caseworkers who conduct many meetings, and caseworkers who tailor training programs to the most appropriate job seekers, have better outcomes. These strategies matter most for job seekers who are less attached to the labor market. We also find that similarity matters; caseworkers matched to job seekers with the same gender, similar employment history or similar educational background, perform better.

CURRENT PROJECTS	<p>Who Are the Early Leavers? Selection on Cognitive and Non-cognitive Skills Prior to Mass Lay-off (with Peter Fredriksson and David Seim)</p> <p>Marginal treatment effects of labor market training programs using random variation (with Johan Vikström)</p> <p>Starting anew - The Consequences of Personal Default for Highly In-debt Individuals</p>
SEMINARS AND CONFERENCE PRESENTATIONS	<p><i>2019</i>: Research Institute for Industrial Economics (IFN), Stockholm University MicroWave, Uppsala Center for Labor Studies (UCLS), Nordic Summer Institute in Labor Economics, UCLS 10-year anniversary conference, EALE 2019, Institute for International Economic Studies, UCLS Research Conference in Labor Market Relations</p> <p><i>2018</i>: Swedish national conference in economics, Stockholm University MicroWave, IFAU, Brown Bag Uppsala University, Research Institute for Industrial Economics (IFN)</p> <p><i>2017</i>: Stockholm University MicroWave</p> <p><i>2016</i>: Barcelona Graduate School of Economics, Institute for Research on Labor and Employment at UC Berkeley, Stockholm University BrownBag</p>
TEACHING EXPERIENCE (COURSE EVAL.)	<p>Teaching Assistant, Econometrics II, Spring 2018, [Graduate] (4/5)</p> <p>Teaching Assistant, Empirical Methods in Economics II, Spring 2016 (3.7/5)</p> <p>Teaching Assistant, Empirical Methods in Economics II, Fall 2015 (4.2/5)</p> <p>Teaching Assistant, Intermediate Microeconomics, Fall 2015 (4.4/5)</p> <p>Teaching Assistant, Empirical Methods in Economics I, Spring 2014 (4.3/5)</p> <p>Teaching Assistant, Macroeconomics I, Fall 2013 (4.6/5)</p> <p>Teaching Assistant, Macroeconomics I, Spring 2013 (3.8/5)</p>
REFEREING EXPERIENCE	<p>Scandinavian Journal of Economics</p>
GRANTS AND HONORS	<p>Tom Hedelius Scholarship for full time studies abroad, 2015</p> <p>The Ljungberg Scholarship from Erik Johan Ljungbergs education fund, 2014</p> <p>Erasmus Scholarship for exchange students, 2010 (declined)</p>
PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE	<p>Research Assistant, “On the Accumulation of Wealth: The Role of Inheritance”, Stockholm University, led by Asst. Professor David Seim and Asst. Professor Arash Nekoei</p> <p>Research Assistant, “Does a declining sequence of UI replacement rates affect to hazard to employment“, IFAU, led by Professor, Peter Fredriksson</p>
PROGRAMMING SKILLS	<p>Stata (advanced), L^AT_EX(proficient), R (proficient), MatLab (basic), Python (beginner)</p>
LANGUAGE SKILLS	<p>English (fluent), Swedish (native), Spanish (beginner)</p>