


Webauthn in Electron Apps

- **Jyotirmay Chauhan**

Webauthn Basics

Authenticator


Hardware Keys




On Platform



Software Based Authenticator



Key Location



No entries for localhost; Not valid domain

Can't view the actual passkeys

W webauthn.io
Last modified today

User Name picard@cs.colgate.edu

Notes

Add Notes

Passkey Options

Passkey Created today

A passkey is a more secure sign-in method than a traditional password. Passkeys are protected by Touch ID on this Mac and use iCloud to sync across your devices. [Learn more...](#)

Password Options

Password Add Password...

Website

webauthn.io

Upload Delete Passkey... Edit Done

3 FIDO specifications

U2F

Universal 2nd Factor

FIDO Authenticator as 2nd factor

UAF

Universal Auth Frameworks

Framework for password-less auth

CTAP

Client To Auth Protocol

OS and Browser Communication
WITH
Authenticators


Webauthn

RP to authenticator
via API

FIDO2

CTAP2

Desktop Applications to authenticator
via API



Certification Standards

L1 L1+

FIDO protocol guarantee
No protection against Malware

Majority of HSKs

L2

TEE- trusted Execution Environment
FIDO client resides on the hardware itself

L3 L3+

FIDO Authenticator Certification Examples

L3+



USB U2F Token built on a CC-certified Secure Element **Certification: L3+**

L3



USB U2F Token built on a basic simple CPU, OS, is certified. Good physical anti-tampering enclosure



UAF implemented as a TA running on a certified TEE with POP memory

L2



UAF implemented as a TA in an uncertified TEE

L1+



UAF in downloadable app using white box crypto and other techniques
Certification: L1+


L1



Downloaded app making use of Touch ID on iOS
Certification: L1




FIDO2 making use of the Android keystore. Keystore is not certified
Certification: L1




FIDO2 built into a downloadable web browser app
Certification: L1


Registration




Registration options



Registration




Response: PublicKeyCredential



```
PublicKeyCredential {  
  id: 'ADSULLKQmbqdGtpu4sjseh4cg2TxSvrbcHDTBsv4NSSX9...',  
  rawId: ArrayBuffer(59),  
  response: AuthenticatorAttestationResponse {  
    clientDataJSON: ArrayBuffer(121),  
    attestationObject: ArrayBuffer(306),  
  },  
  type: 'public-key'  
}
```

Registration




Sign In




Electron

Electron app



Deployed on AWS EC2



Login Form

File Edit View Window Help

Console

For more information and help, consult <https://electronjs.org/docs/tutorial/security>.
This warning will not show up

Windows Security

Security key setup

Set up your security key to sign in to webauthn.io as tempo.

This request comes from C:\Users\Jaycee\Documents\cs_research\electron_app\node_modules\electron\dist\electron.exe, which is an unverified app.

OK Cancel

```
▶ Response {type: 'basic', url: 'https://ec2-18-116-80-89.us-east-2.compute.amazonaws.com/registration', redirected: false, status: 200, ok: true, ...}
Returned from checkCredentialExistence: renderer.js:110
▶ {type: 'Buffer', data: Array(64)} render器.js:111
[object ArrayBuffer] render器.js:254
object render器.js:255
DOMException: The operation either timed out or was not allowed. See: https://www.w3.org/TR/webauthn-2/#sctn-privacy-considerations-client. render器.js:268
```

Prior Work

Social Engineering Attack

Evaluating the Security Posture of Real-World FIDO2 Deployments


CCS '23, November 26–30, 2023, Copenhagen, Denmark




(a) User downloads and installs a malicious browser extension [61].



(b) With an active session on WalletCo., user attempts to make a transaction on another merchant site, say MerchantCo.



(c) Extension detects the transaction and attempts attacker-initiated action (e.g., transferring funds to the attacker's wallet) in a background tab. This triggers a FIDO2 authentication prompt.






(d) User is tricked into authenticating the attacker's transaction, mistaking it as authenticating their own transaction (which did not actually require authentication).

Via browser Extensions
permission: tabs, scripting, host extension

The Popup

How does it look like?


Any common component ?



Attacker Model: Origin Spoofing

Main Idea

- If I can spoof the ORIGIN
- Load a phishing page and steal credentials.
 - But passive credential stealing won't work



Proof of Concept

Login Form

File Edit View Window Help

Console

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object render器.js:255
DOMException: The operation either timed out or was not allowed. See: https://www.w3.org/TR/webauthn-2/#sctn-privacy-considerations-client. render器.js:268
```

webauthn.io

WebAuthn.io

A demo of the WebAuthn specification

example_username


Register Authenticate

Advanced Settings

A woman with dark skin and curly hair is shown in profile, running from left to right. She is wearing a black blazer over a green top and blue jeans. A large purple smartphone is positioned in front of her, showing a white checkmark icon inside a circle. To the right of the phone, there is a pink circular icon containing a calendar with the number '31'. In the bottom right corner, there is a purple circular icon containing a bar chart.


Vulnerability

App or Website?



- Webauthn - Origin
- CTAP - Relying Party ID of Application
- Which one to use on electron?

Electron app



```
protocol.handle('https', (req) => {
  const { host, pathname } = new URL(req.url);
  if (host === 'webauthn.io' && (pathname === '/' || pathname === '/renderer.js')) {
    const url = new URL('.' + (pathname === '/' ? '/index.html' : pathname), pathToFileURL(__filename));
    return net.fetch("https://google.com");
  }
  return net.fetch(req, { bypassCustomProtocolHandlers: true });
});
```

Malicious URL

old library perhaps.
ANY URL endpoint on the Internet

Google

About Store Gmail Images Sign in

Google

Search bar with microphone and camera icons.

Google Search I'm Feeling Lucky

Our third decade of climate action: join us

Advertising Business How Search works Privacy Terms Settings

Elements Console Sources > Default levels ▾ 21

Refused to apply style from 'https://webauthn.io/xjs/_ss/xjs.hd.k6MEuMt-yQ0.L.W.0/am=QAEAAAAAAMAAAAAA...Yew0q0/m=cdo_d,csi,cEt90b,SNUn3,qddgKe,sTsDMc,dtl0hd,eHDfl' because its ('text/html') is not a supported stylesheet MIME type, and checking is enabled.

GET https://webauthn.io/xjs/_js/k=xjs.hd.en.eUptFWZy0Wk.0AAAAAAAAAAAAAAA...Qtpxbd/m=cdos,hsm,jsa,mb4ZUb,d,csi,cEt90b,qddgKe,sTsDMc,dtl0hd,eHDfl net::ERR_ABORTED 404 (Not Found)

Refused to execute script from 'https://webauthn.io/xjs/_hd.en.eUptFWZy0Wk.0/am=AAAAAAAAAAAAAAA...Qtpxbd/m=cdos,hsmi,cEt90b,SNUn3,qddgKe,sTsDMc,dtl0hd,eHDfl' because its MIME ('text/html') is not executable, and strict MIME type checking is enabled.

GET https://webauthn.io/images/branding/googlelogo/2x/g_w_ooglelogo_color_272x92dp.png 404 (Not Found)

GET https://webauthn.io/images/searchbox/desktop_searchbox_es318_hr.webp 404 (Not Found)

▶ POST https://webauthn.io/gen_204?s=webhp&t=aft&atyp=csi&NztWOtzh0PEPtYmXi...rt.1256&wh=572&imn=11&ima=0&imad=0&imac=0&aft=1&aftp=-1&opi=89978449 404 (Not Found)

VM4

A Electron Security Warning (Insecure Content-Security-Policy) process has either no Content Security Policy set or a policy with "unsafe-eval" enabled. This exposes this app to unnecessary security risks.

For more information and help, consult <https://electronjs.org/docs/tutorial/security>. This warning will not show up once the app is packaged.

> window.location.href
< 'https://webauthn.io/'

Failed to load resource: the <https://www.google.com/widget...=1&spি> server responded with a status of 403 (Forbidden)

Future Work

- Looking at Webauthn in electron apps
- Github:
 - Doesn't do webauthn in app
 - Custom schemes:
 - GOAL: Hijack callback url w/ custom schema

```
<key>CFBundleURLTypes</key>
<array>
<dict>
<key>CFBundleURLName</key>
<string>com.github.GitHubClient</string>
<key>CFBundleURLSchemes</key>
<array>
<string>x-github-desktop-auth</string>
<string>x-github-client</string>
<string>github-mac</string>
</array>
</dict>
</array>
```

Future Work

- Lots of possibilities beyond webauthn
- Possible exploits:
 - Phishing Attack
 - Malware distribution
 - Session hijack

JUDGEMENT & QnA

- What do you guys think ?

