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DEFENSE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY AGENCY

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Cyber Shared Indicator Bulletin (SIB)

(U) Passwordstate Compromised in Supply Chain Attack

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(U) SUMMARY

(U) On April 24, 2021, Danish Cybersecurity Firm, CSIS Security Group, reported that widely used password-management software, Passwordstate, was compromised by malicious cyber actors during an in-place update from 20-22 April. Any Passwordstate customers that performed an in-place upgrade during this time are believed to be affected and any passwords stored in Passwordstate were likely harvested.

(U) TECHNICAL DETAILS

(U) Between the April 20, 2021, 8:33 p.m. coordinated universal time (UTC) and April 22, 2021, 00:30 a.m. UTC, the update mechanism of Passwordstate was used to drop a malicious update via a zip file "Passwordstate_upgrade.zip" containing a rogue dynamic link library (dll) "moserware.secretsplitter.dll." The rogue dll was injected/modified with a malicious code snippet. The command and control of the rogue dll was using a Content Delivery Network (CDN) that was terminated on April 22, 2021, 7:00 a.m. UTC. While the command and control (C2) servers for this attack are currently offline, harvested information and credentials could be used at a later date if the C2 servers come back online.

(U) Indicators of Compromise:

- (U) *Malicious dll:*
f23f9c2aaf94147b2c5d4b39b56514cd67102d3293bdef85101e2c05ee1c3bf9
Moserware.SecretSplitter.dll
- (U) *User-Agent:*
Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko)
Chrome/89.0.4389.128 Safari/537.36
- (U) *C2:*
[https://passwordstate-18ed2.kxcdn\[.\]com/upgrade_service_upgrade.zip](https://passwordstate-18ed2.kxcdn[.]com/upgrade_service_upgrade.zip)

(U) DCSA recommends all Passwordstate users check the file size of moserware.secretsplitter.dll located in their c:\inetpub\passwordstate\bin\ directory. If the file size is 65kb, then compromise is likely. All Passwordstate users should immediately reset all passwords stored in Passwordstate, including Virtual Private Networks, firewalls, switches, local accounts, and servers. Additionally, all users should follow any

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additional Passwordstate guidelines for remediation. All known or suspected compromises should be immediately reported to DCSA.

(U) ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

(U) Companies should follow established internal procedures if they suspect any malicious activity and promptly report the incident in accordance with existing policies, regulations, and agreements. The DCSA cyber threat products are not intended to serve as definitive block lists. DCSA does not provide recommendations or advice regarding protections of information systems processing unclassified information. Product recipients must decide how to use the information contained in this document. Each company must weigh possible risks against operational requirements when determining any block list implementation.

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(U) REFERENCES

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(U) CSIS. "Supply chain attack on the password manager Clickstudios – PASSWORDSTATE." 23 April 2021. <https://www.csis.dk/newsroom-blog-overview/2021/moserpass-supply-chain/>

(U) ZDNet. "Enterprises need to change passwords following ClickStudios, Passwordstate attack." 24 April 2021. <https://www.zdnet.com/article/enterprises-need-to-change-passwords-following-clickstudios-passwordstate-attack/>

(U) DarkReading. "Password Manager Suffers 'Supply Chain' Attack." 23 April 2021. <https://beta.darkreading.com/attacks-breaches/password-manager-suffers-supply-chain-attack>