

1 A general approach and tool to evaluate the effectiveness of no-take marine reserves

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Abstract

Marine reserves are often implemented to preserve habitat and recover overfished stocks.

To date, the evaluation of the reserves relies solely on biological data, ignoring socioeconomic and governance dimensions. In absence of a standardized methodology, existing data is analyzed in different ways, hindering the ability to compare results across communities. We developed a framework to evaluate the effectiveness of the reserves by matching 7 commonly stated management objectives to a set of 9 biophysical, 5 socioeconomic, and 14 governance indicators. This framework includes a standardized survey to collect governance and socioeconomic data. Biophysical indicators are evaluated with a Difference-in-Difference analysis, estimating the net effect of the reserve through time. Linear regression models are fitted to socioeconomic indicators through time, testing for the difference in trends before and after the implementation of the reserve. Governance indicators are analyzed based on literature, identifying common governance structures and their associated effectiveness. To make the framework accessible to fishers and decision makers, and allow replication of results, we developed an open source application. The results produced by the application contain a report for a general audience, and a technical report that can inform the renewal and decision-making process.

Introduction

Overfishing and unsustainable fishing practices are some of the major threats to the conservation of marine ecosystems around the world [1,2]. Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) are frequently proposed as fishery management and conservation tools to help fish stocks rebound [3,4] by limiting or restricting fishing effort and gears. No-take marine reserves (marine reserves hereinafter) are a particular type of MPAs, where all fishing effort and extractive activities are off-limits or highly limited. The International Union for the Conservation of

Nature [6] categorizes them as Ia (Strict Natural Reserves) or Ib (Wilderness Area). However, see [7] for a detailed regulation-based classification system.

MPAs have proven to increase biomass [4,8], enhance resilience of the bounded region [9], and preserve genetic diversity [10]. Compared to partially protected MPAs, marine reserves are known to have even higher levels of biomass, density, richness, and larger organisms [3]. Often, these effects are measured as biological changes in the area through time and often lack a control site against which to compare [11]. This before-after comparison leaves aside other factors for which one must control [12], impeding us to talk about causation with complete certainty. While some studies have used control sites, their analyses do not estimate the net effect of the reserve, and often use a control-impact comparison approach [4,8,13,14]. A smaller fraction of studies use measurements of some biological attribute of a reserve and control sites before and after the implementation of the reserves, thus having a before-after-control-impact design [4,15,16], allowing them to use causal inference techniques to estimate the net effect of the reserve.

The diversity of approaches used to evaluate the effect of protected areas highlights the need to standardize approaches that enable us to truly evaluate the effect of protection. Though biophysical aspects are important to reserve success, the effectiveness of reserves also depends on the socioeconomic status and governance system of the local fishing community [17,18], dimensions largely ignored until recently. Currently, the only the IUCN framework [19,20] provides a comprehensive list of biophysical, socioeconomic, and governance indicators, and insight into how these indicators may be measured. However, it does not expand on how to analyze them, nor provide a user-friendly tool that enable replicability and scalability of the analysis.

Open science and the development of tools have become increasingly popular to make science scalable and reproducible [21]. The Ocean Health Index [22,23], for example, has successfully standardized a way to measure the health and benefits of the oceans. This has been successfully

66 implemented at global scales, but also at country-level [24], and regional scales [25,26]. Open
67 access tools are not limited to conservation, and have also been developed to evaluate fishery
68 performance indicators [27], design territorial use rights for fisheries [28], or to improve
69 decision making in the hydropower industry [29], among others.

70 The lack of a comprehensive framework -or the complexity of existing ones, which alienate
71 non-experts- and user-friendly tools to evaluate the effectiveness of marine reserves calls for
72 the development of a new framework and tool. Here, we present a framework to evaluate
73 no-take marine reserves, which incorporates the biological, socioeconomic, and governance
74 dimensions of these conservation areas. We provide a list of commonly stated management
75 objectives, and match them to appropriate indicators that measure the effectiveness of
76 the management intervention. We include a simple approach to analyze these indicators,
77 building on causal inference techniques [15], largely needed to truly understand the effect
78 of management interventions [30]. At the same time, we introduce the Marine Reserve
79 Evaluation App (MAREA), an open source web-based tool that automates the framework
80 described in this paper. Case studies from three regions of Mexico are presented as proof of
81 concept of the app.

Materials and methods

Here, we describe the proposed framework to evaluate the effectiveness of marine reserves (Fig. 1). We explain how management objectives were identified and matched to appropriate indicators that allow the evaluation of the reserves, and provide guidelines on data collection and formating. Alongside, methodologies to analyze these indicators are presented. Then, we describe the development of MAREA and provide guidance on how to use this user-friendly open access tool. Finally, we provide guidelines on how to interpret the results and output generated by MAREA.




Figure 1: Workflow to evaluate the effectiveness of no-take marine reserves.

Reserve objectives and indicators

Throughout this work, we will refer to the stated goals for which a reserve has been established as objectives. Given that this work was motivated by the need to provide a framework to evaluate mexican marine reserves, we focused on identifying objectives of Mexican marine reserves. However, we group these objectives into seven major categories, which can be applied to other conservation areas in the world. The list of objectives was gathered through a literature review from the reserves' stated objectives in official documents such as the Technical Justification Studies (*Estudios Tecnicos Justificativos*), agreements, decrees, and specific legislation [31]. Even though each reserve -or set of reserves- has its own goals, seven main categories of objectives were identified:

1. Avoid overexploitation
2. Conserve species under a special protection regime
3. Maintain biological process (reproduction, recruitment, growth, feeding)
4. Improve fishery production in nearby waters
5. Preserve biological diversity and the ecosystem
6. Recover overexploited species
7. Recover species of economic interest

Based on these seven objectives, we determined a set of indicators to evaluate the effectiveness. The list of indicators was built through a review of scientific literature, where we identified indicators that were used to measure similar objectives. A first filter eliminated indicators for which baseline data does not exist, or for which data aquisition was expensive or outside of the general scope. The initial list of indicators was reviewed at a workshop with participation of members from Mexican fishery management agencies and non-government organizations. Later, these were also presented to fishers from the Ensenada Fishing Cooperative (*S.C.P.P. Ensenada*), which provided input. Our final list of indicators includes, at least, those identified in review works such as [4] or [32].

Indicators are divided into three main types: biophysical, socioeconomic, and governance. Biophysical indicators ($n = 7$) focus on fish and invertebrate communities that are evaluated using underwater ecological surveys performed inside and outside the reserve (see Data section for specific sampling design and methodologies). Socioeconomic indicators ($n = 3$) reflect the performance of the fishery in terms of catches, income from catches and availability of alternative livelihoods. Governance indicators ($n = 15$) describe the governance structures under which the community operates. These indicators may be numeric (*e.g.* Fish biomass) or descriptive (*e.g.* Reasoning for reserve location). Our list includes indicators that respond to the implementation of the reserve (*i.e.* outcome variables) or that might further the understanding of its performance. In that sense, most biophysical and socioeconomic indicators are outcome variables, while governance indicators might explain poor reserve performance, for example. Whenever an indicator is said to also be applied to “Objective Species”, it means that the indicator will be used for all species (*e.g.* Fish Biomass) and individual species that are either the conservation target of the reserve, or are of particular economic or ecological interest (*e.g.* Grouper Biomass). **Table 1** presents the proposed indicators. **Table 2** shows how objectives are matched with indicators.

Table 1: List of indicators to evaluate the effectiveness of no-take marine reserves, grouped by type. Type of data and units are provided.

Code	Indicator	Data type	Unit
Biophysical			
B1	Shannon diversity index	Continuous	
B2	Species richness	Discrete	Number of species / transect
B3	Density of mature organisms	Continuous	Percent points
B4	Density*	Continuous	Organisms/transect
B5	Natural Disturbance	Descriptive	
B6	Mean Trophic Level	Continuous	
B7	Biomass*	Continuous	kg/transect
Socioeconomic			
S1	Total landings*	Continuous	kg
S2	Income from total landings*	Continuous	\$
S3	Alternative economic opportunities	Ordinal	
Governance			
G1	Access to the fishery	Categorical	
G2	Number of fishers	Discrete	
G3	Legal recognition of reserve	Binary	
G4	Reserve type	Descriptive	
G5	Illegal harvesting	Ordinal	
G6	Management plan	Binary	
G7	Reserve enforcement	Descriptive	
G8	Size of reserve	Discrete	
G9	Reasoning for reserve location	Descriptive	
G10	Membership to fisher organizations	Binary	
G11	Type of fisheries organizations	Categorical	
G12	Representation	Ordinal	
G13	Internal Regulation	Binary	
G14	Perceived Effectiveness	Categorical	
G15	Social Impact of Reserve	Categorical	

* The indicator is applied to objective species

Table 2: This table indicates which indicators must be used for each objective.

[illegible]

Data and analyses

Biophysical data is collected via underwater ecological surveys as part of a reserve's monitoring program, often carried out by local fishers with guidance of non-government organizations, such as Comunidad y Biodiversidad or Niparajá. Local fishers, trained in scientific diving, perform SCUBA dives to record fish and invertebrate richness and abundances, as well as fish total length. This information is recorded along 30 m transects, with a sampling window of 2 m X 2 m. Between 10 and 24 transects are performed in each site at depths between 1 and 30 m. Ecological surveys are performed yearly in each reserve and its corresponding control site(s), before and after the implementation of the reserve. Control sites are areas where habitat is similar to that of the reserve, but with presence of fishing activity.

Having control sites for biophysical data allows us to use counterfactual approaches to evaluate the net effect of the reserve. The hypothesis that the indicators will respond to the implementation of the reserve is tested by analysing spatial and temporal changes in each numeric biophysical indicator (all but B5) using generalized linear models [15]. To account for variations in the environment and survey conditions, covariates that describe the environment and gathered during the underwater ecological surveys are included into a model with form:

$$I_{i,t,z} = \beta_0 + \sum_{t=2}^T \gamma_{i,t} Y_t + \beta_1 Z_{i,z} + \beta_2 P_{i,t,z} \times Z_{i,t,z} + \beta_3 T_{i,t,z} + \beta_4 V_{i,t,z} + \beta_5 D_{i,t,z} + \epsilon_{i,t,z} \quad (1)$$

In this model, i , t , and z are subindices for transect, time, and zone (control or reserve site), respectively. This model allows us to estimate the change in an indicator (I) based on the year (Y), treatment (Z), an interaction between a variable that indicates pre- or post-implementation (P) and treatment (Z), and covariates such as bottom temperature (T), visibility during the survey (V), and depth at which survey was performed (D). Here, years are modeled as factors, using the first year as the reference level. The treatment and

154 post variables are modeled by dummy variables coded as Control = 0 and Reserve = 1; and
 155 Pre-implementation = 0 and Post-implementation = 1, respectively.

156 Socioeconomic data is collected by the fishers or fishery management agencies, which record
 157 landings, income, and sometimes prices for each species. In order to control for inflation and
 158 changes in buying power, income is adjusted with the countries consumer price index:

$$I_t = RI \times \frac{CPI_t}{CPI_T} \quad (2)$$

159 Where I_t represents the adjusted income for year t as the product between the reported
 160 income for year t and the ratio between the consumer price index (CPI) in that year to the
 161 present year's (T) CPI. Since no control sites are available, numeric socioeconomic indicators
 162 (G1 and G2) are evaluated with a simplified version of *eq. 1*:

$$I_t = \beta_0 + \beta_1 P_t + \epsilon_t \quad (3)$$

163 While this model does not allow assertion of a causal relation, we can still measure changes
 164 in mean landings and income before and after the implementation of the reserve and provide
 165 valuable input.

166 Governance data, however, is not readily available nor systematically gathered by the
 167 community or any other organizations. In this case, we created a survey specifically designed
 168 to collect information needed for the proposed indicators (B5, S3, and G1-G15). The survey
 169 is included as supplementary material (**Appendix 1**). To analyze governance information,
 170 we performed a literature review of common governance structures and their relation to
 171 effectiveness in managing fisheries or marine reserves. This approach has proven to
 172 successfully allow the evaluation of governance structures [33]. Governance information is not
 173 analyzed in a quantitative way, but is presented along with the biophysical and socioeconomic

indicators to provide managers and users with a full description of the reserve.

Marine Reserve Evaluation App (MAREA)

MAREA was developed in R Studio [34] using the shiny framework [35]. This provides the tools to build interactive web applications, hosted on an open server. MAREA can be accessed at turfeffect.shinyapps.io/marea. While the original version was developed in spanish (aimed mainly at Latinamerican countries), all its content can be translated by a translation tool available within the environment.

MAREA is designed into a 6-step process. The first part provides an introduction to the app, and provides the user with an overview of the process. Then, the user must select management objectives, and MAREA will automatically select appropriate indicators, based on **Table 2**. Then, the user can load the data, using standard *.csv formatting; sample datasets are provided in the environment. Once data have been loaded, MAREA identifies all reserves in the data, and lets the user select the reserve to be evaluated. At this point, the user can also specify the year of implementation of the reserve, as well as select objective species that are of particular management interest. Before presenting the results MAREA provides the user with a section to confirm that all the decisions taken before are correct. Finally, the user is taken to the results, which are represented in two ways.

The first result is a color-coded scorecard, intended to provide a general overview of the effectiveness of the reserve to a general public. The scorecard provides a global score for the reserve, a general score for each category of indicators, and an individual score for each selected indicator. The global and category scores are determined by the percentage of positive indicators, overall and for each category. For numeric biophysical indicators (all but B5), the color is defined by the sign of the interaction term coefficient (β_2) in *eq. 1*. For socioeconomic indicators, colors are assigned based on the direction of the slope (β_1). Red, yellow or green are used for $\beta_i < 0$, $\beta_i = 0$, and $\beta_i > 0$ respectively. The intensity of the

color is defined by the significance of coefficient, testing the null hypothesis of no change (*i.e.* $H_0 : \beta_i = 0$) with Student t-test. Cutoff values are $p < 0.05$ and $p < 0.1$. Thus, even in a case where $\beta_i > 0$ if the coefficient is not significant (*i.e.* $p > 0.1$) the indicator will be assigned a yellow color. A legend (**Fig. 2**) is provided in the app to aid in the interpretation of these results. Governance indicators, however, are evaluated binomially and can be either red or green. The color is defined based on what literature shows to be a positive (green) or negative (red) value for each indicator. However, due to the nature of some governance indicators, which require the user to provide a narrative, only indicators XXX are presented in the scorecard.



Figure 2: Legend used to interpret the scorecard produced by MAREA. Colors indicate direction of change, and color intensity is given by the statistical significance.

The second output from MAREA is a technical report, intended to communicate information and statistical results in a rigorous way. This report also includes a scorecard as a summary of the results, but provides more information for each indicator. For all numeric indicators, the technical report includes graphs of the value of the indicator, for the reserve and control sites through time. It also provides a regression table [36] that summarizes the value of all coefficients in the regression and their respective standard errors. The summary table also provides information on model fit (R^2) and significance of the regression.

The scorecard is produced with functions from the Shinydashboard package [37]. The technical report is produced by a parameterized Rmarkdown document [38] processed by the knitr package [39]. Another feature of MAREA is that the user can choose to share the data. Once the technical report is downloaded, information on the reserve, its management objectives, and all uploaded data is saved into a central repository. These data can be accessed at any

time by any person interested in acquiring them.

Case study

We apply the proposed framework and tool to evaluate the effectiveness of one no-take marine reserves from Isla Natividad, in Baja California Sur, Mexico. Isla Natividad is located 8 Km off the Pacific Coast of the Baja Peninsula (**Fig. 3**). Fishers in Isla Natividad operate under a fishing cooperative (S.C.P.P. Buzos y Pescadores de la Baja California), which promotes co-management of marine resources [40,41]. Additionally, fishers have Territorial Use Rights for Fisheries (TURFs), that provide them with exclusive rights to exploit the marine resources for which they hold permits.




Figure 3: General location of Isla Natividad (left) and map of the island (right). The marine reserve polygon is indicated in gray, and the approximate location of the control site is shown with no fill.

229 In 2006, the community implemented two marine reserves within their TURF. These reserves
230 have proven to be effective in enhancing resilience to climate variations [9] and preserving
231 genetic diversity of highly valuable commercial species, like abalone [10]. These ecological
232 benefits have been translated into economical benefits, enhancing population persistence and
233 supporting abalone fisheries [42]. For the purpose of this evaluation, we will focus on the “La
234 Plana / Las Cuevas” Marine reserve, located in the southern end of the Island (**Fig. 3**) and
235 its corresponding control site “La Dulce / Babencho”.

236 The reserve was implemented to recover species of economic interest -which have been
237 overexploited in the last years- in order to enhance fishery production in nearby waters. Fishers
238 were also interested in preserving biological diversity and the ecosystem. Thus, objectives
239 objectives 4-7 were selected. Using **Table 2** to match these objectives with appropriate
240 management indicators, we selected all biophysical, socioeconomic, and governance indicators.

241 Biophysical data was gathered by fishers from the community. The reserves have been
242 monitored following a standardized ReefCheck protocol [43] to collect data on fish and
243 invertebrate communities inside and outside the reserves between 2016 and 2017. A total of
244 242 and 245 transects were performed in the reserve site for fish and invertebrate surveys,
245 respectively. Similar sampling effort was applied to the control site, with 221 fish and 222
246 invertebrate transects. Between 12 and 27 transects were performed in each site every year.

247 Socioeconomic data was obtained from the National Commission for Fisheries and Aquaculture
248 (Comisión Nacional de Pesca y Acuicultura; CONAPESCA). The data contains species-level
249 (9 spp) information on monthly landings and income from 2000 to 2014. Data on landings
250 and income was aggregated by year, and the yearly Consumer Price Index was included.
251 From the 9 species available, we selected as objective species those that contribute the
252 most (88.27%) to historical income: lobster (*Panulirus interruptus*; 71.76%), red sea urchin
253 (*Strongylocentrotus franciscanus*; 9.33%), snail (*Megastrea undosa*; 3.93%), and sea cucumber
254 (*Parastichopus parvimensis*; 3.23%). Abalone species (*Haliotis fulgens*; 4.52 and *Haliotis*

corrugata; 6.16) were excluded because the cooperative decided to implement an informal closure on the species to allow its populations to recover. Eliminating all fishing pressure on these species means that control sites receive (for this species) the same treatment.

For governance data, we constructed the database based on our knowledge of the area, as well as prototype interviews performed to leaders of the fishing cooperative.

Results and Discussion

The results shown here intend to highlight the relevance and utility of the framework and tool, which automate the analysis and make it replicable. First, we present the scorecard generated by MAREA to provide an overview of the state of the reserve. Then, we provide (modified for style) a set of figures generated by MAREA, showing time-series for biophysical and socioeconomic indicators as well as tables containing the magnitude and significance of the β_2 and β_1 coefficients. A table with the governance indicators is also provided and discussed.

The scorecard (**Fig. 4**) shows that, overall, the reserve has a good performance achieving a general score of 63.6% of positive indicators. All category-level scores were also high, with values of 66.7%, 60%, and 75% positive indicators for Biophysical, Socioeconomic and Governance, respectively.



Figure 4: Scorecard for the “La Plana / Las Cuevas” marine reserve in Isla Natividad, Mexico. This scorecard was produced by MAREA.)

Within the biophysical indicators, the greatest effect of the reserve was observed for snail and cucumber densities, with values of $\beta_3 = 97.17$ ($p < 0.05$) and $\beta_3 = 2.31$ ($p < 0.05$), respectively. Urchin and lobster densities also increased by $\beta_3 = 2.15$ and $\beta_3 = 7.66$ respectively. However, changes in urchin densities were only significant at $p < 0.1$, and not significant for lobster ($p > 0.1$). Shannon’s diversity index ($\beta_3 = -0.67$) and richness $\beta_3 = -2.71$ showed a significant decrease ($p < 0.05$). Fish indicators showed no significant change ($p > 0.1$), with negative trends for Shannon’s diversity index and fish species richness and positive trends for density, biomass, and mean trophic level. Changes through time for these indicators are presented in **Figure 5**, and a summary of β_3 coefficients is provided in **Table 3**.

In the case of socioeconomic indicators, total landings were on average 64.20 tones higher

282 ($p > 0.1$) after the implementation of the reserves. Total income was \$10,344.85 ($p < 0.05$)
283 thousands of Mexican Pesos (MXP) higher after the implementation of the reserves. On
284 avergae, lobster and cucumber landings and increased, while urchin and snail landings and
285 income decreased. **Figure 6** presents the changes in this indicators through time, and **Table**
286 **4** summarizes this information.

287 All invertebrates show increased densities within the reserve, as compared to the control site,
288 providing evidence that the reserve is effectively protecting these species. While we are not
289 able to infer causality from the socioeconomic analysis, we are able to identify important
290 trends. For example, snail and urchin density hve significantly increased within the reserve,
291 but their landings and income have decreased. The opposite is observed for lobster and
292 cucumber, which have shown increases in densities, landing, and income. While further
293 information on market behaviour of each species is needed, these results provide insights into
294 the state of the reserve, as well as the associated fisheries.

295 In terms of governance, it is evident that the community is strongly organized, which is a
296 cause of their success. The first point of success is the existance of a fishing cooeprative that
297 is also affiliated to federation. These polycentric governance structures allow different levels
298 of organization that foster communication and cooperation; federations also provide bargain
299 power with governments [33,44]. Fishers also have good management instruments. Access to
300 the fishing resources they exploit is managed through permits and fishing quotas. Along with a
301 stable number of fishers participating in extractive activities, these limit the total fishing effort
302 effort applied. Additionally, their TURF promotes a sense of stewardship of their resources
303 and incentivizes correct resource management [40,44]. Together, these structures enabled
304 a participative, bottom-up process during the reserve design phase; Opinions of all fishing
305 members -and often non-fishers, but community members- were included. Participation of
306 community members in reserve survailance and yearly monitoring indicate commitment and
307 interest, and allow informal communication of results to un-involved community members.

308 While the reserve has not been legally recognized (as of this moment), the community has
309 started the process to have the reserve be recognized as a fishery replenishment zone (*Zona*
310 *de Refugio Pesquer*) under the corresponding Mexican norms [31]. Furthermore, the reserve
311 is partially isolated from poaching activity and fishers have internal regulations pertaining
312 the reserves. The low level of illegal fishing by members of the community and outsiders both
313 inside and outside the reserve represents another indication of effectiveness. A summary of
314 governance indicators is provided in **Table 5**.

Table 3: Summary of average treatment effect of the La Plana / Las Cuevas marine reserve on biophysical indicators. Asterisks indicate significance level, with (*) indicating $*p^* < 0.1$ and (**) $*p^* < 0.05$.

Indicator	Estimate (SD)	t-score
Shannon fish	-0.22 (0.16)	-1.40
Richness fish	-0.61 (0.43)	-1.41
Density fish	0.74 (6.15)	0.12
Trophic fish	0.00 (0.01)	0.14
Biomass fish	0.22 (1.47)	0.15
Shannon invert	-0.67 (0.22)**	-3.05
Richness invert	-2.71 (0.81)**	-3.35
Density invert	91.21 (47.11)*	1.94
Lobster	7.66 (8.93)	0.86
Urchin	2.15 (1.23)*	1.74
Snail	97.17 (42.90)**	2.27
Cucumber	2.31 (1.17)**	1.98

Table 4: Summary of average treatment effect of the La Plana / Las Cuevas marine reserve on socioeconomic indicators. Asterisks indicate significance level, with (*) indicating $*p^* < 0.1$ and (**) $*p^* < 0.05$.

Indicator	Estimate (SD)	t-score
Landings	64.20 (90.07)	0.71
Income	10344.85 (3982.20)**	2.60
Lobster landings	7.37 (13.95)	0.53
Urchin landings	-30.00 (9.49)**	-3.16
Snail landings	-69.53 (33.82)*	-2.06
Cucumber landings	9.34 (6.72)	1.39
Lobster income	14372.85 (3634.64)**	3.95
Urchin income	-5800.46 (1867.50)**	-3.11
Snail income	-404.85 (187.07)**	-2.16
Cucumber income	131.49 (185.66)	0.71




Figure 5: Plots for values of each biophysical indicator (y-axis) through time (x-axis). Red and blue correspond to the reserve and control sites, respectively. Black lines indicate yearly mean values, and ribbons indicate ± 1 standard error. Dots are horizontally jittered to aid visualization.




Figure 6: Plots for values of each socioeconomic indicator (y-axis) through time (x-axis). Red and blue correspond to before and after the implementation of the reserve, respectively.

Table 5: Summary of governance indicators.

Indicator	Description
Access to the fishery	Permits, Territorial Use Rights for Fisheries, Quotas
Number of fishers	Stable
Legal recognition of reserve	Not recognized, but the community has started the process to declare it as a Fishery Replenishment Zone (Zona de Refugio Pesquero) under the @nom049sagpesc_2014-V6
Reserve type	
Illegal harvesting	Due to its relative isolations, neither the reserve or TURF suffer from significant illegal harvesting
Management plan	The reserve does not have a management plan, but written rules exist within the cooperative
Reserve enforcement	Fishers have two land stations equiped with radars and patrol boats 24/7 to patrol the reserves.
Size of reserve	The reserve is big enough to protect the targeted sesile or not highly mobile invertebrates (lobster, urchin, snail, cucumber, and abalone)
Reasoning for reserve location	The reserves were put in place in zones that, according to local knowledge, were once very productive. Habitat heterogeneity and ease of monitoring, surveillance and enforcement were also considered.
Membership to fisher organizations	The fishers are part of fisher roganizations.
Type of fisheries organizations	The fishers are part of a cooperative (S.C.P.P. Buzos y Pescadores de la Baja California) and are afiliated to a federation (FEDECOOP).
Representation	Reserves were designed by fishers in a bottom-up approach, incorporating expertise from academics and NGO members. This was a highly inclusive and participatory process.
Internal Regulation	Fishers have stringent internal regulations to control fishing effort throughouth their TURF, assigning different fishing zones and gears to different teams. Rules pertaining the marine reseves also exist.
Perceived Effectiveness	The fishers have a positive perception about the effectiveness of their reserve, often stating that they have seen significant economic benefits.
Social Impact of Reserve	The reserves have had a significant positive social impact. Fishers are proud to be an world-class case of success in marine conservation, allowing them to have increased social capital.

Conclusions

One of the greatest challenges in management measuring the extent to which objectives have been met. The present framework provides a simple and straightforward way to align management objectives with performance indicators. We acknowledge that these 25 indicators might not fully describe a particular reserve. However, we believe that these provide a starting point to perform the evaluation, and urge decision-makers, managers, and users to include other indicators (*e.g.* larval dispersal or connectivity) that are relevant to their reserve.

The proposed methodologies, specially the way in which biophysical indicators are evaluated, provide valuable information for managers. The analysis isolates the net effect of the reserve, providing a proper measure of reserve effectiveness. We agree there is room for improvement in the way in which socioeconomic and governance data are analyzed. However, we believe that providing a unifying platform where all can be analyzed and comprehensively presented represents a valuable step towards effective management.

The main value of MAREA is that it provides a free, simple, and replicable way to perform rigorous analysis. The tool can easily be used by fishers, NGO members, and managers in government agencies, providing transparency of the analysis and results. The way in which results are presented allow this information to be interpreted by a wider audience. The scorecard is easily understandable by experts and non-experts, and can be used as an effective tool for communicating the results of yearly evaluations. On the other side, the technical report can serve as a tool for managers and scientists to rapidly communicate information at a more technical level.

While the first release of MAREA is now available, it will continue to be developed and maintained. This will incorporate new features, and enhance current ones, aiming to improve user experience and expand the scope of the analysis. Yet, we believe that this first release represents a major step towards effective management of marine reserves.

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