

1 A general approach and tool to evaluate the effectiveness of no-take marine reserves

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## Abstract

Marine reserves are often implemented to preserve habitat, recover overfished stocks, and secure livelihoods of coastal communities. As with any other management interventions, we need to better understand their effectiveness and impacts on coastal communities and the environment. To date, the evaluation of the reserves largely relies on analysing ecological data, ignoring socioeconomic and governance dimensions. In absence of a standardized methodology, existing data is analyzed in different ways, hindering the ability to compare results across case studies. We present a framework and tool to evaluate the effectiveness of marine reserves by matching 7 commonly stated management objectives to a set of 9 biophysical, 5 socioeconomic, and 14 governance indicators. We provide guidelines on how to properly collect data that can then be analysed with standardized methods. Biophysical indicators are evaluated with causal inference techniques, using a counterfactual approach, to measure the net effect of the reserve on each indicator. Linear regression models are fitted to socioeconomic indicators through time, testing for the differences before and after the implementation of the reserve. Governance indicators are quantitatively analyzed based on literature, identifying common governance structures and their associated effectiveness. To make the framework accessible to fishers and decision makers, and allow replication of results, we developed an open source, web-based Marine Reserve Evaluation App (MAREA). Together, this framework and MAREA represent a major step in marine reserve evaluation that can further our understanding and simplify our management of marine reserves.

## Introduction

Overfishing and unsustainable fishing practices are some of the major threats to the conservation of marine ecosystems around the world (Pauly, Watson, and Alder 2005; B. S. Halpern et al. 2008). Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) are frequently proposed as fishery management

and conservation tools to help fish stocks rebound (S. Lester and Halpern 2008; S. Lester et al. 2009; Sala et al. (2016)) by limiting or restricting fishing effort and gears. No-take marine reserves (marine reserves hereinafter) are a particular type of MPAs, where all fishing effort and extractive activities are off-limits or highly regulated. The International Union for the Conservation of Nature (2017) categorizes them as Ia (Strict Natural Reserves) or Ib (Wilderness Areas). However, see (Horta e Costa et al. 2016) for a detailed regulation-based classification system.

MPAs have proven to increase biomass (Aburto-Oropeza et al. 2011; S. Lester et al. 2009), enhance resilience of the bounded region (Micheli et al. 2012), and preserve genetic diversity (Munguía-Vega et al. 2015). Compared to partially protected MPAs, marine reserves are known to have even higher levels of biomass, density, richness, and larger organisms (S. Lester and Halpern 2008). Often, these effects are measured as biological changes in the area through time and lack a control site against which to compare (Betti et al. 2017). This before-after comparison ignores other factors for which one must control (Davies, Mees, and Milner-Gulland 2017), impeding us to talk about causation with complete certainty. While some studies have used control sites, their analyses do not estimate the net effect of the reserve, and often use a control-impact comparison approach (Guidetti et al. 2014; Friedlander et al. 2017; S. Lester et al. 2009; Aburto-Oropeza et al. 2011; A. G. Rodriguez and Fanning 2017). A smaller fraction of studies use measurements of some biological attribute of a reserve and control sites before and after the implementation of the reserves, thus having a before-after-control-impact design (Moland et al. 2013; Soykan and Lewison 2015; S. Lester et al. 2009), allowing them to use causal inference techniques that estimate the net effect of the reserve.

As with any other policy intervention, it is important that we can measure its effect in order to adapt and learn. The diversity of approaches currently used to evaluate the effect of marine reserve often does not answer the simplest question: What is the net effect of

the marine reserve? This highlights the need to develop standardized approaches that enable us to truly evaluate the effect of the intervention. Furthermore, while biophysical aspects are important to reserve success, the effectiveness of reserves also depends on the socioeconomic status and governance system of the local fishing community (Basurto, Gelcich, and Ostrom 2013; Basurto and Nenadovic 2012), dimensions often ignored. By excluding these important dimensions, the evaluation provides just a partial picture of the state of the reserve. Currently, only the IUCN framework “How to evaluate your MPA” (R. S. Pomeroy et al. 2005; R. S. Pomeroy, Parks, and Watson 2004) provides a comprehensive list of biophysical, socioeconomic, and governance indicators, and insight into how these indicators may be measured, but does not provide guidelines on how to analyse them. A more recent work by Mascia et al. (2017) integrates these three dimensions and uses causal inference techniques to provide a measure of the effect of implemented an MPA. However, these two certainly novel approaches do not provide a user-friendly tool that enable replicability and scalability of the analysis.

An increasingly popular way to make science reproducible, scalable and replicable is through Open science and the development of tools (Lowndes et al. 2017). The Ocean Health Index (B. S. Halpern et al. 2012; B. S. Halpern et al. 2017), for example, has successfully standardized a way to measure the health and benefits of the oceans. This has been implemented at global scales, but also at country-level (E. R. Selig et al. 2015), and regional scales (B. S. Halpern et al. 2014; C. T. Elfes et al. 2014). Open access tools are not limited to conservation, and have also been developed to evaluate fishery performance indicators (J. L. Anderson et al. 2015), design territorial use rights for fisheries (TURFs; Oyanedel et al. 2017), or to improve decision making in the hydropower industry (Vilela and Reid 2017), just to list a few.

The lack of a comprehensive framework -or the complexity of existing ones, which alienate non-experts- and user-friendly tools to evaluate the effectiveness of marine reserves calls for the development of a new framework and tool. Here, we present a framework to evaluate

no-take marine reserves, which incorporates the biological, socioeconomic, and governance dimensions of these conservation areas. We provide a list of commonly stated management objectives, and match them to appropriate indicators that measure the effectiveness of the management intervention. We include a simple approach to analyze these indicators, building on causal inference techniques (Moland et al. 2013), largely needed to truly understand the effect of management interventions (Burgess et al. 2016; Mascia et al. 2017). We also introduce the Marine Reserve Evaluation App (MAREA), an open source web-based tool that automates the framework described in this paper. To demonstrate the potential of MAREA, we perform an evaluation of marine reserve established by fishers from Isla Natividad, Mexico in 2006.

## Materials and methods

Here, we describe the proposed framework to evaluate the effectiveness of marine reserves (Fig. 1). We explain how management objectives were identified and matched to appropriate indicators that allow the evaluation of the reserves, and provide brief guidelines on data collection. Alongside, methodologies to analyze these indicators are presented. Then, we describe the development of MAREA and explain how this user-friendly open access tool can be used by anyone. Finally, we provide guidelines on how to interpret the results and output generated by MAREA.




Figure 1: Workflow to evaluate the effectiveness of no-take marine reserves.

## Reserve objectives and indicators

Throughout this work, we will refer to the stated goals for which a reserve was designed as objectives. Given that this work was motivated by the need to provide a framework to evaluate Mexican marine reserves, or focus was on identifying objectives of marine reserves in Mexico. However, we group these objectives into seven major categories, which can be applied to other conservation areas in the world. The list of objectives was gathered through a literature review from the reserves' stated objectives in official documents such as the Technical Justification Studies (*Estudios Tecnicos Justificativos*), agreements, decrees, and specific legislation (NOM-049-SAG/PESC 2014) associated to these areas. Even though each reserve has its own goals, seven main categories of objectives were identified:

1. Avoid overexploitation
2. Conserve species under a special protection regime
3. Maintain biological process (reproduction, recruitment, growth, feeding)
4. Improve fishery production in nearby waters
5. Preserve biological diversity and the ecosystem
6. Recover overexploited species
7. Recover species of economic interest

Based on these seven objectives, we determined a set of indicators to evaluate the effectiveness. The list of indicators was built through a review of scientific literature, where we identified indicators that were used to measure similar objectives. A first filter eliminated indicators for which baseline data does not exist, or for which data acquisition was expensive or outside of the general scope. The initial list of indicators was reviewed at a workshop with participation of members from Mexican fishery management agencies and non-government organizations. Later, these were also presented to fishers from the Ensenada Fishing Cooperative (*S.C.P.P. Ensenada*), which provided input. Our final list of indicators includes, at least, those identified in review works such as S. Lester et al. (2009) or Woodcock et al. (2017).

Indicators are divided into three main categories: biophysical, socioeconomic, and governance. Biophysical indicators ( $n = 7$ ) focus on fish and invertebrate communities that are evaluated using underwater ecological surveys performed inside and outside the reserve (see Data section for specific sampling design and methodologies). Socioeconomic indicators ( $n = 3$ ) reflect the performance of the fishery in terms of catches, income from catches, and availability of alternative livelihoods. Governance indicators ( $n = 15$ ) describe the governance structures under which the community operates. These indicators may be numeric (*e.g.* Fish biomass) or descriptive (*e.g.* Reasoning for reserve location). Our list includes indicators that respond to the implementation of the reserve (*i.e.* outcome variables) or that might further the understanding of its performance. In that sense, most biophysical and socioeconomic indicators are outcome variables. On the other hand, governance indicators are viewed as explanatory variables that might explain reserve performance. Whenever an indicator is said to also be applied to “Objective species”, it means that the indicator can be used for all species (*e.g.* Fish Biomass) and individual species that are either the conservation target of the reserve or are of particular economic or ecological interest (*e.g.* Grouper Biomass). **Table 1** presents the proposed indicators, and **Table 2** shows how objectives are matched with indicators.



Table 1: List of indicators to evaluate the effectiveness of no-take marine reserves, grouped by type. Type of data and units are provided.

Code	Indicator	Data type	Unit
<b>Biophysical</b>			
B1	Shannon diversity index	Continuous	
B2	Species richness	Discrete	Number of species / transect
B3	Density of mature organisms	Continuous	Percent points
B4	Density*	Continuous	Organisms/transect
B5	Natural Disturbance	Descriptive	
B6	Mean Trophic Level	Continuous	
B7	Biomass*	Continuous	kg/transect
<b>Socioeconomic</b>			
S1	Total landings*	Continuous	kg
S2	Income from total landings*	Continuous	\$
S3	Alternative economic opportunities	Ordinal	
<b>Governance</b>			
G1	Access to the fishery	Categorical	
G2	Number of fishers	Discrete	
G3	Legal recognition of reserve	Binary	
G4	Reserve type	Descriptive	
G5	Illegal harvesting	Ordinal	
G6	Management plan	Binary	
G7	Reserve enforcement	Descriptive	
G8	Size of reserve	Discrete	
G9	Reasoning for reserve location	Descriptive	
G10	Membership to fisher organizations	Binary	
G11	Type of fisheries organizations	Categorical	
G12	Representation	Ordinal	
G13	Internal Regulation	Binary	
G14	Perceived Effectiveness	Categorical	
G15	Social Impact of Reserve	Categorical	

\* The indicator is applied to objective species

Table 2: This table indicates which indicators must be used for each objective.

[illegible]

## Data and analyses

Biophysical data is collected via underwater ecological surveys as part of a reserve’s monitoring program, often carried out by local fishers with guidance of non-government organizations, such as Comunidad y Biodiversidad or Niparajá. Local fishers -trained in scientific diving- perform SCUBA dives to record fish and invertebrate richness and abundances, as well as fish total length. This information is recorded along 30 m transects, with a sampling window of 2 m X 2 m. Between 10 and 24 transects are performed in each site at depths between 1 and 30 m. Ecological surveys are performed yearly in each reserve and its corresponding control site(s), before and after the implementation of the reserve, allowing us to have a before-after-control-impact sampling design. Control sites are areas where habitat is similar to that of the reserve, but with presence of fishing activity.

Having control sites for biophysical data allows us to use counterfactual approaches to evaluate the net effect of the reserve. The hypothesis that the indicators will respond the the implementation of the reserve is tested by analysing spatial and temporal changes in each numeric biophysical indicator (all but B5) using generalized linear models (Moland et al. 2013). To account for variations in the environment and survey conditions, covariates that are gathered during the underwater ecological surveys are included into a model with form:

$$I_{i,t,z} = \beta_0 + \sum_{t=2}^T \gamma_{i,t} Y_t + \beta_1 Z_{i,z} + \beta_2 P_{i,t,z} \times Z_{i,t,z} + \beta_3 T_{i,t,z} + \beta_4 V_{i,t,z} + \beta_5 D_{i,t,z} + \epsilon_{i,t,z} \quad (1)$$

In this model,  $i$ ,  $t$ , and  $z$  are subindices for transect, time, and zone (control or reserve site), respectively. This model allows us to estimate the change in an indicator ( $I$ ) based on the year ( $Y$ ), a dummy variable that indicates treatment ( $Z$ ; *i.e.* control or reserve), an interaction between a dummy variable that indicates pre- or post-implementation ( $P$ ) and treatment ( $Z$ ), and covariates such as bottom temperature ( $T$ ; in °C), horizontal visibility during the

survey ( $V$ ; in m), and depth at which survey was performed ( $D$ ; in m).  $\epsilon$  represents the error term associated to the equation. Here, years are modeled as factors, using the first year as the reference level. By modelling years as factors, we avoid overimposing a linear structure in the way an indicator changes through time (*i.e.* the change in biomass between 2000 and 2001 does not have to be the same as the change between 2006 and 2007). The treatment and post variables, modeled as dummy variables, are coded as Control = 0 and Reserve = 1; and Pre-implementation = 0 and Post-implementation = 1, respectively.

Socioeconomic data is often collected by fishers or fishery management agencies, which record landings, income, and sometimes prices for each species. In order to control for inflation and changes in buying power, income is adjusted with the countries consumer price index:

$$I_t = RI \times \frac{CPI_t}{CPI_T} \quad (2)$$

Where  $I_t$  represents the adjusted income for year  $t$  as the product between the reported income for that year and the ratio between the consumer price index ( $CPI$ ) in that year to the most recent year's ( $T$ )  $CPI$ . Since no control sites are available, numeric socioeconomic indicators (G1 and G2) are evaluated with a simplified version of *eq. 1*:

$$I_t = \beta_0 + \beta_1 P_t + \epsilon_t \quad (3)$$

While this model does not allow assertion of a causal relation, we can still measure changes in mean landings and income before and after the implementation of the reserve and provide valuable input. For both models (**eq. 1** and **eq. 3**), coefficients are estimated via ordinary least squares, and heteroskedastik-robust standard errors are calculated.

Governance data, however, is not readily available nor systematically collected by the community or any other organizations. In this case, we created a survey specifically designed

to collect information needed for the proposed indicators (B5, S3, and G1-G15). The survey is included as supplementary material (**Appendix 1**). To analyze governance information, we performed a literature review of common governance structures and their relation to effectiveness in managing fisheries or marine reserves. This approach has proven to successfully allow the evaluation of governance structures (Espinosa-Romero et al. 2014). Governance information is not analyzed in a quantitative way, but is presented along with the biophysical and socioeconomic indicators to provide managers and users with a full description of the reserve.

## **Marine Reserve Evaluation App (MAREA)**

MAREA was developed in R Studio (R Core Team 2017) using the shiny framework (Chang et al. 2017), which provides the tools to build interactive web applications, hosted on an open server. MAREA can be accessed at [turfeffect.shinyapps.io/marea](http://turfeffect.shinyapps.io/marea). While the original version was developed in Spanish (aimed at Mexico and other Latin American countries), all its content can be translated by a translation widget available within the environment.

MAREA is designed into a 6-step process, divided in tabs. The first tab provides an introduction to the app and an overview of the evaluation process. Then, the user selects management objectives, which MAREA automatically matches to appropriate indicators, based on **Table 2**. The user can then load the data, using standard \*.csv files; sample datasets are provided within MAREA. Once data have been loaded, MAREA identifies all reserves in the data, and lets the user select the reserve to be evaluated. At this point, the user can also specify the year of implementation of the reserve, and indicate objective species that are of particular management interest. Before presenting the results, MAREA provides the user with a section to confirm that all the decisions taken until then are correct. Finally, the user is taken to the results tab, where results can be viewed at a glance or downloaded as a technical report.

The first result is a color-coded scorecard, intended to provide a general overview of the effectiveness of the reserve to a general public. The scorecard provides a global score for the reserve, a general score for each category of indicators, and an individual score for each indicator. The global and category-level scores are determined by the percentage of positive indicators, overall and for each category. For numeric biophysical indicators (all but B5), the color is defined by the sign of the interaction term coefficient ( $\beta_2$ ) in *eq. 1*. For socioeconomic indicators, colors are assigned based on the direction of the slope ( $\beta_1$ ). Red, yellow and green are used for  $\beta_i < 0$ ,  $\beta_i = 0$ , and  $\beta_i > 0$ , respectively. The intensity of the color is defined by the significance of coefficient, testing the null hypothesis of no change (*i.e.*  $H_0 : \beta_i = 0$ ) with a Students t-test. Cutoff values are  $p < 0.05$  and  $p < 0.1$ . Thus, even in a case where  $\beta_i > 0$  if the coefficient is not significant (*i.e.*  $p > 0.1$ ) the indicator will be assigned a yellow color. A legend (**Fig. 2**) is provided within the scorecard to aid in the interpretation of these results. Governance indicators, however, are represented by red or green. The color is defined based on what literature shows to be a positive (green) or negative (red) factor for a reserve. However, due to the nature of some governance indicators, which require the user to provide a narrative, only some indicators are presented in the scorecard (although all are included in the technical report).



Figure 2: Legend used to interpret the scorecard produced by MAREA. Colors indicate direction of change, and color intensity is given by the statistical significance.

The second output from MAREA is a technical report, intended to communicate information and statistical results in a more formal and technical way. This report also includes a scorecard as a summary of the results, but provides more information for each indicator. For all numeric indicators, the report includes a graph of the value of the indicator, for the

reserve and control sites, through time. It also provides a regression table that summarizes the value of all coefficients in the regression and their respective robust standard errors. The summary table also provides information on model fit ( $R^2$ ) and significance of the regression. The scorecard is produced with functions from the Shinydashboard package (Chang and Borges Ribeiro 2017). The technical report is produced by a parameterized Rmarkdown document (Allaire et al. 2017) processed by the knitr package (Xie 2017). Another feature of MAREA is that the user can choose to share the data. Once the technical report is downloaded, information on the reserve, its management objectives, and all uploaded data is saved into a central repository. These data can be accessed at any time by any person interested in acquiring them.

## Case study

We apply the proposed framework and tool to evaluate the effectiveness of one marine reserve from Isla Natividad, in Baja California Sur, Mexico. Isla Natividad is located 8 Km off the Pacific Coast of the Baja Peninsula (**Fig. 3**), where fishers operate under a fishing cooperative (S.C.P.P. Buzos y Pescadores de la Baja California) that promotes co-management of marine resources (B. McCay 2017; B. J. McCay et al. 2014). Additionally, fishers have Territorial Use Rights for Fisheries (TURFs) that provide them with exclusive access rights to exploit the marine resources in a given perimeter.

In 2006, the community implemented two marine reserves within their TURF (making them TURF-reserves; Afflerbach et al. 2014). The reserves from Isla Natividad have proven to be effective in enhancing resilience to climate variations (Micheli et al. 2012) and preserving genetic diversity of highly valuable commercial species, like abalone (Munguía-Vega et al. 2015). These ecological benefits have been translated into economical benefits, enhancing population persistence and supporting abalone fisheries (Rossetto et al. 2015). For the purpose of this evaluation, we will focus on the “La Plana / Las Cuevas” Marine reserve,




Figure 3: General location of Isla Natividad (left) and map of the island (right). The marine reserve polygon is indicated in gray, and the approximate location of the control site is shown with no fill.



located in the southern end of the Island (**Fig. 3**) and its corresponding control site “La Dulce / Babencho”.

The reserve was implemented to recover species of economic interest -which were overexploited- in order to enhance fishery production in nearby waters. Fishers were also interested in preserving biological diversity and the ecosystem. Thus, objectives objectives 4-7 were selected. Using **Table 2** to match these objectives with appropriate management indicators, we selected all biophysical, socioeconomic, and governance indicators.

Biophysical data was gathered by fishers from the community. The reserves have been monitored following a standardized ReefCheck protocol (Suman et al. 2010) to collect data on fish and invertebrate communities inside and outside the reserves between 2016 and 2017. A total of 242 and 245 transects were performed in the reserve site for fish and invertebrate surveys, respectively. Similar sampling effort was applied to the control site, with 221 fish and 222 invertebrate transects. Between 12 and 27 transects were performed in each site every year.

Socioeconomic data was obtained from the National Commission for Fisheries and Aquaculture (Comisión Nacional de Pesca y Acuacultura; CONAPESCA). The data contains species-level (9 spp) information on monthly landings and income from 2000 to 2014. Data on landings and income was aggregated by year, and the yearly Consumer Price Index was included. From the 9 species available, we selected as objective species those that contribute the most (88.27%) to historical income: lobster (*Panulirus interruptus*; 71.76%), red sea urchin (*Strongylocentrotus franciscanus*; 9.33%), snail (*Megastrea undosa*; 3.93%), and sea cucumber (*Parastichopus parvimensis*; 3.23%). Abalone species (*Haliotis fulgens*; 4.52 and *Haliotis corrugata*; 6.16) were excluded because the cooperative decided to implement an informal closure on the species to allow its populations to recover. Eliminating all fishing pressure on these species means that control sites receive (for this species) the same treatment.

For governance data, we constructed the database based on our knowledge of the area, as well

292 as prototype interviews performed to lidere of the fishing cooperative.

## 293 Results and Discussion

294 The results shown here intend to highlight the relevance and utility of the framework and  
295 tool, which automate the analysis and make it replicable. First, we present the scorecard  
296 generated by MAREA to provide an overview of the state of the reserve. Then, we provide  
297 (modified for style) a set of figures generated by MAREA, showing time-series for biophysical  
298 and socioeconomic indicators as well as tables containing the magnitude and significance  
299 of the  $\beta_2$  and  $\beta_1$  coefficients. A table with the governance indicators is also provided and  
300 discussed.

301 The scorecard (**Fig. 4**) shows that, overall, the reserve has a good performance achieving  
302 a general score of 63.6% of positive indicators. All category-level scores were also high,  
303 with values of 66.7%, 60%, and 75% positive indicators for Biophysical, Socioeconomic and  
304 Governance, respectively.



Figure 4: Scorecard for the “La Plana / Las Cuevas” marine reserve in Isla Natividad, Mexico. This scorecard was produced by MAREA.)

Within the biophysical indicators, the greatest effect of the reserve was observed for snail and cucumber densities, with values of  $\beta_3 = 97.17$  ( $p < 0.05$ ) and  $\beta_3 = 2.31$  ( $p < 0.05$ ), respectively. Urchin and lobster densities also increased by  $\beta_3 = 2.15$  and  $\beta_3 = 7.66$  respectively. However, changes in urchin densities were only significant at  $p < 0.1$ , and not significant for lobster ( $p > 0.1$ ). Shannon’s diversity index ( $\beta_3 = -0.67$ ) and richness  $\beta_3 = -2.71$  showed a significant decrease ( $p < 0.05$ ). Fish indicators showed no significant change ( $p > 0.1$ ), with negative trends for Shannon’s diversity index and fish species richness and positive trends for density, biomass, and mean trophic level. Changes through time for these indicators are presented in **Figure 5**, and a summary of  $\beta_3$  coefficients is provided in **Table 3**.

In the case of socioeconomic indicators, total landings were on average 64.20 tones higher

( $p > 0.1$ ) after the implementation of the reserves. Total income was \$10,344.85 ( $p < 0.05$ ) thousands of Mexican Pesos (MXP) higher after the implementation of the reserves. On average, lobster and cucumber landings increased, while urchin and snail landings and income decreased. **Figure 6** presents the changes in these indicators through time, and **Table 4** summarizes this information.

The results identified by our framework and MAREA are consistent to those previously published (*e.g.* Micheli et al. 2012; Rossetto et al. 2015). Invertebrates show increased densities within the reserve, as compared to the control site, providing evidence that the reserve is effectively protecting these species. While we are not able to infer causality from the socioeconomic analysis, we are able to identify important trends. For example, snail and urchin density have significantly increased within the reserve, but their landings and income have decreased. The opposite is observed for lobster and cucumber, which have shown increases in densities, landing, and income. While further information on market behaviour of each species is needed, these results provide insights into the state of the reserve, as well as the associated fisheries.

In terms of governance, it is evident that the community is strongly organized, which is a cause of their success. The first point of success is the existence of a fishing cooperative that is also affiliated to federation. These polycentric governance structures allow different levels of organization that foster communication and cooperation; federations also provide bargain power with governments (Espinosa-Romero et al. 2014; Finkbeiner and Basurto 2015). Fishers also have good management instruments. Access to the fishing resources they exploit is managed through permits and fishing quotas. Along with a stable number of fishers participating in extractive activities, these limit the total fishing effort applied. Additionally, their TURF promotes a sense of stewardship of their resources and incentivizes correct resource management (B. McCay 2017; Finkbeiner and Basurto 2015). Together, these structures enabled a participative, bottom-up process during the reserve design phase;

341 Opinions of all fishing members -and often non-fishers, but community members- were  
342 included. Participation of community members in reserve surveillance and yearly monitoring  
343 indicate commitment and interest, and allow informal communication of results to un-involved  
344 community members.

345 While the reserve has not been legally recognized (as of this moment), the community has  
346 started the process to have the reserve be recognized as a fishery replenishment zone (*Zona*  
347 *de Refugio Pesquer*) under the corresponding Mexican norms (NOM-049-SAG/PESC 2014).  
348 Furthermore, the reserve is partially isolated from poaching activity and fishers have internal  
349 regulations pertaining the reserves. The low level of illegal fishing by members of the  
350 community and outsiders both inside and outside the reserve represents another indication of  
351 effectiveness. A summary of governance indicators is provided in **Table 5**.

Table 3: Summary of average treatment effect of the La Plana / Las Cuevas marine reserve on biophysical indicators. Asterisks indicate significance level, with (\*) indicating  $*p^* < 0.1$  and (\*\*)  $*p^* < 0.05$ .

Indicator	Estimate (SD)	t-score
Shannon fish	-0.22 (0.16)	-1.40
Richness fish	-0.61 (0.43)	-1.41
Density fish	0.74 (6.15)	0.12
Trophic fish	0.00 (0.01)	0.14
Biomass fish	0.22 (1.47)	0.15
Shannon invert	-0.67 (0.22)**	-3.05
Richness invert	-2.71 (0.81)**	-3.35
Density invert	91.21 (47.11)*	1.94
Lobster	7.66 (8.93)	0.86
Urchin	2.15 (1.23)*	1.74
Snail	97.17 (42.90)**	2.27
Cucumber	2.31 (1.17)**	1.98

Table 4: Summary of average treatment effect of the La Plana / Las Cuevas marine reserve on socioeconomic indicators. Asterisks indicate significance level, with (\*) indicating  $*p^* < 0.1$  and (\*\*)  $*p^* < 0.05$ .

Indicator	Estimate (SD)	t-score
Landings	64.20 (90.07)	0.71
Income	10344.85 (3982.20)**	2.60
Lobster landings	7.37 (13.95)	0.53
Urchin landings	-30.00 (9.49)**	-3.16
Snail landings	-69.53 (33.82)*	-2.06
Cucumber landings	9.34 (6.72)	1.39
Lobster income	14372.85 (3634.64)**	3.95
Urchin income	-5800.46 (1867.50)**	-3.11
Snail income	-404.85 (187.07)**	-2.16
Cucumber income	131.49 (185.66)	0.71




Figure 5: Plots for values of each biophysical indicator (y-axis) through time (x-axis). Red and blue correspond to the reserve and control sites, respectively. Black lines indicate yearly mean values, and ribbons indicate  $\pm 1$  standard error. Dots are horizontally jittered to aid visualization.




Figure 6: Plots for values of each socioeconomic indicator (y-axis) through time (x-axis). Red and blue correspond to before and after the implementation of the reserve, respectively.



Table 5: Summary of governance indicators.

Indicator	Description
Access to the fishery	Permits, Territorial Use Rights for Fisheries, Quotas
Number of fishers	Stable
Legal recognition of reserve	Not recognized, but the community has started the process to declare it as a Fishery Replenishment Zone (Zona de Refugio Pesquero) under the @nom049sagpesc_2014-V6
Reserve type	
Illegal harvesting	Due to its relative isolations, neither the reserve or TURF suffer from significant illegal harvesting
Management plan	The reserve does not have a management plan, but written rules exist within the cooperative
Reserve enforcement	Fishers have two land stations equiped with radars and patrol boats 24/7 to patrol the reserves.
Size of reserve	The reserve is big enough to protect the targeted sesile or not highly mobile invertebrates (lobster, urchin, snail, cucumber, and abalone)
Reasoning for reserve location	The reserves were put in place in zones that, according to local knowledge, were once very productive. Habitat heterogeneity and ease of monitoring, surveillance and enforcement were also considered.
Membership to fisher organizations	The fishers are part of fisher roganizations.
Type of fisheries organizations	The fishers are part of a cooperative (S.C.P.P. Buzos y Pescadores de la Baja California) and are afiliated to a federation (FEDECOOP).
Representation	Reserves were designed by fishers in a bottom-up approach, incorporating expertise from academics and NGO members. This was a highly inclusive and participatory process.
Internal Regulation	Fishers have stringent internal regulations to control fishing effort throughouth their TURF, assigning different fishing zones and gears to different teams. Rules pertaining the marine reseves also exist.
Perceived Effectiveness	The fishers have a positive perception about the effectiveness of their reserve, often stating that they have seen significant economic benefits.
Social Impact of Reserve	The reserves have had a significant positive social impact. Fishers are proud to be an world-class case of success in marine conservation, allowing them to have increased social capital.

## Conclusions

One of the greatest challenges in management measuring the extent to which objectives have been met. The present framework provides a simple and straightforward way to align management objectives with performance indicators. We acknowledge that these 25 indicators might not fully describe a particular reserve. However, we believe that these provide a starting point to perform the evaluation, and urge decision-makers, managers, and users to include other indicators (*e.g.* larval dispersal or connectivity) that are relevant to their reserve.

The proposed methodologies, specially the way in which biophysical indicators are evaluated, provide valuable information for managers. The analysis isolates the net effect of the reserve, providing a proper measure of reserve effectiveness. We acknowledge there is room for improvement in the way in which socioeconomic and governance data are analyzed. Despite this, we believe that providing a unifying platform where all can be analyzed and comprehensively presented represents a valuable step towards evidence-based effective management.

Furthermore, MAREA's value is that it provides a free, simple, and replicable way to perform rigorous analysis. The tool can easily be used by fishers, NGO members, and managers in government agencies, providing transparency of the analysis and results. The way in which results are presented allow this information to be interpreted by a wider audience. The scorecard is easily understandable by experts and non-experts, and can be used as an effective tool for communicating the results of yearly evaluations. On the other side, the technical report can serve as a tool for managers and scientists to rapidly communicate information at a more technical level.

While the first release of MAREAI is now available, it will continue to be developed and maintained. This will incorporate new features, and enhance current ones, aiming to improve user experience and expand the scope of the analysis. Yet, we believe that this first release

377 represents a major step towards effective management of marine reserves.

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