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**Effectiveness of community-based marine reserves in small-scale fisheries**

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### ABSTRACT

1. Al finalizar revisiones
2. **Keywords: Marine Protected Areas, Marine Conservation, Small-Scale Fisheries, Citizen Science, Mexico, Social-Ecological Systems**

### Titulos alternativos

1. “Management and effectiveness of community-based marine reserves in small-scale fisheries”
2. “Community-based marine reserves in small-scale fisheries”
3. “Effectiveness of community-based marine reserves: lessons for their management and implementation”
4. (no me encanta)
5. Algun otro?

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## 1 INTRODUCTION

1. Marine ecosystems around the world sustain significant impacts due to overfishing and unsustainable
2. fishing practices [(Halpern et al., 2008;](#_bookmark24) [Worm et al., 2006;](#_bookmark48) [Pauly et al., 2005).](#_bookmark40) A common approach to
3. manage the spatial distribution of fishing effort to recover stocks and preserve biodiversity is through
4. the implementation of marine reserves. These areas allow bounded populations to recover by limiting all
5. extractive activities [(Halpern and Warner, 2002).](#_bookmark25)
6. The science of marine reserves has largely focused on understanding the ecological effects of these
7. areas, which include increased biomass, richness, and densities of organisms within the protected regions,
8. climate change mitigation, and protection from environmental variability [(Lester et al., 2009;](#_bookmark31) [Giakoumi](#_bookmark21)
9. [et al., 2017;](#_bookmark21) [Sala and Giakoumi, 2017;](#_bookmark46) [Roberts et al., 2017;](#_bookmark43) [Micheli et al., 2012).](#_bookmark35) Modelling studies show
10. that fishery benefits of marine reserves depend on initial stock status and the management under which
11. the fishery operates, as well as reserve size and the amount of larvae exported from these [(Hilborn et al.,](#_bookmark26)
12. [2006;](#_bookmark26) [Krueck et al., 2017).](#_bookmark30) Other research has focused on the relationship between socioeconomic and
13. governance structures and their relationship to reserve effectiveness [(Halpern et al., 2013;](#_bookmark23) [Lo´pez-Angarita](#_bookmark32)
14. [et al., 2014;](#_bookmark32) [Mascia et al., 2017).](#_bookmark33) However, few studies simultaneously evaluate reserves from all these
15. perspectives (*e.g.* [Lo´pez-Angarita et al. (2014)).](#_bookmark32)
16. Implementation of marine reserves can be done by following one of three main approaches in terms
17. of implementation. We describe these in the context of Mexican MRs, but argue that at least the first
18. two apply elsewhere. Marine reserves are usually implemented and managed by a government agency, in
19. this case the National Commission of Natural Protected Areas (*Comisio´n Nacional de A´reas Naturales*
20. *Protegidas*, CONANP). While CONANP has made efforts to incorporate stakeholders in the design and
21. implementation phases, these are still characterized by a heavy top-down process. A second approach is
22. the implementation of community-based marine reserves, usually placed within areas of exclusive access
23. (*i.e.* TURFs). Community-based spatial closures occur in other places, like the *kapu* or *ra’ui* areas in the
24. Pacific Islands [(Bohnsack et al., 2004;](#_bookmark9) [Johannes, 2002).](#_bookmark28) This bottom-up approach increases compliance and
25. self-enforcement [(Gelcich and Donlan, 2015;](#_bookmark20) [Espinosa-Romero et al., 2014;](#_bookmark17) [Beger et al., 2004).](#_bookmark7) However,
26. without legal recognition these are difficult to enforce and fishers rely on the exclusive access granted by
27. the TURF. In an effort to bridge this normative gap, Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) served as the link
28. between fishers and government, and set out to create a legal framework that solve this governance issue.
29. In 2014, a new norm was created, allowing fishers to request the legal recognition of a community-based
30. reserve under the name of “Fishing Refugia” [(NOM-049-SAG/PESC, 2014).](#_bookmark37) These can be implemented as
31. temporal or partial reserves, which can protect one, some, or all resources within them. Since then, **41** of
32. community-based marine reserves along the Pacific, Gulf of California, and Mexican Caribbean coastlines
33. have gained legal recognition, but no formal evaluation of their effectiveness has taken place.
34. This work combines causal inference techniques and the social-ecological systems framework to provide
35. a holistic evaluation of community-based marine reserves in three coastal communities in Mexico. The
36. objective of this work is twofold. First, provide a triple bottom line evaluation of the effectiveness of
37. community-based marine reserves that can inform similar processes in other countries. And second,
38. perform the first formal evaluation of Fishing Refugia in Mexico and identify areas where improvement or
39. adjustment might result in increased effectiveness. On both cases, we draw from the lessons learned and
40. provide management recommendations to maximize the effectiveness of community-based marine reserves
41. in small-scale fisheries.

## 2 MATERIALS AND METHODS

### 2.1 Study area

1. We evaluate community-based marine reserves from three coastal communities located in the Pacific
2. coast of Baja California and the Mexican Caribbean (Fig [1).](#_bookmark0) All communities are organized as fishing
3. cooperatives that hold Territorial Use Rights for Fisheries (TURFs). Isla Natividad lies west of the Baja
4. California Peninsula (Fig [1B),](#_bookmark0) where kelp forests and rocky reefs are the predominant habitats. The island
5. is home to the *Buzos y Pescadores de la Baja California* fishing cooperative, whose main resource by
6. value is the spiny lobster (*Panulirus interruptus*). Other resources like finfish, sea cucumber, red sea urchin,
7. snail, and abalone are also important sources of income. In 2006, the community decided to implement
8. two community-based marine reserves within their fishing grounds to protect commercially important
9. invertebrate species (mainly lobster and abalone). These reserves obtained legal recognition in 2018, but
10. were well enforced since their implementation in 2006.
11. The other two communities are Maria Elena and Punta Herrero, which are located in the Yucatan
12. Peninsula, where coral reefs and mangroves are the representative coastal ecosystems( Fig [1C).](#_bookmark0) Maria
13. Elena is a fishing camp –visited intermittently during the fishing season– belonging to the Cozumel fishing
14. cooperative (*SCPP Cozumel*); Punta Herrero is home to the *SCPP Jose´ Mar´ıa Azcorra* cooperative. Their
15. main fishery is the Caribbean spiny lobster (*Panulirus argus*), but they also target finfish in the off-season.
16. Maria Elena and Punta Herrero established eight marine reserves in 2012, and four marine reserves in 2013,
17. respectively. All these reserves are legally recognized as Fishing Refugia since their creation.

### 2.2 Data collection

1. We use three main sources of information to evaluate these reserves across the ecological, socioeconomic,
2. and governance dimensions. Ecological data come from the annual ecological monitoring of reserve
3. and control areas, carried out by members from each community and personnel from the Mexican
4. CSO *Comunidad y Biodiversidad* [(COBI).](http://www.cobi.org.mx/) Trained divers record richness and abundances of fish and
5. invertebrate species in the reserves and control sites. Size structures are also collected during fish surveys.
6. We define control sites as regions with habitat characteristics similar to the corresponding reserves, and that
7. presumably had a similar probability of being selected as reserves during the design phase. We focus our
8. evaluation on sites where data are available for reserve and control sites, before and after the implementation
9. of the reserve. This provides us with a Before-After-Control-Impact (*i.e.* BACI) sampling design that
10. allows us to capture and control for temporal and spatial dynamics [(De Palma et al., 2018;](#_bookmark11) [Ferraro and](#_bookmark18)
11. [Pattanayak, 2006).](#_bookmark18) BACI designs and causal inference techniques have proven effective to evaluate marine
12. reserves, as they allow us to causally attribute observed changes to the intervention [(Moland et al., 2013;](#_bookmark36)
13. [Villasen˜or-Derbez et al., 2018).](#_bookmark47) All sites were surveyed annually, and at least once before implementation
14. of the reserves. Table [1](#_bookmark1) shows a summary of the reserves included in this study.

# A

30N

25N


20N

15N

115W 110W 105W 100W 95W 90W

**C**

19.6N




Mexico

Gulf of

Mexico

Pacific

Ocean



Maria Elena

Punta Herrero

0 5 10km

19.5N

19.4N

**B** 28N 27.95N

27.9N

27.85N

27.8N

27.75N

27.7N



0

10

20km

115.6W 115.5W 115.4W 115.3W 115.2W 115.1W

19.3N

19.2N

87.7W 87.6W 87.5W 87.4W 87.3W

**Figure 1.** Location of the three coastal communities studied (A). Isla Natividad (B) is located off the Baja California Peninsula, Maria Elena (C) and Punta Herrero (D) are located in the Yucatan Peninsula. Blue polygons represent the TURFs, and red polygons the marine reserves.

**Table 1.** Summary of commuity–based marine reserves by community.

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Community | TURF area (*km*2) | Reserve area (*km*2) | Percent as reserves | Year of implementation |
| Isla Natividad | 889.5 | 1.53 | 0.1720067 | 2006 |
| Maria Elena | 353.1 | 0.10 | 0.0283206 | 2012 |
| Punta Herrero | 299.7 | 0.43 | 0.1434768 | 2013 |

1. Socioeconomic data come from landing receipts reported to the National Commission for Aquaculture
2. and Fisheries (*Comisio´n Nacional de Acuacultura y Pesca*; CONAPESCA). Data contain monthly lobster
3. landings (Kg) and revenues (MXP) from 2000 to 2014 for cooperatives with and without marine rese-
4. rves(**Fig S1**). All cooperatives of each region (*i.e.* Pacific and Caribbean) incorporated in this analysis,
5. belong to larger Cooperative Federations, and are exposed to the same markets and institutional frameworks
6. [(McCay, 2017;](#_bookmark34) [Ayer et al., 2018),](#_bookmark6) making them plausible controls. Landings and revenues were aggregated
7. at the cooperative-year level, and revenues were adjusted by the Consumer Price Index for Mexico [(OECD,](#_bookmark38)

93 [2017)](#_bookmark38) as:

*It* = *RIt*

*CP It*

*× CP IT*

(1)

1. Where *It* represents the adjusted income for year *t* as the product between the reported income for that
2. year and the ratio between the consumer price index in that year (*CP It*) to the most recent year’s consumer
3. price index (*CP IT* ).
4. Data for the qualitative analysis of the social-ecological system were collected at the community–level
5. from official documents used in the creation and designation of the marine reserves [(DOF, 2012,](#_bookmark13) [2013,](#_bookmark14)
6. [2018)](#_bookmark15) and based on the authors’ experience and knowledge of the communities. These include information
7. on the resource system, the resource units, actors, and the governance system itself (**S1 Table**).

### 2.3 Data analysis

1. We evaluate the effect that marine reserves have had on four ecological and two socioeconomic indicators
2. (Table [2).](#_bookmark2) Recall that reserves were implemented to protect lobster and other benthic invertebrates. However,
3. we also use the available fish datato test for associated co-benefits.

**Table 2.** List of indicators used to evaluate the effectiveness of marine reserves, grouped by category.

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Category | Indicador | Units |
| Biological | Lobster density | org m−2 |
| Biological | Invertebrate density | org m−2 |
| Biological | Fish biomass | Kg m−2 |
| Biological | Fish density | org m−2 |
| Socioeconomic | Income from target species | M MXP |
| Socioeconomic | Landings from target species | Metric Tonnes |

1. We use a difference-in-differences analysis to evaluate these indicators. This approach allows us to
2. estimate the effect that the reserve had by comparing trends across time and treatments (*i.e.* reserve /
3. control sites [Moland et al. (2013);](#_bookmark36) [Villasen˜or-Derbez et al. (2018)).](#_bookmark47) The analysis of ecological indicators is
4. performed with a multiple linear regression of the form:

*Iitj* = *α* + *γtY eart* + *βZonei* + *λtY eart × Zonei* + *σjSppj* + *s* (2)

1. Where year-fixed effects are represented by *γitY eart*, and *βZonei* captures the difference between
2. reserve (*Zone* = 1) and control (*Zone* = 0) sites. The interaction term *λitY eart × Zonei* represents the
3. mean change in the indicator inside the reserve, for year *t*, with respect to the year of implementation in the
4. control site (See Table [1).](#_bookmark1) When evaluating biomass and densities of the entire benthic or fish communities,
5. we include *σj* to control for species-fixed effects.
6. Socioeconomic indicators are evaluated with a similar approach. Due to data constrains, we only
7. evaluate socioeconomic data for Isla Natividad and Maria Elena. Neighboring communities are used as
8. counterfacutals that allow us to control for unobserved time-invariants. Each “treated” community (Isla
9. Natividad and Maria Elena) has three counterfactual communities.

*I* = *α* + *γtY eart* + *βT reatedi* + *λtY eart × T reatedi* + *σjComj* + *s* (3)

1. The model interpretation remains as for Eq [2,](#_bookmark3) but in this case the *T reated* dummy variable indicates if
2. the community has a reserve (*T reated* = 1) or not (*T reated* = 0) and *σjCom* captures community-level
3. fixed-effects. These regressions allows us to make a causal link between the implementation of marine
4. reserves and the observed trends by accounting for temporal and spatial dynamics [(De Palma et al., 2018).](#_bookmark11)
5. The effect of the reserve is captured by the *λt* coefficient, and represents the difference observed between
6. the control site before the implementation of the reserve and the treated sites at time *t* after controlling
7. for other time and space variations (*i.e. γt* and *β* respectively). All model coefficients were estimated
8. via ordinary least-squares and heteroskedastic-robust standard errors [(Zeileis, 2004).](#_bookmark49) All analyses were
9. performed in R 3.5.0 and R Studio 1.1.453 [(R Core Team, 2018).](#_bookmark42)

**3 RESULTS**

1. The following sections present the effect that marine reserves had on each of the biological and socioe-
2. conomic indicators for each coastal community. Results are presented in terms of the difference through
3. time and across sites, relative to the control site on the year of implementation (*i.e.* effect size *λt*). We also
4. provide an overview of the governance settings of each community, and discuss how these might be related
5. to the effectiveness and performance of the reserves.

### 3.1 Biological

1. Indicators showed ambiguous responses through time for each reserve. Figure [2A](#_bookmark4) shows positive effect
2. sizes for lobster densities in Isla Natividad and Punta Herrero during the first years, but the effect is eroded
3. through time. These effects are in the order of 0.2 extra organisms m−2 but are not significantly different
4. from zero (*p >* 0*.*05). Lobster densities were only significantly positive for Isla Natividad on the sixth
5. year (*i.e.* 2012; *p <* 0*.*05), a year after the hypoxia events described by [Micheli et al. (2012)](#_bookmark35) caused
6. mass mortality of organisms. Likewise, no changes were detected in fish biomass or invertebrate and fish
7. densities [(2B-D),](#_bookmark4) where effect sizes oscillated around zero without clear trends. Full tables with model
8. coefficients are presented in the supplementary materials (**S2 Table**, **S3 Table**, **S4 Table**).

### 3.2 Socioeconomic

1. Lobster landings and revenue were only available for Isla Natividad and Maria Elena (Fig [3).](#_bookmark5) For all years
2. before implementation, the effect sizes are close to zero, indicating that the control and treatment sites have
3. similar pre-treatment trends, asuggesting that these are plausible controls. However, effect sizes do not
4. change after the implementation of the reserve. Again, the negative coefficient observed for Isla Natividad
5. on year 5 correspond to the 2011 hypoxia events. The only positive change observed in lobster landings
6. is for Isla Natividad in 2014 (*p <* 0*.*1). The three years of post-implementation data for Maria Elena do
7. not show a significant effect of the reserve. Isla Natividad shows higher revenues after the implementation
8. of the reserve, as compared to the control communities. However, these changes are not significant and
9. are associated to increased variation. All regression coefficients for each community and indicator are
10. presented in **S5 Table**.

### 3.3 Governance

1. Although we have little information on the social dimension of these fisheries, we can use the social-
2. ecological systems framework (**S1 Table**) to analyze the performance of each governance system (**S6**
3. **Table**). Our analysis shows that all of the systems analyzed share similarities in their Governance system
4. which is based on cooperatives (GS5.2.3.2), with strong rules in use that include Operational rules (GS6.2),
5. Collective-choice rules (GS6.3), Constitutional rules (GS6.3), and even Territorial use communal rights
6. (GS6.1.4.3). However, we identified important differences in terms of the actors, resource systems, and
7. resource units. Although all communities show a high level of leadership (A5), the level of trust (A6.1) is
8. lower in Punta Herrero. In general, the presence and success of conservation initiatives depends on the
9. incentives of local communities to maintain a healthy status of the resources they depend upon [(Jupiter](#_bookmark29)
10. [et al., 2017).](#_bookmark29) The enabling conditions for conservation seem to be strongly present in all communities. Due
11. to the clarity of access rights and isolation, the benefits of conservation directly benefit the members of
12. the fishing cooperative. These conditions have favored the development of an efficient community-based
13. enforcement systems.

**A** 0.3



0.2

t

0.1

0.0

−0.1

**C** 0.10

0.05

0.00

t

−0.05

−0.10



−1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Years since implementation



−1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Years since implementation

**B** 0.04

0.02

t

0.00

−0.02

**D** 0.1



Community

IN PH

ME

0.0

t

−0.1

−0.2



−1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10



Years since implementation

−1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Years since implementation

**Figure 2.** Effect sizes for marine reserves from Isla Natividad (IN; red cirlcles), Maria Elena (ME; blue triangles), and Punta Herrero (PH; green squares) for lobster densities (*Panulirus spp*; A), fish biomass (B), invertebrate densities (C), and fish densities (D). Plots are ordered by survey type (left column: invertebrates; right column: fish). Points are jittered hotizontally to avoid overplotting. Points indicate the effect size, and errorbars standard errors. Years have been centered to year of implementation.

# A

50

0

t

−50

Community

IN ME



−10 −5 0 5

Years since implementation

# B



20

10

t

0

−10

−10 −5 0 5

Years since implementation

Community

IN ME



**Figure 3.** Effect sizes for lobster catches (A) and revenues (B) in at Isla Natividad (IN; red circles) and Maria Elena (ME; blue triangles)

## 4 DISCUSSION

1. Our results indicate that marine reserves do not achieve the main objective of increasing lobster densities.
2. No co-benefits were identified when using other ecological indicators other than the previously reported
3. buffering effect that reserves can have to environmental variability in Isla Natividad [(Micheli et al., 2012).](#_bookmark35)
4. The socioeconomic indicators pertaining landings and revenues showed little to no change after reserve
5. implementation. The lack of expected effectiveness poses the question: why do these communities continue
6. to support the reserves? Understanding the social-ecological context in which these communities and
7. their reserves operate might provide insights to this question. Here we touch on potential shortcomings
8. in our analysis, and discuss our findings in the context of existing literature and our social-ecological
9. system analysis. Finally, we provide recommendations to guide the implementation of new (and improve
10. effectiveness of) community-based marine reserves in small-scale fisheries.
11. Some works evaluate marine reserves by performing inside-outside [(Guidetti et al., 2014;](#_bookmark22) [Friedlander](#_bookmark19)
12. [et al., 2017;](#_bookmark19) [Rodriguez and Fanning, 2017)](#_bookmark44) or before-after comparisons [(Betti et al., 2017).](#_bookmark8) The first
13. approach does not address temporal variability, and the second can not distinguish between the temporal
14. trends in a reserve and the entire system [(De Palma et al., 2018).](#_bookmark11) Our approach to evaluate the temporal and
15. spatial changes provides a more robust measure of reserve effectiveness. However, this method assumes
16. control sites are a plausible counterfactual for treated sites. This supposed that treated sites would have
17. followed the same trend as control sites, had the reserves not been implemented. Nonetheless, overall
18. trends for each site don’t show any significant increases, supporting our findings of lack of change in the
19. indicators used (**S2 Figure**, **S3 Figure**, **S4 Figure**, **S5 Figure**, **S6 Figure**).
20. Literature shows that age, isolation, and enforcement are important factors that influence reserve effecti-
21. veness [(Edgar et al., 2014).](#_bookmark16) Isla Natividad has the oldest reserve, and all communities are fairly isolated,
22. and have a well-established community-based enforcement system. With these characteristics, one would
23. expect the reserves to be effective. However, another key condition for effectiveness is reserve is size
24. [(Edgar et al., 2014)](#_bookmark16), and the lack of effectiveness can perhaps be attributed to reserves being too small.
25. Previous research has shown that reserves in Isla Natividad yield fishery benefits for the abalone fishery
26. [(Rossetto et al., 2015).](#_bookmark45) Abalone are less mobile than lobsters, and perhaps the reserves provide enough
27. protection to these sesile invertebrates, but not lobsters. Maria Elena and Punta Herrero are relatively young
28. reserves, and it is known that community-based marine reserves in tropical ecosystems may take up to six
29. years to show a spillover effect [(da Silva et al., 2015).](#_bookmark10) Work by [Ayer et al. (2018)](#_bookmark6) shows these communities
30. support the implementation of marine reserves. Nevertheless, fishers may favor implementation of reserves
31. that pose low fishing costs either because of their location or size. The economic data support our claim
32. that reserves are small, as neither landings nor revenues showed the expected short-term costs associated to
33. the first years of reserve implementation [(Ovando et al., 2016).](#_bookmark39)
34. Even if reserves had appropriate sizes, there are other plausible explanations for the observed lack of
35. effectiveness. Marine reserves are only likely to provide fisheries benefits if initial population sizes are low
36. and the fishery is poorly managed [(Hilborn et al., 2006).](#_bookmark26) However, both lobster fisheries were, at some
37. point, certified by the Marine Stewardship Council (P[e´rez-Ram´ırez et al., 2016).](#_bookmark41) Additionally, lobster
38. fisheries are managed via species-specific minimum catch sizes, seasonal closures, protection of “berried”
39. females, and escapement windows where traps are allowed [DOF (1993).](#_bookmark12) It is uncertain whether that such a
40. well-managed fishery will experience additional benefits from marine reserves.
41. While reserves fail to provide fishery benefits, there are a number of additional ecological, fisheries, and
42. social benefits. Marine reserves provide protection to a wider range of species and vulnerable habitat, like
43. coral reefs. These sites can serve as an insurance against environmental shocks or mistakes in fisheries
44. management [(Hilborn et al., 2004,](#_bookmark27) [2006;](#_bookmark26) [Micheli et al., 2012)](#_bookmark35). Embarking in a marine conservation project
45. can bring the community together, which promotes social cohesion and builds social capital. Furthermore,
46. showing commitment to marine conservation allows fishers to have greater bargaining power and leverage
47. over fisheries management.
48. Community-based marine reserves in small-scale fisheries can be helpful conservation and fishery mana-
49. gement tools when appropriately implemented. Lessons learned from these cases can guide implementation
50. of community-based marine reserves elsewhere. For the particular case of the marine reserves that we
51. evaluate, the possibility of expanding reserves or merging existing polygons into larger areas should be
52. evaluated and proposed to the communities. At the broader scale, having full community support surely
53. represents an advantage, but it is important for marine reserves to meet essential design principles such as
54. size and placement. Community-based marine reserves might have more benefits that result from indirect
55. effects of the reserves, which should be taken into account when evaluating the outcomes of similar
56. projects.

## CONFLICT OF INTEREST STATEMENT

1. The authors declare that the research was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial
2. relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest.

## AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS

1. JC and EA analyzed and interpreted data, discussed the results, and wrote the first draft. AS, SF and JT
2. discussed the results and edited the manuscript.

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3. by members of the communities here mentioned, who collected the biological data.

## SUPPLEMENTAL DATA

1. [Supplementary Material](http://home.frontiersin.org/about/author-guidelines#SupplementaryMaterial) should be uploaded separately on submission, if there are Supplementary Figures,
2. please include the caption in the same file as the figure. LaTeX Supplementary Material templates can be
3. found in the Frontiers LaTeX folder

#### *S1 Figure*

1. Map of control and treated sites in A and control and treated landings in B

#### *S2 Figure*

1. Time series of biological indicators for IN

#### *S3 Figure*

1. Time series of biological indicators for ME

#### *S4 Figure*

1. Time series of biological indicators for PH

#### *S5 Figure*

1. Time series of economic indicators for ME

#### *S6 Figure*

1. Time series of economic indicators for PH

#### *S1 Table*

1. Coefficient estimates for biological indicators in Isla Natividad

#### *S2 Table*

1. Coefficient estimates for biological indicators in Maria Elena

#### *S3 Table*

1. Coefficient estimates for biological indicators in Punta Herrero

#### *S4 Table*

1. Coefficient estimates for economic indicators

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
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## FIGURE CAPTIONS