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Sat, 08 March 2014 ~ yyyyyyy

RuCTF Quals 2014: Crypto 500 "decrypt message" writeup

This challenge required solvers to perform a related message attack on RSA. The task description is as follows:

Two agents, Alex and Jane, have simultaneously known very secret message and transmitted it to Center. You know following:

- 1. They used RSA with this (see below) public key
- 2. They sent exactly the same messages except the signatures (name appended, eg. "[message]Alex")
- 3. They did encryption this way:

```
c, = pubKey.encrypt(str_to_num(message), 1) # using RSA from Crypto.PublicKey
c = num_to_str(c).encode('hex')
```

4. And here are cryptograms you have intercepted:

"61be5676e0f8311dce5d991e841d180c95b9fc15576f2ada0bc619cfb991cddfc51c4dcc5ecd150d7176c835449b5ad0
85abec38898be02d2749485b68378a8742544ebb8d6dc45b58fb9bac4950426e3383fa31a933718447decc5545a7105d
cdd381e82db6acb77f4e335e244242a8e0fbbb940edde3b9e1c329880803931c"

"9d3c9fad495938176c7c4546e9ec0d4277344ac118dc21ba4205a3451e1a7e36ad3f8c2a566b940275cb630c66d95b1f97614c3b55af8609495fc7b2d732fb58a0efdf0756dc917d5eeefc7ca5b4806158ab87f4f447139d1daf4845e18c8c7120392817314fec0f0c1f248eb31af153107bd9823797153e35cb7044b99f26b0"

Now tell me that secret message! (The answer for this task starts from 'ructf_')

The public key was given as

```
----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY----
MIGeMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GMADCBiAKBgQCjX+QVVbBrI812miqtd8rTo9qm
p23nWRyLjyga+lElKX+xBUE4f4uZjS/Rp2Eg3RRygaxSC0pS0+ytHj58q1wNskfd
+HzYrc0tE7+1ceJtLhf/okKagLfp299AVIRf0iQq4HH+GhldKJA02kBdo+k3yinf
8oTgUow9tRDeqcczvwICMAE=
----END PUBLIC KEY----
```

which decodes to

 $e = 0 \times 3001$

 $n = 0 \times a35 + 64155 + 5060 + 2360 +$

Let's try to collect potentially useful information. We know...

- ...the public key (n, e) used to encrypt the plaintexts p_0 , p_1 .
- ...the two plaintexts' difference (that is, $\delta := (p_1 p_0) \mod n$).
- ...the ciphertexts $c_0 = m_0^e \mod n$, $c_1 = m_1^e \mod n$.

Some quick Google-Fu yielded the paper "Low-Exponent RSA with Related Messages (http://www.cs.unc.edu/~reiter/papers/1996/Eurocrypt.pdf)" (D. Coppersmith et al.) that describes an attack on settings like these. It says, among other things (note that the following talks about e = 5, $\delta = 1$):

Let z denote the unknown message m. Then z satisfies the following two polynomial relations:

$$z^5 - c_1 = 0 \mod N$$

 $(z+1)^5 - c_2 = 0 \mod N$

where the c_i are treated as known constants. Apply the Euclidean algorithm to find the greatest common divisor of these two univariate polynomials over the ring \mathbb{Z}/N :

$$\gcd(z^5 - c_1, (z+1)^5 - c_2) \in \mathbb{Z}/N[z].$$

This should yield the linear polynomial z - m (except possibly in rare cases).

This means: Assuming the given ciphertexts are *not* an instance of "rare cases", the greatest common divisor $d \in (\mathbb{Z}/n\mathbb{Z})[X]$ of $X^e - c_0$ and $(X + \delta)^e - c_1$ equals X - m multiplied by some constant in $\mathbb{Z}/n\mathbb{Z}$ (as d is only unique up to multiplication by units). Dividing d by its lead coefficient will result in X - m.

Using my Python algebra library (that, by the way, only came into existence while solving this challenge since I was unable to find packages that could properly handle polynomials over arbitrary rings), the required computation is easily implemented:

```
from algebra.ring.algorithm import euclid
from algebra.ring.mod import mod
from algebra.ring.poly import poly
from Crypto.PublicKey import RSA
import binascii
with open('key.pub', 'rb') as f:
  key = RSA.importKey(f.read())
5e244242a8e0fbbb940edde3b9e1c329880803931c', 16)
8eb31af153107bd9823797153e35cb7044b99f26b0', 16)
delta = int(binascii.hexlify(b'Jane'), 16) - int(binascii.hexlify(b'Alex'), 16)
Zn = mod(key.n)
ZnX = poly(Zn)
delta = Zn(delta)
#f = ZnX.X ** key.e - ZnX(R(c0)) #exponentiation is slow...
f = ZnX([Zn.zero] * key.e + [Zn.one], 'little') - ZnX(Zn(c0), 'little')
#g = (ZnX.X + ZnX(delta)) ** key.e - ZnX(Zn(c1)) #exponentiation is slow...
gs = [delta ** key.e]
for k in range(key.e):
  gs.append(Zn(key.e - k) / (Zn(k + 1) * delta) * gs[-1])
g = ZnX(gs, 'little') - ZnX(Zn(c1))
d = euclid(f, g)[0]
d /= ZnX(d.lc())
print(bytes(-d.get(0)))
```

Some tests with smaller constants suggested the program would run pretty long, but as there was plenty of time left, I gave it a shot. About an hour later, the solver printed the flag:

```
$ ./solve.py
b'The key is RUCTF_StandBackImGonnaDoMath. Alex'
```

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