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# More Smoked Leet Chicken

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« [Codegate 2014 Quals – Angry Doraemon \(pwn 250\)](#)

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Mar  
02

## Boston Key Party CTF – Differential Power (Crypto 400)

- [Writeups](#)

by [hellman](#)

we hooked up a power meter to this encryption box. we don't know the key. that's what we want to know. you can encrypt any string of 8 characters on the service [http://54.218.22.41:6969/string\\_to\\_encrypt](http://54.218.22.41:6969/string_to_encrypt)

[encrypt.asm](#)

[chall source \(released after ctf\)](#)

This was cool challenge about differential power analysis. Actually, it was rather simplified and we simply got number of flipped bits during each instruction.

The code was rather simple:

```
0  add $t1, $zero, $zero# clear out $t1 ; 00004820
1  addi $t1, $t1, 0x9e# TEA magic is 0x9e3779b7 ; 2129009E
2  sll $t1, $t1, 8# shift out making room in the bottom 4; 00094a00
3  addi $t1, $t1, 0x37 ; 21290037
4  sll $t1, $t1, 8 ; 00094a00
5  addi $t1, $t1, 0x79 ; 21290079
6  sll $t1, $t1, 8 ; 00094a00
7  addi $t1, $t1, 0xb9 # now $t1 holds the magic 0x9e3779b9 ; 212900b9
8  add $t2, $zero, $zero# $t2 is the counter ; 00005020
9  add $t0, $zero, $zero# $t0 is the sum ; 00004020
10 lw $t8, $zero, 8# k0 mem[8-23] = k ; 8c180008
11 lw $s7, $zero, 12# k1 ; 8c17000c
12 lw $s6, $zero, 16# k2 ; 8c160010
13 lw $t3, $zero, 20# k3 now our keys are in registers ; 8c0b0014
```

```

14 lw $t7, $zero, 0# v0 mem[0-7] = v ; 8c0f0000
15 lw $t6, $zero, 4# v1, our plaintext is in the registers ; 8c0e0004
16 loop: add $t0, $t0, $t1# sum+=delta ; 01094020
17 sll $s4, $t6, 4# (v1 << 4) ; 000ea100
18 add $s4, $s4, $t8# +k0 part 1 is in s4 ; 0298a020
19 add $s3, $t6, $t0# (v1 + sum) part 2 is in s3 ; 01c89820
20 srl $s2, $t6, 5# (v1 >> 5) ; 000e9142
21 add $s2, $s2, $s7# +k1, now do the xors part 3 in s2 ; 02579020
22 xor $s1, $s2, $s3# xor 2 and 3 parts ; 02728826
23 xor $s1, $s1, $s4# xor 1(2,3) ; 2348826
24 add $t7, $t7, $s1# done with line 2 of the tea loop ; 01f17820
25 sll $s4, $t7, 4# (v0 << 4) ; 000fa100
26 add $s4, $s4, $s6# +k2 part 1 in s4 ; 0296a020
27 add $s3, $t7, $t0# (v0 + sum) part 2 in s3 ; 01e89820
28 srl $s2, $t7, 5# (v0 >> 5) ; 000f9142
29 add $s2, $s2, $s7# +k3 part 2 in s2 ; 024b9020
30 xor $s1, $s2, $s3# xor 2 and 3 parts ; 2728826
31 xor $s1, $s1, $s4# xor 1(2,3) ; 2348826
32 add $t6, $t6, $s1# done with line 2! ; 01d17020
33 addi $s0, $zero, 32# for compare ; 20100020
34 addi $t2, $t2, 1# the counter ; 214a0001
35 bne $t2, $s0, 17# bne loop, now save back to the memory ; 15500010

```

Easy to see it's TEA cipher. We need to get 4 32bit keys (16 bytes overall).

If we sent a string to a web service, it responded with an array of values. Each value corresponded to a number of bits flipped during an instruction execution.

How can we extract key from the data?

Easy, we can make use of such instructions:

```

18 add $s4, $s4, $t8# +k0 part 1 is in s4 ; 0298a020
...
21 add $s2, $s2, $s7# +k1, now do the xors part 3 in s2 ; 02579020
...

```

We can make a guess for **k0**, **s4** is known, and we can check then number of flipped bits. We can repeat this a couple of times to narrow down the key space. Also we should use other instructions, like 22 `xor $s1, $s2, $s3# xor 2 and 3 parts ; 02728826`, because that `add`'s depend only on some parts of plaintext (because of shifts) and therefore will not yield the whole information about the key.

Making guesses for 32bit number is not such fast. There are many ways from here: we can suppose that key is printable and narrow supposed charset more; use more effective way of guessing — putting a plaintexts with a few bits set and thus check whether there was a carry at some position. Also we can get number of “1” bits in keys from `lw` instructions:

```

10 lw $t8, $zero, 8# k0 mem[8-23] = k ; 8c180008

```

Anyway, this is rather messy and need some accuracy. Let's feed that to z3. Something like this:

```

from z3 import *

S = Solver()
k0, k1, k2, k3 = BitVecs("k0 k1 k2 k3", 32)

```

```

S.add(k0 & 0x80808080 == 0)
S.add(k1 & 0x80808080 == 0)
S.add(k2 & 0x80808080 == 0)
S.add(k3 & 0x80808080 == 0)
S.add(bitsum(k0) == k0bitsum)
S.add(bitsum(k1) == k1bitsum)
S.add(bitsum(k2) == k2bitsum)
S.add(bitsum(k3) == k3bitsum)

```

And then just translate instructions to code and add bitsum checks:

```

for s, data in known.items():
    v0 = unpack(">I", s[:4])[0]
    v1 = unpack(">I", s[4:8])[0]

    s0 = s1 = s2 = s3 = s4 = s5 = s6 = s7 = s8 = 0
    t0 = t1 = t2 = t3 = t4 = t5 = t6 = t7 = t8 = 0

    # 0  add $t1, $zero, $zero# clear out $t1 ; 00004820
    # 1  addi $t1, $t1, 0x9e# TEA magic is 0x9e3779b7 ; 2129009E
    # 2  sll $t1, $t1, 8# shift out making room in the bottom 4; 00094a00
    # 3  addi $t1, $t1, 0x37 ; 21290037
    # 4  sll $t1, $t1, 8 ; 00094a00

    # 5  addi $t1, $t1, 0x79 ; 21290079
    # 6  sll $t1, $t1, 8 ; 00094a00
    # 7  addi $t1, $t1, 0xb9 # now $t1 holds the magic 0x9e3779b9 ; 212900b9
    t1 = 0x9e3779b9

    # 8  add $t2, $zero, $zero# $t2 is the counter ; 00005020
    t2 = 0

    # 9  add $t0, $zero, $zero# $t0 is the sum ; 00004020
    t0 = 0

    ...

    # 16  loop: add $t0, $t0, $t1# sum+=delta ; 01094020
    t0 = (t0 + t1) & 0xffffffff

    # 17  sll $s4, $t6, 4# (v1 << 4) ; 000ea100
    s4 = (t6 << 4) & 0xffffffff

    # 18  add $s4, $s4, $t8# +k0 part 1 is in s4 ; 0298a020
    s4b = (s4 + t8) & 0xffffffff
    S.add(bitsum(s4b ^ s4) == data[18])
    s4 = s4b

    # 19  add $s3, $t6, $t0# (v1 + sum) part 2 is in s3 ; 01c89820
    s3b = (t6 + t0) & 0xffffffff
    S.add(bitsum(s3b ^ s3) == data[19])
    s3 = s3b

    ...

```

[Full script:](#)

```

$ time py sat.py
10 collected
sat
[k2 = 1769241186,
 k1 = 1684368738,
 k3 = 1915756833,

```

```
k0 = 1718380912]
0x666c6970 flip
0x64656d62 demb
0x69747a62 itzb
0x72302121 r0!!

real    0m35.580s
user    0m35.224s
sys     0m0.079s
```

So, the flag: “flipdembitzbr0!!”.

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1.



*bowknotbowknot* says:

March 20, 2016 at 19:40 (UTC 3)

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- [September 2016](#) (3)
- [May 2016](#) (5)
- [April 2016](#) (2)
- [March 2016](#) (5)
- [September 2015](#) (2)
- [May 2015](#) (4)
- [April 2014](#) (4)
- [March 2014](#) (1)
- [February 2014](#) (4)
- [January 2014](#) (2)
- [December 2013](#) (1)
- [October 2013](#) (1)
- [June 2013](#) (6)
- [April 2013](#) (1)
- [February 2013](#) (2)
- [November 2012](#) (6)
- [October 2012](#) (7)
- [May 2012](#) (6)
- [April 2012](#) (2)
- [March 2012](#) (4)
- [February 2012](#) (17)
- [January 2012](#) (12)

- [December 2011](#) (6)
- [October 2011](#) (5)
- [September 2011](#) (10)
- [August 2011](#) (8)
- [July 2011](#) (3)
- [June 2011](#) (5)
- [April 2011](#) (10)
- [March 2011](#) (7)
- [January 2011](#) (2)
- [December 2010](#) (1)
- [November 2010](#) (1)
- [October 2010](#) (11)
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