

# Econ 8010 HW4

## Due Tuesday, October 24

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1. Consider the following normal form game.

		2		
		<i>a</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>c</i>
1	<i>A</i>	4,5	0,2	0,0
	<i>B</i>	3,2	3,0	3,2
	<i>C</i>	0,0	0,2	4,4

- (a) Find all rationalizable strategies.
- (b) Find all Nash equilibria.

2. Consider the following normal form game.

		2		
		<i>a</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>c</i>
1	<i>A</i>	4,4	0,2	0,0
	<i>B</i>	3,2	3,0	3,2
	<i>C</i>	0,0	0,2	4,4

- (a) Find all rationalizable strategies.

- (b) Find all Nash equilibria.
3. Consider the following normal form game.

		2			
		<i>a</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>c</i>	<i>d</i>
1	<i>A</i>	6,0	3,3	1,5	6,3
	<i>B</i>	4,1	4,1	2,2	7,1
	<i>C</i>	2,4	2,3	5,2	2,0
	<i>D</i>	5,3	2,3	0,4	5,3

- (a) Find all rationalizable strategies.
- (b) Find all Nash equilibria.
4. Two firms  $i \in \{1, 2\}$  engage in price competition in a differentiated product market. That is, their strategies are prices for their product  $p_i \geq 0$ . Consumers view the two firms' products as substitutes (but not perfect substitutes). The demand for firm 1's product is given by

$$Q_1(p_1, p_2) = \max\{12 - 2p_1 + p_2, 0\}$$

and the demand for firm 2's product is given by

$$Q_2(p_1, p_2) = \max\{12 - 2p_2 + p_1, 0\}$$

Firm 1 and firm 2 each produce at constant marginal cost of 4. Thus, their payoffs when they play  $(p_1, p_2)$  are

$$\pi_1(p_1, p_2) = (p_1 - 4) \max\{12 - 2p_1 + p_2, 0\}$$

$$\pi_2(p_1, p_2) = (p_2 - 4) \max\{12 - 2p_2 + p_1, 0\}$$

Solve for the pure strategy Nash equilibrium.