

Capítulo 1

La Categoría del Testimonio en el Pensamiento de Elizabeth Anscombe

Este es el capítulo central del trabajo. El recorrido que haremos a lo largo del pensamiento de Anscombe está orientado según las siguientes cuestiones:

- La legitimidad de la pregunta filosófica y religiosa sobre la verdad.
- Aclarar la naturaleza original del testimonio cristiano.
- Demostrar que el testimonio es un modo adecuado de conocer y de transmitir

la verdad

- Examen de la relevancia del testimonio en nuestras vidas
- Lugar del testimonio en el panorama epistemológico y la tradición del debate sobre ese lugar
- Qué se puede decir para defender la extensa relevancia que se ha afirmado sobre nuestra confianza en el testimonio

Anscombe no crea un sistema o teoría general en el acercamiento a los problemas filosóficos, más bien toma cada caso en sus propios méritos. Esta evasión de sistema complica la tarea de estudiar su pensamiento. Como respuesta a esta dificultad es útil la metodología empleada por Teichmann en el estudio de la filosofía de Anscombe que él mismo describe en tres momentos: “read thoroughly”, “bring out the manifold connections between her thoughts on different topics” y “engage with what Anscombe says”.

Añado a pie de página los artículos de Anscombe a los que se hará referencia en cada apartado.

Wittgenstein y Anscombe: La Razonabilidad de la Fe

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¹ Ludwig Wittgenstein, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, Wittgenstein, Frege and Ramsey, Wittgenstein: Whose Philosopher?, Wittgenstein's 'two cuts' in the history of philosophy, Consequences of the Picture Theory, On the form of Wittgenstein's writing, Was Wittgenstein a conventionalist?, The Simplicity of the Tractatus, An Introduction to Wittgenstein's Tractatus

El primer apartado recorre la biografía de Anscombe; su desarrollo como filósofa y creyente. Estudia también su relación con Wittgenstein. En este camino examinamos el tema de la razonabilidad de la fe. Cómo Anscombe responde a este aspecto de la fe y cuáles cuestiones Wittgenstein plantea sobre este asunto. Al final de este apartado abrimos la pregunta sobre la verdad.

El primer interés filosófico de Anscombe fue en el tema de la causalidad. El segundo la percepción.

For years, I would spend time, in cafés, for example, staring at objects saying to myself: 'I see a packet. But what do I really see? How can I say that I see here anything more than a yellow expanse?'...I always hated phenomenism and felt trapped by it. I couldn't see my way out of it but I didn't believe it. It was no good pointing to difficulties about it, things which Russell found wrong with it, for example. The strength, the central nerve of it remained alive and ragged achingly. It was only in Wittgenstein's classes in 1944 that I saw the nerve being extracted, the central thought I have got this, and I define yellow"(say) as this being effectively attacked.[viii - ix, M&PM]

'Why should one tell the truth if it's to one's advantage to tell a lie?'

«¿Por qué uno debería de decir la verdad si es para beneficio de uno decir una mentira?» De pie en un portal de su casa, con ocho o nueve años de edad, Wittgenstein no encontraba una objeción a esta consideración. Esta experiencia, si no fue decisiva para el futuro modo de vida del filósofo, es en

cualquier caso característica de su naturaleza en esa época.

2

'wild life striving to erupt into the open'

Tractatus: Connection between language, or thought, and reality

In the Tractatus truth receives a good deal more attention than meaning

Nature of philosophy Accordingly, "the word 'philosophy' must mean something which stands above or below, but not beside the natural sciences" (TLP 4.111). Not surprisingly, then, "most of the propositions and questions to be found in philosophical works are not false but nonsensical" (TLP 4.003). Is, then, philosophy doomed to be nonsense (unsinnig), or, at best, senseless (sinnlos) when it does logic, but, in any case, meaningless? What is left for the philosopher to do, if traditional, or even revolutionary, propositions of metaphysics, epistemology, aesthetics, and ethics cannot be formulated in a sensible manner? The reply to these two questions is found in Wittgenstein's character-

²When I was 8 or 9 I had an experience which if not decisive for my future way of life was at any rate characteristic of my nature at the time. How it happened, I do not know: I only see myself standing in a doorway in our house and thinking 'Why should one tell the truth if it's to one's advantage to tell a lie?' I could see nothing against it. [...] my lies had the aim of making me appear agreeable in the eyes of others. They were simply lies out of cowardice. (Wittgenstein: A Life : Young Ludwig, 1889-1921, Volume 1 By Brian McGuinness p. 48)

rization of philosophy: philosophy is not a theory, or a doctrine, but rather an activity. It is an activity of clarification (of thoughts), and more so, of critique (of language). Described by Wittgenstein, it should be the philosopher's routine activity: to react or respond to the traditional philosophers' musings by showing them where they go wrong, using the tools provided by logical analysis. In other words, by showing them that (some of) their propositions are nonsense.

"All propositions are of equal value" (TLP 6.4)—that could also be the fundamental thought of the book. For it employs a measure of the value of propositions that is done by logic and the notion of limits. It is here, however, with the constraints on the value of propositions, that the tension in the *Tractatus* is most strongly felt. It becomes clear that the notions used by the *Tractatus*—the logical-philosophical notions—do not belong to the world and hence cannot be used to express anything meaningful. Since language, thought and the world, are all isomorphic, any attempt to say in logic (i.e., in language) "this and this there is in the world, that there is not" is doomed to be a failure, since it would mean that logic has got outside the limits of the world, i.e. of itself. That is to say, the *Tractatus* has gone over its own limits, and stands in danger of being nonsensical.

The "solution" to this tension is found in Wittgenstein's final remarks, where he uses the metaphor of the ladder to express the function of the *Tractatus*. It is to be used in order to climb on it, in order to "see the world rightly"; but thereafter it must be recognized as nonsense and be thrown away. Hence:

“whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent” (7).

Philosophical Investigations: 'I'll teach you differences'

meaning gets more attention than truth

par 599. In philosophy we do not draw conclusions. “But it must be like this!” is not a philosophical proposition. Philosophy only states what everyone admits.

nature of philosophy In his later writings Wittgenstein holds, as he did in the *Tractatus*, that philosophers do not—or should not—supply a theory, neither do they provide explanations. “Philosophy just puts everything before us, and neither explains nor deduces anything.—Since everything lies open to view there is nothing to explain” (PI 126). The anti-theoretical stance is reminiscent of the early Wittgenstein, but there are manifest differences. Although the *Tractatus* precludes philosophical theories, it does construct a systematic edifice which results in the general form of the proposition, all the while relying on strict formal logic; the *Investigations* points out the therapeutic non-dogmatic nature of philosophy, verily instructing philosophers in the ways of therapy. “The work of the philosopher consists in marshalling reminders for a particular purpose” (PI 127). Working with reminders and series of examples, different problems are solved. Unlike the *Tractatus* which advanced one philosophical method, in the *Investigations* “there is not a single philosophical method, though there are indeed methods, different therapies, as it were” (PI 133d).

This is directly related to Wittgenstein's eschewal of the logical form or of any a-priori generalization that can be discovered or made in philosophy. Trying to advance such general theses is a temptation which lures philosophers; but the real task of philosophy is both to make us aware of the temptation and to show us how to overcome it. Consequently "a philosophical problem has the form: 'I don't know my way about.'" (PI 123), and hence the aim of philosophy is "to show the fly the way out of the fly-bottle" (PI 309).

The style of the Investigations is strikingly different from that of the Tractatus. Instead of strictly numbered sections which are organized hierarchically in programmatic order, the Investigations fragmentarily voices aphorisms about language-games, family resemblance, forms of life, "sometimes jumping, in a sudden change, from one area to another" (PI Preface). This variation in style is of course essential and is "connected with the very nature of the investigation" (PI Preface). As a matter of fact, Wittgenstein was acutely aware of the contrast between the two stages of his thought, suggesting publication of both texts together in order to make the contrast obvious and clear.

Still, it is precisely via the subject of the nature of philosophy that the fundamental continuity between these two stages, rather than the discrepancy between them, is to be found. In both cases philosophy serves, first, as critique of language. It is through analyzing language's illusive power that the philosopher can expose the traps of meaningless philosophical formulations. This means that what was formerly thought of as a philosophical problem may

now dissolve “and this simply means that the philosophical problems should completely disappear” (PI 133). Two implications of this diagnosis, easily traced back in the *Tractatus*, are to be recognized. One is the inherent dialogical character of philosophy, which is a responsive activity: difficulties and torments are encountered which are then to be dissipated by philosophical therapy. In the *Tractatus*, this took the shape of advice: “The correct method in philosophy would really be the following: to say nothing except what can be said, i.e. propositions of natural science ... and then whenever someone else wanted to say something metaphysical, to demonstrate to him that he had failed to give a meaning to certain signs in his propositions” (TLP 6.53) The second, more far-reaching, “discovery” in the *Investigations* “is the one that enables me to break off philosophizing when I want to” (PI 133). This has been taken to revert back to the ladder metaphor and the injunction to silence in the *Tractatus*.

'I have loved the truth'

'I do not mean, when I say that, that I have the truth'.

Differences in Anscombe

In Anscombe's writing, the two topics of meaning and truth, insofar as they can be separated, seem to enjoy roughly equal status, although her manner of with each is not the same.

A. Almost always invokes meaning in the course of dealing with a topic not belonging as such to philosophy of language. By contrast A. treats truth much more as a topic in its own right.

For A. in indicative sentences sensefulness is associated with bivalence. W. and Russell is in the same side of the fence. For them 'having a sense' was one and the same thing with being true or false. A. says that W. remained on this side of the fence his whole life. (IWT 58, 59) (TEICH192)

"It was left to the moderns to deduce what could be from what could hold of thought, as we see Hume to have done. This trend is still strong. But the ancientys had the better approach, arguing only that a thought was impossible because the thing was impossible, or as the Tractatus puts it, 'an impossible thought is an impossible thought'. (FPW,p .xi) (TEICH 193)

A. does not swallow the whole of the picture theory of propositions. But she sees what is probably the most illuminating thing about W.'s comparison of propositions and pictures; namely, this janus-faced aspect of a proposition, an aspect that can be expressed in various ways... in her lecture "la verdad" A. raises the question having to do with the primacy of truth over falsehood. What is the inequality of truth and falsehood? Anselm solution to this is to ascribe a purpose to the assertion, that of saying what is the case. Can we not make ourselves understood with false propositions just as we have done up till now with true ones? So long as it is known that they are false. No! For a proposition is true if we use it as it is known that they are meant to be false.

La pregunta sobre la Verdad

3

Atendemos en el segundo apartado la pregunta sobre la verdad en los escritos de Anscombe. Este tema nos conducirá a la cuestión sobre la verdad de la fe.

Fe, verdad y testimonio

4

Anscombe estudia el tema de la fe en “Faith” donde nos introducirá al tema del testimonio. Afirma: “the supposition that someone has faith is the supposition that he believes that something –it may be a voice, it may be so-

³ Truth: Anselm and Wittgenstein, Truth: Anselm or Thomas?, Anselm and the Unity of Truth, A theory of Language?, Necessity and Truth, Thought and Action in Aristotle: What is Practical Truth?, Practical Truth

⁴ Faith, What is to believe someone?, A Reply to Mr. C. S. Lewis’s Argument that “Naturalism” is Self-Refuting, Has Mankind One Soul: An Angel Distributed among many Bodies?, Human Essence, La esencia Humana, Plato, Soul and ‘the Unity of Apperception’, Why Anselm’s Proof in the Proslogion is not an ontological argument, On the Hatred of God, On Attachment to Things and Obedience to God, On being on Good Faith, On Humanae Vitae, Philosophers and Economists: Two Philosophers’ Objections to Usury, Retractation, Sin: the McGivney Lectures, The Immortality of the Soul, Two Moral Theologians, You Can Have Sex without Children: Christianity and the New Offer, Morality, Modern Moral Philosophy

mething he has been thought– comes as a word from God. Faith is then the belief he accords to that word.” La relación entre fe y testimonio queda remarcada en “What is It to Believe Someone?”. Estos dos escritos nos ofrecen el vínculo entre la pregunta sobre la verdad, la fe y el testimonio. Al final de este apartado quedará abierta la pregunta sobre el valor epistemológico del testimonio.

La tradición sobre el valor epistemológico del testimonio

5

Realizamos el estudio sobre el lugar epistemológico del testimonio y la tradición de ese lugar desde las aportaciones de Hume. En “Hume and Julius Caesar” Anscombe plantea la postura de Hume sobre el conocimiento por testimonio en el conocimiento de la historia y argumenta sobre ella. “Prophecy and Miracles” y “Hume on Miracles” nos permitan considerar también el valor del testimonio de narraciones extraordinarias.

⁵ Hume and Julius Caesar, Hume on causality: introductory, The Reality of the Past, Causality and Determination, Causality and Extensionality, “Whatever has a beginning of existence must have a cause”: Hume’s Argument Exposed, Times, Beginnings and Causes, Before and After, The Causation of Action, Chisolm on Action, Action, Intention and ‘Double Effect’, Part Three: Causality and time Aristotle and the Sea Battle: De Interpretatione, Chapter IX, Prophecy and Miracles, Hume on Miracles, Modern Moral Philosophy, Good and Bad Human Action

El testimonio en el lenguaje epistémico y creyente

6

Los temas tratados en los anteriores apartados nos han dejado con algunos terminos epistémicos relacionados con el lenguaje sobre el testimonio como autoridad, creer y confiar. En este apartado los examinamos con más detalle y comparamos el testimonio con otros terminos relacionados con el conocimiento como son la percepción, la memoria y los sentidos. Se trata de considerar y valorar el testimonio como parte del lenguaje epistémico y como parte del lenguaje sobre la fe. Al final de este apartado abrimos la pregunta sobre el misterio.

⁶ On Wisdom, Knowledge and Certainty, Knowledge and Reverence for Human Life, 'The General Form of Proposition', Comments on Professor R. L. Gregory's Paper on Perception, On Brute Facts, Will and Emotion, Memory, 'Experience' and Causation, Understanding Proofs: Meno, 85d9 – 86c2, Subjunctive Conditionals, What is it to Believe Someone?, The Intentionality of Sensation, Substance, The Subjectivity of Sensation, Events in the mind, On Sensations of Position, Intention, Pretending, Practical Inference What is it to Believe Someone? Authority in Morals, On the Source of the Authority of the State, The Moral Environment of the Child, On Promising and its justice, and Whether it Need be Respected in Foro Interno, Rules, Rights and Promises, The Two Kinds of error in action

Sentido, sinsentido y misterio

7

En este último apartado examinamos el misterio, el sentido y el sinsentido. Anscombe afirma en “The Question of Linguistic Idealism”: “In the Catholic faith, certain beliefs (such as the Trinity, the Incarnation, the Eucharist) are called ‘mysteries’; this means at the very least that it is neither possible to demonstrate them nor possible to show once and for all that they are not contradictory and absurd. On the other hand contradiction and absurdity is not embraced; «this can be disproved, but I still believe it» is not an attitude of faith at all.”(QLI, 122) Anscombe se pregunta cómo se puede distinguir entre “nonsense” y “mystery”. Su respuesta tiene que ver con nuestro tema del testimonio y en su escrito “On transubstantiation” encontramos un buen lugar para culminar el recorrido por su pensamiento.

⁷ ‘Mysticism’ and Solipsism, Analytical Philosophy and the Spirituality of Man, On Transubstantiation, Parmenides, Mystery and Contradiction, The Question of Linguistic Idealism, Paganism, Superstition and Philosophy, On Piety, or: Plato’s Euthyphro.