


Markov Decision Processes





Slides courtesy of Dan Klein and Pieter Abbeel

University of California, Berkeley

[These slides were created by Dan Klein and Pieter Abbeel for CS188 Intro to AI at UC Berkeley. All CS188 materials are available at <http://ai.berkeley.edu>.]


Stochastic Search Problems

- Instead of dealing with situations where the environment is deterministic, MDPs deal with **stochastic** environments.



Defining MDPs


- Markov decision processes:
 - Set of states S
 - Start state s_0
 - Set of actions A
 - Transitions $P(s' | s, a)$ (or $T(s, a, s')$)
 - Rewards $R(s, a, s')$ (and discount γ)
- MDP quantities so far:
 - Policy = Choice of action for each state
 - Utility = sum of (discounted) rewards



Solution == Policy


- In search problems a solution was a **plan**: a sequence of action that corresponded to the shortest path from the start to a goal.
- Because of the non-determinism in MDPs we cannot simply give a sequence of actions.
- Instead, the solution to an MDP is a **policy**. A policy maps from a state onto the action to take if the agent is in that state.

- $\pi(s) = a$




Optimal Quantities

- The value (utility) of a state s :
 $V^*(s)$ = expected utility starting in s and acting optimally
- The value (utility) of a q-state (s,a) :
 $Q^*(s,a)$ = expected utility starting out having taken action a from state s and (thereafter) acting optimally
- The optimal policy:
 $\pi^*(s)$ = optimal action from state s



The Bellman Equations



How to be optimal:

Step 1: Take correct first action

Step 2: Keep being optimal

The Bellman Equations


- Definition of “optimal utility” via expectimax recurrence gives a simple one-step lookahead relationship amongst optimal utility values

$$V^*(s) = \max_a Q^*(s, a)$$

$$Q^*(s, a) = \sum_{s'} T(s, a, s') [R(s, a, s') + \gamma V^*(s')]$$

$$V^*(s) = \max_a \sum_{s'} T(s, a, s') [R(s, a, s') + \gamma V^*(s')]$$

- These are the Bellman equations, and they characterize optimal values in a way we'll use over and over




Example Hyperdrive MDP

The Millennium Falcon needs to travel far far away, quickly

Three **states**: Cruising, Hyperspace, Crashed

Two **actions**: *Maintain speed*, *Punch it*

Punching it **doubles the reward**, even if it doesn't work.




Value Iteration


- Start with $V_0(s) = 0$: no time steps left means an expected reward sum of zero
- Given vector of $V_k(s)$ values, do one ply of expectimax from each state:

$$V_{k+1}(s) \leftarrow \max_a \sum_{s'} T(s, a, s') [R(s, a, s') + \gamma V_k(s')]$$

- Repeat until convergence
- Complexity of each iteration: $O(S^2A)$
- Theorem: will converge to unique optimal values
 - Basic idea: approximations get refined towards optimal values
 - Policy may converge long before values do





Computing Time-Limited Values




Example: Value Iteration

V_2

V_1



V_0




Assume no discount!

$$V_{k+1}(s) \leftarrow \max_a \sum_{s'} T(s, a, s') [R(s, a, s') + \gamma V_k(s')]$$

Example: Value Iteration

			
V_2	3.5	2.5	0
V_1	2	1	0
V_0	0	0	0



Assume no discount!


$$V_{k+1}(s) \leftarrow \max_a \sum_{s'} T(s, a, s') [R(s, a, s') + \gamma V_k(s')]$$

Value Iteration

- Start with $V_0(s) = 0$: no time steps left means an expected reward sum of zero
- Given vector of $V_k(s)$ values, do one ply of expectimax from each state:


$$V_{k+1}(s) \leftarrow \max_a \sum_{s'} T(s, a, s') [R(s, a, s') + \gamma V_k(s')]$$

- Repeat until convergence
- Complexity of each iteration: $O(S^2A)$
- Theorem: will converge to unique optimal values
 - Basic idea: approximations get refined towards optimal values
 - Policy may converge long before values do




Convergence*

- How do we know the V_k vectors are going to converge?
- Case 1: If the tree has maximum depth M , then V_M holds the actual untruncated values
- Case 2: If the discount is less than 1
 - Sketch: For any state V_k and V_{k+1} can be viewed as depth $k+1$ expectimax results in nearly identical search trees
 - The difference is that on the bottom layer, V_{k+1} has actual rewards while V_k has zeros
 - That last layer is at best all R_{MAX}
 - It is at worst R_{MIN}
 - But everything is discounted by γ^k that far out
 - So V_k and V_{k+1} are at most $\gamma^k \max |R|$ different
 - So as k increases, the values converge




k=0



Noise = 0.2
Discount = 0.9
Living reward = 0

$k=1$



Noise = 0.2
Discount = 0.9
Living reward = 0

k=2



Noise = 0.2
Discount = 0.9
Living reward = 0

k=3



Noise = 0.2
Discount = 0.9
Living reward = 0

$k=4$



Noise = 0.2
Discount = 0.9
Living reward = 0

k=5



Noise = 0.2
Discount = 0.9
Living reward = 0

k=6



Noise = 0.2
Discount = 0.9
Living reward = 0

$k=7$



Noise = 0.2
Discount = 0.9
Living reward = 0

$k=8$



Noise = 0.2
Discount = 0.9
Living reward = 0

$k=9$



Noise = 0.2
Discount = 0.9
Living reward = 0

k=10



Noise = 0.2
Discount = 0.9
Living reward = 0

k=11



Noise = 0.2
Discount = 0.9
Living reward = 0

k=12




Noise = 0.2
Discount = 0.9
Living reward = 0

k=100




Noise = 0.2
Discount = 0.9
Living reward = 0

Policy Methods




Policy Evaluation




Fixed Policies

Do the optimal action



Do what π says to do




- Expectimax trees max over all actions to compute the optimal values
- If we fixed some policy $\pi(s)$, then the tree would be simpler – only one action per state
 - ... though the tree's value would depend on which policy we fixed

Utilities for a Fixed Policy


- Another basic operation: compute the utility of a state s under a fixed (generally non-optimal) policy
- Define the utility of a state s , under a fixed policy π :
 $V^\pi(s)$ = expected total discounted rewards starting in s and following π
- Recursive relation (one-step look-ahead / Bellman equation):

$$V^\pi(s) = \sum_{s'} T(s, \pi(s), s') [R(s, \pi(s), s') + \gamma V^\pi(s')]$$




Example: Policy Evaluation

Always Go Right



Always Go Forward



Example: Policy Evaluation

Always Go Right



Always Go Forward




Policy Evaluation

- How do we calculate the V 's for a fixed policy π ?
- Idea 1: Turn recursive Bellman equations into updates (like value iteration)


$$V_0^\pi(s) = 0$$

$$V_{k+1}^\pi(s) \leftarrow \sum_{s'} T(s, \pi(s), s') [R(s, \pi(s), s') + \gamma V_k^\pi(s')]$$



- Efficiency: $O(S^2)$ per iteration
- Idea 2: Without the maxes, the Bellman equations are just a linear system
 - Solve with Matlab (or your favorite linear system solver)

Policy Extraction



Computing Actions from Values

- Let's imagine we have the optimal values $V^*(s)$
- How should we act?
 - It's not obvious!
- We need to do a mini-expectimax (one step)




$$\pi^*(s) = \arg \max_a \sum_{s'} T(s, a, s') [R(s, a, s') + \gamma V^*(s')]$$

- This is called **policy extraction**, since it gets the policy implied by the values

Computing Actions from Q-Values


- Let's imagine we have the optimal q-values:
- How should we act?
 - Completely trivial to decide!

$$\pi^*(s) = \arg \max_a Q^*(s, a)$$



- Important lesson: actions are easier to select from q-values than values!

Policy Iteration




Problems with Value Iteration

- Value iteration repeats the Bellman updates:

$$V_{k+1}(s) \leftarrow \max_a \sum_{s'} T(s, a, s') [R(s, a, s') + \gamma V_k(s')]$$

- Problem 1: It's slow – $O(S^2A)$ per iteration
- Problem 2: The “max” at each state rarely changes
- Problem 3: The policy often converges long before the values



Policy Iteration

- Alternative approach for optimal values:
 - **Step 1: Policy evaluation:** calculate utilities for some fixed policy (not optimal utilities!) until convergence
 - **Step 2: Policy improvement:** update policy using one-step look-ahead with resulting converged (but not optimal!) utilities as future values
 - Repeat steps until policy converges
- This is **policy iteration**
 - It's still optimal!
 - Can converge (much) faster under some conditions

Policy Iteration

- Step 1 (Policy Evaluation): For fixed current policy π , find values with policy evaluation:
 - Iterate until values converge:

$$V_{k+1}^{\pi_i}(s) \leftarrow \sum_{s'} T(s, \pi_i(s), s') [R(s, \pi_i(s), s') + \gamma V_k^{\pi_i}(s')]$$

- Step 2 (Policy Improvement): For fixed values, get a better policy using policy extraction
 - One-step look-ahead:

$$\pi_{i+1}(s) = \arg \max_a \sum_{s'} T(s, a, s') [R(s, a, s') + \gamma V^{\pi_i}(s')]$$

Comparison

- Both value iteration and policy iteration compute the same thing (all optimal values)
- In value iteration:
 - Every iteration updates both the values and (implicitly) the policy
 - We don't track the policy, but taking the max over actions implicitly recomputes it
- In policy iteration:
 - We do several passes that update utilities with fixed policy (each pass is fast because we consider only one action, not all of them)
 - After the policy is evaluated, a new policy is chosen (slow like a value iteration pass)
 - The new policy will be better (or we're done)
- Both are dynamic programs for solving MDPs


Summary: MDP Algorithms

- So you want to....
 - Compute optimal values: use value iteration or policy iteration
 - Compute values for a particular policy: use policy evaluation
 - Turn your values into a policy: use policy extraction (one-step lookahead)
- These all look the same!
 - They basically are – they are all variations of Bellman updates
 - They all use one-step lookahead expectimax fragments
 - They differ only in whether we plug in a fixed policy or max over actions

Maximum Expected Utility

- Why should we average utilities? Why not minimax?
- Principle of maximum expected utility:
 - A rational agent should choose the action that **maximizes its expected utility, given its knowledge**
- Questions:
 - Where do utilities come from?
 - How do we know such utilities even exist?
 - How do we know that averaging even makes sense?
 - What if our behavior (preferences) can't be described by utilities?

What Utilities to Use?




- For worst-case minimax reasoning, terminal function scale doesn't matter
 - We just want better states to have higher evaluations (get the ordering right)
 - We call this **insensitivity to monotonic transformations**
- For average-case expectimax reasoning, we need *magnitudes* to be meaningful

Utilities

- Utilities are functions from outcomes (states of the world) to real numbers that describe an agent's preferences
- Where do utilities come from?
 - In a game, may be simple (+1/-1)
 - Utilities summarize the agent's goals
 - Theorem: any "rational" preferences can be summarized as a utility function
- We hard-wire utilities and let behaviors emerge
 - Why don't we let agents pick utilities?
 - Why don't we prescribe behaviors?



Utilities: Uncertain Outcomes




Preferences


- An agent must have preferences among:

- Prizes: A , B , etc.
- Lotteries: situations with uncertain prizes

A Prize



A Lottery




$$L = [p, A; (1 - p), B]$$

- Notation:

- Preference:
 $A \succ B$
- Indifference:
 $A \sim B$



Rationality




Rational Preferences

- We want some constraints on preferences before we call them rational, such as:

Axiom of Transitivity: $(A \succeq B) \wedge (B \succeq C) \Rightarrow (A \succeq C)$

- For example: an agent with **intransitive preferences** can be induced to give away all of its money
 - If $B > C$, then an agent with C would pay (say) 1 cent to get B
 - If $A > B$, then an agent with B would pay (say) 1 cent to get A
 - If $C > A$, then an agent with A would pay (say) 1 cent to get C



Rational Preferences

The Axioms of Rationality

Orderability

$$(A \succ B) \vee (B \succ A) \vee (A \sim B)$$

Transitivity

$$(A \succ B) \wedge (B \succ C) \Rightarrow (A \succ C)$$

Continuity

$$A \succ B \succ C \Rightarrow \exists p [p, A; 1 - p, C] \sim B$$

Substitutability

$$A \sim B \Rightarrow [p, A; 1 - p, C] \sim [p, B; 1 - p, C]$$

Monotonicity

$$A \succ B \Rightarrow (p \geq q \Leftrightarrow [p, A; 1 - p, B] \succeq [q, A; 1 - q, B])$$



Theorem: Rational preferences imply behavior describable as maximization of expected utility


MEU Principle

- Theorem [Ramsey, 1931; von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944]
 - Given any preferences satisfying these constraints, there exists a real-valued function U such that:


$$U(A) \geq U(B) \Leftrightarrow A \succeq B$$

$$U([p_1, S_1; \dots ; p_n, S_n]) = \sum_i p_i U(S_i)$$

- I.e. values assigned by U preserve preferences of both prizes and lotteries!
- Maximum expected utility (MEU) principle:
 - Choose the action that maximizes expected utility
 - Note: an agent can be entirely rational (consistent with MEU) without ever representing or manipulating utilities and probabilities
 - E.g., a lookup table for perfect tic-tac-toe, a reflex vacuum cleaner



Human Utilities



Utility Scales

- **Normalized utilities:** $u_+ = 1.0$, $u_- = 0.0$
- **Micromorts:** one-millionth chance of death, useful for paying to reduce product risks, etc.
- **QALYs:** quality-adjusted life years, useful for medical decisions involving substantial risk
- Note: behavior is invariant under positive linear transformation

$$U'(x) = k_1 U(x) + k_2 \quad \text{where } k_1 > 0$$

- With deterministic prizes only (no lottery choices), only **ordinal utility** can be determined, i.e., total order on prizes



Micromort examples

Death from	Micromorts per exposure
Scuba diving	5 per dive
Skydiving	7 per jump
Base-jumping	430 per jump
Climbing Mt. Everest	38,000 per ascent

1 Micromort	
Train travel	6000 miles
Jet	1000 miles
Car	230 miles
Walking	17 miles
Bicycle	10 miles
Motorbike	6 miles




Human Utilities

- Utilities map states to real numbers. Which numbers?
- Standard approach to assessment (elicitation) of human utilities:
 - Compare a prize A to a **standard lottery** L_p between
 - “best possible prize” u_+ with probability p
 - “worst possible catastrophe” u_- with probability $1-p$
 - Adjust lottery probability p until indifference: $A \sim L_p$
 - Resulting p is a utility in $[0,1]$




Pay \$30

~




Money

- Money does not behave as a utility function, but we can talk about the utility of having money (or being in debt)
- Given a lottery $L = [p, \$X; (1-p), \$Y]$
 - The **expected monetary value** $EMV(L)$ is $p \cdot X + (1-p) \cdot Y$
 - $U(L) = p \cdot U(\$X) + (1-p) \cdot U(\$Y)$
 - Typically, $U(L) < U(EMV(L))$
 - In this sense, people are **risk-averse**
 - When deep in debt, people are **risk-prone**



Example: Insurance

- Consider the lottery $[0.5, \$1000; 0.5, \$0]$
 - What is its **expected monetary value**? (\$500)
 - What is its **certainty equivalent**?
 - Monetary value acceptable in lieu of lottery
 - \$400 for most people
 - Difference of \$100 is the **insurance premium**
 - There's an insurance industry because people will pay to reduce their risk
 - If everyone were risk-neutral, no insurance needed!
 - It's win-win: you'd rather have the \$400 and the insurance company would rather have the lottery (their utility curve is linear and they have many lotteries)



Example: Human Rationality?

- Famous example of Allais (1953)

- A: [0.8, \$4k; 0.2, \$0]
- B: [1.0, \$3k; 0.0, \$0]
- C: [0.2, \$4k; 0.8, \$0]
- D: [0.25, \$3k; 0.75, \$0]

- Most people prefer $B > A$, $C > D$

- But if $U(\$0) = 0$, then

- $B > A \Rightarrow U(\$3k) > 0.8 U(\$4k)$
- $C > D \Rightarrow 0.8 U(\$4k) > U(\$3k)$

