RISK AND PLANNING FOR MISTAKES II

Eunsuk Kang

LEARNING GOALS:

- Evaluate the risks of mistakes from AI components using the fault tree analysis (FTA)
- Design strategies for mitigating the risks of failures due to Al mistakes

RISK ANALYSIS

• What can possibly go wrong in my system, and what are potential impacts on system requirements?

- What can possibly go wrong in my system, and what are potential impacts on system requirements?
- Risk = Likelihood * Impact

- What can possibly go wrong in my system, and what are potential impacts on system requirements?
- Risk = Likelihood * Impact
- A number of methods:
 - Failure mode & effects analysis (FMEA)
 - Hazard analysis
 - Why-because analysis
 - Fault tree analysis (FTA) <= Today's focus!
 - **...**


RISKS?

- Lane assist system
- Credit rating
- Amazon product recommendation
- Audio transcription service
- Cancer detection
- Predictive policing

Discuss potential risks, including impact and likelyhood




FAULT TREE ANALYSIS (FTA)




FAULT TREE ANALYSIS (FTA)

- Fault tree: A top-down diagram that displays the relationships between a system failure (i.e., requirement violation) and its potential causes.
 - Identify sequences of events that result in a failure
 - Prioritize the contributors leading to the failure
 - Inform decisions about how to (re-)design the system
 - Investigate an accident & identify the root cause



FAULT TREE ANALYSIS (FTA)

- Fault tree: A top-down diagram that displays the relationships between a system failure (i.e., requirement violation) and its potential causes.
 - Identify sequences of events that result in a failure
 - Prioritize the contributors leading to the failure
 - Inform decisions about how to (re-)design the system
 - Investigate an accident & identify the root cause
- Often used for safety & reliability, but can also be used for other types of requirement (e.g., poor performance, security attacks...)




• Increaseingly used in automotive, aeronautics, industrial control systems, etc.,

- Increaseingly used in automotive, aeronautics, industrial control systems, etc.,
- Al is just one part of the system


- Increaseingly used in automotive, aeronautics, industrial control systems, etc.,
- Al is just one part of the system
- AI will EVENTUALLY make mistakes
 - Ouput wrong predictions/values
 - Fail to adapt to changing environment
 - Confuse users, etc.,

- Increaseingly used in automotive, aeronautics, industrial control systems, etc.,
- Al is just one part of the system
- AI will EVENTUALLY make mistakes
 - Ouput wrong predictions/values
 - Fail to adapt to changing environment
 - Confuse users, etc.,
- How do mistakes made by AI contribute to system failures? How do we ensure their mistakes do not result in a catastrophe?

FAULT TREES:: BASIC BUILDING BLOCKS




FAULT TREES:: BASIC BUILDING BLOCKS




- Event: An occurrence of a fault or an undesirable action
 - (Intermediate) Event: Explained in terms of other events
 - Basic Event: No further development or breakdown; leafs of the tree

FAULT TREES:: BASIC BUILDING BLOCKS




- Event: An occurrence of a fault or an undesirable action
 - (Intermediate) Event: Explained in terms of other events
 - Basic Event: No further development or breakdown; leafs of the tree
- Gate: Logical relationship between an event & its immedicate subevents
 - AND: All of the sub-events must take place
 - OR: Any one of the sub-events may result in the parent event

FAULT TREE EXAMPLE




FAULT TREE EXAMPLE



• Every tree begins with a TOP event (typically a violation of a requirement)

FAULT TREE EXAMPLE




- Every tree begins with a TOP event (typically a violation of a requirement)
- Every branch of the tree must terminate with a basic event

ANALYSIS

- What can we do with fault trees?
 - Qualitative analysis: Determine potential root causes of a failiure through minimal cut set analysis
 - Quantitative analysis: Compute the probablity of a failure

MINIMAL CUT SET ANALYSIS



- Cut set: A set of basic events whose simultaneous occurrence is sufficient to guarantee that the TOP event occurs.
- Minimal cut set: A cut set from which a smaller cut set can be obtained by removing a basic event.
- Q. What are minimal cut sets in the above tree?

FAILURE PROBABILITY ANALYSIS

FAILURE PROBABILITY ANALYSIS

- To compute the probability of the top event:
 - Assign probabilities to basic events (based on domain knowledge)
 - Apply probability theory to compute prob. of intermediate events through AND & OR gates
 - (Alternatively, as sum of prob. of minimal cut sets)

FAILURE PROBABILITY ANALYSIS

- To compute the probability of the top event:
 - Assign probabilities to basic events (based on domain knowledge)
 - Apply probability theory to compute prob. of intermediate events through AND & OR gates
 - (Alternatively, as sum of prob. of minimal cut sets)
- In this class, we won't ask you to do this.
 - Why is this especially challenging for software?

- 1. Specify the system structure
 - Environment entities & machine components
 - Assumptions (ENV) & specifications (SPEC)

- 1. Specify the system structure
 - Environment entities & machine components
 - Assumptions (ENV) & specifications (SPEC)
- 2. Identify the top event as a violation of REQ

- 1. Specify the system structure
 - Environment entities & machine components
 - Assumptions (ENV) & specifications (SPEC)
- 2. Identify the top event as a violation of REQ
- 3. Construct the fault tree
 - Intermediate events can be derived from violation of SPEC/ENV

- 1. Specify the system structure
 - Environment entities & machine components
 - Assumptions (ENV) & specifications (SPEC)
- 2. Identify the top event as a violation of REQ
- 3. Construct the fault tree
 - Intermediate events can be derived from violation of SPEC/ENV
- 4. Analyze the tree
 - Identify all possible minimal cut sets

- 1. Specify the system structure
 - Environment entities & machine components
 - Assumptions (ENV) & specifications (SPEC)
- 2. Identify the top event as a violation of REQ
- 3. Construct the fault tree
 - Intermediate events can be derived from violation of SPEC/ENV
- 4. Analyze the tree
 - Identify all possible minimal cut sets
- 5. Consider design modifications to eliminate certain cut sets

FTA PROCESS


- 1. Specify the system structure
 - Environment entities & machine components
 - Assumptions (ENV) & specifications (SPEC)
- 2. Identify the top event as a violation of REQ
- 3. Construct the fault tree
 - Intermediate events can be derived from violation of SPEC/ENV
- 4. Analyze the tree
 - Identify all possible minimal cut sets
- 5. Consider design modifications to eliminate certain cut sets
- 6. Repeat

EXAMPLE: FTA FOR LANE ASSIST



- REQ: The vehicle must be prevented from veering off the lane.
- ENV: Sensors are providing accurate information about the lane; driver responses when given warning; steering wheel is functional
- SPEC: Lane detection accurately identifies the lane markings; the controller generates correct steering commands to keep the vehicle within lane

EXAMPLE: FTA FOR LANE ASSIST




MITIGATION STRATEGIES

ELEMENTS OF FAULT-TOLERANT DESIGN


- Assume: Components will fail at some point
- Goal: Minimize the impact of failures
- Detection
 - Monitoring
- Response
 - Graceful degradation (fail-safe)
 - Redundancy (fail over)
- Containment
 - Decoupling & isolation

DETECTION: MONITORING



- Goal: Detect when a component failure occurs
- Heartbeat pattern
 - Periodically sends diagnostic message to monitor
- Doer-Checker pattern
 - Doer: Perform primary function; untrusted and potentially faulty
 - Checker: If doer output faulty, perform corrective action (e.g., default safe output, shutdown); trusted and verifiable

DOER-CHECKER EXAMPLE: AUTONOMOUS VEHICLE




- ML-based controller (doer): Generate commands to maneuver vehicle
 - Complex DNN; makes performance-optimal control decisions
- Safe controller (**checker**): Checks commands from ML controller; overrides it with a safe default command if maneuver deemed risky
 - Simpler, based on verifiable, transparent logic; conservative control

RESPONSE: GRACEFUL DEGRADATION (FAIL-SAFE)




- **Goal**: When a component failure occurs, continue to provide safety (possibly at reduced functionality and performance)
- Relies on a monitor to detect component failures
- Example: Perception in autonomous vehicles
 - If Lidar fails, switch to a lower-quality detector; be more conservative
 - But what about other types of ML failures? (e.g., misclassification)

RESPONSE: REDUNDANCY (FAILOVER)



- Goal: When a component fails, continue to provide the same functionality
- Hot Standby: Standby watches & takes over when primary fails
- Voting: Select the majority decision
- Caution: Do components fail independently?
 - Reasonable assumption for hardware/mechanical failures
 - Q. What about software?

RESPONSE: REDUNDANCY (FAILOVER)



- Goal: When a component fails, continue to provide the same functionality
- Hot Standby: Standby watches & takes over when primary fails
- Voting: Select the majority decision
- Caution: Do components fail independently?
 - Reasonable assumption for hardware/mechanical failures
 - Software: Difficult to achieve independence even when built by different teams (e.g., N-version programming)
 - Q. ML components?

RESPONSE: HUMAN IN THE LOOP

Less forceful interaction, making suggestions, asking for confirmation

- Al and humans are good at predictions in different settings
 - AI better at statistics at scale and many factors
 - Humans understand context and data generation process and often better with thin data
- Al for prediction, human for judgment?
- But:
- Notification fatigue, complacency, just following predictions; see
 Tesla autopilot
- Compliance/liability protection only?
- Deciding when and how to interact
- Lots of UI design and HCI problems

Examples?

Speaker notes

Cancer prediction, sentencing + recidivism, Tesla autopilot, military "kill" decisions, powerpoint design suggestions

RESPONSE: UNDOABLE ACTIONS

Design system to reduce consequence of wrong predictions, allowing humans to override/undo

Examples?

Speaker notes

Smart home devices, credit card applications, Powerpoint design suggestions

CONTAINMENT: DECOUPLING & ISOLATION


• Goal: Faults in a low-critical (LC) components should not impact high-critical (HC) components

POOR DECOUPLING: USS YORKTOWN (1997)



- Invalid data entered into DB; divide-by-zero crashes entire network
- Required rebooting the whole system; ship dead in water for 3 hours
- Lesson: Handle expected component faults; prevent propagation

POOR DECOUPLING: AUTOMOTIVE SECURITY




- Main components connected through a common CAN bus
 - Broadcast; no access control (anyone can read/write)
- Can control brake/engine by playing a malicious MP3 (Stefan Savage, UCSD)

CONTAINMENT: DECOUPLING & ISOLATION

- Goal: Faults in a low-critical (LC) components should not impact high-critical (HC) components
- Apply the principle of least privilege
 - LC components should be allowed to access min. necessary data
- Limit interactions across criticality boundaries
 - Deploy LC & HC components on different networks
 - Add monitors/checks at interfaces
- Identify and eliminate implicit interactions
 - Memory: Shared memory, global variables
 - CPU resources: LC tasks running at high-priority, starving HC tasks
- Is AI in my system performing an LC or HC task?
 - If HC, can we "demote" it into LC?


EXAMPLE: RADIATION THERAPY



• Safety requirement: If door opens during treatment, insert beam block.


EXISTING DESIGN

- Which components are responsible for establishing this safety requirement (e.g., high critical)?
- Existing design includes:
 - Pub/sub event handler: 3rdparty library; missing source code; company went bankrupt
 - Event logging: May throw an error if disk full
 - Event handler/logging used by all tasks, including LC ones
- Is it possible to achieve high confidence that these HC components don't fail?



ALTERNATIVE DESIGN

- Build in an emergency unit
 - Bypass event handler for HC tasks
- Still needs to rely on door & beam controllers
 - Can't eliminate the risk of failure, but significantly reduce it
 - Emergency unit simpler, can be verified & tested



SUMMARY

- Accept that ML components will make mistakes
- Use risk analysis to identify and mitigate potential problems
- Design strategies for detecting and mitigating the risks from mistakes by Al



