

# A Paradox of Blown Leads: Rethinking Win Probability in Team Sports


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# Case Study: Super Bowl LVII

- At the start of the 2nd half, the Chiefs trailed the Eagles 14–24 and faced a 3rd and 1 at their own 34
- At that point, the Eagles' projected win probability was 78.4%
- On the next play, Jerick McKinnon converted with a 14-yard run, and the Chiefs would go on to score, eventually winning 38–35.



Data via nflfastR

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- To investigate this, we formalize the question mathematically.

# Mathematical Framework

- The win probability of a team  $i$  at time  $t$  is a function of team strength  $S_i$  and game state  $(\mathcal{G}, t)$ . Symbolically,

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- We will investigate the distribution of  $M_\ell$  as a function of the team strengths  $S_A$  and  $S_B$ .

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- So the win prob. for each possible game state  $(\mathcal{G}, t)$  is given by

$$\begin{aligned} \text{WP}_A(t) = & \mathbb{P}[\text{Binom}(n_t, p_A) + \text{score}_A(t) > \text{Binom}(n_t, p_B) + \text{score}_B(t)] \\ & + \frac{p_A}{p_A + p_B} \mathbb{P}(\text{A and B tie}) \end{aligned}$$

where  $n_t = N - t$  is the number of possessions remaining.



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
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
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  - Case 1:  $p_A = p_B$ ,  $f$  is symmetric across teams
  - Case 2:  $p_A \neq p_B$ ,  $f$  is asymmetric across teams

# Symmetric Case: $p_A = p_B$





# Symmetric Case: Threshold Plot



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
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
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- Holding  $p_A = p_B$  constant, the distribution of  $M_\ell$  becomes less discrete and approaches a continuous limit as  $N$  increases.
- In **about half** of all games, the losing team attains a win probability of at least **66% or more**.

# Asymmetric Case: $p_A \neq p_B$



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- Larger strength differentials decrease the proportion of games where the losing team attains a high win probability.

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- Since  $\tau_x$  is a stopping time, we invoke the optional stopping theorem to derive the distribution of  $M_A$ .

# Closed-Form Distributions: Discrete Case

- **Theorem 1:** The distribution of  $M_A$  satisfies:

$$F_{M_A}(x) \geq 1 - \frac{p_0}{x}, \quad x \in [p_0, 1)$$

with equality when  $\mathbb{P}(\tau_x = N) = 0$  (continuous limits).<sup>1</sup>

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- **Theorem 2:** The conditional distribution of  $M_A$  given that team  $A$  loses satisfies:

$$F_{M_A|Y=0}(x) \geq 1 - \left( \frac{p_0}{1-p_0} \right) \cdot \left( \frac{1-x}{x} \right), \quad x \in [p_0, 1)$$

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- **Theorem 3:** Since team labels are arbitrary, let team  $A$  be the favorite ( $p_0 \geq 0.5$ ). Then the distribution of  $M_\ell$  satisfies:

$$F_{M_\ell}(x) \geq \begin{cases} 1 - \frac{1 - p_0}{x} & \text{if } x \in [1 - p_0, p_0) \\ 2 - \frac{1}{x} & \text{if } x \in [p_0, 1) \end{cases}$$

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  - For example, consider the simplest case:  $N = 1$  and  $p_0 = 0.5$ .

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- In discrete time, there are **finitely-many** levels for  $WP_A$  and  $WP_B$ , so the process can “jump over” level  $x$  at the final step.
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  - In this limit, the process becomes continuous and we can derive exact closed-form expressions for the distributions of  $M_A$ ,  $M_B$ , and  $M_\ell$ .
  - In addition, **Donsker's Invariance Principle** allows us to approximate the scoring process  $X_k$  with a Brownian motion!

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- Then define the following quantities:
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- Then by Donsker's Invariance Principle, we have that

$$\frac{X_{\lfloor Nt \rfloor}}{\sigma\sqrt{N}} \xrightarrow{d} B_t + \mu^* t, \quad \mu^* = \frac{\sqrt{N}\mu}{\sigma}, \quad t \in [0, 1]$$

where  $B_t$  is standard Brownian motion.

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- Then we invoke the optional stopping theorem and use properties of Brownian motion to derive the distribution of  $M_A, M_B$ , and  $M_\ell$ .

- **Theorem 4:** The distribution of  $M_A$  satisfies:

$$F_{M_A}(x) = 1 - \frac{p_0}{x} = 1 - \frac{\Phi(\mu^*)}{x}, \quad x \in [\Phi(\mu^*), 1)$$



# Closed-Form Distributions: Continuous Case

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- **Theorem 5:** The conditional distribution of  $M_A$  given that team  $A$  loses satisfies:

$$\begin{aligned} F_{M_A|Y=0}(x) &= 1 - \left( \frac{p_0}{1-p_0} \right) \cdot \left( \frac{1-x}{x} \right), \quad x \in [p_0, 1) \\ &= 1 - \left( \frac{\Phi(\mu^*)}{1-\Phi(\mu^*)} \right) \cdot \left( \frac{1-x}{x} \right), \quad x \in [\Phi(\mu^*), 1) \end{aligned}$$

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- **Theorem 6:** Since team labels are arbitrary, let team  $A$  be the favorite ( $\mu^* \geq 0$ ). Then the distribution of  $M_\ell$  satisfies

$$F_{M_\ell}(x) = \begin{cases} 1 - \frac{1 - p_0}{x} & \text{if } x \in [1 - p_0, p_0) \\ 2 - \frac{1}{x} & \text{if } x \in [p_0, 1) \end{cases}$$

where  $p_0 = \Phi(\mu^*)$ .

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
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
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  - Scoring often isn't binary!
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  - Weather, injuries, game strategy, and other external factors matter!
- Let's take a look at the distribution of  $M_\ell$  for real-life games...

# Evenly-Matched NFL Games (2002–2024, $|\text{Spread}| < 2$ )




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
# Unevenly-Matched NFL Games: 2002–2024, $|\text{Spread}| = 3$



Games = 1005; Mean = 0.679, SD = 0.143

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# Conclusions

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- Blown leads happen **all the time**, especially in even matchups!

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- Blown leads happen **all the time**, especially in even matchups!
- Conditioning on an eventual loss **fundamentally changes** the distribution of the maximum win probability attained.

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- From this position (assuming a well-calibrated model) **it's true** that the Eagles only had a 21.6% chance of losing the game.
- However, the event that the eventual loser of this game reached 78.4% is **provably closer** to 30%.

# Acknowledgements

- Special thanks to Professor Jiaoyang Huang, Dr. Paul Sabin, and Dr. Ryan Brill for their helpful feedback.
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# Proof of Theorem 1

- **Theorem 1:** When  $p_A = p_B$ , the cumulative distribution of  $M$  satisfies

$$F_M(x) \geq 1 - \frac{p_0}{x}, \quad x \in [p_0, 1)$$

with equality exactly when  $\mathbb{P}(\tau_x = N) = 0$ .

# Proof of Theorem 1 (continued)

- If  $x \leq p_0$ , then  $\tau_x = 0$  a.s., so  $M \geq x$  a.s. and  $F_M(x) = 0$ .
- For  $x > p_0$ , by the optional stopping theorem on the bounded martingale  $(p_k)$  at  $\tau_x \wedge N$ :

$$\mathbb{E}[p_{\tau_x \wedge N}] = p_0$$

- Decomposing this:

$$p_0 = \mathbb{E}[p_{\tau_x} \mathbf{1}_{\{\tau_x < N\}}] + \mathbb{E}[p_N \mathbf{1}_{\{\tau_x = N\}}]$$

- Since  $p_{\tau_x} = x$  on  $\{\tau_x < N\}$  and  $p_N = 1$  on  $\{\tau_x = N\}$ :

$$p_0 = x\mathbb{P}(\tau_x < N) + \mathbb{P}(\tau_x = N)$$

# Proof of Theorem 1 (continued)

- Since  $\mathbb{P}(M \geq x) = \mathbb{P}(\tau_x < N) + \mathbb{P}(\tau_x = N)$ :

$$p_0 = x\mathbb{P}(M \geq x) + (1 - x)\mathbb{P}(\tau_x = N)$$

- For  $x < 1$ ,  $\mathbb{P}(\tau_x = N) \geq 0$  and we have:

$$\mathbb{P}(M \geq x) \leq \frac{p_0}{x}, \quad x \in [p_0, 1)$$

with equality exactly when  $\mathbb{P}(\tau_x = N) = 0$ .

- When  $x = 1$ ,  $\tau_x = N$  a.s., so:

$$\mathbb{P}(M \geq 1) = \mathbb{P}(M = 1) = p_0$$

- **Theorem 2:** When  $p_A = p_B$ , the cumulative distribution of  $M$  conditional on  $Y = 0$  satisfies

$$F_{M|Y=0}(x) \geq 1 - \left( \frac{p_0}{1 - p_0} \right) \cdot \left( \frac{1 - x}{x} \right), \quad x \in [p_0, 1)$$

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## Proof of Theorem 2 (continued)

- Decompose the event  $\{M \geq x\}$ :

$$\mathbb{P}(M \geq x) = \mathbb{P}(M \geq x, Y = 0) + \mathbb{P}(M \geq x, Y = 1)$$

- On  $\{Y = 1\}$ ,  $p_N = 1 \geq x$  a.s. So  $\{M \geq x\} \cap \{Y = 1\} = \{Y = 1\}$ :

$$\begin{aligned}\mathbb{P}(M \geq x) &= \mathbb{P}(Y = 1) + \mathbb{P}(M \geq x, Y = 0) \\ &= \mathbb{P}(Y = 1) + \mathbb{P}(Y = 0)\mathbb{P}(M \geq x \mid Y = 0) \\ &= p_0 + (1 - p_0)\mathbb{P}(M \geq x \mid Y = 0)\end{aligned}$$

- From Theorem 1:  $\frac{p_0}{x} \geq p_0 + (1 - p_0)\mathbb{P}(M \geq x \mid Y = 0)$
- Solving for  $\mathbb{P}(M \geq x \mid Y = 0)$ :

$$\mathbb{P}(M \geq x \mid Y = 0) \leq \left( \frac{p_0}{1 - p_0} \right) \cdot \left( \frac{1 - x}{x} \right)$$

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- **Theorem 3:** When  $p_A = p_B$ , the distribution of  $M_\ell$  satisfies

$$F_{M_\ell}(x) \geq 2 - \frac{1}{x}, \quad x \in [0.5, 1)$$

with equality exactly when  $\mathbb{P}(\tau_x = N) = 0$ .

## Proof of Theorem 3 (continued)

- Since  $p_A = p_B$ , we have  $p_0 = 0.5$  and the mixture weights are equal.
- From Theorem 2, both conditional distributions are identical:

$$F_{M_A|Y=0}(x) = F_{M_B|Y=1}(x) \geq 1 - \left(\frac{0.5}{0.5}\right) \cdot \left(\frac{1-x}{x}\right) = 1 - \frac{1-x}{x}$$

- Since both teams have identical distributions, the mixture is simply:

$$F_{M_\ell}(x) \geq 0.5 \cdot F_{M_A|Y=0}(x) + 0.5 \cdot F_{M_B|Y=1}(x) = 1 - \frac{1-x}{x} = 2 - \frac{1}{x}$$

- **Theorem 4:** When  $p_A \neq p_B$ , the cumulative distribution of  $M$  satisfies

$$F_M(x) = 1 - \frac{p_0}{x} = 1 - \frac{\Phi(\mu^*)}{x}, \quad x \in [p_0, 1)$$



## Proof of Theorem 4 (continued)

- By the optional stopping theorem on the bounded martingale  $(p_t)$  at  $\tau_x \wedge 1$ :

$$\mathbb{E}[p_{\tau_x \wedge 1}] = p_0$$

- Decomposing this:

$$p_0 = \mathbb{E}[p_{\tau_x} \mathbf{1}_{\{\tau_x < 1\}}] + \mathbb{E}[p_1 \mathbf{1}_{\{\tau_x = 1\}}]$$

- Since  $p_{\tau_x} = x$  on  $\{\tau_x < 1\}$  and  $p_1 = 1$  on  $\{\tau_x = 1\}$ :

$$p_0 = x\mathbb{P}(\tau_x < 1) + \mathbb{P}(\tau_x = 1)$$

- Since  $\mathbb{P}(M \geq x) = \mathbb{P}(\tau_x < 1) + \mathbb{P}(\tau_x = 1)$ :

$$p_0 = x\mathbb{P}(M \geq x) + \mathbb{P}(\tau_x = 1)$$

## Proof of Theorem 4 (continued)

- For  $x < 1$ ,  $\mathbb{P}(\tau_x = 1) = 0$  (continuous paths), so:

$$\mathbb{P}(M \geq x) = \frac{p_0}{x} = \frac{\Phi(\mu^*)}{x}, \quad x \in [p_0, 1)$$

- When  $x = 1$ ,  $\tau_x = 1$  a.s., so:

$$\mathbb{P}(M \geq 1) = \mathbb{P}(M = 1) = p_0 = \Phi(\mu^*)$$

- **Theorem 5:** When  $p_A \neq p_B$ , the conditional distribution of  $M$  given  $Y = 0$  satisfies

$$F_{M|Y=0}(x) = 1 - \left( \frac{p_0}{1 - p_0} \right) \cdot \left( \frac{1 - x}{x} \right), \quad x \in [p_0, 1)$$

where  $p_0 = \Phi(\mu^*)$  and  $M = 0$  for  $x \in [0, p_0)$ .

## Proof of Theorem 5 (continued)

- Decompose the event  $\{M \geq x\}$ :

$$\mathbb{P}(M \geq x) = \mathbb{P}(M \geq x, Y = 0) + \mathbb{P}(M \geq x, Y = 1)$$

- On  $\{Y = 1\}$ ,  $p_1 = 1 \geq x$  a.s. So  $\{M \geq x\} \cap \{Y = 1\} = \{Y = 1\}$ :

$$\begin{aligned}\mathbb{P}(M \geq x) &= \mathbb{P}(Y = 1) + \mathbb{P}(M \geq x, Y = 0) \\ &= \mathbb{P}(Y = 1) + \mathbb{P}(Y = 0)\mathbb{P}(M \geq x \mid Y = 0) \\ &= p_0 + (1 - p_0)\mathbb{P}(M \geq x \mid Y = 0)\end{aligned}$$

- From Theorem 4:  $\frac{p_0}{x} = p_0 + (1 - p_0)\mathbb{P}(M \geq x \mid Y = 0)$
- Solving for  $\mathbb{P}(M \geq x \mid Y = 0)$ :

$$\mathbb{P}(M \geq x \mid Y = 0) = \left( \frac{p_0}{1 - p_0} \right) \cdot \left( \frac{1 - x}{x} \right)$$

- **Theorem 6:** When  $p_A \neq p_B$ , let team  $A$  be the favorite ( $\mu^* \geq 0$ ). Then the distribution of  $M_\ell$  satisfies

$$F_{M_\ell}(x) = \begin{cases} 1 - \frac{1 - p_0}{x} & \text{if } x \in [1 - p_0, p_0) \\ 2 - \frac{1}{x} & \text{if } x \in [p_0, 1) \end{cases}$$

where  $p_0 = \Phi(\mu^*)$  and  $M_\ell = 0$  for  $x \in [0, 1 - p_0)$ .

# Proof of Theorem 6 (continued)

- The distribution of  $M_\ell$  is a mixture:

$$F_{M_\ell}(x) = (1 - p_0)F_{M_A|Y=0}(x) + p_0F_{M_B|Y=1}(x).$$

- From Theorem 5, we have the conditional distributions:

$$F_{M_A|Y=0}(x) = \begin{cases} 0 & x \in [0, p_0) \\ 1 - \left(\frac{p_0}{1-p_0}\right) \cdot \left(\frac{1-x}{x}\right) & x \in [p_0, 1) \end{cases}$$

$$F_{M_B|Y=1}(x) = \begin{cases} 0 & x \in [0, 1 - p_0) \\ 1 - \left(\frac{1-p_0}{p_0}\right) \cdot \left(\frac{x}{1-x}\right) & x \in [1 - p_0, 1) \end{cases}$$

## Proof of Theorem 6 (continued)

- For  $x \in [1 - p_0, p_0)$ :  $F_{M_A|Y=0}(x) = 0$  (since  $x < p_0$ ), so

$$\begin{aligned} F_{M_\ell}(x) &= (1 - p_0) \cdot 0 + p_0 \cdot \left(1 - \frac{1 - p_0}{p_0} \cdot \frac{x}{1 - x}\right) \\ &= 1 - \frac{1 - p_0}{x} \end{aligned}$$

- For  $x \in [p_0, 1)$ : Both terms contribute, giving

$$\begin{aligned} F_{M_\ell}(x) &= (1 - p_0) \left(1 - \frac{p_0}{1 - p_0} \cdot \frac{1 - x}{x}\right) + p_0 \left(1 - \frac{1 - p_0}{p_0} \cdot \frac{x}{1 - x}\right) \\ &= 2 - \frac{1}{x} \end{aligned}$$