How to dissect cyber theatre and be deeply technical curious!



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Another informal Uhlmann dinnertime conversation.

There are four themes for today

- 1. You cannot dissect cyber theatre by being technical.
- 2. You can be technically correct and wrong.
- 3. Curiosity is more powerful and useful.
- 4. Stop asking are you Technical and ask more open questions that drive innovation.

We're going to quickly review what being technical means, then what being curious means and why it's important.

We'll then run through some fun case studies to illustrate the difference.

We're going to also keep coming back to asking "Is this really the best/most critical advice right now?"



adjective characterizing or showing skill in or specialized knowledge of applied arts and sciences

Gobbledygook

language that is meaningless or is made unintelligible by excessive use of abstruse technical terms; nonsense.







Technical comes from the Greek tekhno, which means "art or skill." Anything technical requires both art and skill. If you're an Olympic gymnast, you have technical abilities. You might go to a technical school to learn how to be a chef, a mechanic, or a massage therapist.

So that means without context it is meaningless.

The most senior software developer on a team is often not the most technical. They add value to design and code reviews by asking questions - not by reviewing technical syntax. They coach junior developers to stop focussing on the perfect syntax and elegant object-orientated design and instead to ask questions about business value, unexpected costs and worst-case scenarios.

Closed questions like 'are you technical?' are a mutual disbenefit. They both gatekeep others access to conversations, but also your access to learn from other perspectives.

So, what are the (open) questions we should be asking instead?



Why does cyber security exist? What is our primary function?

Favourite analogies –

Cars have brakes so that they can **drive faster**.

The role of the NASA janitor was to **put people on the moon**.



First and foremost: We are there to solve problems and **enable business** to thrive. Reading LinkedIn posts, it's easy to assume that the majority of cyber security workforce think we exist to secure the business environment.

Hard news: cyber security is **not** a **business top priority**, **and it shouldn't be**. Cyber threats manifest as business risks the same way natural hazards do, and service outages do. And like the hospital emergency department, they need to be prioritised and triaged. Taking a everything is priority stance, makes nothing a priority.

Make it clear that you understand the business priorities, their top 3 business critical functions and ensure those work. Make conversations about solving their problems, rather than your own background. Business outcomes, not product features. Where does your solution or service fit into the wider business context? Most of us are technical with a different area of speciality, hence why we work as a team. But we should all be facing the same way, working on the same problem or outcome.

So, what's the alternative that we can ask folks? What are you trying to do? What's most important? What has to happen? What does success look like?

Passion is temporary, curiosity is infinite...





- NEIL DEGTZASSE TYSON





Innovation isn't about playing it safe. It's about embracing uncertainty and thriving on the unfamiliar. **Do best what you know least.**

Curiosity is the spark that ignites innovation. It's the driving force behind some of the world's most game-changing ideas and inventions. Children are naturally curious and innovative. They question everything around them, play mind-boggling games and bombard their parents with tough questions. They experiment, try new things and never stop learning. But as we grow up, we become more risk-averse and less willing to experiment. **We become focused on the outcome** rather than the process, which limits our ability to think creatively.

In a recent Harris Poll of US Workers, only 22% described themselves as curious at work, while 66% reported barriers to asking more questions and only 12% felt their employer is extremely encouraging of curiosity.

To innovate, we need to start questioning everything around us. Innovation isn't only about creating something from scratch; it's about improving current processes and seeing old problems with fresh eyes.



- 1. Stay curious
- 2. Embrace failure
- 3. Surround yourself with curious people
- 4. Stay informed
- 5. Take risks





So how do we create a more curious culture in cyber security? It takes a willingness to be personally vulnerable in front of others, it takes vulnerable leadership and it takes courage to participate in uncomfortable conversations where we might learn.

Curiosity is contagious. Surround yourself with people who are also curious and innovative. This will inspire and motivate you to keep pushing the boundaries.

Innovation requires taking risks. Don't hesitate to step out of your comfort zone and try something new. This means you need to know what your personal risk appetite is. If a tour guide asks you to stand 2m back from the cliff edge, how far back do you stand? 5m, 2m or 1m?

This is directly relevant to the cyber security advice you dish out! It is biased by your personal risk zones.

Embracing curiosity is the key to developing innovation skills. It's what separates successful innovators from the rest. By questioning everything around us and exploring new ideas, we can identify problems that others have overlooked.

Cyber Theatre: Ask Questions!

A cyber program without defined threats and risks is a waste of money.

Questions to ask:

- What is your vision? Why would business care?
- If you can only do 2 things, what would you do?
- What features in my products should I not use?
- What will move the dial the most?
- Which business opportunity does this open up?
- What are my acceptable risk tolerances?
- Is this more likely than being struck by lightning?





We're getting to the fun bit now! Let's start asking questions of current cyber advice out there...

If folks aren't familiar with Bob Lord and hacklore – do yourselves a favour and follow him.

As Bob says, when we tell people to worry about attacks that do not happen in the wild, we end up not protecting them from those that do!

You are technically correct







Most security advice is technically correct – and completely wrong for your organisation.





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Think theoretical cyber security versus applied cyber security.

Governments (and consultants) typically product risk-adverse cybersecurity advice.

This is appropriate for government.

But most businesses are risk-exploitative.

Even worse, the advice is often coming from folks with zero practical experience with **running** *business* IT systems.

The best advice usually comes from the folks that started in the service desk and have a lived understanding of adoption costs, user friction and realised risk.

Too often the lack of specific technical knowledge is used to gatekeep cybersecurity. But we need far less technically correct knowledge and far more curiosity asking the right questions.



"Sophisticated attack breaks security assurances of the most popular FIDO key" is technically correct.


Technically interesting? Absolutely! Relevant to your organisation's security? No.

Yubikeys are not quite as secure against cloning attacks via physical access as we previously thought.

But did those particular security assurances matter?

The standard Yubikey was never resistant to physical access. You literally just tap it to use it.

And the FIDO standard includes a monotonic counter to detect cloning.



Educating users is the first aid of cybersecurity. It stems the bleeding to give us time to find and address the root cause.

Unfortunately, sometimes we forget to rip the band-aid off, and sometimes the band-aid was only applied to make the child feel better rather than for any actual necessity.

General users will always choose convenience before security. And this is right. If you only get 20mins a year to educate a user, are you going to spend it telling them not to use public WiFi or is there a more probable threat you could help them guard against?


The public WiFi risk was unencrypted sensitive data (especially passwords) – and it was not limited to public WiFi.

The internet is literally a network of untrusted networks.

Google solved this via their HTTPS Everywhere initiative. Everything that matters is now encrypted.

Today the choice is one of user convenience – not security.

Juice jacking – never seen in the wild and mitigated by vendors.




Failing to patch is the proximate cause not the root cause. It's also blaming the victims. It was useful in 2015 when we had a browser exploitation epidemic and we needed to stem the bleeding. Google solved that for us – yet we're still being told to patch even faster. The "patch everything even faster" advice had been soundly debunked as cost ineffective. Folks should just keep calm and patch at the cadence appropriate for their desired risk posture. It is pure security theatre in 2024.

The primary exploitation threat since 2020 has been network edge devices – and patching is not the best advice here.

Instead of patch asap - GET IT OFF THE INTERNET. It will save you heartache and hours of effort not having to patch future urgent updates.

Only public-facing services need to be on the discoverable internet. For employee-facing services, like VPNs, there are modern alternatives – WireGuard, ZNTA even IPv6.

The artificial urgency in this routine advice reduces the impact of alerts with true urgency, contributes to staff burnout, and pulls resources away from activities that actually reduce risk.



Folks are so focussed on being technically correct about the strongest passwords that they are missing that **NIST's primary advice is to not use passwords at all!**

Letting users pick passwords is like letting users choose which padlock will secure your business's door - and users always correctly optimise for their convenience.

Large organisations should be passwordless and SSO where possible – and a password manager otherwise.

Small organisation and individuals should use your browser to chooses unique passwords (or passkeys) for you and sync between your devices.

And don't turn on MFA wherever possible – **just wherever it matters**. So, banking and email.

Recommending password managers instead of browsers to individuals is letting perfection get in the way of progress.

The implementation cost is **much** higher and the additional security benefits do not meaningfully change the risk.



Let's looks at some recent password stealer advice.

Buried at the end there 2 pages of mitigation advice – 9 items. All of it is technically correct.

The ASX100 might need that depth of advice – but they also have in-house expertise. So, who is the audience? <statistics on next slide>

Remote access is convenient, but risky. But not having remote access is also risky! It's a business risk.

What is **your** organisation's risk tolerance for each service?

Assume breach \rightarrow and that all passwords are eventually public knowledge.

So, if your user passwords are public knowledge, ask yourself what needs to be true for remote access risk to be acceptable for your business.

Scale:

Hidden Link – Password – 2FA – pMFA – MAM (←BYOD)//(Managed→) MDM – Onsite – Onsite with 10ft fence.

Australian Business Breakdown

Number of employees	Number of businesses	% of total businesses
Small business (0-19 employees)	2,589,595	97.2%
Medium business (20-199 employees)	68,214	2.6%
Large business (200+ employees)	5,189	0.2%
Total	2,662,998	100.0%






97.2% of Australian businesses have fewer than 20 employees and 99.8% fewer than 200 employees.

So, what is the right advice for these businesses?

They are unlikely to have internal IT support, probably not even an MSP and without the skills to interpret how most Govt advisories alter their business "solvency"?



There were two concurrent outages – OT and IT.

Companies often have contingencies for IT outages, but your OT is literally your business operations.

The primary impact per the reporting – hospitals, airports and payment systems – was the OT outage, not the IT outage.


And the root cause was (automatic) updates on OT. Staged automatic updates are still automatic updates.

How did automatic updates end up on your OT? It was running Windows and Windows always needs EDR, doesn't it?

Where do we need EDR? What is the best value for EDR deployment? Where is it least value? Can I save money and use it on something else?


If Microsoft's proposed Safe Deployment Practices for Endpoint Security policy was in place last month, would it have prevented the outage?

Probably not. CrowdStrike would have passed Microsoft's (paper based) review with flying colours.



14 questions for **everyone** to demand high software quality. Cut down from 77 questions in the Software Acquisition Guide for Government Enterprise Consumers.

But does the quality of this software matter to me? Higher quality means higher price. Don't I want fit-for-purpose quality?



Before demanding quality start by asking some questions to determine how much quality you need.

Is it internet exposed? Is it running as root? Does it handle untrusted data? Does it handle sensitive data? Can I segment or sandbox it?

After Volt Typhoon, Microsoft was pressured into offering 6 months of security audit logs for "free". *not actually free.

Cost driven up for folks that will never use these logs.

Access to audit logs should be free, but log retention should be cost recovered.

We should demand software quality where it matters.

We should patch where it matters.

We should MFA where it matters.



Our annual reminder that the Essential Eight was defined in the **most recent** update to ASD's Strategies to Mitigate Cyber Security Incidents.

This update was published in February **2017** when the primary threat was internet to the desktop.

The recent updates to the Essential Eight **Maturity Model** have tweaked the method but not the substance of the advice.

Is the Essential Eight right for my organisation?


What portion of contemporary tradecraft does it still cover?

How many incidents did ASD respond to last year involved Unpatched User Applications, Unhardened User Applications or Office Macros?

Is patching my legacy edge devices even feasible? Or do I need modern equivalents that are segmented?



Our previous suggested updates to the Essential Eight based on an analysis of the 2023 ACSC Threat Report and major contemperory incidents.



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- 2. You can be technically correct and wrong.
- 3. Curiosity is more powerful and useful than being technical and harder to develop
- 4. Stop asking are you Technical and ask more open questions that drive business innovation.
- 5. Understand your business priorities better than the CEO and craft your strategy to deliver these. Not to secure all the things that probably won't happen. Let your execs travel and use public wifi!

Hopefully, we've left you with some questions you can ask the next time you see an all-important critical advisory promoting immediate action.

Remember, you just need to swim faster than your neighbour;)