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# **Implementation of Intrusion Detection System in Tensorflow**

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## **Abstract**

The increasing number of cyber threats in industrial environments has prompted pioneers to search for security solutions that can protect and prevent industries from significant monetary loss and brand erosion.

The cyber attacks on Davis-Besse Power Station in January, 2003 and on Iranian Nuclear Plant in December, 2010 has turned industries into finding new and effective ways to tackle cyber security threats in industrial automation. According to Kaspersky lab “Every month, an average of one industrial computer in five (20.1%) is attacked by malware.”[1]

With the rapid adaption and expansion of artificial neural networks for various information and data processing, it is imminent that it will find its use in tackling cyber security. As artificial neural networks are becoming powerful day by day, its power can be harnessed to find the anomalies in industrial network traffic.

Stacked Autoencoder and Deep Belief Networks are such artificial neural network which are used for unsupervised learning. A Stacked Autoencoder and Deep Belief Network are multi-layer deep artificial neural networks (DNNs). DNNs are multiple layer architecture which extracts inherent features in data and discover important hidden structure in diverse data sets. This makes them suitable for classification tasks.

In this project Stacked Autoencoder and Deep Belief Network were created using Tensorflow, Google’s open-source software library for Machine Intelligence. The NSL-KDD dataset was used as it solved some of inherent problems of the KDD’99 dataset. Greedy layer-wise training approach was applied to train our models. Different learning parameters such as different activation functions, different optimizers and variables batch size were also used, there is a command line interface where anyone can tweak these and many more parameters to get optimum results.

# Chapter 1

## Introduction

With the exponential increase in computer network usage and the increasing number of devices getting connected to a network, it is of great importance that they are operated securely. All computer networks suffers from one of many security flaws, the recent “Wannacry Ransomware” took cyber security industry by storm. Though there was a fix for that security loophole, organizations were slow on applying the security patches, this behaviour of the organization can be because of organizational heirarchial structure, to increase monetry profit or in some cases the machine is operating a critical infrastructure. Therefore, Intrusion Detection System’s (IDS) role is becoming important in tackling cyber security.

### 1.1 Intrusion Detection System

Intrusion detection system can be compared with a burglar alarm [2]. For example the alarm system at a house is to protect a house. If somebody who is not authorized to enter the house gets in, it is the burglar alarm that detects and informs the owner of the intrusion in the house or if need be it locks the house. Intrusion detection system in a similar way compliments the firewall security. The firewall protects institution from malicious attacks and it is the job of the Intrusion detection system if someone bypasses the firewall and try to break into or tries to access the system it alerts the network administrator in case of security breach.

However, Firewalls do a great job of filtering out the unwanted incoming traffic into the industrial or institutional network but there may be some cases where external users can connect to the Intranet by dialling in through a modem installed in the private network of the organization.[2] This kind of access would not be detected by a firewall. Although Firewalls can be very helpful in repelling intrusions, but they cannot offer any protection against sabotage as the attacker already has trusted access to the company’s network and resources. Also hardware firewalls require to be purchased and installed for each network node, which can go very costly.

So, an Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) has more benefits from a firewall as it monitors and analyses the network traffic and checks it for anomalies and abnormalities

in the network. If it finds any it creates an alert in the system or informs the system administrator of the attacks whether it is originating from outside and also has the ability to check if the system misuse or attacks are originating from inside the organization.

The attacks may be of various types and the system should be able to predict and identify the attacks accurately, without giving false positives, hence the accuracy of the system becomes more important.

## **1.2 Classification of Intrusion Detection System**

### **1.2.1 Network Intrusion Detection System**

Network Intrusion Detection System (NIDS) are placed at particularly defined places within the network to monitor the traffic going in and out of all devices in the network. NIDS are mostly passive devices that monitor the on-going network activity without adding significant overhead or interfering with the network operations. They are easy to install and are secure against attack and may even be undetectable to attackers; they also require little effort to install and use on existing networks. Ideally it would scan all inbound and outbound traffic; however, doing so might create a bottleneck that would impair the overall speed of the network.

### **1.2.2 Host based Intrusion Detection System**

Host based Intrusion Detection System (HIDS) runs on individual hosts or devices on the network. A HIDS monitors the incoming and outgoing packets from the device only and will alert the user or administrator of suspicious activity detected. The suspicious activities are based on the type detection technique employed. For example, audit analysis technique is able to identify the activities related to operating-system-level intrusion and application-level intrusions.

## **1.3 Advantages of Network Based Intrusion Detection System**

1. Low Cost of Ownership
2. Easier to deploy
3. Detect network based attacks
4. Retaining evidence
5. Real Time detection and quick response
6. Detection of failed attacks

## **1.4 Advantages of Host Based Intrusion Detection System**

1. Verifies success or failure of an attack
2. Monitor System Activities
3. Detects attacks that network based IDS fails to detect
4. Near real time detection and response
5. Does not require additional hardware
6. Low entry cost

## **1.5 Limitations of Intrusion Detection Systems**

Although IDS are very powerful these systems also suffer from many limitations. Noise such as bad packets generated from software bugs, corrupted DNS data can create false alarms [3]. Outdated expired software versions are generally the target of the attackers, hence a constantly updated signature database has to be maintained in order to tackle these threats [3]. Also for signature based Intrusion Detection system there is a delay between a new threat detected and the signature being recorded in the database, this can make IDS vulnerable.

Taking authentication and identity confirming mechanism into consideration, IDS are helpless against weak authentication when an attacker gains access. A weakness in the network protocol also makes IDS vulnerable. Encrypted packets are not processed by the IDS and this makes it easy for an attacker to send in encrypted packets and gain access to the system. As NIDS analyse the same network protocol as the attacker uses to attack the system, NIDS on its own can become vulnerable and susceptible to such attacks. [4]

# Chapter 2

## Tensorflow

### 2.1 Introduction

Tensorflow is an interface for expressing machine learning algorithms and an implementation for executing such algorithms. A computation expressed using Tensorflow can be expressed with little or no changes on wide variety of heterogeneous systems [10].

The Google's Brain project built DistBelief, the first-generation scalable distributed training and inference system. With all the understanding and DistBelief as its core, Google's Brain Team built Tensorflow the second generation of machine learning library. Google and other Alphabet companies have deployed DistBelief and Tensorflow into many of Google's products including Google's search [11], Google's Advertising Production, Google's Speech Recognition, Maps, Photos and many more.

Tensorflow is highly scaleable and can be mapped on many devices and platform ranging from Android and iOS to large scale system consisting of multi-cpu and multi-gpu configurations. For scaling neural network training to larger deployment, Tensorflow allows parallelism through replication and parallel execution of core model with different computational devices all collaborating to update a set of shared parameters or other states. Modest changes in the description of the computation allows a wide variety of different approaches to parallelism with low effort. Some uses of Tensorflow allows some flexibility in terms of the consistency of parameters updates and we can easily express and take advantage of these relaxed synchronization requirements in some of large deployments.

A computation model in Tensorflow is called a *graph*, which in turn composes of set of *nodes*. The graph represents the flow of computation with extension for allowing some kind of nodes to maintain and update its states. Tensorflow supports two front end languages C++ and Python to construct these graphs.

## 2.2 Graph Construction and Basic Programming Concept

As mentioned in section 2.1 a Tensorflow model consists of a *graph* which is composed of *nodes*. These *nodes* has zero or more inputs and zero or more outputs. Values that flow along the edges are called *tensors*. They are nothing but arbitrary dimensional arrays.

### 2.2.1 Operations, Kernels, Variables, and Sessions

#### Operations and Kernels

An operation in its simplest of meaning is calculation of inputs to form output. In Tensorflow, calculation such as “matrix multiplication” or “addition” are operations. An *operation* in Tensorflow has name and attributes which have to be provided at the time of graph construction.

A *kernel* is a particular implementation of an operation that can be run on a particular type of devices like CPU or GPU.

#### Variables

A computation graph is executed many times for a single model, most tensors do not have a persistent state and loses its state after a single execution. Hence, *Variable* which are persistent, mutable handles for storing tensors.

#### Session

A user interact with Tensorflow system by creating a *Session* which creates the computation graph. One primary operation supported by *Session* is *Run* which takes set of output names that needed to be computed, as well as an a set of tensors to be fed to the computational graph and operations are performed accordingly.

### 2.2.2 Tensor

A tensor as mentioned above, is an multidimensional array. Tensorflow supports variety of tensor elements including signed and unsigned integers ranging from 8bits to 64bits.



# Chapter 3

## Deep Neural Networks

### 3.1 Introduction

A Deep Neural Network (DNN) is an Artificial Neural Network (ANN) with multiple hidden layers, input and output layer. Similar to other ANNs, DNNs can model complex non-linear relationships. Because each hidden layers computes a non-linear transformation of previous layer, a DNN can have significantly greater power of representation. DNNs are typically feedforward networks in which data flows from the input layer to the output layer without looping back. However, recurrent neural networks, in which data can flow in any direction, are also used, especially long short-term memory, for applications such as language modeling. Convolutional deep neural networks (CNNs) are used in computer vision.

### 3.2 Artificial Neural Network

An Artificial Neural Network (ANN) are information processing units that are inspired by the way a human nervous system, such as brain, process information. As human brain processes information and takes decision, these models are designed to do the same. Human brain learns from its day to day experience, these ANN try and replicate the learning process, which makes them suitable for some of the unsolvable and resource hungry task. The key element of these neural networks is a Neuron, this neuron is responsible for all the mathematical operations that are performed such as summation, multiplication etc. When these neurons are highly interconnected in large numbers, they work in unison to solve parts of a bigger problem.

ANNs, like human beings learn by examples. An ANN is configured for a specific task or application. These task varies from patten recognition in computer-aided diagnosis, speech recognition to classification of data such as text into various categories. Today ANNs find its use in variety of applications, Google's search are optimized by these neural networks, Facebook's predictive algorithm in news feeds to Amazon's virtual assistant Alexa.

Neural Network with their ability to derive meaning from complicated and huge data, that would have been otherwise impossible for either humans or other computer techniques, is what makes it powerful tool. Other advantages include Adaptive Learning, Self Organization, and Fault Tolerance.

An artificial neuron is the building block of an ANN. Every input is multiplied with random weights so that the inputs are weighted. These weighted inputs are then summed up with biases and passed through a transfer function and then the net input is passed through the activation function as shown in the figure 1




Figure 1: Structure of Artificial Neuron

Although the structure and computation of a single artificial neuron looks simple and easy, but its full potential and power of calculation is realized when they are interconnected and made into an artificial neural network as show in figure 2

These artificial neural networks are interconnections of artificial neurons, however these neurons can not be connected however we want. There are predefined architectures and topologies which make them more beneficial to use. These architectures are very effective in numerous tasks and can solve problems quickly and effectively. Once we know the type of problem we need to solve, then we can select appropriate architecture or topology for the artificial neural network and run our model.

Once the appropriate topology is selected, then we are ready to train our model. Just like a human brain which learns its responses from the inputs from all the sensory organs, for an artificial neural network to do whatever its intended to do it requires training. There are two phases of training, one is pre-training and another is fine tuning phase. As ANN is successful in solving the problems we have provided, then it can be used for solving the problem we intended. Artificial neural networks are used in the fields of chemistry, medicine, banking, stock market. It can also solve problems like facial recognition, time-series prediction, regression analysis, pattern recognition.




Figure 2: Structure of Artificial Neural Network

### 3.3 Artificial Neural Networks: Types

As we know the building block of Artificial Neural Network (ANN) is the artificial neuron, and when we have more than two artificial neurons working together, we have an artificial neural network. A single neuron is not powerful enough to solve big complex real world problems, but when they are put together in a specified topology or architecture they can be very handy in solving the same task a single neuron fails to perform. Advantage of artificial neural network is that these neurons can process data in distributed way, in parallelly, non-linearly and locally.

The ways in which these neurons are connected is what makes them so powerful. There are basically two main topologies in which these neurons are connected.




Figure 3: Feed Forward and Recurrent Neural Network

As we can see from the figure 3 that in feed forward neural network the flow of information is only in one direction that is from inputs to the outputs wherein in the recurrent neural network the information flows in many possible directions as show in the figure 3

There are other neural networks as follows

- Convolutional Neural Networks
- Long sort-term memory
- Deep Belief Networks
- Stacked Auto-encoders
- Hopfield Neural Networks
- Elman and Jordan Artificial Neural Networks
- Generative Adversarial Networks
- Boltzmann and Restricted Boltzmann Machines

### 3.4 Training A Deep Neural Network

Training a neural network *Deep or Shallow* requires some parameters to be set. These parameters are important in a way that it determines the way a neural network will be producing results. Once the structure of the network is decided that is how many layers would be needed for that specific task and what will be the number of neurons in each layer, will you be needing a shallow or a deep network. After the structure of the neural network is decided upon then it has to be decide what *activation function* is to be used, what will be the learning algorithm to be used, how many epochs will be needed, what kind of learning will be needed, will it be supervised, unsupervised or reinforcement learning. These parameters will decide what kind of output will it be producing.

#### 3.4.1 Supervised Learning

Supervised Learning is similar to how a human brain learns. Inputs and corresponding outputs are given to the network, this makes it easy for the network to classify or recognize the inputs as they are, then a new set of inputs are given to the network which the network has never seen before and its told to recognize based on the previous learning. Initially the weights are randomly selected and the neural network then maps the inputs and compares the corresponding outputs to the given labels or targets. Based on the comparison an error signal is generated, ideally the error signal is zero if the outputs are equal or similar to the inputs given, this error signal is then back propagated to the network. System then fine- tunes its weights according to the error signal and optimize the error to make it more accurate. The repetitive process minimises the error signal to a point where it is within our error tolerance level. Figure 4 shows how the error calculated at the end is back propagated to the network.

Some of the supervised learning algorithms are listed below

- Perceptron Learning
- Back-propagation
- Newton Method
- Grossberg Learning




Figure 4: Supervised Learning

### 3.4.2 Unsupervised Learning

Contrary to supervised learning, in unsupervised learning only inputs are provided and no outputs are provided. Input data is then grouped together and the network is trained on the features decided by the model itself. It learns the hidden structure and representation of the data. Many approaches use unsupervised learning, some of them include clustering, where dataset given is to be clustered or grouped together based on their similarities. In artificial neural networks Generative adversarial networks (GAN) use unsupervised learning, implemented by a system of two neural networks competing against each other in a zero-sum game framework[7].

An example of unsupervised learning is clustering, in the figure 5 *k-means* clustering is seen where  $k=2$ , hence the data is clustered into two different clusters based on their structure.

Unsupervised learning approaches include

- Clustering
- Generative Adversarial Networks(GAN)
- Hebbian Learning




Figure 5: Unsupervised Learning

### 3.4.3 Reinforcement Learning

Reinforcement learning is inspired by behaviourist psychology. As the name suggest it reinforces itself to maximize the performance of the network. Reinforcement learning is different from other learning in a sense that in reinforcement learning we do not provide pair of input and output data, rather an agent takes an action in an environment which is then interpreted by an interpreter or critic which then rewards the agent accordingly and this feedback is then analysed and agent improves its performance in accordance to the reward.




Figure 6: Reinforcement Learning

### 3.4.4 Activation Functions

Activation function in a neural network can be described as a function which transfers or translates the input signal to output signal. Comparing it to electrical circuit an activation function is one which can be “ON” (1) or “OFF” (0) depending on the input it receives. As the artificial neurons are inspired by the biological neuron, the activation function in biological form is either the neuron is firing or not.

Activation functions are selected for a specific application and are highly application dependent. There are many applications which needs classification and there are many application which require prediction, hence the properties of different activations are used in different applications. The most common activation functions with its properties are listed below. However we have used only four of the activation functions namely *Sigmoid Activation*, *ReLU activation*, *eLU activation*, *Softplus activation* and in all the models the last layer of the model has *Softmax activation*.

#### Sigmoid Activation Function

Sigmoid is one of the most common activation function used in neural networks. This function is widely used because its easy to calculate their derivatives, which makes weights calculation very easy in some cases. Sigmoid activation has the vanishing gradient problem.

$$S(x) = \frac{1}{1 + e^{-x}} \quad (1)$$




Figure 7: Sigmoid Activation Function

### Step Function

Step function was used in perception. The output is certain value, if the sum of the inputs is above or below a certain threshold. These kind of activation functions were used in case of binary classification. In other words, if there are only two classes to classify we can use this activation function.

$$f(x) = \begin{cases} 1 & x \in A \\ 0 & x \notin A \end{cases} \quad (2)$$




Figure 8: Step Activation Function

### Rectified Linear Unit

Rectified Linear Unit function was first introduced by Hahnloser in 2000 [5] with strong biological motivation and justification. This is the most popular activation function from deep neural networks.

$$f(x) = \begin{cases} 0 & x < 0 \\ x & x \geq 0 \end{cases} \quad (3)$$




Figure 9: Rectified Linear Unit Activation Function



### TanH Activation Function

TanH activation function has characteristics similar to sigmoid activation function, its a scaled sigmoid. It is nonlinear in nature, and its gradient is stronger than sigmoid. Deciding on which to use will depend on the application. Like sigmoid, TanH also has the vanishing gradient problem.

$$f(x) = \tanh(x) = \frac{2}{1 + e^{-2x}} - 1 \quad (4)$$




Figure 10: TanH Activation Function

### Exponential Linear Unit

Exponential Linear Unit alleviate the vanishing gradient problem via the identity for positive values. However, Exponential Linear Units have improved learning characteristics compared to the units with other activation functions [6].

$$f(\alpha, x) = \begin{cases} \alpha(e^x - 1) & x < 0 \\ x & x \geq 0 \end{cases} \quad (5)$$

### Softmax Activation Function

Softmax activation function is a generalization of the logistic function, in probability theory the output of the softmax function can be used to represent a categorical distribution, that is a probability distribution over  $X$  possible outcomes. Hence, softmax activation function is used in various multi-class classification in artificial neural networks.

$$f_i(\vec{x}) = \frac{e^{x_i}}{\sum_{j=1}^J e^{x_j}} \forall i=1 \dots J \quad (6)$$

### 3.4.5 Optimization Algorithm

Optimization algorithms in neural networks helps in minimizing or maximize a loss function which is simple a mathematical function dependent on models internal parameter which calculates models inability in computing the target values from the set of predictions. The internal parameters such as weights and biases values of a neural network which plays a major role in training process of the neural network, optimizing algorithm helps in setting the values such that there is practically no difference between the predicted value and the value that was feed to the network.

In this project of ours we have used four different optimizers to minimize the loss function, namely *Adam Optimizer*, *Stochastic Gradient Descent optimizer*, *RMSProp Optimizer*, *Momentum Optimizer*

#### Stochastic Gradient Descent Optimizer

Gradient descent is also called steepest descent. It is used to find the minimum of a function. It is also the popular method in the field of machine learning to find the highest accuracy and to minimize the error rate of a given training set and is used to calculate the minimum error by minimizing the cost function . To find the gradient descent, we need to take some steps which are proportional to the negative of the gradient of the function at a point. And if we take steps which are proportional to the positive gradient it reaches the local maximum of that particular function. This is known as gradient ascent[9].

#### Adam Optimizer

ADAM (Adaptive Moment Optimizer) is an extension to GradientDescent optimizer which is seen these days as a broader option for deep learning applications in case of computer vision and natural language processing. It is used instead of GD to update the weights in the network based on iterations in the training data and is used to calculate the adaptive learning rate for each parameters (weight and bias)[9]. It's an popular algorithm in deep learning and have shown good results combining the properties of both AdaGrad and RMSProp algorithms which could handle the noise problems

#### Momentum Optimizer

It is used to accelerate the learning using SGD. If gradient descent is navigating down a valley with steep sides, it tends to madly oscillate from one valley wall to the other without making much progress down the valley. This is because the largest gradients point up and down the valley walls whereas the gradient along the floor of the valley is quite small. Momentum Optimization attempts to remedy this by keeping track of the prior gradients and if they keep changing direction then damp them, and if the gradients stay in the same direction then reward them. This way the valley wall gradients get

reduced and the valley floor gradient enhanced.[8]

### **RMSProp Optimizer**

It is able to increase or decrease the learning rate which the other optimizer named Adagrad is not able to. In RMSProp overall learning rate will be divided by the square root of the sum of squares of the previous update gradients for a given parameter. The difference is that RMSProp doesn't weight all of the previous update gradients equally, it uses an exponentially weighted moving average of the previous update gradients which means that the old error values doesn't contribute much[9]. In this way this optimizer jumps around the optimum.

## **3.5 Challenges in Training A Deep Neural Network**

Deep Neural Networks are comprised of multiple hidden layers, so many issues can arise while training a DNN. Two most common issues are *Overfitting* and *Computation time*.

DNNs are prone to overfitting because of the added layers of abstraction, which allows them to model rare dependencies in the training data. Regularization method such as weight decay (l2- regularization) or sparsity (l1 regularization) can be applied during the training of the model to combat overfitting[12].

Training a DNN with multiple hidden layers consisting of hundreds of thousands of neurons can be a lengthy and time consuming process. Considering many training parameters such as size, the learning rate, initial weights, biases and trying each and every possible combination can be a time consuming process and may not even be a feasible process[13]. Various tricks such as batch size can speed up the computation process. Use of GPU can also speed up the process.

## **3.6 Stacked Autoencoder**

An autoencoder is a simple artificial neural network first introduced in 1980 by Hinton and the PDP group [14]. Autoencoders are used for unsupervised learning. They were introduced to address the problem of "backpropagation without teacher", by using inputs as teacher [15]. The aim of an autoencoder is to learn a representation of a data. Recently, the autoencoders have become widely popular and used for learning generative models in unsupervised pre-training.

### **3.6.1 Structure**

In its simplest form an autoencoder is a feedforward, non recurrent model. It can be generalized as a network having input layer, output layer and hidden layer or layers. A

stacked autoencoder is nothing but a network we get by stacking hidden layers onto one another and making it a deep architecture. The output layer has same number of nodes as the input layer with the purpose of reconstruction of the inputs. In our case we had to classify the attacks in a network with five class hence in our case there will five neurons in the output layer.

In simplest of the cases, where there is only one hidden layer the mathematical representation of autoencoder will be,

$$y = \sigma(Wx + b) \quad (7)$$

Where:

$y$  : is the output of the network

$\sigma$  : is the activation or the transfer function

$W$  : is the weights values

$x$  : is the values of input signal

$b$  : is the values of bias added




Figure 11: Autoencoder with single hidden layer

### 3.6.2 Types of Autoencoders

The simple autoencoder have some disadvantages, in some cases it was unable to learn the important features effectively. Hence, there was a need for improving the ability of autoencoders to learn the important features and representations for highly accurate results.

#### **Denoising Autoencoders**

When a neural network like autoencoder is trained, its kept in mind that the inputs provided for training purpose are not corrupted. After the training is done and the model is applied to a real world problem there is a possibility that the inputs given to autoencoder are corrupted, this may destabilize the model, and the results may not be robust. In order to tackle this problem, in *Denoising autoencoder* takes partially corrupted inputs in the training phase to recover the uncorrupted inputs.

#### **Sparse Autoencoder**

In *Spares autoencoder*, we have large number of hidden units, more than inputs, by doing so the autoencoder can learn more useful structures and representation of the data. This kind of autoencoder is useful in classification tasks. Also sparsity can be achieved by tweaking the loss function during training (comparing probability distribution of the hidden unit activation with some low desired values) or by manually choosing the strongest hidden activation functions and ignoring the rest refereed to as *k-sparse autoencoders*[16].

### 3.7 Deep Belief Networks

Deep Belief Networks are probabilistic generative models that are composed of multiple layers of stochastic, latent variables. The latent variables are binary units and are often called feature detectors[17]. There is connection between units of different layers but not within the layers. A deep belief network is stacked *Restricted Boltzmann Machines* (RBM), in which each RBM layer communicates with previous and subsequent layer, but the nodes of any single layer don't communicate with each other.

#### 3.7.1 Restricted Boltzmann Machine

A *restricted boltzmann machine*(RBM) is a generative stochastic artificial neural network that can learn a probability distribution over a set of inputs. RBMs were invented by Harmonium by Paul Smolensky in 1986[18]. RBMs have found their uses in dimensionality reduction, classification, collaborative fitting, feature learning and topic modelling[19]. They are variant of Boltzmann Machines, with the restrictions that their neurons must form a bipartite graph, and nodes in same layer have no connection between themselves. In figure 12,  $h$  is the hidden units and  $x$  is the inputs.




Figure 12: Deep Belief Network

#### 3.7.2 Greedy Layer-Wise Training of Neural Networks

As we have seen already seen in section 3.5 that training a deep architecture of neural network is challenging. So the question remains how can we train deep networks? Geoffrey Hilton proposed greedy layer-wise training algorithm to train Deep Belief Networks [20]. The process involves is to train the layers of a network one at a time, suppose we have a deep neural network of four layers, so first we train a network with one hidden layer and after the first layer is trained we save the weights and biases. After the training is done we add a new layer and train again, in the end we save all the weights and biases, then we train the whole neural network with the weight and biases initialized from the saved ones from pre training of each layer.

# Chapter 4

## Evaluation and Results

### 4.1 The Approach

#### 4.1.1 Parameters

##### Learning Rate

*Learning rate* is a training parameter that decides how quickly the weight and biases of the neural network are updated during the learning process. This factor is as important as other because if the learning rate is too high then the problem of *overfitting* arises and if the learning rate is too low then it would not reach the local minima for the decided number of iterations. However, there is no definitive way to know what learning rate should be used, but to do multiple iterations and get the idea of what the learning rate should be.

##### Epochs

One *Epoch* is the one forward and one backward pass of **all** the training examples in a neural network. Suppose we have 10,000 training examples, than one epoch will be feed pass of all the 10,000 training examples and then one backward pass of the same 10,000 training examples, although these examples will be divided into batches.

##### Batch Size

It is the number of training examples in one forward and backward pass. Here test set in NSL-KDD dataset has 22,542 records with 41 features, the representation of which is [22542,41], the batch size we has is 10 so this means it will take [10,41] matrix and feed it to the neural network for forward and backward pass 2254 times in one epoch.

The following attributes were evaluated for all both the models.

### Accuracy

Accuracy is the percentage measure of correctly classified or identified records over the total number of records.

### Precision (P)

Referred as Positive Predictive Value (PPV) defined as the percentage ratio of the number of *True Positive (TP)* records divided by the sum of *True Positive* and *False Positive (FP)* classified records.

$$Precision = \frac{TP}{TP + FP} \quad (8)$$

### Recall (R)

Referred as the TP rate as sensitivity defined as the percentage ratio of number of *True Positive (TP)* records divided by the sum of *True Positive (TP)* and *False Negative (FN)* classified records

$$Recall = \frac{TP}{TP + FN} \quad (9)$$

### F-Measure (F1-Score)

A measure to represent test accuracy defined as the harmonic mean of precision and recall and represents a balance between them.

$$F - Measure = 2 * \frac{P * R}{(P + R)} \quad (10)$$



## 4.2 Data Set Evaluation

There are 3 datasets available to us in NSL-KDD dataset. A generalized neural network need *train data* for training a neural network, *test data* to evaluate the model with different parameters and a *validation set* to validate the training of a model. Here we have all three dataset with their labels set as well.

However, the distribution of the attack types in each are different. In test data set there are total of 22,542 records and in train data set there are 1,25,972 records. The distribution of attack types in both test and train set is shown in 4.1

Attack Types	Number of records in Train Set	Number of records in Test Set
Normal	67342	10003
DoS	45927	7164
Probe	11656	2421
U2R	995	2887
I2R	52	67

Table 4.1: Distribution of records in Test and Train Set

As we can see from the table 4.1 that the attack types are more evenly distributed in test set then in the train set. However, we decided to proceed the unconventional way, that is using *test data* and *validation data* for training and *train data* for testing

## 4.3 Stacked Autoencoder

### 4.3.1 Results

We have implemented stacked autoencoders in three different ways. Doing so will give us a better view on which parameters work well for what configurations. In the following sections, the evaluation of stacked autoencoder in Greedy Layer-Wise pre-training can be found. The evaluation of stacked autoencoder in supervised training with TFlern library can be found in appendix A and results of stacked autoencoder with simple unsupervised training can be found in appendix B.

The settings used to evaluate this model are depicted below, if due to some reason the settings are tweaked then it will be mentioned beforehand.

Parameters	Values
Learning Rate	0.1
Pre-Training Epochs	10
Fine Tuning Epochs	10
Batch Size	100

Table 4.2: Configuration of Autoencoder for Greedy Layer-Wise Pre-Training

### 4.3.2 Adam Optimizer




Figure 13: Accuracy of Adam Optimizer for different activation functions

Figure 13 shows that sigmoid and softplus activation functions have good accuracy compared to ReLU and eLU activation functions. We have also analysed all the attack types correctly predicted by different activation functions as show in table 4.3

Attack Types	Total Samples	Sigmoid	ReLu	eLu	Softplus
Normal	67342	61293	0	64074	67000
DoS	45927	43761	45927	0	40137
Probe	11656	7199	0	41200	0
U2R	995	397	0	0	0
I2R	52	0	0	0	0

Table 4.3: Number of samples correctly identified for Adam Optimizer with different Activation functions

The *Precision*, *Recall* and *F-Measure* scores of the sigmoid activation with adam optimizer is listed below.

### Sigmoid Activation

Attack Type	Precision	Recall	F1-Score
Normal	0.9323	0.9102	0.9211
DoS	0.9317	0.9528	0.9421
Probe	0.6719	0.6176	0.6436
U2R	0.1561	0.3990	0.2244
I2R	0	0	0

Table 4.4: Precision, Recall, and F1 Score of Stacked Autoencoder with Adam Optimizer for Sigmoid Activation

### ReLU Activation

Attack Type	Precision	Recall	F1-Score
Normal	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
DoS	0.3646	1.0000	0.5343
Probe	0.6719	0.6176	0.6436
U2R	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
I2R	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000

Table 4.5: Precision, Recall, and F1 Score of Stacked Autoencoder with Adam Optimizer for ReLU Activation

**eLU Activation**

<b>Attack Type</b>	<b>Precision</b>	<b>Recall</b>	<b>F1-Score</b>
<b>Normal</b>	0.8473	0.9949	0.8790
<b>DoS</b>	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
<b>Probe</b>	0.1155	0.4991	0.1876
<b>U2R</b>	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
<b>I2R</b>	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000

Table 4.6: Precision, Recall, and F1 Score of Stacked Autoencoder with Adam Optimizer for eLU Activation

**Softplus Activation**

<b>Attack Type</b>	<b>Precision</b>	<b>Recall</b>	<b>F1-Score</b>
<b>Normal</b>	0.7873	0.9949	0.8964
<b>DoS</b>	0.9821	0.8739	0.9248
<b>Probe</b>	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
<b>U2R</b>	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
<b>I2R</b>	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000

Table 4.7: Precision, Recall, and F1 Score of Stacked Autoencoder with Adam Optimizer for Softplus Activation

### 4.3.3 RMSProp Optimizer




Figure 14: Accuracy of RMSProp Optimizer for different activation functions

In the table 4.8 we can see that sigmoid activation function has better chances of identifying different classes of attacks

Attack Types	Total Samples	Sigmoid	ReLU	eLu	Softplus
Normal	67342	60465	61945	56884	0
DoS	45927	43699	0	0	45927
Probe	11656	8156	9840	8365	0
U2R	995	662	340	926	0
I2R	52	13	0	0	0

Table 4.8: Number of samples correctly identified for RMSProp Optimizer with different Activation functions

**Sigmoid Activation**

<b>Attack Type</b>	<b>Precision</b>	<b>Recall</b>	<b>F1-Score</b>
<b>Normal</b>	0.9266	0.8979	0.9120
<b>DoS</b>	0.9596	0.9515	0.9555
<b>Probe</b>	0.6807	0.6997	0.6901
<b>U2R</b>	0.2220	0.6653	0.3329
<b>I2R</b>	0.0607	0.2500	0.0977

Table 4.9: Precision, Recall, and F1 Score of Stacked Autoencoder with RMSProp Optimizer for Sigmoid Activation

**ReLU Activation**

<b>Attack Type</b>	<b>Precision</b>	<b>Recall</b>	<b>F1-Score</b>
<b>Normal</b>	0.9010	0.9199	0.9103
<b>DoS</b>	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
<b>Probe</b>	0.1772	0.8442	0.2929
<b>U2R</b>	0.2013	0.3417	0.2534
<b>I2R</b>	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000

Table 4.10: Precision, Recall, and F1 Score of Stacked Autoencoder with RMSProp Optimizer for ReLU Activation

**eLU Activation**

<b>Attack Type</b>	<b>Precision</b>	<b>Recall</b>	<b>F1-Score</b>
<b>Normal</b>	0.9538	0.8447	0.8960
<b>DoS</b>	0.9656	0.9597	0.9627
<b>Probe</b>	0.6481	0.7177	0.6811
<b>U2R</b>	0.1190	0.9307	0.2111
<b>I2R</b>	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000

Table 4.11: Precision, Recall, and F1 Score of Stacked Autoencoder with RMSProp Optimizer for eLU Activation

### Softplus Activation

Attack Type	Precision	Recall	F1-Score
<b>Normal</b>	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
<b>DoS</b>	0.3646	1.0000	0.5343
<b>Probe</b>	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
<b>U2R</b>	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
<b>I2R</b>	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000

Table 4.12: Precision, Recall, and F1 Score of Stacked Autoencoder with RMSProp Optimizer for Softplus Activation

### 4.3.4 Stochastic Gradient Descent Optimizer




Figure 15: Accuracy of Stochastic Gradient Descent Optimizer for different activation functions

The number of records identified by the Stochastic Gradient Descent Optimizer is in table 4.13 and it is clear from that table that *ReLU* and *eLU* activation function works better with Stochastic Gradient Descent Optimizer.

Attack Types	Total Samples	Sigmoid	ReLu	eLu	Softplus
Normal	67342	54189	40123	53659	0
DoS	45927	42080	44038	0	0
Probe	11656	3	1550	6615	0
U2R	995	0	395	317	995
I2R	52	0	1	0	0

Table 4.13: Number of samples correctly identified for Stochastic Gradient Descent Optimizer with different Activation functions

### Sigmoid Activation

Attack Type	Precision	Recall	F1-Score
Normal	0.8429	0.8047	0.8234
DoS	0.6828	0.9162	0.7825
Probe	0.7500	0.0003	0.0005
U2R	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
I2R	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000

Table 4.14: Precision, Recall, and F1 Score of Stacked Autoencoder with Stochastic Gradient Descent Optimizer for Sigmoid Activation

### ReLU Activation

Attack Type	Precision	Recall	F1-Score
Normal	0.9596	0.5958	0.7352
DoS	0.6363	0.9589	0.7649
Probe	0.1980	0.1330	0.1591
U2R	0.0556	0.3970	0.0975
I2R	0.0714	0.0192	0.0303

Table 4.15: Precision, Recall, and F1 Score of Stacked Autoencoder with Stochastic Gradient Descent Optimizer for ReLU Activation



**eLU Activation**

<b>Attack Type</b>	<b>Precision</b>	<b>Recall</b>	<b>F1-Score</b>
<b>Normal</b>	0.7487	0.7968	0.7720
<b>DoS</b>	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
<b>Probe</b>	0.3399	0.5675	0.4252
<b>U2R</b>	0.0627	0.3186	0.1048
<b>I2R</b>	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000

Table 4.16: Precision, Recall, and F1 Score of Stacked Autoencoder with Stochastic Gradient Descent Optimizer for eLU Activation

**Softplus Activation**

<b>Attack Type</b>	<b>Precision</b>	<b>Recall</b>	<b>F1-Score</b>
<b>Normal</b>	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
<b>DoS</b>	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
<b>Probe</b>	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
<b>U2R</b>	0.0079	1.0000	0.0157
<b>I2R</b>	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000

Table 4.17: Precision, Recall, and F1 Score of Stacked Autoencoder with Stochastic Gradient Descent Optimizer for Softplus Activation

### 4.3.5 Momentum Optimizer




Figure 16: Accuracy of Momentum Optimizer for different activation functions

Attack Types	Total Samples	Sigmoid	ReLU	eLu	Softplus
Normal	67342	58606	18267	462	0
DoS	45927	42619	0	44841	0
Probe	11656	5316	0	0	11656
U2R	995	0	380	414	0
I2R	52	0	2	0	0

Table 4.18: Number of samples correctly identified for Momentum Optimizer with different Activation functions

The classification of attacks is not satisfactory with Momentum optimizer, however it was able to identify some records with sigmoid activation function.

The *Precision*, *Recall* and *F-Measure* values for Momentum Optimizer is in the following section.

**Sigmoid Activation**

<b>Attack Type</b>	<b>Precision</b>	<b>Recall</b>	<b>F1-Score</b>
<b>Normal</b>	0.8622	0.8703	0.8662
<b>DoS</b>	0.8232	0.9280	0.8725
<b>Probe</b>	0.8530	0.4561	0.5944
<b>U2R</b>	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
<b>I2R</b>	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000

Table 4.19: Precision, Recall, and F1 Score of Stacked Autoencoder with Momentum Optimizer for Sigmoid Activation

**ReLU Activation**

<b>Attack Type</b>	<b>Precision</b>	<b>Recall</b>	<b>F1-Score</b>
<b>Normal</b>	0.3008	0.2713	0.2853
<b>DoS</b>	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
<b>Probe</b>	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
<b>U2R</b>	0.0071	0.3819	0.0139
<b>I2R</b>	0.0002	0.0385	0.0004

Table 4.20: Precision, Recall, and F1 Score of Stacked Autoencoder with Momentum Optimizer for ReLU Activation

**eLU Activation**

<b>Attack Type</b>	<b>Precision</b>	<b>Recall</b>	<b>F1-Score</b>
<b>Normal</b>	0.7487	0.7968	0.7720
<b>DoS</b>	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
<b>Probe</b>	0.3399	0.5675	0.4252
<b>U2R</b>	0.0627	0.3186	0.1048
<b>I2R</b>	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000

Table 4.21: Precision, Recall, and F1 Score of Stacked Autoencoder with Momentum Optimizer for eLU Activation

**Softplus Activation**

<b>Attack Type</b>	<b>Precision</b>	<b>Recall</b>	<b>F1-Score</b>
<b>Normal</b>	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
<b>DoS</b>	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
<b>Probe</b>	0.0925	1.0000	0.1694
<b>U2R</b>	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
<b>I2R</b>	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000

Table 4.22: Precision, Recall, and F1 Score of Stacked Autoencoder with Momentum Optimizer for Softplus Activation

## 4.4 Deep Belief Network

Deep Belief Networks are made up of stacked Restricted Boltzmann Machine which is explained in 3.7 and 3.7.1

The accuracy different Optimizers on Sigmoid Activation is given in the figure below 17.




Figure 17: Accuracy of Deep Belief Network with different optimizers for Sigmoid activation

The parameters used in evaluation of Deep Belief Network (DBN) are different for pre-training phase and fine tuning phase. The following table depicts the parameters used in both the phases.

Parameters	Pre-Training Phase	Fine Tuning Phase
Activation Function	Sigmoid	Sigmoid
Learning Rate	1.0	0.01
Batch Size	100	10
Number of Epochs	10	30

Table 4.23: Parameters of DBN with Sigmoid Activation

The table 4.24 below shows the number of correctly identified attacks types by different optimizers with Sigmoid Activation functions.

<b>Attack Types</b>	<b>Adam</b>	<b>Mom</b>	<b>RMSProp</b>	<b>SGD</b>
<b>Normal</b>	62141	61473	59991	64251
<b>DoS</b>	43547	44008	43693	41243
<b>Probe</b>	8121	961	7225	0
<b>U2R</b>	101	24	391	0
<b>I2R</b>	0	0	0	0

Table 4.24: Number of samples correctly identified for DBN for different Optimizers with Sigmoid Activation functions

The Precision, Recall, and F-Measure for different optimizers with sigmoid activation function is also evaluated in the following section.

#### **Adam Optimizer**

<b>Attack Type</b>	<b>Precision</b>	<b>Recall</b>	<b>F1-Score</b>
<b>Normal</b>	0.9276	0.9228	0.9252
<b>DoS</b>	0.9561	0.9482	0.9521
<b>Probe</b>	0.6687	0.6967	0.6824
<b>U2R</b>	0.0782	0.1015	0.0883
<b>I2R</b>	0	0	0

Table 4.25: Precision, Recall, and F1 Score of DBN with Adam Optimizer for Sigmoid Activation

#### **Momentum Optimizer**

<b>AttackTypes</b>	<b>Precision</b>	<b>Recall</b>	<b>F1-Score</b>
<b>Normal</b>	0.9295	0.9128	0.9211
<b>DoS</b>	0.7654	0.9582	0.8510
<b>Probe</b>	0.9431	0.0824	0.1516
<b>U2R</b>	0.0182	0.0241	0.0207
<b>I2R</b>	0	0	0

Table 4.26: Precision, Recall, and F1 Score of DBN with Momentum Optimizer for Sigmoid Activation

**RMSProp**

<b>AttackTypes</b>	<b>Precision</b>	<b>Recall</b>	<b>f1-Score</b>
<b>Normal</b>	0.9224	0.8908	0.9063
<b>DoS</b>	0.9026	0.9514	0.9263
<b>Probe</b>	0.8684	0.6199	0.7234
<b>U2R</b>	0.0931	0.3930	0.1505
<b>I2R</b>	0	0	0

Table 4.27: Precision, Recall, and F1 Score of DBN with RMSProp Optimizer for Sigmoid Activation

**Stochastic Gradient Descent Optimizer**

<b>AttackTypes</b>	<b>Precision</b>	<b>Recall</b>	<b>f1-Score</b>
<b>Normal</b>	0.8464	0.9541	0.8970
<b>DoS</b>	0.8239	0.8980	0.8593
<b>Probe</b>	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
<b>U2R</b>	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
<b>I2R</b>	0	0	0

Table 4.28: Precision, Recall, and F1 Score of DBN with RMSProp Optimizer for Sigmoid Activation

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# Appendix A

## Results of Supervised Training of Stacked Autoencoder

We started with the implementation of *stacked autoencoder*. The library we first started implementing *stacked autoencoder* in was **Tflearn**. It is a modular deep learning library built on top of Tensorflow, which is designed to provide higher-level API to Tensorflow in order to provide speed in experimentation.

We had build a model using Tflearn, just like Tensorflow it allows device placement for using multiple CPU/GPU. We started with building the network with input layer to be of 41 neurons as that is the number of input features that NSL-KDD has. Secondly we decided on having three hidden layers with 30, 20 and 10 neurons respectively. The next thing was to identify which activation function to use. We had gone with the most popular *Sigmoid* activation as it is widely popular. So for the three layers we used the *Sigmoid* activation. The final layer or the output layer has five neurons as we have to classify the attacks in five different classes namely, *Normal*, *DoS*, *Probing*, *I2R*, *U2R*, hence we have used 5 neurons in the last layer. The activation function for the last layer is *Softmax*, as stated in section 3.4.4 *Softmax* is used in multi-class classification.

After the network is setup, the next task in hand was to define loss function and optimizer function, a *loss function* will calculate the amount to information or data that is lost in the learning process. *Optimizer* will try and minimize the loss parameter. For the purpose of this model we have used the *categorical cross entropy*, which is square of the difference between the estimated values and the original values.

Parameters	Values
Learning Rate	0.001
Epochs	80
Batch Size	100

Table A.1: Settings used to evaluate stacked autoencoder in tflearn

## A.1 Adam Optimizer




Figure 18: Accuracy of Stacked Autoencoder with Adam optimizer for different activation

Attack Types	Total Samples	Sigmoid	ReLU	eLu	Softplus
<b>Normal</b>	67342	60102	56263	60612	61729
<b>DoS</b>	45927	43823	44161	43631	43759
<b>Probe</b>	11656	7835	7936	7187	7116
<b>U2R</b>	995	482	756	153	145
<b>I2R</b>	52	20	14	21	29

Table A.2: Number of samples correctly identified for Adam Optimizer with different Activation functions

The *Precision*, *Recall* and *F1-Score* measurement are other parameter we analysed for different activation functions.

### A.1.1 Sigmoid Activation

Attack Types	Precision	Recall	F1-score
<b>Normal</b>	0.9337	0.8925	0.9126
<b>DoS</b>	0.9247	0.9542	0.9392
<b>Probe</b>	0.6894	0.6721	0.6806
<b>U2R</b>	0.1762	0.4844	0.2584
<b>I2R</b>	0.1869	0.3846	0.2516

Table A.3: Precision Recall and F1-Score Values of Sigmoid Activation for RMSProp Optimizer

### A.1.2 ReLu Activation

Attack Types	Precision	Recall	F1-score
<b>Normal</b>	0.9291	0.8355	0.8798
<b>DoS</b>	0.9041	0.9615	0.9319
<b>Probe</b>	0.6640	0.6809	0.6723
<b>U2R</b>	0.1843	0.7598	0.2966
<b>I2R</b>	0.0271	0.2692	0.0492

Table A.4: Precision Recall and F1-Score Values of ReLU Activation for Adam Optimizer

### A.1.3 eLu Activation

Attack Types	Precision	Recall	F1-score
<b>Normal</b>	0.9233	0.9001	0.9115
<b>DoS</b>	0.9516	0.9500	0.9508
<b>Probe</b>	0.6343	0.6166	0.6253
<b>U2R</b>	0.0737	0.1538	0.0996
<b>I2R</b>	0.0196	0.4038	0.0374

Table A.5: Precision Recall and F1-Score Values of eLU Activation for Adam Optimizer

### A.1.4 Softplus Activation

Attack Types	Precision	Recall	F1-score
Normal	0.9383	0.9170	0.9275
DoS	0.9524	0.9587	0.9555
Probe	0.7142	0.6999	0.7070
U2R	0.1176	0.1578	0.1348
I2R	0.0223	0.5000	0.0427

Table A.6: Precision Recall and F1-Score Values of Softplus Activation for Adam Optimizer

## A.2 RMSProp Optimizer




Figure 19: Accuracy of Stacked Autoencoder with RMSProp optimizer for different activation

Attack Types	Total Samples	Sigmoid	ReLu	eLu	Softplus
Normal	67342	49217	57898	60346	63140
DoS	45927	43393	43364	43711	43352
Probe	11656	8015	6277	7937	7886
U2R	995	862	912	616	208
I2R	52	0	21	8	0

Table A.7: Number of samples correctly identified for RMSProp Optimizer with different Activation functions

### A.2.1 Sigmoid Activation

Attack Types	Precision	Recall	F1-score
Normal	0.9207	0.7309	0.8149
DoS	0.8268	0.9448	0.8819
Probe	0.7103	0.6876	0.6988
U2R	0.0985	0.8663	0.1769
I2R	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000

Table A.8: Precision Recall and F1-Score Values of Sigmoid Activation for RMSProp Optimizer

### A.2.2 ReLu Activation

Attack Types	Precision	Recall	F1-score
Normal	0.9175	0.8598	0.8877
DoS	0.9217	0.9442	0.9378
Probe	0.6503	0.5385	0.5891
U2R	0.1368	0.9166	0.2380
I2R	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000

Table A.9: Precision Recall and F1-Score Values of ReLU Activation for RMSProp Optimizer

### A.2.3 eLu Activation

Attack Types	Precision	Recall	F1-score
Normal	0.9234	0.8961	0.9096
DoS	0.9605	0.9517	0.9516
Probe	0.6869	0.6809	0.6839
U2R	0.1871	0.6191	0.2878
I2R	0.0299	0.1538	0.0500

Table A.10: Precision Recall and F1-Score Values of eLU Activation for RMSProp Optimizer

### A.2.4 Softplus Activation

Attack Types	Precision	Recall	F1-score
Normal	0.9329	0.9276	0.9352
DoS	0.9302	0.9439	0.9370
Probe	0.7940	0.6766	0.7306
U2R	0.1190	0.9166	0.1517
I2R	0.0000	0.2090	0.0000

Table A.11: Precision Recall and F1-Score Values of Softplus Activation for RMSProp Optimizer

### A.3 Stochastic Gradient Descent Optimizer




Figure 20: Accuracy of Stacked Autoencoder with Stochastic Gradient Descent optimizer for different activation

Attack Types	Total Samples	Sigmoid	ReLU	eLu	Softplus
Normal	67342	61461	67342	59815	59197
DoS	45927	43505	0	42755	43341
Probe	11656	1441	0	7163	8294
U2R	995	430	0	845	562
I2R	52	22	0	0	26

Table A.12: Number of samples correctly identified for Stochastic Gradient Descent Optimizer with different Activation functions



### A.3.1 Sigmoid Activation

Attack Types	Precision	Recall	F1-score
<b>Normal</b>	0.9221	0.9127	0.9174
<b>DoS</b>	0.9611	0.9473	0.9542
<b>Probe</b>	0.6916	0.5985	0.6417
<b>U2R</b>	0.1194	0.4322	0.1871
<b>I2R</b>	0.0601	0.4231	0.1053

Table A.13: Precision Recall and F1-Score Values of Sigmoid Activation for Stochastic Gradient Descent Optimizer

### A.3.2 ReLU Activation

Attack Types	Precision	Recall	F1-score
<b>Normal</b>	0.5346	1.0000	0.6967
<b>DoS</b>	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
<b>Probe</b>	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
<b>U2R</b>	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
<b>I2R</b>	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000

Table A.14: Precision Recall and F1-Score Values of ReLU Activation for Stochastic Gradient Descent Optimizer

### A.3.3 eLu Activation

Attack Types	Precision	Recall	F1-score
<b>Normal</b>	0.9422	0.8882	0.9144
<b>DoS</b>	0.9569	0.9309	0.9437
<b>Probe</b>	0.6208	0.6145	0.6176
<b>U2R</b>	0.1349	0.8492	0.2328
<b>I2R</b>	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000

Table A.15: Precision Recall and F1-Score Values of eLU Activation for Stochastic Gradient Descent Optimizer

### A.3.4 Softplus Activation

Attack Types	Precision	Recall	F1-score
<b>Normal</b>	0.9307	0.8791	0.9042
<b>DoS</b>	0.9684	0.9437	0.9559
<b>Probe</b>	0.5982	0.7116	0.6500
<b>U2R</b>	0.1602	0.5648	0.2496
<b>I2R</b>	0.1074	0.5000	0.1769

Table A.16: Precision Recall and F1-Score Values of Softplus Activation for Stochastic Gradient Descent Optimizer

## A.4 Momentum Optimizer




Figure 21: Accuracy of Stacked Autoencoder with Momentum optimizer for different activation

Attack Types	Total Samples	Sigmoid	ReLu	eLu	Softplus
Normal	67342	67342	60660	59305	43372
DoS	45927	0	43093	43092	43024
Probe	11656	0	6783	7104	8082
U2R	995	0	689	831	396
I2R	52	0	13	9	0

Table A.17: Number of samples correctly identified for Momentum Optimizer with different Activation functions

#### A.4.1 Sigmoid Activation

Attack Types	Precision	Recall	F1-score
Normal	0.5346	1.0000	0.6967
DoS	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Probe	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
U2R	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
I2R	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000

Table A.18: Precision Recall and F1-Score Values of Sigmoid Activation for Momentum Optimizer

#### A.4.2 ReLU Activation

Attack Types	Precision	Recall	F1-score
Normal	0.9345	0.9008	0.9173
DoS	0.9397	0.9383	0.9390
Probe	0.6121	0.5819	0.5966
U2R	0.1692	0.6925	0.2720
I2R	0.2708	0.2500	0.2600

Table A.19: Precision Recall and F1-Score Values of ReLU Activation for Momentum Optimizer

### A.4.3 eLu Activation

Attack Types	Precision	Recall	F1-score
Normal	0.9530	0.8807	0.9154
DoS	0.9075	0.9383	0.9226
Probe	0.6039	0.6095	0.6067
U2R	0.1863	0.8352	0.3046
I2R	0.2812	0.1731	0.2143

Table A.20: Precision Recall and F1-Score Values of eLU Activation for Momentum Optimizer

### A.4.4 Softplus Activation

Attack Types	Precision	Recall	F1-score
Normal	0.9619	0.6441	0.7715
DoS	0.8974	0.9368	0.9167
Probe	0.6199	0.6934	0.6546
U2R	0.0199	0.3980	0.0379
I2R	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000

Table A.21: Precision Recall and F1-Score Values of Softplus Activation for Momentum Optimizer

## Appendix B

### Unsupervised Training Results of Stacked Autoencoder

For unsupervised learning algorithm we have used greedy layer-wise pre-training approach, but we soon realized that for unsupervised training we will need more epochs and hence we bumped the epochs from 80 to 300.

This evaluation uses *validation set* pre-train the model greedy layer-wise, *train set* to train the whole neural network and *test set* to evaluate the with different evaluation parameters.

#### B.1 Adam Optimizer




Figure 22: Accuracy of Stacked Autoencoder with Adam optimizer for different activation, Unsupervised Learning

Attack Types	Total Samples	Sigmoid	ReLu	eLu	Softplus
Normal	10003	9769	9948	9943	9951
DoS	7164	5314	2180	5516	5200
Probe	2421	1491	0	0	0
U2R	2887	215	0	0	0
I2R	67	6	0	0	0

Table B.1: Number of samples correctly identified for Adam Optimizer with different Activation functions, Unsupervised Learning

As we can see that with *Adam Optimizer*, only the *sigmoid activation* was able to classify correctly different attack types, ReLU, eLU, and Softpuls were unable to classify single *Probing*, *U2R* and *I2R* attacks.

### B.1.1 Sigmoid Activation

Attack Types	Precision	Recall	F1-score
Normal	0.6763	0.9766	0.7992
DoS	0.9571	0.7418	0.8553
Probe	0.7986	0.6159	0.6954
U2R	0.3365	0.0745	0.1220
I2R	0.1538	0.0896	0.1132

Table B.2: Precision Recall and F1-Score Values of Sigmoid Activation for Adam Optimizer, Unsupervised Learning

### B.1.2 ReLU Activation

Attack Types	Precision	Recall	F1-score
Normal	0.4934	0.9945	0.6596
DoS	0.9160	0.3034	0.4568
Probe	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
U2R	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
I2R	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000

Table B.3: Precision Recall and F1-Score Values of ReLU Activation for Adam Optimizer, Unsupervised Learning

### B.1.3 eLU Activation

Attack Types	Precision	Recall	F1-score
Normal	0.6170	0.9940	0.7614
DoS	0.8583	0.7700	0.8117
Probe	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
U2R	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
I2R	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000

Table B.4: Precision Recall and F1-Score Values of eLU Activation for Adam Optimizer, Unsupervised Learning

### B.1.4 Softplus Activation

Attack Types	Precision	Recall	F1-score
Normal	0.5814	0.9948	0.7339
DoS	0.8583	0.7259	0.8260
Probe	0.9582	0.0000	0.0000
U2R	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
I2R	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000

Table B.5: Precision Recall and F1-Score Values of Softplus Activation for Adam Optimizer, Unsupervised Learning

## B.2 RMSProp Optimizer




Figure 23: Accuracy of Stacked Autoencoder with RMSProp optimizer for different activation, Unsupervised Learning

Attack Types	Total Samples	Sigmoid	ReLU	eLu	Softplus
<b>Normal</b>	10003	9662	0	10003	9756
<b>DoS</b>	7164	5905	7164	0	4805
<b>Probe</b>	2421	1521	0	0	1497
<b>U2R</b>	2887	205	0	0	0
<b>I2R</b>	67	5	0	0	0

Table B.6: Number of samples correctly identified for RMSProp Optimizer with different Activation functions, Unsupervised Learning

As we can see that with *Adam Optimizer*, only the *sigmoid activation* was able to classify correctly different attack types, ReLU, eLU, and Softpuls were unable to classify single *Probing*, *U2R* and *I2R* attacks.



### B.2.1 Sigmoid Activation

Attack Types	Precision	Recall	F1-score
Normal	0.6763	0.9766	0.7992
DoS	0.9571	0.7418	0.8553
Probe	0.7986	0.6159	0.6954
U2R	0.3365	0.0745	0.1220
I2R	0.1538	0.0896	0.1132

Table B.7: Precision Recall and F1-Score Values of Sigmoid Activation for RMSProp Optimizer, Unsupervised Learning

### B.2.2 ReLU Activation

Attack Types	Precision	Recall	F1-score
Normal	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
DoS	0.3178	1.0000	0.4823
Probe	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
U2R	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
I2R	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000

Table B.8: Precision Recall and F1-Score Values of ReLU Activation for RMSProp Optimizer, Unsupervised Learning

### B.2.3 eLU Activation

Attack Types	Precision	Recall	F1-score
Normal	0.4438	1.0000	0.6148
DoS	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Probe	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
U2R	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
I2R	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000

Table B.9: Precision Recall and F1-Score Values of eLU Activation for RMSProp Optimizer, Unsupervised Learning

### B.2.4 Softplus Activation

Attack Types	Precision	Recall	F1-score
Normal	0.6362	0.9753	0.7701
DoS	0.9850	0.6707	0.7980
Probe	0.6428	0.6183	0.6303
U2R	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
I2R	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000

Table B.10: Precision Recall and F1-Score Values of Softplus Activation for RMSProp Optimizer, Unsupervised Learning

### B.3 Stochastic Gradient Descent Optimizer




Figure 24: Accuracy of Stacked Autoencoder with Stochastic Gradient Descent optimizer for different activation, Unsupervised Learning

Attack Types	Total Samples	Sigmoid	ReLU	eLU	Softplus
Normal	10003	9696	9106	9792	8802
DoS	7164	5392	2714	4524	3078
Probe	2421	1937	0	1136	1071
U2R	2887	0	0	0	0
I2R	67	0	0	0	0

Table B.11: Number of samples correctly identified for Stochastic Gradient Descent Optimizer with different Activation functions, Unsupervised Learning

As we can see that with *Adam Optimizer*, only the *sigmoid activation* was able to classify correctly different attack types, ReLU, eLU, and Softplus were unable to classify single *Probing*, *U2R* and *I2R* attacks.

### B.3.1 Sigmoid Activation

Attack Types	Precision	Recall	F1-score
<b>Normal</b>	0.6663	0.9693	0.7897
<b>DoS</b>	0.9608	0.7527	0.8441
<b>Probe</b>	0.8149	0.8001	0.8074
<b>U2R</b>	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
<b>I2R</b>	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000

Table B.12: Precision Recall and F1-Score Values of Sigmoid Activation for Stochastic Gradient Descent Optimizer, Unsupervised Learning

### B.3.2 ReLU Activation

Attack Types	Precision	Recall	F1-score
<b>Normal</b>	0.4904	0.9103	0.6374
<b>DoS</b>	0.6927	0.3788	0.4898
<b>Probe</b>	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
<b>U2R</b>	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
<b>I2R</b>	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000

Table B.13: Precision Recall and F1-Score Values of ReLU Activation for Stochastic Gradient Descent Optimizer, Unsupervised Learning

### B.3.3 eLU Activation

Attack Types	Precision	Recall	F1-score
<b>Normal</b>	0.6059	0.9789	0.7485
<b>DoS</b>	0.9558	0.6315	0.7605
<b>Probe</b>	0.6940	0.4692	0.5599
<b>U2R</b>	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
<b>I2R</b>	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000

Table B.14: Precision Recall and F1-Score Values of eLU Activation for Stochastic Gradient Descent Optimizer, Unsupervised Learning

### B.3.4 Softplus Activation

Attack Types	Precision	Recall	F1-score
<b>Normal</b>	0.5827	0.8799	0.7011
<b>DoS</b>	0.9716	0.4296	0.5958
<b>Probe</b>	0.2909	0.4424	0.3510
<b>U2R</b>	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
<b>I2R</b>	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000

Table B.15: Precision Recall and F1-Score Values of Softplus Activation for Stochastic Gradient Descent Optimizer, Unsupervised Learning

## B.4 Momentum Optimizer




Figure 25: Accuracy of Stacked Autoencoder with Momentum optimizer for different activation, Unsupervised Learning

Attack Types	Total Samples	Sigmoid	ReLu	eLu	Softplus
Normal	10003	9696	9106	9792	8802
DoS	7164	5392	2714	4524	3078
Probe	2421	1937	0	1136	1071
U2R	2887	0	0	0	0
I2R	67	0	0	0	0

Table B.16: Number of samples correctly identified for Momentum Optimizer with different Activation functions, Unsupervised Learning

As we can see that with *Adam Optimizer*, only the *sigmoid activation* was able to classify correctly different attack types, ReLU, eLU, and Softpuls were unable to classify single *Probing*, *U2R* and *I2R* attacks.

#### B.4.1 Sigmoid Activation

Attack Types	Precision	Recall	F1-score
Normal	0.6663	0.9693	0.7897
DoS	0.9608	0.7527	0.8441
Probe	0.8149	0.8001	0.8074
U2R	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
I2R	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000

Table B.17: Precision Recall and F1-Score Values of Sigmoid Activation for Momentum Optimizer, Unsupervised Learning

#### B.4.2 ReLU Activation

Attack Types	Precision	Recall	F1-score
Normal	0.4904	0.9103	0.6374
DoS	0.6927	0.3788	0.4898
Probe	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
U2R	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
I2R	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000

Table B.18: Precision Recall and F1-Score Values of ReLU Activation for Momentum Optimizer, Unsupervised Learning

### B.4.3 eLU Activation

Attack Types	Precision	Recall	F1-score
Normal	0.6059	0.9789	0.7485
DoS	0.9558	0.6315	0.7605
Probe	0.6940	0.4692	0.5599
U2R	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
I2R	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000

Table B.19: Precision Recall and F1-Score Values of eLU Activation for Momentum Optimizer, Unsupervised Learning

### B.4.4 Softplus Activation

Attack Types	Precision	Recall	F1-score
Normal	0.5827	0.8799	0.7011
DoS	0.9716	0.4296	0.5958
Probe	0.2909	0.4424	0.3510
U2R	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
I2R	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000

Table B.20: Precision Recall and F1-Score Values of Softplus Activation for Momentum Optimizer, Unsupervised Learning