

P = Equined - Erost & E (not energy gain of = probability of success P=OE - Directly incorporate different oH+ (1-0) W H= Handling time temporal dosts into our W = Wasted time estimation of profibability Na -(rentral place forcing) Failure is a risk Marginal Value Theorem (Charnor 1976) - Habitat is heterogeneous landscape with different amounts of food that requires different auts of foraging effort to extract - Optimal Foragings. Organism must forage in the most profitable patch


- A foraging animal should stay in a partch until

the time when the rate of energy gain has

declined to the average rate of energy gain in the habitet

- The 'giving - p time' should vary as a function of the

travel costs



Risk: Do animals gamble - 2 scenatios Ex= 9 x=1 (constant) Blue bird box 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 5x=9 x=1 (risky) Red bird box Ø Ø B Ø B B Ø B B -16 you are Misk-sensitive, these 2 scenarios III risk-insensitive both scenarios are the same are different - When organisms are near stanuation 00 00 tive. they tend to chose ristien risky bird strategies (is they are box, apsey risk seasitive) Energy Energetic ( fot ) state Surplus of forager

Game Theory	oFF atrix
Prisoner's Dilemma  PB  Defect	What stategy
PA Cooperate R	Maximizes Fitness  PAYOFF  R=Reward
Defect T	S= Sucker's Payolo T= temptation payolb
T>R>P>S	P= penishment payobb
NASH Equilibrium: Strategy Wh do better Strategy	by changing their

Fitness as the result of interactions  Beefle population: Large Morph  A  B
Small norph: lower energetic requirements  large morph: † E requirements  Vompetitive advantage against  Small morphs  Reette Z
Beetle Z  A  Beetle Z  A  Beetle Z  Beetle Z  B  B  B  B  B  B  B  B  B  B  B  B  B