

# Side Channels and Fault Injection

# What is a side channel

- Any observable side effect of computation that an attacker could measure and possibly influence.
    - Timing
    - Light
    - Power
    - RF
    - Sound
    - Vibration
    - Heat
- Vulnerable computations:
- Caches
  - Data-dependent algorithms
  - Branch prediction units

# Classic Side Channels: RSA square-and-multiply algorithm


- **Simple power analysis (SPA) attack**
  - Just read the bits off an oscilloscope!
- **Timing attack**
  - More complicated, chosen ciphertext attack

# SPA Intuition: Recursive version of RSA modular exponentiation

RSA Timing/Power Attack

$$c = m^e \pmod{n}$$

$$x^n = \begin{cases} x \cdot (x^2)^{\frac{n-1}{2}}, & \text{if } n \text{ is odd} \\ (x^2)^{\frac{n}{2}}, & \text{if } n \text{ is even.} \end{cases}$$



# SPA in practice: Iterative version of RSA modular exponentiation

- $m = c^d \bmod n$  ( $d$  is  $k$  bits)  
example:  $4^9 = 4^{1001} = (4^8)^1 \times (4^4)^0 \times (4^2)^0 \times (4^1)^1$
- $m = 1$   
while  $d > 0$ 
  - if ( $d$  is odd) // lsb-to-msb
  - $m = (m * c) \bmod n$  // slow
  - shift  $d$  right 1 bit
  - $c = c^2 \bmod n$  // slow

# SPA side channel attack on iterative modexp

- $m = c^d \bmod n$  ( $d$  is  $k$  bits)

$m = 1$

while  $d > 0$

  if ( $d$  is odd)

$m = (m * c) \bmod n$    // extra slow

    shift  $d$  right 1 bit

$c = c^2 \bmod n$            // slow, but less slow

- Intuition: Squaring less slow because = special case of multiplication. Dynamic programming tricks reuse internal computations and use left “shift” operator  $\ll$  for fast doubling that are not applicable to generic multiplication

# Square-and-multiply

- Example:  $4^{13} \bmod 497$
- $4^1 \bmod 497 = 4$ ,  $4^2 \bmod 497 = 16$ ,  $4^4 \bmod 497 = 256$ ,  $4^8 \bmod 497 = 429$

$$13_{10} = 1\textcolor{blue}{1}\textcolor{red}{0}\textcolor{blue}{1}_2, \text{ result} = 4^{1000} * 4^{100} * 4^1$$

- $\text{result} = 429 * 256 * 4 \bmod 497 = 445$

# SPA Exercise: Find the RSA exponent

Note: Red pulses backwards



[https://partners.nytimes.com/library/tech/98/06/  
biztech/articles/22card.html](https://partners.nytimes.com/library/tech/98/06/biztech/articles/22card.html)

<https://www.rambus.com/differential-power-analysis/>



# RSA modexp timing attack


- **Chosen ciphertext** timing attack: recover private RSA exponent  $d$  of  $m = c^d \bmod n$
- Intuition: Trick victim into performing decryptions of chosen ciphertexts, observe time for decryption to reveal MSB of exponent
- Method: Adversary chooses many pathological ciphertexts to illicit unusual behavior and performance of textbook modexp algorithm

# RSA modexp timing attack


- Assume: Modular **multiplication** usually fast, but occasionally a ciphertext causes multiplication to be slower than an entire modular **exponentiation**
- If mult step slow, but total decryption fast, we know the next LSB exponent bit **must** be 0
- If mult step fast, but total decryption slow, the next LSB exponent bit was **probably** 1
- Iterate on each bit of exponent from LSB to MSB (dynamic programming)

# Cache timing attack


- Assume shared bignum library
- Repeatedly:
  - measure access time to shared code
  - flush shared code from cache
  - while modexp is running



# Timing attack on SSH passwords




<https://people.eecs.berkeley.edu/~daw/papers/ssh-use01.pdf>



# Timing attack on SSH passwords

Histogram of the latency of character pairs



# Modem light side channel




Fig. 1. Compromising optical emanations. The lower trace shows the  $\pm 15$  V EIA/TIA-232-E input signal (at 9600 bits/s); the upper trace shows optical emanations intercepted 5 m from the device.

# Acoustic side channel

- Different keys sound different; same keys sound the same
  - Speed up brute force attack
- Printer acoustics reveals printer output
  - 3-D printer acoustics, too

# Data remanence







Figure 4: We loaded a bitmap image into memory on Machine A, then cut power for varying lengths of time. After 5 seconds (left), the image is indistinguishable from the original. It gradually becomes more degraded, as shown after 30 seconds, 60 seconds, and 5 minutes.


# Time and Remanence Decay in SRAM




# Detecting Malware at Power Outlets



- (a) An Apple advertisement from 2009 [6] touts energy-efficiency gains that also happen to reveal keystrokes in power traces.




**(a)** Time-domain plots




**(b)** Spectrogram plots

**Fig. 1:** Time- and frequency-domain plots of several power traces as a MacBook loads two different pages. In the frequency domain, brighter colors represent more energy at a given frequency. Despite the lack of obviously characteristic information in the time domain, the classifier correctly identifies all of the above traces.

“Current Events: Identifying Webpages by Tapping the Electrical Outlet”  
by Clark et al, ESORICS 2013



**(a)** The network activity is correlated with high current consumption, but is not the only cause. Spikes before and after network activity show that local computation dominates the consumption.




**(b)** The system call activity (as measured by DTrace) is also correlated with high current consumption, and our results suggest that systems exercised by system calls are a major cause of consumption.


**Fig. 2:** Time-domain plots as a MacBook loads webpages. Both network activity and system calls appear to correlate with energy consumption.

# Intuition

Embedded



General-purpose



120VAC 15A MAX



PowerGuard

VirtaLabs

VIRTA LABORATORIES, INC.  
HW1.0

VIRTA LABS

# Side channel defenses

- Ciphers with bounded side channel leakage
  - Fixed-time algorithms (no data-dependent delays, branches)

From GnuPG:

```
/* To mitigate the Yarom/Falkner flush+reload cache
 * side-channel attack on the RSA secret exponent, we
 * do the multiplication regardless of the value of
 * the high-bit of E.
...
/* To mitigate the Yarom/Falkner flush+reload cache side-channel
 * attack on the RSA secret exponent, we don't use the square
 * routine but multiplication.
...
```

# Side channel defenses

- TEMPEST fonts

TrustNo1

TrustNo1

# Side channel defenses

- TEMPEST fonts
- Masking and blinding with random nonces
- Differential matching (flip 0 and 1) to mask transitions
- Pre-charging registers and busses to reduce predictable transitions
- Add amplitude or temporal noise

# RF side channel & injection




Fig. 1. Eavesdropping eel-up using a variable oscillator and a frequency divider to restore synchronization. The picture on the TV is picked up from the radiation of the VDU in the background.

# Intentional Electromagnetic Interference (Or Don't Trust Your Sensors)


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**"Ghost Talk: Mitigating EMI Signal Injection Attacks against Analog Sensors"**  
**by Foo Kune et al. In Proc. IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, 2013.**

Joint work with Denis Foo Kune (U. Michigan),  
John Backes (U. Minnesota), Shane Clark (U. Mass Amherst),  
Dr. Dan Kramer (Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center),  
Dr. Matthew Reynolds (Harvard Clinical Research Institute),  
Yongdae Kim (KAIST), Wenyuan Xu (U. South Carolina)

# Inputs may not be trustworthy

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# Many reports of accidental interference

Cellphone  
+  
Oven



New York Times  
Aug 21 2009

Ambulance comm  
+  
Life support system



Armstrong, Hutley  
2007


EMI  
+  
Anti-lock brakes



NASA pub 1374  
1995

# Ghost Talk: Intentional interference


- Conducting traces can couple to EMI (back-door).
- Sensitive analog sensors can be affected.



# The fundamental problem: It's the baseband


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- Baseband: frequency range of desired signals.
- Interference outside the baseband is easy to filter.
- Interference in the baseband is hard to remove.




# Mic and dipole antenna

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


# Microphone interference with USRP



# Operational challenges for intentional EMI


- Transform emitted interference to match circuit.
- Reduce transmission power with high frequency carrier




# Sampler can demodulate signal

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
Induced  
interference



Resulting  
sampled signal



# The cardiac cycle




*American Heart Association, August 2012*

# Experimental setup: Simulators

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Saline bath




Fluoroscope  
(radiation)



Lead  
vests

# Experimental setup: Devices and emitters

Waveform source and amplifier




Transmitting antenna

Programmer head over device

Curved leads


Cardiac device





Transmitting antenna

# Results: Waveforms and responses

Pulsed sinusoid




Modulated heart beat



Ventricular  
pace

Signal  
onset



Signal  
onset

Ventricular  
sense


# Results: Interference distances

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Device	Open air pacing	Open air Defib	Saline tips only	SynDaver
Medtronic Adapta	1.40m	NA	<b>3cm</b>	Untested
Medtronic InSync Sentry	1.57m	1.67m	<b>5cm</b>	<b>8cm</b>
Boston Scientific Cognis	1.34m	No defib	Untested	Untested
St. Jude Promote	0.68m	No defib	Untested	Untested

# GhostTalk on Mobile Phones

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[<http://www.wired.com/2015/10/this-radio-trick-silently-hacks-siri-from-16-feet-away/>]

# “Runs on a Chip”

## How LED Lights Can Cause Problems With Your Garage Door Opener

NOVEMBER 4, 2013 BY TOMMY MELLO

If you've been experiencing problems with your garage door opener remote unit – sometimes it works, sometimes it doesn't – and can't track the problem down, you might look to the type of lights you're using in and around your garage for the culprit.



# “Runs on a Chip”

## Can LED lights interfere with your garage door opener?

By Deni Hawkins | Published: Apr 17, 2014 at 5:39 PM MDT | Last Updated: Apr 17, 2014 at 7:04 PM MDT



NAMPA, Idaho (KBOI) - A local man makes strides to conserve energy, but believes it may have caused problems for him and his neighbors in the process.

# No Worries As Long As No Antenna...

## GSMem: Data Exfiltration from Air-Gapped Computers over GSM Frequencies

Mordechai Guri, Assaf Kachlon, Ofer Hasson, Gabi Kedma, Yisroel Mirsky<sup>1</sup>, Yuval Elovici<sup>1</sup>




Figure 3: A plot of the amplitude of the radio waves emitted from a motherboard with an 800MHz I/O bus using DDR3-1600 RAM. Blue: casual use of the computer. Red: our transmission algorithm while using the dual channel data paths.

USENIX Security 2015

We propose that a computer's memory bus can be exploited to act as an antenna capable of transmitting information wirelessly to a remote location. When data is exchanged between the CPU and the RAM, radio waves are emitted from the bus's long parallel circuits. The emission frequency is loosely wraps around the frequency of the RAM's I/O bus clock with a marginal span of +/-200MHz. The casual use of a computer does not generate these radio waves at significant amplitude, since it requires a major buildup of voltage in the circuitry. Therefore, we have found that by generating a continuous stream of data over the multi-channel memory buses, it is possible to raise the amplitude of the emitted radio waves. Using this observation, we are able to modulate binary data over these carrier waves by deterministically starting and stopping multi-channel transfers using special CPU instructions.

# Z-axis of MEMS gyroscopes

- 8 kHz acoustic tone hits resonant frequency of MEMS gyroscope
- Disturbs PID feedback control
- Drone falls from sky




Figure 8: Propagation of the effect of sound noise

[Son et al., USENIX Security' 15]




Figure 2: Concept of MEMS gyroscope structure for one axis





Figure 3: Operation of a three-axis MEMS gyroscope [10] (the X-, Y-, and Z-axes are defined as the pitch, roll, and yaw, respectively.)

# Acoustic Attacks on MEMS Accelerometers


[“WALNUT” by Trippel et al., IEEE Euro S&P 2017]



[spqr.eecs.umich.edu/  
walnut](http://spqr.eecs.umich.edu/walnut)



# Unintentional Demodulation



**vs.**



Both: Intentional signal  
modulation

**Intentional**  
signal demodulation

**Unintentional**  
signal demodulation

# Acoustic Rickroll

[ [spqr.eecs.umich.edu/walnut](http://spqr.eecs.umich.edu/walnut) ]





# MEMS Sensors

## ■ Micro-Electro-Mechanical Systems


- Accelerometers
- Gyroscopes
- Clocks

## ■ Advantages:

- Low Cost – easy to manufacture
- Low Power – some < 1 mA
- Small Size – integrated circuit



Mechanical\*




Electrical\*

\*Photos courtesy of “Everything about STMicroelectronics’ 3-axis digital MEMS gyroscopes – Technical Report”, by STMicroelectronics.


# Controlling Output

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


# Output Control Modulation


Desired Accelerometer  
Output Signal




+  
MEMS Resonant Frequency  
(Carrier Signal)





=  
Modulated Acoustic  
Attack Signal



**a) Output Control Attack on MIS2DH**



**b) Output Control Attack on MPU6500**



# Randomized Sampling

- Destroy predictability of sampling regime
- Randomize delay at each sampling interval

